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Abstract 
This study examines the intellectual background of the paradoxes of John Donne. In 
the first chapter, the classical foundations of the concept of paradox are detailed. 
These foundations reflect basic philosophical differences which are manifest in a 
writer's approach to the defense of a paradox or uncommon opinion. The first 
chapter also discusses the derivation of classical concepts of paradox by sixteenth-
century writers in an effort to correlate these concepts with the respective 
philosophical positions with which Donne would have been familiar. The second 
chapter focuses on the dialectical procedure of the thesis. Aristotle explicitly 
associated the thesis with paradox, and he delineated its fundamental role in the 
investigation of contested speculative questions. Cicero adapted it to his rhetorical 
theory but continued to observe its essentially dialectical character. In the sixteenth 
century, writers on both rhetoric and logic drew heavily on the works of Aristotle 
and Cicero for their own formulations of the thesis. These formulations reflect 
precisely the relationship which Aristotle and Cicero observed between the paradox 
and the thesis. The third chapter begins by examining the challenge posed by Peter 
Ramus to the Aristotelian dialectic upon which the scholastic curricula of European 
universities was based. Donne's English contemporaries, Gabriel Harvey and 
Thomas Nashe, disagreed on the value of Ramus' innovations, and their comments 
on them in their quarrel reveal an awareness of the profound epistemological 
ramifications of Ramus' denial of the sceptical use of the thesis which Aristotle had 
observed in his Topics. The fourth chapter details those epistemological theories 
which competed with Ramus' neoaristotelianism. The majority of these theories are 
neoplatonic; they exhibit the characteristic features of Platonic Idealism which 
Aristotle had rejected in his Metaphysics, and which would be later rejected by 
Aquinas. Donne was familiar with these neoplatonic alternatives and was not 
wholly unreceptive to them. However, he explicitly denies the value of neoplatonic 
theories of mind for the practical affairs of Christian life, and maintains that the 
doubt implicit in matters to which revelation and reason have not delivered absolute 
precepts insures the viability of paradoxical opinions. The fifth chapter compares 
Donne's Aristotelian notion of paradox with other paradoxes of the sixteenth 
century. Through this comparison, the scholastic foundation of Donne's dialectical 
argumentation is exposed. Once exposed, his characteristic tentativeness with 
regard to the doctrinal differences of his day is understood to be a consequence of 
his Aristotelian and Thomist regard for the difficulty with which reason attains 
knowledge. The sixth chapter examines Donne's paradox and thesis, Biathanatos, in 
light of the Thomist principles which it employs in its exposition of the problem of 
suicide. Throughout Biathanatos Donne criticizes the value of Augustine's moral 
doctrine in practical life, and accepts an epistemological doctrine which 
accomodates doubt and error in the manner detailed by Aquinas and denied by 
Augustine. It is with this doubt and error in mind that Donne's paradox proceeds 
towards its conclusion's request for charitable interpretation, an interpretation which 
is informed specifically by Aquinas' doctrine of charity. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this study is to examine the intellectual tradition which informed 
the Renaissance conception of paradox, and to demonstrate the importance of this 
tradition for the articulation of fundamental epistemological and ethical positions 
relating to the sceptical critique of knowledge and to the problem of the application 
of knowledge in Christian moral life. The paradoxes of John Donne have been 
chosen for special attention not only because they are representative of the 
intellectual tradition with which we are concerned, but also because an 
understanding of this tradition is fundamental to an understanding of the relation of 
his ethical and epistemological views to the general currents of thought in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. There have been many studies of Donne's 
thought which have attempted to reconcile the fallacious argumentation of the 
eleven short paradoxes, which he composed in the early 1590's as a law student at 
Lincoln's Inn, and the apparently serious argumentation of his long paradox 
defending suicide, Biathanatos, which was written about 1607 or 1608. 1 As a 
perusal of the notes of this study will clearly indicate, the opinions expressed in 
these, and related, studies are so numerous and varied that any attempt to engage 
with them individually in the midst of our examination of the primary material 
would undermine the coherent exposition of the central issues concerning this study. 
It is for this reason that the relevant views of other critics and scholars have been 
recorded in notes which detail the main points with which we agree or disagree. 
These notes may be consulted by the reader who would like to learn more about the 
critical debates which surround particular issues treated in this study, but they are 
not necessary for an understanding of the primary material discussed in the body of 
the work. 
The intellectual tradition which is most relevant to the Renaissance 
conception of paradox is the tradition of academic disputation. And the tradition of 
academic disputation, as Donne observes in his ninth paradox, 'That By Discord 
Things Increase', is principally concerned with the treatment of discordant opinions. 
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As we will see by the end of this study, discord could be initiated both as a threat to 
the harmony enjoyed by those united in a common or 'orthodox' opinion, or as a 
means to secure that harmony through a clarification of the contentious issues upon 
which opinion could become divided. In his ninth paradox, Donne prefers to 
characterize discord as a means of clarification. He says, 'We are ascertained of all 
disputable doubts only by arguing and differing in opinion, and if formal disputation 
which is but a painted, counterfeit, and dissembled Discord, can worke us this 
benefit, what shall not a full and maine discord accomplish?,2 Earlier in his essay, 
he had identified discord as the source of his paradoxes. 'Whilst I differ from 
common opinions,' he explains, 'by this discord the number of my Paradoxes 
encreaseth.'3 Donne's description of his paradoxes as views contrary to the common 
opinion places them most obviously in the tradition of Cicero's Paradoxa 
Stoicorum, a collection of six essays in which Cicero defends Stoic ethical tenets 
according to his own principles of rhetorical exposition. Less obviously, but perhaps 
more importantly, by differing from the common opinion, Donne's paradoxes follow 
in the tradition of the thesis, which Aristotle was the first to describe, and which 
continued to form a fundamental part of academic disputation throughout the 
seventeenth century.4 Donne called his defense of suicide (Biathanatos) both a 
paradox and a thesis, and thus made explicit the integral relation between the 
tradition of paradox stemming from Cicero's Paradoxa and the tradition of the thesis 
recorded by Aristotle. 
In Biathanatos, Donne described the function of his serious thesis in much 
the same terms as he had described the function of his youthful paradoxes over a 
decade earlier. He says of the uncommon opinion which he will defend, 'As in the 
pool of Bethsaida there was no health till the water was troubled, so the best way to 
find the truth in this matter was to debate and vex it'. 5 Again, we see that it is by 
discord that Donne intends to clarify the doubts which must be resolved before the 
truth can be found. It is important that we recognize that Donne believed that his 
defense of paradoxes or theses could conduce to a discovery of some obscured truth, 
as such a recognition cannot but expand our understanding of the famous advice of 
his third satire to 'doubt wisely' and' stand inquiring right' .6 The central concern of 
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this satire, as of so much of Donne's intellectual life before his ordination in 1615, is 
with the religious controversies in which the rival opinions of Protestants and 
Catholics were disputed.7 Though Donne may not have thought that all of the issues . 
upon which these sects disagreed could be settled with certainty, he never ceased to 
stress the importance of developing an informed opinion in which one could find the 
security of a rectified conscience. And this informed opinion, we will see, is 
sometimes acquired at the expense of the common opinion, through the proof of a 
paradox, or at the expense of the paradox itself, through the exposure of the 
weakness of the argumentation which recommends it. In a letter accompanying the 
ten paradoxes, which he sent to his friend Henry Wotton in 1600, Donne reminded 
him that the uncommon opinions expressed in them were created to be refuted, and 
should be viewed as practice in the disputation from which informed opinions may 
emerge. He says: 
if they make you to fmd better reasons against them they do there office: for 
they are but swaggerers: quiet enough if you resist them. if perchance they 
be pretyly guilt, that is there best for they are not yet hatcht: they are rather 
alarums to truth to arme her then enemies: and they have only this advantadg 
to scape from being caled ill things that they are nothings: therfore take heed 
of allowing any of them least you make another. 8 
We will see that Aristotelian methods of refutation were part of every university-
educated man's knowledge, and particularly of those, such as Donne, who studied 
law in the Inns of Court after completing their undergraduate course.9 Integral to 
this method is the ability to expose the fallacies hidden in the argumentation of 
sophistical paradoxes such as those which Donne wrote while at Lincoln's Inn. 10 
The thesis of Biathanatos, however, is itself a refutation (that suicide is not always a 
sin), and therefore, will seek to vex the truth by introducing a discord into the debate 
over suicide which genuinely reflects the contentiousness of the issue. 
Not all paradoxes written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were 
intended to affirm the benefits of contention, however. Some paradoxes were 
expressed in the form of paradoxical encomia, and as we will see, did not employ 
logical techniques for the refutation of a thesis. Among these paradoxical encomia, 
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Erasmus' Praise of Folly (1511) was clearly the most influential in the sixteenth 
century. Although it is aptly called a paradox in so far as it praises an object which 
the common opinion would not consider worthy of praise, our failure to recognize 
the paradoxical encomium's essentially rhetorical character will result in a confusion 
of the taxonomic distinctions which Donne and his contemporaries observed with 
respect to the Renaissance paradox. 11 Though both may be called paradoxes, the 
paradoxical encomium is properly composed according to the prescriptions of 
epideictic oratory, while the paradox as a defense of a thesis is composed according 
to the principles of dialectical analysis. It is vital that we distinguish Donne's own 
paradoxes as defenses of theses which participate in the Aristotelian and Ciceronian 
tradition of philosophical inquiry from uncritical paradoxical encomia which only 
loosely deserve to be called paradoxes, such as those we find in the Essayes of 
Certain Paradoxes (1616) written by Donne's friend, William Cornwallis. Three of 
Cornwallis' four essays are entitled praises; only the last 'That it is Good to be in 
Debt' is a paradoxical thesis of the type described by Aristotle and defended by 
Cicero and Donne.12 After composing his praises of Richard the Third, the French 
Pox and Nothing according to the rhetorical criteria for the encomium upon which, 
we will see, Isocrates had insisted in his criticisms of Gorgias' encomium of Helen, 
Cornwallis distinguishes his final essay as a defense of a thesis which, like Donne's 
paradoxes, affirms the benefits of contention. He explains that 'in tender 
commiseration of mankinde, ... [he] will endevour to rectifie their iudgement in a 
Paradox, then which there hath none more intricate, been discussed and canvassed 
among the Stoiks in Zenas porch'. 13 As will see when we examine Isocrates' 
prescriptions for epideictic oratory in relation to the sophistical and paradoxical 
defenses of Gorgias, the generic distinctions drawn there continued to be observed 
by sixteenth-century writers of paradoxical encomia and paradoxes. 
In his Apology for Poetry (1595), Philip Sidney decried the abuses of 
paradoxical encomiasts in similar terms to those which, we will see, Isocrates used 
in his criticisms of the sophists in his Helen. 14 Sidney calls the worse sort of these 
encomiasts 'poet-haters' and declares that 'they do prodigally spend a great many 
wandering words in quips and scoffs, and carping and taunting at each thing which, 
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by stirring the spleen, may stay the brain from a thorough-beholding the worthiness 
of the subject..I5 Although he is careful to recognize that Erasmus' and Cornelius 
Agrippa's paradoxical encomia of ignorance had 'another [morally serious] 
foundation' (a foundation which we will see influenced the moral objective of the 
most popular paradoxist of the sixteenth century, Ortensio Lando), Sidney describes 
the majority of these 'faultfinders' as 'playing wit[s]' whose 'itching 
tongue [ s] ... confute others' knowledge before they can confirm their own' .16 Donne 
will describe those paradoxists who draw upon the learning of renowned scholars 
such as Erasmus and Agrippa in much the same way in his Courtier's Library. He 
explains that in his time 'men move along a middle way, and in their efforts to shun 
the disgrace of ignorance and to save themselves the tedium of reading they all use 
--- one art that they may keep up the appearance of knowing the rest of the arts.' 
'Hence', Donne continues, 'the taste for epitomes and paradoxes and for the itchy 
outbreaks of far-fetched wit.'17 Despite their distaste for these 'itchy' wits, both 
Donne and Sidney agree that an ability to detect the ignorance of these dilettantes is 
the mark of the wise man; as exercises which cultivate this ability, both could 
recommend paradoxical encomia as morally edifying as Erasmus' Praise of Folly 
and paradoxes as logically challenging as Donne's. Just as Sidney observes that 
'good fools' such as we [md in Erasmus' Praise deserve to be laughed at, so Donne 
recognizes, in his seventh paradox, 'That a wise man is knowne by much Laughing', 
that Erasmus' Folly was meant to make her 'beholders laughe.' 18 At the end of his 
paradox, Donne affirms the challenging wit which, once discerned, will 
simultaneously raise the 'alarum to truth' and delight those wise enough to detect its 
fallacies. 'Which promptnes oflaughing is so great in wise men, that I thinke all 
wise men (yf any wise men do read this paradox) will laugh both at it and me.' 19 
The character called 'Paradox' in the Gray's Inn Revels of 1618 was created 
to provoke just this type of wise laughter. As his lineage indicates, he is the 
offspring of three doctrines which the Anglican members of the Inn would have 
considered paradoxical. After declaring that he is 'a meere Greek, a Sophister of 
Athens', he says, 'Know then, my name is Paradox .. .1 am a slip of darkness; my 
father a Jesuit, my mother an Anabaptist ... And Methode breeds my name 
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Paradox. ,20 Paradox's Jesuit father refers to the equivocal arguments with which 
Catholic dissenters in England attempted to elude the inquisitions of their Anglican 
interrogators and to avoid taking the Oath of Allegiance to the English monarch. In 
the fIrst decade of the seventeenth century, Donne assisted the Anglican 
controversialist, Thomas Morton, in the preparation of his arguments against the 
Jesuits, and he would certainly have been familiar with Morton's Apologia 
Catholica (1605), in which the Jesuits' equivocal defenses of their allegiance to the 
Pope are called 'Paradoxa, Haereses, Blasphemiae, [and] Scelera'.21 As we will see 
later in our discussion of his own defense of the Anglican position against the 
Jesuits, Pseudo-Martyr (1610), Donne believed that the source of the paradoxes of 
the Jesuits lay in their willingness to maintain a dangerous uncommon opinion in 
spite of their own recognition of the weakness of the arguments supporting it. The 
mother of the Gray's Inn Paradox, refers to the Puritan disparagement of reason in 
the defense of their own doctrines. As we will see when we examine the neoplatonic 
views of advocates of fIdeism such as Erasmus and Lando, the mystical nature of the 
Christian paradoxes (e.g. the Trinity, the fortunate faU), was asserted as proof 
against the power of the Aristotelian dialectic of the scholastic philosophers to assist 
in the discovery of moral knowledge. As our study proceeds, it will become 
increasingly clear that Donne's paradoxes operate according to this dialectic, and 
therefore, reflect his opposition to the Puritans' own paradox, that Aristotelian 
philosophy is of no use to the Christian. Finally, the 'Methode which breeds' the 
name of Paradox, refers to the dialectical method of Peter Ramus, which he 
introduced as a simplifIcation of what he believed was the corrupt Aristotelian 
dialectic of the schoolmen. As we will see when we examine the details of his 
dispute with the Ramist, Gabriel Harvey, for Thomas Nashe, the method of Ramism 
was as dangerous an innovation to traditional Aristotelian logic as the Jesuits' 
equivocal abuses, and hence, deserved to be called a paradox. As an Anglican, 
Donne had to reject the paradoxes of the Jesuits, the Puritans and the often 
Puritanical Ramists.22 In doing so, however, he was forced to take their arguments 
seriously, and to postpone his derision of their subversive doctrines until he had 
digested the matter thoroughly. As Sidney had advised, Donne would have laughed 
at the 'good fool' satirizing these paradoxes in the Gray's Inn Revels, but only after 
he had judged the strength of their arguments to be weaker than his own against 
them. The wisdom necessary to justify his laughter at these paradoxes is acquired 
only through a sober appraisal of their theses. 
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There is little doubt that Donne would have applied himself soberly to the 
consideration of the twenty-eight theses of Luther's 1518 Heidelberg Disputation. 
Luther's theses, he says, were devised to function as paradoxes (paradoxae) against 
the commonly held theological and philosophical opinions of the Roman church in 
order to determine whether they accorded with the teachings of the two most 
important Christian authorities in his view, St. Paul and St. Augustine.23 Not 
surprisingly, Plato's doctrine ofldeas is preferred to Aristotle's causal explanations 
of intelligibles on the same grounds as we will see Luther's sometime antagonist and 
fellow Augustinian, Erasmus, dismissed Aristotle in favor of Plato in his 
Enchiridion (1503).24 Luther's twenty-ninth and and thirty-sixth theses summarize 
his criticisms of Aristotle and his scholastic proponents. The twenty-ninth reads, 
'Whoever is minded to apply himself to the Aristotelian philosophy without danger 
to his soul must first be made truly foolish in Christ.' The thirty-sixth reads, 
, Aristotle was in the wrong when he reproved and scoffed at Plato's philosophy of 
ideas which is a better philosophy than his own. ,25 In the ninety-seven theses of his 
1517 Disputation against Scholastic Theology, Luther reveals his distrust of the 
Aristotelian syllogistic upon which he and his fellow reformers (e.g. Erasmus, 
Agrippa) maintain the proud rationalist theology of the schoolmen is founded. His 
forty-fifth thesis, he says, is 'against the generally accepted opinion' that 'a 
theologian who is not a logician is a monstrous heretic' , and is therefore a paradox. 
This paradox is followed by others which deny the value of syllogistic argument in 
theological matters. In his forty-seventh thesis, Luther says, 'No syllogistic form is 
valid in reasoning about God', and in his forty-ninth he explains why, 'If the 
syllogistic form were valid in theological thinking, then the trinitarian formula [so 
fundamental to Augustine's theology] would be a matter of knowledge and not 
faith. ,26 
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Although it would be incorrect to call Luther anti-intellectual, his view that it 
is necessary to become 'foolish in Christ' by denying reason the power to discover 
the truths of God's law through the use of Aristotelian syllogistic is an indication 
that his paradoxes will not be acceptable to the common opinion unless that opinion 
enjoys the assistance of God's grace in the cultivation of faith in the mysteries they 
express?7 As we will see, Donne's confidence in the power of syllogism to yield 
reliable, if not certain, conclusions regarding Christian ethics places him in 
opposition to Luther and other reformers who similarly denied the utility of 
Aristotelian logic.28 While Luther could explain the wonder which his paradoxical 
views aroused in those whose syllogistic analyses of his opinions revealed logical 
contradictions by insisting that such wonder is a result of an encounter with the 
inscrutable truth of God's law, Donne continued to trust the power of logic to reveal 
at least the likelihood of an opinion's conformity with the truth?9 Donne's 
scholastic sympathies were not lost in his conversion from Catholicism. For him, as 
with those scholastic dialecticians considering the logical problems of their 
sophismata, a paradox which cannot be made amenable to the common opinion 
because it appears self-contradictory is often an indication that it is fallacious, not 
that it expresses a mystical truth.30 Certainly, Donne does not fail to wonder at the 
Christian mysteries for which no rational explanation can be attempted, but as 
Paradox in the Grays Inn Revels explains, paradox is a 'strain of wit and invention 
screwed above the vulgar conceit, to beget admiration.,31 This admiration, we will 
see, is the same wonder which Cicero claims the Stoic's believed the logical 
demonstrations of their paradoxes aroused. As Cicero had in his exposition of the 
Stoic paradoxes in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, however, Donne will suspect the 
wonder which paradoxes produce in their admirers, and create paradoxes of his own 
which seek to diminish this effect.32 His earlier paradoxes will accomplish this end 
by inverting the method of Cicero in his Paradoxa in an attempt to move his readers 
to find better reasons against them by identifying the fallacies responsible for their 
apparent paradoxicality. His later paradox, Biathanatos, will make an earnest 
attempt to prove the uncommon opinion, that suicide is not always a sin, by carefully 
specifying the conditions under which his view may be acceptable in the manner of 
9 
Cicero's defense of the Stoic theses. Our account of the function of Donne's 
paradoxes must begin, therefore, with an account of the influence of Cicero's notion 
of paradox on the sixteenth-century understanding of the term. 
Notes to Introduction 
Ian the date of Donne's early paradoxes, see Donne, 1980, pp. xv, xxvi-xxvii. On the dates of the 
Paradoxes and Problems and of Biathanatos, see Bald, 1970, pp. 200-201. 
2 Donne, 1980, p. 20, 11. 31-35 
3 Ibid., p. 19,11.7-8 
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paradoxical encomium from the paradox, as we will below. See Jones-Davies, 1982, pp. 105-123. In 
his appraisal of the scholastic methods of teaching in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Cambridge, 
W. T. Costello has described the student's exhibition of his learning (in all areas of his study) as a 
series of defenses of theses or quaestiones. See Costello, 1958. For an account of the medieval 
development of quaestiones disputatae, see Copleston, 1972, pp. 150-153. It should be noted that the 
term thesis was also used more broadly by Donne, as well as his contemporaries, to signify any 
position advanced in debate. It is according to this broad definition that Malloch and Vickers 
understand the term. Theses thus defined were not specifically restricted by the generic limitations 
elaborated by Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. In his Courtier's Library (1650), which was probably 
written between 1603-1611, Donne refers to theses advanced pro and contra in the context of a 
controversia. Though his use of the term expresses some of the general characteristics of the thesis, 
which we describe below, it does not distinguish it from the controversia, nor does it refer to its 
paradoxical nature. It should be emphasized, however, that Donne's description of Biathanatos as a 
thesis does correspond with the more specific understanding of the term outlined below. See Donne, 
1930, pp. 49-50; on the date of composition, see Donne, 1930, p. 7. 
5 Donne, 1982,11.1147-1150 
6 Satire III, 11. 77-78 
7 For a list of the controversial works in Donne's library, see Keynes, 1972, pp. 258-279. 
8 Quoted in Donne, 1980, p. xxvi. In the introduction to her edition of the Paradoxes and Problems, 
Helen Peters discusses I. A. Shapiro's unpublished view that the letter was not addressed to Wotton, 
which is contrary to E. M. Simpson's view. Shapiro does not question Simpson's dating of the letter 
at 1600, however. See Donne, 1980, p. xxv; and Simpson, 1948, pp. 316-317. For further discussion 
ofthis letter, see Summers and Pebworth, 1991, pp. 26-27. 
9 W. T. Costello has noted that even at sixteenth-century Cambridge, which has been traditionally 
considered to be less conservative in its deference to Aristotle than Oxford, the study of logic was 
'genuinely Aristotelian'. See Costello, 1958, p. 45. 
10 C. L. Hamblin reminds us that as late as 1950, Lincoln's Inn conducted debates derived from 
scholastic and Aristotelian methods of dialectical disputation, See Hamblin, 1970, p. 126, n. 2. 
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II It should be noted here that' encomium' in the Greek for 'paradoxical encomium' may only 
function as a substantive when it denotes a song of praise. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the 
Greek for 'paradoxical' is the adjective when the genre is described in the Greek 'paradoxical 
encomium'. See Liddell and Scott, 1980, p. 191; and H. K. Miller, 1956, pp. 145-178, esp. 146. 
12 H. K. Miller has mistakenly observed that Cornwallis' Essayes 'are all mock encomia'. See H. K. 
Miller, 1956, p. 160. Miller, does not, as we do below, distinguish between the serious yet 
paradoxical encomium of Isocrates and the sceptical mock encomium of Gorgias. 
13 Cornwallis, 1616, sig, G2. Helen Peters discusses Cornwallis' Essayes in relation to Donne's 
Paradoxes and Problems, and asserts that both collections reflect the influence of Ortensio Lando's 
Paradossi. This influence wiII be contested later in the study. See Donne, 1980, pp. xxi-xxii. 
14 Isocrates, Helen, 1 
15 Sidney, 1965, p. 121 
16 Ibid., p. 121 
17 Donne, 1930, pp. 39-40 
18 Sidney, 1965, p. 121; Donne, 1980, p. 14, I. 12 
19 Donne, 1980, p. 16,11.61-63 
20 Quoted in Bullough, 1972, p. 66 
21 Quoted in Bald, 1970, p. 203. On Donne's interest in the religious controversies of his time, and 
particularly his involvement with the Anglican controversialist, Thomas Morton, see Walton, 1928, 
pp. 6-7, 12-15, 18,23-27; Bald, 1970, pp. 200-301; and Flynn, 1975-1976a, pp. 1-17; and Flynn, 
1975-1976b, 178-195. For a brief summary of the Jesuit doctrine of equivocation in the 1590's, see 
Malloch, 1979-1981, pp. 387-395. 
22 In a letter to Henry Goodyer in 1609, Donne had warned against the 'in-obedient Puritans' and the 
'over-obedient Papists'. See Donne, 1977, p. 101. W. T. Costello has noted that the theology of both 
Oxford and Cambridge in the late sixteenth century was predominantly scholastic and Anglican. He 
also notes that Cambridge's reputation for Puritanism in the early seventeenth century has arisen from 
the Puritanical leanings of only two of its colleges, Emmanuel and Sidney Sussex. See Costello, 
1958, pp. 108-110. 
23 See Luther, 1962, p. 276. For a discussion of Luther's Heidelberg theses with respect to 
Aristotelian directions for the handling offallacy and paradox, see Evans, 1998, pp. 202-204. 
24 In his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos (1624), Pierre Gassendi pursued a more 
decidedly sceptical end in his critique of Aristotle. Like Luther, however, Gassendi acknowledged 
the prominence of Aristotelian philosophy among the common opinion of the learned by calling his 
arguments against Aristotle 'paradoxes'. For a discussion of Gassendi in light of the Gianfrancesco 
Pico's sceptical critique of Aristotle, see Schmitt, 1964, pp. 105-132, esp. 127-130. 
25 Luther, 1962, pp. 280-281 
26 Ibid., p. 270 
27 On the high value attributed to the practice of academic disputation as a preparation for 
involvement in religious controversies, see Watson, 1908, pp. 91-97. On the prominence of 
Aristotelian syllogistic in the academic disputations in which Donne would have taken part, see 
Costello, 1958, pp. 19-31, 48-49. An illuminating illustration of the importance of syllogism in 
religious disputations can be found in the apology for the Jesuit doctrine of equivocation written by 
Robert Persons and addressed to Donne's Anglican associate, Thomas Morton, as a response to his 
Full Satisfaction Concerning a Double Romish Iniquitie (London, 1606). In his Treatise Tending to 
Mitigation towardes Catholicke-Subiects in England (London, 1607), Persons seeks to refute 
Morton's position by attacking the validity of his syllogisms. Morton had argued his own position by 
advancing a series of formal syllogisms in which the major and minor premises, as well as the 
conclusions, were asserted with explicit reference to their syllogistic function. See for instance, 
Persons, 1607, pp. 442,472-477; and Morton, 1606, pp. 50, 57, 60-63, 88-90. 
28 For an examination of Donne's use of Aristotelian logic in his poetry, see Wiggins, 1945, pp. 41-
60. 
29 In a 1625 sermon preached upon Whitsunday, Donne described the syllogistic process of the 
disputation of paradoxes in religious controversies with particular reference to to Aristotle's methods 
of refutation and his formulation of the probable basis of opinion in the Sophistical Refutations. 
There he warned that 'paradoxicall imaginations' must not become the subject of formal disputations 
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because they have not achieved the status of opinion, paradoxical or otherwise. See Donne, 1953, VI, 
pp.316-319. In a 1629 sennon preached on Christmas day, he discussed the virgin birth as a subject 
for disputation, and called it 'Paradoxa virgo'. There he likened it to the case of' Amelberga, the 
wife of one of the Earls of Flanders, who lived continently even in marriage, and is therefore called 
Paradoxa virgo, a virgin beyond opinion'. See Donne, 1953, IX, p. 143. 
30 Cicero felt similarly. He referred to the sophismata of Stilpo, Diodorus and Alexinus as 'fallaees 
eonclusiuneulae', which denote fallacious and misleadingly precise syllogisms. See A eadem iea II, 
75. For an overview of the late medieval scholastic treatment of sophismata and their relation to 
paradox undertsood as logical contradiction, see Kretzmann, 1982, pp. 211-245. 
31 Quoted in Bullough, 1972, p. 66 
32 For views which mistakenly conclude Donne's wish to arouse wonder (admiration) in his 
paradoxes, see Quinn, 1969, pp. 626-647; and Klause, 1987, pp. 41-66. 
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Chapter I 
Sixteenth-Century Paradox and the Classical Foundations of Doubt 
1 
English Concepts of Paradox and Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum 
The Paradoxa Stoicorum, while principally a philosophical work, represented 
for sixteenth-century readers a middle ground between the sceptics and the dogmatists, 
the rhetoricians and the dialecticians, and the orator and the philosopher.l Their 
understanding of the term 'paradox', therefore, would have been derived not simply 
from Cicero's Latin rendering of the Greekparadoxa (admirabilia), but from the 
seminal method of exposition according to which the fust formal paradox was 
composed, which, we will see, was also the method of the philosophical thesis first 
described by Aristotle in the Topics? Cicero says that the Stoic tenets he defends in 
the Paradoxa Stoicorum are 'opinions that by no means meet with the acceptance of 
the multitude'; they' are surprising and they run counter to universal opinion' .3 The 
etymology of paradoxa indicates precisely this understanding of the term, para 
meaning 'beside' and doxa meaning 'opinions,.4 Fittingly, the term came also to mean 
'marvelous' or 'wondrous' in Greek and was accordingly translated into Latin 
maintaining this connotive meaning as well as the stricter original Greek denotation. 
Hence, when Cicero discusses why the Stoics call their ethical tenets paradoxa in the 
preface to the Paradoxa Stoicorum, he explains that it is because these 'doctrines are 
surprising and they run counter to universal opinion'. In De Finibus, he characterizes 
them in the same way. 'The Stoics,' he says, 'call these paradoxa, as we might say 
'startling truths,.5 Cicero's Latin term for both 'surprising' and 'startling truths' is 
admirabilia. We should recall at this point, the description of Paradox in the Gray's 
Inn Revels; his function, he tells us, is 'to beget admiration.' Sixteenth-century English 
writers deferred to Cicero's translation of the Greekparadoxa, and consistently 
rendered the term with reference to the wondrous or marvelous quality which 
admirabilia connoted. 
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In The Arte of English Poesie (1589), George Puttenham described the 
rhetorical function of the paradoxon by referring to the practice of the current model of 
eloquence in English, Philip Sidney. Translating strictly from the sense given by 
Cicero, Puttenham terms paradoxon 'the wondrer' in the adjacent margin and goes on 
to explain Sidney's use of the device in similarly faithful terms.6 'Many times our Poet 
[Sidney] is caried by some occasion to report of a thing that is marvelous, and then he 
will seeme not to speake it simply but with some signe of admiration,.7 In The Garden 
of Eloquence (1577), Henry Peacham continues to associate paradox with wonder by 
emphasizing the disbelief aroused by the experience of contrariety which necessarily 
accompanies paradoxical statements. He defines paradoxon as a statement in which 
'we affyrme something to be true, by saying we would not have beleeved it, nor yet 
once suspected it,' and illustrates its use as a figure of rhetoric with an example of his 
own.s 'It was such as lucke as you never heard of, almost incredible, that when fyre 
should have consumed him, fyre saved him, and lykewyse at another tyme, when water 
should have bene his death, it saved his lyfe,.9 In his Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et 
Brittanicae (1565), Thomas Cooper reveals his knowledge of the Paradoxa Stoicorum, 
De Finibus and the Academica by explicitly identifying Cicero as the Latin originator 
of the termparadoxus and indicating (though not explicitly) that it represents his 
translation of the Greek paradoxa, the same form of the term which Cicero himself 
provided in the original Greek in the preface to the Paradoxa Stoicorum and in the 
Academica. lO And like Puttenham and Peacham, he is careful to mention that 
paradoxes are not just contrary to common opinion (praeter opinionem), but also 
strange and incredible (inauditus). He defines paradoxus as: 'Latine admirabilis 
dicitur, praeter opinione, & inauditus. unde paradoxa, neutro genere. Cicero. 
Sentences staunge and contrarie to the opinion of the most part. ' 11 Continuing the 
heritage of Cicero, Thomas Elyot's Dictionary (1538) defmes 'paradoxa' as 'a sentence 
contrary to the opinion of dyverse', and 'mirabilis' as 'meruaylous, wonderfull' .12 
Elyot's definition of paradox, though not explicitly associated with admirabilia, 
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conforms to the definition utilized by Cicero, and therefore, retains its connotations of 
wonder and marvelousness. 13 
In his English translation of the Paradoxa Stoieorum (1569), Thomas Newton, 
the translator of Seneca's Tragedies (1581), calls the admirabilia of the Stoics 
'meruaylous sentences, and suche as are contrary to the opynion of all men' .14 Not 
content to leave the reader to associate Cicero's Latin admirabilia, Zeno' s Greek 
paradoxa and his own English 'meruaylous sentences' , Newton supplements the Latin 
text with a brief defmition of paradox with which his readers would already have been 
familiar. He says that these 'meruaylous sentences ... are by them termed Paradoxa, 
whych signifyeth, thinges merueilous and inopinable.' 15 Paradoxes and things 
'inopinable' were identified by sixteenth-century readers in keeping with the Latin 
version of the Paradoxa Stoieorum with which they would have been familiar from 
their school curricula. 16 Cicero had described the Stoic paradoxa both as inopinata as 
well as mirabilia in his fifth paradox, 'That only the wise man is free, and that every 
foolish man is a slave'. There he says, 'Servi igitur omnes improbi, servi! Nee hoc tam 
re est quam dietu inopinatum atque mirabile' ('All wicked men are slaves therefore, 
slaves! Nor is this really so startling a paradox as it sounds'). 17 Newton translates 
these lines' ... and therfore all naughty persons are slaves and bondmen. Neyther is this 
so staunge inopinable and merveilous in deede, as it is in wordes.' 18 In his collection of 
rhetorical tropes and schemata, Epitome troporum ae sehematarum (1541), Johannus 
Susenbrotus identified paradoxum with inopinatum, and emphasized both its function 
as an argument against common opinion and its utilization of a language which 
produced wonder. 19 By additionally calling the paradoxa 'inopinable' in his translation 
of the preface to the Paradoxa Stoieorum, therefore, Newton was taking liberties with 
the original text of which its author, and his commentators in the sixteenth century, 
would have approved. As Susenbrotus and Newton had emphasized, the paradox, both 
as a rhetorical figure and a dialectically argued thesis, should retain the sense contained 
in Cicero's defmition in the Paradoxa Stoieorum, 'admirabilia eontraque opinionem 
omnium', for, as we will see, the impression of wonder which is caused by a 
paradoxical thesis consists in the combination of ambiguous words in the context of a 
dialectically disputed argument. 20 
2 
Surprise and Deception: Orthodox and Paradox 
In so far as it had been defmed as something wonderful or marvelous contrary 
to the expectations of most people, paradox could be used to express a variety of 
incredible or contradictory states. In his Greene in Conceit (1598), John Dickenson 
wonders at a funeral procession which has 'confounded' joy and sorrow. He says: 
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It is a custome still in use with christians, to attend the funerall of their deceased 
friendes with whole chantries of choyce quire-men, singing solemnly before 
them but behind followes a troop all clad in blacke, which argues mourning: 
much have I marueled at this ceremony, deeming it till now, some hidden 
paradox, confounding thus in one, things so opposite as these signes of joy and 
sorrowe?l 
Dickenson's amazement at this spectacle is in response to the apparent violation of the 
law prohibiting the coexistence of contradictory qualities in one subject, the law of 
non-contradiction. Peacham's illustrations of the figure, paradoxon, embody this 
aspect of the paradoxical situation by insisting on the simultaneous presence of 
opposing conditions such as living while engulfed in fire or water. For Dickenson 
what makes this funeral custom paradoxical is that it may be said to be both happy and 
sad, which in logical language may be translated into contradictory statements such as: 
'it was both happy and not-happy' or 'it was sad and not-sad.' To a logician such a 
state of affairs is a clear indication of absurdity, and therefore, grounds for disbelief. 
When considering whether 'what men think is always true or ... sometimes true and 
sometimes false' in the Theaetetus, Socrates draws a conclusion which appears to 
violate the law of non-contradiction. 'From either supposition', he says, 'it results that 
their thoughts are not always true, but both true and false'. Theodorus naturally 
responds, 'That is incredible Socrates'; his response to Socrates' inference from the 
Pythagorean principle that 'man is the measure of all things' is precisely that which we 
would expect from one who believes he perceives the copresence of contradictory 
qualities.22 Though Dickenson's readers could not have failed to recognize that the law 
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of non-contradiction was not actually violated by his account, it is important to notice 
that the condition in which he claims the marvelous quality of paradox to be contained 
is integrally related to a confounding of contradictory states just, as we will see, 
Isocrates had noticed in his Panathenaicus and Donne had in his Paradoxes.23 As we 
will see when we analyze the details of the fallacious syllogistic by which the 
arguments of the Paradoxes identify normally opposed terms such as death and 
perfection, the impression that the law of non-contradiction has been violated is 
necessary to move their readers to suspect the validity of their wondrous conclusions. 
It is precisely this impression of miraculous unification in the expression of the Stoic 
paradoxa that Cicero attempts to dispel by expounding them rhetorically. 
Cicero's defense of the Stoic paradoxa explains how the apparently startling 
tenets of the Stoics are amenable to natural reason, and thus negates their marvelous 
impact. In his Book of Notes and Commonplaces (1581), John Marbeck undertakes the 
similar task of explaining how the incredible biblical account of the earth's foundation 
upon the sea may be made acceptable to the common view, but discovers ultimately 
that this paradox retains its mystery. While pondering the inscrutable relation of earth 
and sea described in Psalm 24 (23 in Vulgate), Marbeck exclaims in terms faithful to 
the defmitions employed by Cooper, Puttenham, Peacham, Elyot and Newton, 'What a 
wonderful paradoxe and inopinable sentence is this, to saye: quia ipse [super maria} 
fundavit [eum et super flumina stabilivit illum} , .24 After acknowledging that natural 
reason must identify earth as the 'heaviest and lowest of all the four Elements', he 
concedes that the patently unlikely suggestion that the earth is founded upon the sea 
may only gain credence by divine mandate. And as the source of this account is David 
(the 'Prophet') himself, we can only conclude that the 'almightie and most mightie 
creatour of all things, by his myraculous and his divine power, hath altered the order 
generall, and hath made a lawe and statute particular' .25 Marbeck's comments here 
provide more thanjust a confirmation that Newton's translation of Cicero's paradoxa 
as 'thinges merueilous and inopinable' conformed to the popular understanding of the 
term in the sixteenth century, however. They also reveal that paradoxes present 
exceptions to general principles, and therefore, demand that the universality of those 
principles be scrutinized. 
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For Marbeck, such scrutiny simply results in a faithful acknowledgement of the 
power of God to institute a law which appears to reason to violate a universal principle. 
The exceptional conclusions of Donne's Paradoxes as well as of Biathanatos, however, 
require a critical involvement with the terms of the arguments which results in the more 
fundamental questioning of the power of language and logic to convey truth. Such 
questioning, we will see, is an integral part of sceptical tradition of which Cicero's 
Paradoxa Stoicorum is a product, and to which Donne's dialectical analyses of terms 
must be addressed. Like the thesis described by Aristotle in the Topics, the dialectical 
function of the paradox is to stimulate debate by advancing a view which appears 
untenable to the common opinion, and therefore, particular with respect to the general 
view.26 Aristotle had said that 'practically all dialectical problems indeed are now 
called theses' and that such theses represent the 'paradoxical belief[s] of. .. eminent 
philosopher[ s]' whose task it is to make a plausible case for their uncommon opinions. 
The utility of the disputation of theses, as Donne is careful to declare in both the 
Paradoxes and Biathanatos, is to dispel the wonder produced by disbelief and to clarify 
the likelihood or certainty of the common opinion.27 For Marbeck, however, the 
wonder of the paradox of Psalm 24 (23 Vulgate) is not diminished when he searches 
natural reason for an explanation of such an 'inopinable sentence' because the 
particularity of the divinely imposed law permitting earth to float on water remains so 
radically opposed to the universal natural law which prohibits it; and thus, the paradox 
and wonder remain. To Cicero, however, the paradoxes of the Stoics 'appear to 
be ... far and away the truest'; and when he attempts to '[ expound them] in a form to 
win acceptance', he discovers that they are not so marvelous after all?S Thus, Cicero's 
project in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, as with the eminent philosophers mentioned by 
Aristotle, is to make what appears to be a paradox orthodox, or, to use Marbeck's 
terms, to make the particular appear generaL 
If Cicero was committed to rendering apparently startling conclusions 
acceptable to the common opinion in his Paradoxa Stoicorum, it would seem that 
Donne had undertaken precisely the opposite task in his own Paradoxes. For Donne 
argues explicitly for both the delight and the utility of dissent from the majority view. 
He explains that, unlike Cicero, who would 'expound [the paradoxes of the Stoics] in a 
18 
form to win acceptance', he intends to follow the Stoic dialectical method by increasing 
'the number of [his] Paradoxes' through a deliberate effort to 'differ from common 
opinions'.z9 Though it is clear from Donne's warning to Wotton against 'allowing' his 
paradoxes that he did not genuinely accept their conclusions, for the present we must 
acknowledge simply that he was conscious of the tradition of paradox which informed 
Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum, and that both their subjects and their method of 
exposition were recognized by Cicero as common points of debate in his and preceding 
eras. When arguing, in his second paradox, for the uncommon view 'That Women 
Ought to Paint Themselves' , Donne exploits the ancient sceptical position on the 
reliability of the senses (which we will see was most fully articulated by Cicero in the 
A cademica ), that what we perceive by the senses only seems to be as it appears to us. 30 
He says, 'The Stars, the Sun, the Skye, whom thou admirest, alas have no color, but are 
faire because they seeme color'd; If this seeming will not satisfy thee in her, thou hast 
good assurance of her color when thou seest her lay it on. ,31 As we will see when we 
examine his reversal of Cicero's maxim of the good house in De Officiis, Donne is 
arguing for the virtue of allowing oneself to be deceived by perverting Cicero's 
moderately sceptical view that we may maintain the probability of presentations which 
we receive through the senses.32 Hence, Donne recommends that men be as content 
with the fair impression that they receive from a painted woman as they are with that 
which they receive from objects of beauty in nature, despite what Cicero would have 
recognized to be an obvious difference in the likelihood that the perceived fairness of 
these two objects accurately reflects their real beauty. Donne's quibble on 'color' 
indicates his awareness of this difference in likelihood, for when he asserts that for 
those who are not satisfied with the potentially false impression of a woman who wears 
cosmetics, the mere fact that she has resorted to such artificiality is sufficient to assure 
the likelihood that her true, unsupplemented color would be unappealing. 
In his eleventh paradox, 'A Defence of Women's Inconstancy' , Donne asks, 
'Are not your witts pleased with those Jeasts which cozen your Expectatyonn?,33 
Though ostensibly an attempt to further his argument in defense of inconstancy, 
Donne's question simultaneously refers to the intellectual satisfaction derived from a 
display of ingenuity which results in an unexpected conclusion, the same satisfaction 
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with which Sidney had claimed the wise read the witty paradoxical encomia of 'good 
fools' .34 Hence, while Donne is defending the inconstancy of women by appealing to 
the delight of surprise, he is also defending the value of the deceit woven into the 
fallacious fabric of his Paradoxes. He makes explicit this reference to his own act of 
deception in the method of his argumentation by accusing his amused readers of 
judging the inconstancy of women and paradoxes according to a double standard. He 
says, 'You can call it pleasure to be beguyled in Tryfles, and in the most excellent Toye 
in the world you call it Treacherie. ,35 Implicit in Donne's statement is the view that the 
inconstancy in which his readers are currently taking pleasure is the same as the 
inconstancy by which they claim to be betrayed by unfaithful women. More 
importantly, however, he is emphasizing that the ambiguity with which he has 
deployed the critical terms of his paradoxical arguments is responsible for this 
inconstancy. By drawing his readers' attention to the ambiguities which invalidate his 
arguments, Donne honors the promise of his ninth paradox to assist his readers in 
becoming 'acertaind of all disputable doubts' as well as that of his letter to Wotton to 
raise the 'alarum to truth [in order] to arme her'. It is this commitment to the 
investigation of the doubtful and inconstant terms utilized in controversial 
argumentation that establishes the Paradoxes and Biathanatos as paradoxes specifically 
derived from the tradition of the philosophical thesis articulated by Aristotle, Isocrates 
and Cicero.36 
3 
Paradoxical Encomia and Defenses of Uncommon Opinion 
Aristotle explained that a paradox as a defense of an uncommon opinion is 
properly called a thesis, and denotes 'a belief of some eminent philosopher ... such 
as ... the view that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said; or the view of 
Heraclitus that all things are in motion; or that what exists is one as Melissus says'. He 
continues expanding the definition to encompass all uncommon opinions regardless of 
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their proponent. 'Or it may be a view contrary to men's usual opinions about which we 
have an argument, e.g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in 
every case have come to be or be eternal' .37 Isocrates offers the same explanation of 
the paradox as defense of uncommon opinion when he criticizes those 'who are much 
pleased with themselves if, after setting up an absurd or self-contradictory [paradoxon] 
subject, they succeed in discussing it in tolerable fashion'. 38 These paradoxists are 
philosophers and sophists who defend their unorthodox opinions through precisely the 
same type of 'verbal quibbles' to which Cicero objects in the syllogistic proofs for the 
paradoxes of the Stoics. Cicero had complained that 'the Stoics hold a different view 
of good and bad from all their fellow citizens or rather from all other nations, and give 
a different meaning to "honour", "disgrace", "reward", "punishment" -whether correctly 
or otherwise does not concern us now, but if we were to adopt their terminology, we 
should never be able to express our meaning intelligibly about anything. ,39 It is this 
uncommon usage that, Cicero claims, produces the startling conclusions of the Stoic's 
arguments. 
The Stoics construct foolish syllogisms to prove pain no evil, just as if the 
difficulty in question were a verbal one and not one of matter of fact. Why 
deceive me, Zeno? When you say that what is dreadful in my eyes is not an evil 
at all, I am attracted and long to know how it can be true that the condition I 
regard as utter wretchedness is not an even evil. "There is nothing evil," says 
he, "except what is base and wicked." Now you are talking foolishly, for you 
do not take away the cause of my torment: I know that pain is not villainy; stop 
teaching me that; tell me that it makes no difference whether I am in pain or not 
inpain.4o 
Aristotle recognized that arguing theses such as these could provide valuable practice 
in discerning ambiguous terminology in dialectical disputations, but the Stoics, as we 
will see, sought to restrict their terminology in order to allow their 'foolish syllogisms' 
to reach valid, and therefore, genuinely startling conclusions. Aristotle had advised 
disputants, 'Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned, but also in the case of 
its contrary, for the contrary predicate: e.g. argue that good is not necessarily pleasant; 
for neither is evil painful; or that, if the latter is the case, so is the former. ,41 
After listing Antisthenes' view that contradiction is impossible and the proto-
Stoic paradox derived from Plato that' courage and wisdom and justice are identical' , 
Isocrates complains that these 'captious disputations' have not recently come into 
vogue and that other paradoxists have long been advancing similar theses.42 
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who is so backward in learning as not to know that Protagoras and the sophists 
of his time have left to us compositions of similar character and even far more 
overwrought than these? For how could one surpass Gorgias, who dared to 
assert that nothing exists of the things that are, or Zeno, who ventured to prove 
the same things as possible and again as impossible, or Melissus who, although 
things in nature are infmite in number, made it his task to find proofs that the 
whole is one!43 
Had Zeno of Citium (c. 334-262 B.C.), the founder of Stoicism, lived before Isocrates, 
he may also have been included in the above list for propounding his own paradoxa, 
for the Stoic attempt to use deductive logic to demonstrate the certainty of its theses 
produced no less paradoxical results than the sceptical attempts of Gorgias, and the 
other 'eminent philosophers' mentioned by Aristotle and Isocrates.44 Of all those 
mentioned, Antisthenes the Cynic (446-366 B.C.) is the only defender of uncommon 
opinion who was not overtly sceptical, though his tutelage under Gorgias and later, 
under Socrates, suggests that he may have felt similarly tentative about the knowledge 
of the wise man.45 All the rest, Heraclitus, Melissus, Protagoras, Gorgias and Zeno of 
Elea, advocated sceptical positions on the possibility of knowledge. Though Heraclitus 
(c. 540-480 B.C.) does not seem to have completely dismissed the possibility of 
knowledge of truth, according to Diogenes Laertius, he mistrusted the ability of the 
human mind to yield such knowledge sufficiently enough to justify saying, 'Let us not 
conjecture on deepest questions what is likely,' advice that we will see the second-
century (A.D.) Pyrrhonist, Sextus Empiricus, would have found to be eminently 
sceptica1.46 And although Heraclitus claimed that he knew nothing when he was young 
and everything when he was grown, his positive doctrines were reputed to be so 
obscure that 'none but adepts should approach' them.47 According to Sextus, 
Heraclitean knowledge, such as the doctrine that all things are in motion, was so 
impenetrably expressed that it could be esteemed to be nothing less than paradoxical; it 
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was this obscurity which prompted the numerous admirers and expositors of his writing 
to draw such apparently diverse conclusions about its real meaning.48 Melissus (c. 440 
B.c.) was a pupil ofParmenides, whose doctrine of relativism is recorded in Plato's 
dialogue, Parmenides. Diogenes tells us little about Melissus, but in so far as he 
followed Parmenides, we can conclude that he would have agreed with Plato's 
representation of his master's view that 'beauty itself or goodness itself and all the 
things we take as forms in themselves are unknowable to us' .49 Melissus' defense of 
the Parmenidean One is discussed in the pseudo-Aristotlelian, Melissus, Xenophanes, 
and Gorgias; the paradox in which Melissus claims we are bound if we accept the 
evidence provided by our senses that there are a multiplicity of things is summarized as 
follows. 'If there are many things, he [Melissus] says they must arise from what is not; 
and if this is impossible, what is, is not many; for, being ungenerated, anything which 
is, is unlimited, and therefore one' .50 
Protagoras (481-411 B.c.) was the most radically sceptical of those appearing 
in the above lists maintaining that 'soul is nothing apart from the senses' and that 
'everything is true' .51 These two doctrines, as Plato explains in the Theaetetus, result 
from Protagoras' famous relativist dictum that 'man is the measure of all things', which 
is to say that there exists no objective standard to which perceivers may refer to 
confirm the universal accuracy of their perceptions.52 Diogenes also records that 
'Protagoras was the first to maintain that there were two sides to every question, 
opposed to each other, and [that] he even argued in this fashion, being the first to do 
so'; as we will see, the dialectical maxim 'in utramque partem dissere,' though 
advocated by Cicero's probabilist scepticism, did not originate with him and actually 
reflects the long tradition in Greek rhetoric and dialectic which established the role of 
the paradoxist in formal disputation. 53 Protagoras was also a professional teacher of 
disputation, a sophist who was the first 'to institute contests in debating, and to teach 
rival pleaders the tricks of their trade.' Most importantly to our discussion and most 
irritatingly to Isocrates, Diogenes tells us that 'in his dialectic he neglected the meaning 
in favour of verbal quibbling, and he was the father of the whole tribe of eristical 
disputants now so much in evidence' .54 Isocrates undoubtedly was thinking of 
Protagoras, his fellow sophists and their desire to delight young students with 
paradoxical arguments when he complained that: 
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the truth is that these men care for naught save enriching themselves at the 
expense of the youth. It is their 'philosophy' applied to eristic disputations that 
effectively produces this result ... These young men, to be sure, may well be 
pardoned for holding such views; for in all matters they are and always have 
been inclined to what is extraordinary and astounding (thaumatopoiias).55 
Ultimately, Isocrates dismisses such sophistical quibbling, but we may wonder whether 
it was Donne's fear of more severe censors than Isocrates that led him so anxiously to 
limit the circulation of his own paradoxes. 56 As Donne was fully aware, the defender 
of a paradox was regularly suspected of obscuring his subversive intentions through the 
use of sophistical and equivocal language. Though we will see that Donne was 
committed to the clarification of the issues which he investigated in his paradoxes, even 
those playfully examined in the Paradoxes, the conscious attempt to disguise the 
fallacious argumentation of one's thesis was considered in late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth-century England to be the mark of the libertine, the atheist and most 
insidious of all, the Jesuit.57 
Zeno ofElea (born c. 490 B.C.), like Melissus, was a pupil ofPannenides. 
Diogenes reports that he 'was the first to propound the argument of the "Achilles''', 
which is one of the four paradoxes for which he is most often remembered. 58 Zeno 
devised these paradoxes as a denial of the Pythagorean view that the universe was 
comprised of distinct units of extended space, the view which most obviously 
conflicted with Parrnenides' view that the universe was one. The likelihood that these 
paradoxes were attempts to discredit an opposing argument is significant in light of 
what Aristotle believes the role of the paradox in dialectic to be. In Sophistical 
Refutations, he explains that paradox is the third best way (following plain refutation 
and proof of falsity) of defeating one's rival in dialectical disputation. 59 In the Physics, 
Aristotle himself provides refutations of all these paradoxes, as well as the paradox 
concerning possibility mentioned by Isocrates, in an attempt to demonstrate that the 
paradoxes have proceeded from fallacies incorporated into the arguments by Zeno and 
not as necessary consequents of the conjunction of the premises.60 As we will see 
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when we examine his notion of paradox in greater detail, Aristotle, like his scholastic 
disciples, did not believe that contradictory conclusions could follow necessarily from 
valid premises; and so, he concludes that even if we are unable to solve Zeno's 
paradoxes 'it is surely absurd that.. . [we] should make [ ourselves] slaves of [ our] 
inability, and should commit [ourselves] to still greater errors' .61 The role of paradox 
for Aristotle is merely to draw the argument of one's opponent into doubt, not to 
demonstrate a contradiction.62 Diogenes suggests that the objective of Zeno's 
paradoxes was as Aristotle described, to call some view into doubt. It is for this reason, 
Diogenes reports, that Zeno is classified a sceptic. 'They find Xenophanes, Zeno of 
Elea, and Democritus to be sceptics: Xenophanes because he says, "Clear truth hath no 
man seen nor e'er shall know"; and Zeno because he would destroy motion, saying "A 
moving body moves neither where it is or where it is not". ,63 
Gorgias (born c. 490-460 B.C.) is popularly recognized as the founder of the 
paradoxical encomium. Both of the two works which have survived, the Encomium of 
Helen and the Defence of Palamedes, are exhibitions of the power of rhetoric to 
persuade its listeners to forgive faults which had long been attributed to such notorious 
figures as Helen and Palamedes. Isocrates, his pupil, considered the Encomium of 
Helen to be a failure as an example of epideictic rhetoric because it defended her 
impugned actions according to forensic practice and neglected its putative objective of 
praising her virtues. Isocrates' recognition of Gorgias' failure to deliver his promised 
praise is significant because it indicates a familiarity with the three fundamental 
rhetorical classifications, the forensic, epideictic and deliberative, adumbrated by his 
contemporary, Aristotle, in the Rhetoric. These classifications, once codified by 
Cicero, will contain the rhetorical prescriptions to which subsequent oratorical and 
literary enterprises will refer to guide the method of their composition, and against 
which the principally dialectical exposition of philosophical theses will be opposed by 
critics of misleading rhetorical elaboration such as the Stoics. In the preface to his own 
encomium of Helen, Helen, Isocrates clarifies the mistake of Gorgias: 
Although he asserts that he has written an encomium of Helen, it turns out that 
he has actually spoken a defence of her conduct! But the composition in 
defence does not draw on the same topics as the encomium, nor indeed does it 
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deal with actions of the same kind, but quite the contrary; for a plea in defence 
is appropriate only when the defendant is charged with a crime, whereas we 
praise those who excel in some good quality. 64 
Although both Aristotle and Quintilian would observe that the distinctions between the 
three rhetorical classifications were not absolute, the paradoxical encomium was 
properly classed as a type of epideictic speech.65 Paradoxical arguments advanced in 
the form of the Aristotelian thesis, however, were not classed under any of the three 
rhetorical headings. The encomiast must focus on amplifying the qualities which make 
the subject worthy of praise, such as noble lineage and dignity of birthplace. The 
forensic speaker may choose to amplify such qualities, but his primary aim is to defend 
the accused by analyzing the circumstantial details in an attempt to discover the 
particular contextual features which countermand the pronouncement of the supposedly 
violated law. The challenge for the forensic speaker is to discover the spirit in which 
the law was conceived in the hope that the actions of his client will be seen to be in 
accordance with that spirit despite their divergence from the letter of the law. In so far 
as this spirit represents the general philosophical basis for the particular law, the ideal 
lawyer, such as Cicero will describe in Brutus, will be required to undertake the more 
speculative consideration of theses pro and contra in order to arrive at a balanced view 
of the just interpretation of the law (aequitas). 66 Though such speculative 
consideration is not governed by any ofthe three rhetorical classifications, it is, Cicero 
will contend, especially useful for the forensic speaker. The epideictic speaker, 
whether he be conventional or paradoxical, must avoid analysis of the virtues or vices 
being praised or blamed, and merely display them. Such a display may indicate the 
critical activity of the speaker, but as Isocrates maintains, this activity, philosophically 
serious as it is, must not be represented in the epideictic speech itself. Because the 
sixteenth-century paradoxical encomia of Erasmus, Agrippa, Cornwallis and Nashe 
were composed in accordance with the rhetorical prescriptions recorded by Isocrates, 
Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, therefore, we do not expect to find the philosophically 
serious matter of the thesis disputed dialectically in them, though their judgements 
about what subjects to praise may imply such a logical consideration. The speculative 
consideration of paradoxical theses, we will see, is reserved for the paradoxist who 
defends an uncommon opinion. 
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In addition to his criticisms of Gorgias' failure to observe decorum, Isocrates 
also complains that those who undertake the rhetorical challenge of praising the 
unpraiseworthy foolishly claim that success in making the blameworthy seem laudable 
insures their success in persuading their listeners of the virtues of the truly 
praiseworthy. Speaking of the same sophistical rhetoricians whom he had condemned 
for polluting the minds of their students with the apparently 'extraordinary and 
astounding' proofs of Prot agoras, Zeno, Melissus and Gorgias, Isocrates says: 
they have caused mendacity to increase to such a degree that now certain men, 
seeing these persons [the sophists] prospering from such practices, have the 
effrontery to write that the life of beggars and exiles is more enviable than that 
of the rest of mankind, and they use this as proof that, if they can speak ably on 
ignoble subjects, it follows that in dealing with subjects of real worth they 
would easily fmd abundance of arguments. 67 
He summarizes his attack by asking, 'What sensible man would undertake to praise 
misfortunes?' and responds that it is 'because ofweakness ... that they take refuge in 
such topics' .68 The sophists, Isocrates concludes, have trivialized both the 
philosophically serious defense of theses in paradoxes such as Zeno' s and the 
rhetorically challenging paradoxical praise of a conventionally despised subject in their 
mock encomia of unworthy SUbjects. Isocrates is quick to remind us that he will not 
follow Gorgias, and the other sophists, in his own praise of Helen. He will maintain 
that despite her sullied reputation, she is truly a 'remarkable woman, one who in birth, 
and in beauty, and in renown surpassed all others. ,69 His encomium of Helen, though it 
has chosen a notorious subject, will attempt to praise the acknowledged and undisputed 
virtues which legend reports that she possessed. His undertaking is all the more 
worthwhile because worthy subjects such as high-birth, association with nobility and 
physical beauty, unlike the conventional trivial subjects of the mock encomiasts, are 
difficult to support with original arguments. Isocrates explains, 'While it is easy by 
eloquence to overdo the trivial themes, it is difficult to reach the heights of greatness of 
the others; and while on famous subjects one rarely finds thoughts which no one has 
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previously uttered, yet on trifling and insignificant topics whatever the speaker may 
chance to say is entirely original. ,70 Isocrates has drawn an important distinction 
between his own praise of a conventionally unpraiseworthy subject and those of the 
sophists. His encomium of Helen may be paradoxical, but it is not trivial; and in so far 
as it praises the good qualities possessed by a notorious figure, the term 'mock 
encomium' is inappropriately applied to it. Those encomia, such as Gorgias' praise of 
Helen, which question our ability to discriminate good from bad qualities genuinely 
mock the attempts of philosophers and orators alike to defend the just, praise the 
virtuous and advise the right course of action. These sceptical praises, which affIrm 
neither good nor bad, are properly called mock encomia. 71 
4 
The Rhetorical Encomiast and the Dialectical Paradoxist 
In the prefatory letter to Thomas More of his paradoxical encomium, the Praise 
of Folly (1511), Erasmus cites the works which served as the generic rhetorical model 
for his and other paradoxical encomia ofthe sixteenth century. He mentions Lucian's 
Encomium of the Fly, Polycrates' and Isocrates' apology for the Egyptian tyrant, 
Busirus, and Synesius' Laus Calvitii, all of which treat subjects similar to those 
criticized by Isocrates.72 Erasmus citation of these works provides the standard 
prefatory justification for what, to some, might be considered a trivial work by 
deferring to the authority of those universally respected writers who have produced 
similar works.73 But Erasmus lists other works, such as Homer's parodic Battle of the 
Frogs and Mice, and Plutarch's ironic dialogue between the pig, Gryllus, and Ulysses, 
neither of which are strictly speaking encomia. In addition to associating the Praise of 
Folly with parodies and mock dialogues, Erasmus calls his paradoxical encomium a 
'little declamation' (declamiuncula). 74 In light of Isocrates' insistence that encomia be 
composed according to the principles of epideictic oratory, this mix of literary 
precedents would appear to make specific rhetorical classification of the work 
difficult. 75 The solution to this problem lies in recognizing first, that Erasmus was 
principally interested in placing the levity of his encomium in the company of esteemed 
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authors such as Homer and Lucian in order to preempt accusations of frivolity such as 
Isocrates had leveled against the sophistical mock encomiasts, and second, that he 
never intended to compose the Praise of Folly strictly according to the prescriptions of 
epideictic oratory.76 
What we may [md surprising about Erasmus' otherwise conventional deference 
to classical precedent to countenance the paradox which is to follow, however, is that it 
makes no mention of Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum. This omission cannot be 
attributed to oversight or ignorance as Erasmus' editions of and commentary on the 
Paradoxa Stoicorum were used throughout the sixteenth century.77 The tradition from 
which the Praise of Folly derives did not include non-ironic and philosophically 
speculative works such as the Paradoxa Stoicorum, despite Erasmus' insistence upon 
its moral seriousness in his letters to More and Martin Dorp.78 Thomas Nashe, whose 
'Prayse of the Red Herring' in his Lenten Stuffe (1599) never pretended to attempt any 
morally serious comment, clearly demarcates the generic boundary separating 
paradoxes written in the tradition of the Paradoxa Stoicorum and the paradoxical 
encomia, mock eulogies and parodies cited by Erasmus as precedents for his own 
praise.79 He says: 
Homer of rats and frogs hath heroiqut it; other oaten pipers after him praise of 
the Gnat, the Flea, the Hasil nut, the Grasshopper, the Butterflie, the Parrot, the 
Popiniay, Phillip sparrow, and the Cuckowe; the wantonner sort of them sing 
descant on their mistris gloue, her ring, her fanne, her looking glasse, her 
pantofle ... Phylosophers come sneaking in with their paradoxes of pouertie, 
imprisonment, death, sicknesse, banishment, and baldnesse, and as busie they 
are about the bee, the storke, the constant turtle, the horse, the dog, the ape, the 
asse, the foxe, and the ferret. 80 
Nashe claims jokingly that his 'catalogue of wast authours' is cited merely to illustrate 
that tradition has countenanced the activity of praising and defending things as 
apparently unworthy as his red herring, but it is significant in light of his association of 
paradoxes with philosophers, that he calls his own work an encomium. 81 In so doing, 
Nashe, like Erasmus, announces that the work which is to follow is not properly a 
philosophical work; it is not like Donne's Paradoxes and Biathanatos, Ortensio 
Lando's Paradossi (1543), nor James Sandford's supposed translation of the French 
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Mirrour of Madnes: or a Paradoxe maintaining madnes to be most excellent (1576), a 
philosophical defense, serious or otherwise, of a thesis, which will be properly analysed 
according to a dialectical, not a rhetorical, scheme. 82 
Although Synesius' praise of baldness, which Erasmus does include in his list 
of precedents for his encomium, is called a praise (Laus Calvitii) and is also 
occasionally humorous, its method, we will see, is explicitly related to the method of 
the thesis. 83 It was the insignificance of Synesius' theme which Erasmus believed 
made the Praise of Folly similar to it. In his refutation of the claim of the Paris doctor 
of theology, Josse Clichtove, that his Declamation in Praise of Marriage (1518) treated 
a serious subject with excessive levity, Erasmus insists that the work was merely a 
'declamation devised to develop skill in speaking' and was, therefore, to be judged for 
its merit as an academic exercise.84 In his defense, he again defers to the authority of 
the trivial works of Homer, Isocrates, Lucian, Plutarch and Synesius, maintaining that 
works such as these are useful in 'producing quickness of intellect', despite their 
insignificant subjects.85 The subjects of these paradoxical encomia, mock eulogies and 
parodies are indeed paradoxical, and are related to the fictitious subjects treated in the 
more serious declamatory exercises called suasoriae. We will have more to say about 
suasoriae later, but for now, we need only note that they provided the declaimer with 
practice in disputation for and against particular ethical positions. These exercises, as 
Erasmus is aware, are species of the philosophically serious thesis, of which Cicero's 
Paradoxa Stoicorum are examples. Erasmus argues that because his Praise of Marriage 
was conceived to provide the same valuable practice in defending difficult positions, its 
light theme should be received as approvingly as Synesius' Praise of Baldness. All of 
these types of declamation, paradoxical encomium, parody, mock eulogy and 
suasoriae, serve this useful yet inconsequential purpose. It is for this reason that 
Erasmus criticizes the pedantry of Clichtove's objection that his Praise of Marriage is 
actually an exercise in deliberative rhetoric (suasoria), and therefore, should be called a 
'commendation' or 'exhortation'. 86 Erasmus' asks in response to Clichtove's 
objection, 'Do not exhortations and eulogies fall into the category of rhetorical 
exercises?,87 He then observes that encomia may also be employed in the declamation 
of suasoria, of which he maintains, The Praise of Marriage is an example despite its 
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title.88 Hence, when Erasmus claims that his paradoxical encomia follow in the 
tradition of Synesius, he is merely acknowledging that they have been devised to 
provide practice in defending difficult positions by treating a trivial theme to some 
serious end. He does not claim that their methods are the same, nor indeed, that they 
should follow the rhetorical prescriptions indicated in their titles.89 Had Cicero's 
Paradoxa Stoicorum been a set of declamatory exercises upon trivial subjects, Erasmus 
might have included them in his list of precedents. 
In his 1579 translation of the Laus Calvitii, Abraham Fleming appears to have 
been aware that Synesius' dialectical method distinguished it as a work which did, in 
fact, follow in the philosophical tradition of the paradoxical thesis, and the tradition of 
the Paradoxa Stoicorum. The subtitle which he gives under Laus Calvitii is A 
Paradoxe proving by reason and example that Baldnesse is much better than bushie 
haire. And N ashe after him, must also have been aware of this feature of Synesius' 
method because, as we have seen above, baldness is grouped with the paradoxes of 
Nashe's 'sneaking ... Phylosophers'. As we will see when we examine the logical 
procedure of these sixteenth-century paradoxes with respect to the tradition of 
disputation to which they refer, the paradox was a philosophical enterprise which 
addressed itself specifically to dialectical problems. As Donne had explained in his 
ninth paradox, the paradox represented a species of formal disputation by which we 
'are acertaind of all disputable doubts, ... by arguing, and differing in opinion' .90 And 
as Aristotle and Isocrates had observed, the exposure of doubt through the defense of a 
paradoxical belief (thesis) was the particular objective of the sceptical dialectician. As 
we will see later in this study, Erasmus' Praise of Folly, though explicitly concerned 
with the contentions of the scholastic philosophers, does not attempt to participate in 
their disputes; nor does it value the doubtful Aristotelian dialectic according to which 
they argue. Erasmus was not interested in writing paradoxes because they utilize 
dialectic in order to highlight the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of using logic to 
prove a thesis with certainty, a point which the sceptical Cicero was happy to highlight 
in his Paradoxa Stoicorum. 
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5 
Sceptical Dissent and the Proof of Paradoxes 
In the Topics, Aristotle had restricted the use of dialectic to matters of opinion, 
matters such as those treated in the theses of the 'eminent philosophers', which could 
never be demonstrated to be true or false beyond all doubt. 91 In the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum, Cicero's attempt to render the ethical theses of the Stoics amenable to the 
common opinion represents his objection to their dismissal of doubt in the dialectical 
exposition of their apparent paradoxes. The source of his objection is his adherence to 
the scepticism of Cam eades' (c. 214-129 B.c.) New Academy, a philosophical 
allegiance which, we will see, determined his views on the role of rhetoric in the 
investigation of matters of philosophy. The history of scepticism and its influence on 
the thought of the sixteenth century is a vast subject which cannot be examined in great 
detail here. However, if we are to understand the epistemological issues to which 
Cicero was addressing his rhetorical exposition of the Stoic paradoxa (an exposition, it 
will be remembered, which constitutes the origin of the paradox as a distinct prose 
form), we must briefly summarize the principles of the two main forms of scepticism, 
the Academic and the Pyrrhonist. The principles of Academic scepticism are detailed 
most fully in Cicero's Academica. The dogmatic dialectic of the Stoics, to which 
Academic methods of dissent were principally applied, is also discussed in the 
Academica as well as in De Finibus, Tusculan Disputations and the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum. In addition to the information provided by Cicero, the dialectical principles 
of both the Academics and the Stoics are described by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of 
the Eminent Philosophers. Until Henri Estienne's Latin translation of Sextus 
Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism appeared in 1562, the principles of Pyrrhonist 
scepticism were unknown to those who could not read Greek.92 In 1569, Gentian 
Hervet, produced a Latin edition of both the Outlines and Sextus' other work, Against 
the Mathematicians, and with it, the standard classical texts to which the late sixteenth-
32 
century student would refer for an account of both Academic and Pyrrhonist scepticism 
were finally widely available.93 
While the Academica, De Finibus and Tusculan Dipsutations attack Stoic logic 
for its claim to achieve certainty, the Paradoxa represents Cicero's attempt to illustrate 
how the bare syllogisms by which the Stoics defend their positions may be made to 
appear probable by Cicero's own 'oratorical style of discourse' .94 Though Cicero's 
scepticism was incompatible with Stoic logic, he accepted the tenets of Stoic ethics 
which he defended in the Paradoxa because they agreed with his own Academic ethics. 
He explains in the Academica that 'the Stoic theory should be deemed a correction of 
the Old Academy rather than actually a new system', because its founder, Zeno, held 
that 'happiness lies in virtue alone' in agreement with 'the whole of the great 
philosophy of antiquity' including proto-Academics such as Socrates, Aristotle and the 
Peripatetics, as well as members of the Old Academy such as Plato and Polemo, Zeno's 
teacher. 95 Under Polemo (315-273 B.C.), Zeno studied the ethical tenets of the Old 
Academy and began to devise a dialectic which could be used to prove them beyond 
the doubt traditionally held necessarily to accompany their positive assertion. What 
resulted was an ethical doctrine which Cicero would recognize to be both dogmatic and 
paradoxical, dogmatic because it maintained its own absolute certainty, and paradoxical 
because the universality of its tenets could not be deemed acceptable to the common 
opinion.96 Arcesilaus (316-242 B.C.), a fellow pupil of Zeno under Polemo and 
founder of the Middle Academy, extended the method of doubt initiated by Socrates 
and Plato by focusing his polemic on the dialectical innovations of Zeno. 97 Though 
Arcesilaus left no significant philosophical writings, his attack on Zeno' s dialectic 
began a tradition in Academic logic which would bind it tightly to Stoicism as a foil. 
This tradition was expanded when Cameades (214-129 B.C.), the founder of the New 
Academy to which Cicero claimed allegiance, attacked the sophistications of Stoic 
dialectic introduced by Chryssipus (280-207 B.C.), the third head of the Stoa. As 
Cicero explains in his defense of Cameades in the Academica, Chryssipus' innovations 
were of a piece with those of his forerunner, Zeno; they both attempt to defend the 
ethics of the Old Academy within the seemingly irrefutable logical structure of the 
syllogism. 
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The objective for both Zeno and Chryssipus in employing the syllogism was to 
combat the uncertainty which their respective Academic masters, Polemo and 
Arcesilaus, had insisted necessarily accompanies their ethical doctrine.98 As Aristotle 
had formulated it in the Prior Analytics, a syllogism is an argument which reaches a 
conclusion which follows necessarily from an acceptance of its premises.99 According 
to Aristotle, a valid syllogism must have at least one universal premise and at least one 
affirmative premise. 100 If a syllogism must make both a universal statement such as 
'every A is B' or 'no A is B' and an affirmative statement such as 'some A is B' or 
'every A is B', however, it should not be difficult to see why the sceptic, who doubts 
the affmnability of any statement, would deny the certainty and necessity of syllogistic 
demonstrations. 101 It is considerably more difficult, however, to appreciate 
comprehensively the various grounds upon which the sceptic would maintain a position 
of uncertainty (akatalepsia) and consequently insist upon a suspension of judgement 
(epoche).102 These various grounds would eventually be systematized by the most 
extreme sceptics, the Pyrrhonists, into sets of modes of argumentation to which the 
sceptic could refer to undermine specific classes of dogmatic assertion. These sets, 
however, are hardly less various than the grounds of which they are meant to be 
collections. Aenesidemus (early 1st century B.C.), the resurrector ofPyrrhonism from 
the dogmatism of Antiochus' (130-68 B.C.) Fourth Academy, reputedly devised ten 
general modes of sceptical dissent as well as eight specific modes devoted to 
undermining aetiological claims alone. 103 Agrippa (end of 1st century B.C.), his 
follower, is said to have distilled Aenesidemus' ten modes to five modes. Finally 
Sextus himself offered his own distillation of Agrippa's five modes to twO.104 
Like Cicero, Sextus did not doubt that the dogmatic tenets of the Stoics could 
achieve a degree of plausibility, but he went further than Cicero in insisting that no 
position could be demonstrated to be any more plausible than any other; Sextus' 
method of sceptical dissent entailed an absolute relativism which Cicero's notion of 
moral and civic responsibility could not have tolerated. In the Outlines, he says of 
Plato's much disputed lapse from true scepticism into a form of dogmatism, that 'ifhe 
commits to them [assertions about the Forms, the existence of Providence or the 
virtuous life being preferable to vice] as being more plausible, he has abandoned the 
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distinctive character of Scepticism, since he is giving something preference in point of 
convincingness and lack of convincingness' . 105 In his third paradox, Cicero's 
dissimilarity to Sextus on this point is evident when he asks, 'On matters of moral good 
ought we to inquire what is the opinion of the porters and labourers, or of persons of 
the highest learning? especially as this opinion is not only the truest [verior] that can be 
discovered but even the most serviceable for the conduct of life. ,106 Though Sextus 
would certainly have objected to Cicero's comment because of its deference to 
authority for the verification of even probable claims, the most conspicuous difference 
is revealed in Cicero's use of verior or truest; to Sextus, the truest, or most probable, 
position could never be ascertained by proof, from principles, examples or authority. 
As we will see, Donne will parody the efforts of scholastic philosophers such as 
Raymond Lull and Raymond Sebond, to escape the problems of probabilism (and its 
cognate doctrine of relativism) by restricting the denotation of superlatives. This 
restriction, Donne will show, produces syllogisms which appear to have distributed 
middle terms, but which still fail to demonstrate the univocity of those terms. Donne's 
implicit rejection of this solution to probabilism is reflected later in his serious 
advocacy of a limited probabilism in Biathanatos, an advocacy which will be 
contrasted to the Pyrrhonist scepticism of sixteenth-century fideists such as Erasmus, 
Cornelius Agrippa, Ortensio Lando and Montaigne. To the fideist devoted to 
undermining the independent power of rational discourse to reveal truth, Sextus' 
Pyrrhonist scepticism will succeed where Cicero's Academic probabilism failed, for as 
Augustine knew, probabilism enables its adherents to claim a vague awareness of 
'resemblance to truth' (aliquid veri simile), while permitting the possibility of error 
because of the unreliability of the senses. 107 To the dogmatist (such as Augustine was 
to become after his refutation of scepticism in Against the Academicians), probabilism 
is ethically problematic because it forgives sin through an unjustified appeal to human 
ignorance, but to the Pyrrhonist, it presents a logical problem precisely because such an 
appeal to ignorance is justified. As we will see when we examine the attack of 
sixteenth-century advocates of ignorance such as Erasmus, Agrippa and Lando, on the 
vain attempts of the schoolmen to demonstrate the certainty of Christian moral 
principles using Aristotelian syllogistic, appeals to faith as the sole means by which the 
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mind may apprehend the paradoxes of Christian doctrine derive ultimately from a 
sceptical recognition of the insoluble contentiousness of all doctrine. The Stoics 
claimed that their ethics were demonstrable by syllogism; the Academics, suspicious of 
the capacity of the senses to perceive and the intellect to comprehend truly, could offer 
no more than a doctrine of probability to lend rational support to Stoic ethics; and the 
Pyrrhonists asserted most boldly that such a doctrine of probability relies on an ability 
to recognize resemblances to truth which human beings do not have. In response to the 
doubt raised by scepticism concerning the knowability of moral principles, Augustine 
adopted Plato's theory of recollection in order to support a doctrine of illumination 
which could confirm the certainty of the principles he found stated so axiomatically 
(yet ambiguously) in scripture. But far from offering a cognitive theory that could 
secure reliability for the senses and the principles derived inductively from them, 
Augustine's theory of knowledge relied upon an initial motion of faith in the possibility 
of certain knowledge, a motion which requires the doubting Christian to assert the 
suspiciously paradoxical credo ut intelligam. 
6 
The Pyrrhonist Use of Paradox 
In 1520, the Examen Vanitatis Doctrinae Gentium of the Italian humanist 
Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola was published. In it, Pico follows the principles 
outlined in the Greek version of Sextus' Outlines and Against the Mathematicians to 
attack the power of Aristotelian logic to yield necessary conclusions. lOS The Examen 
Vanitatis is the first work to employ Sextus' sceptical writings in an attempt to 
undermine the foundations of Aristotelian logic, and will be followed, we will see, by a 
number of works which utilize Hervet's Latin Sextus for similarly destructive 
reasons.109 With respect to the validity of the logical backbone of Aristotelian 
metaphysics, the demonstration per causam, Pico employs a method clearly derived 
from Sextus: 
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If you say that you have come to recognize the one through the other [i.e. cause 
through effect], and this in different ways and confusedly at first and then 
distinctly, you go around in a circle. For, if you say that he first uses sense and 
then, intellect, how will what he stated be true, that the demonstration per 
causam is more certain than demonstration per effectum, since to prove this he 
uses no other foundation than that of sense? But surely you will say that sense 
is the prior way, intellect the surer and more proper. But you cannot deny that it 
is credited to sense. Therefore, all certitude will depend on sense, which 
perceives the effect through which the cause is known. I 10 
As we have seen, Sextus explains in the Outlines that all of the modes of sceptical 
dissent may be reduced to two, the reciprocal and the infinite. Both modes insist on an 
acceptable standard of judgement to be established before an inference can be drawn. 
The reciprocal mode results in the question-begging circularity condemned by Pico 
above by maintaining that a standard by which judgements can be made must be 
confirmable as such by another standard, but that these two standards cannot confirm 
each other. III Hence, because the senses, which perceive effects, are not reliable, they 
cannot be trusted to provide a standard by which to judge the conclusions of the 
intellect concerning the causes of those effects; but because the intellect derives its 
information about the phenomenal world from the unreliable senses, its standards of 
judgement cannot be trusted to lead to certain conclusions about the causes which 
explain the effects initially perceived by the senses. The infinite mode is an 
anticipation of the dogmatist's attempt to avoid the circularity of mutual confirmation 
by positing a distinct proximate standard of judgement for every conclusion. 
According to this mode, both Sextus and Pico would argue that the standard by which 
effects are judged per causam is derived ultimately from the senses, and consequently, 
requires another standard for its confirmation. I 12 To avoid the reciprocal mode, the 
dogmatist will offer another standard derived from the senses to confirm his initial 
standard, which in turn will require yet another standard and so on ad infinitum. Under 
the heading 'What are the Two Modes,' therefore, Sextus concludes, 'If that by means 
of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means 
of something else, they [the sceptics] throw you into the reciprocal or infinite mode.' 113 
Later in the Outlines, Sextus will extend his attack on standards of judgement to their 
conjunction in syllogistic arguments. He says of the formal validity of such an 
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argument that 'we shall not recognize whether the argument is probative if we do not 
possess an undisputed judgement on conditionals by which to judge whether the 
conclusion follows the conjunction of the assumptions of the argument.' 114 Sextus' 
attack does not stop with the indemonstrability of conditionals, however, for the ground 
upon which his two fundamental modes of dissent is based is the denial of any end to 
the infinite regression or reciprocation in proofs which claim unequivocal signification. 
If such an end were found, the dogmatist would have a first principle from which to 
begin to deduce conclusions with certainty from which he could, in turn, deduce other 
conclusions with certainty and so on towards a system of knowledge which could claim 
a foundation in truth. 1 IS To complete his critique, Sextus must attack the fundamental 
elements of meaning, the irreducible constituents of intelligibility, signs. 
Under the heading 'Are there any indicative signs?' Sextus presents the 
Pyrrhonist refutation of the Stoic theory of the' sayable' or lekton. 116 After 
acknowledging the Stoics as the only dogmatic school that has 'treated the matter [of 
the sign] accurately', he provides their definition of the lekton and their understanding 
of its relation to the conditional statements which comprise their syllogistic proofs. 
A sign is a pre-antecedent statement in a sound conditional, revelatory of the 
consequent. They say that a statement is a self-contained sayable [lekton] 
which is assertoric so far as it itself goes and that a sound conditional is one 
which does not begin from a truth and end with a falsity ... They call pre-
antecedent the antecedent in a conditional which begins from a truth and ends in 
truth. It is revelatory of the consequent since 'This woman is lactating' is 
thought to make clear 'This woman has conceived' in the conditional 'If this 
. I . hi h . d ,117 woman IS actatmg, t s woman as conceIve . 
Though Sextus would dispute the certitude of this conditional, for the sake of 
representing the Stoic concept of the lekton, he provides an example in which it appears 
clear that a consequent (i.e. 'this woman has conceived') is implicit in its antecedent 
(i.e. 'this woman is lactating'). Proofs, which Sextus calls kinds of signs, can be 
constructed to demonstrate the self-evidency of lekta. 118 These proofs will take the 
form of any of the five unprovables which Sextus claims ground the whole of Stoic 
dialectic; 'if they are rejected,' he says, 'the whole of dialectic is overthrown.' 119 
Sextus goes on to argue that if the Stoics maintain that the truth of 'self-contained 
sayables' (lekta) can be demonstrated by proofs, they attempt to prove the uncertain 
(the reality of lekta) by a conjunction of these same uncertainties (i.e. a conditional 
syllogism whose major premise contains a lekton in the antecedent position). 120 For 
instance, the above example rendered in the form of the first unprovable given by 
Sextus would read: 
If this woman is lactating, she has conceived. 
But she is lactating. 
Therefore, she has conceived. 121 
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In light of Sextus' critique, this syllogism may be refuted by the reciprocal mode of 
dissent because it is never certain that the woman is, in fact, lactating. The syllogistic 
demonstration of the conjunction of these premises (both of which contain the lekton in 
dispute) cannot conclude necessarily because the evidence expressed in the whole of 
the minor premise and in the antecedent of the major is considered unclear. 122 We will 
examine the sceptical reasons for doubting the clarity of this evidence in our discussion 
of the Stoic theory of phantasia, but suffice it for now to say that Sextus believed that 
the five unprovables of the Stoics were unable to demonstrate the correspondence of 
lekta with reality. 
The five unprovables provide the laws of inference which underpin the whole of 
Stoic dialectic. Like Aristotle's four 'perfect' syllogisms of the first figure, the 
unprovable arguments of the Stoics needed no proof themselves 'since', as Sextus 
describes them, 'their validity is immediately clear' .123 In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle 
says of syllogisms of the first figure that they' [need] nothing other than what has been 
stated to make the necessity evident' and 'that all the imperfect deductions are made 
perfect by means of the first figure.' 124 The importance to Stoic and Peripatetic logic of 
the five unprovables and the four perfect moods of syllogism cannot be underestimated, 
for it was from the self-evident necessity of arguments of these forms that arguments 
derived from them obtained their claim to demonstrability. Cicero recognized the 
importance of the unprovables as a foundation for the dialectic of the Stoics observing 
that they generated 'innumerable conclusions' from which 'almost the whole of 
[dialectic]' is derived. 125 Even more fundamental than the unprovables, however, are 
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sayables (Zekta), for it is their accurate representation of reality which permits the 
unprovables to demonstrate something which also accurately reflects reality. Similarly, 
for Aristotle's syllogisms of the first figure to obtain categorically rather than merely 
hypothetically, the predicates which are said to belong to subjects in categorical 
propositions must belong to them independent of their definition as such.126 When we 
examine Peter Ramus' rejection of Aristotle's distinction between definitions which are 
neither certain nor demonstrable, and axioms which are certain though indemonstrable, 
we will see that Aristotle recognized that these definitions could not claim the 
correspondence with external reality necessary to establish their unerring reliability as 
first principles. Significantly, Aristotle called these definitions theses, and by so doing, 
confirmed that the paradoxical doctrines (theses) argued by the philosophers could not 
escape the uncertainty which necessarily attended their dialectical exposition. Thus, 
these definitions remained bound to the realm of opinion (doxa) and disputation, unlike 
the self-evident axioms from which Ramus would claim all human knowledge was 
derived. Though Ramus' reformulated Aristotelian dialectic would not allow an 
inductive source for our knowledge of universals, Aristotle's empiricism permitted him 
to acknowledge that 'it is clear that it is necessary for us to become familiar with the 
primitives [fundamental universals such as "animal"] by induction; for perception too 
instils the universal in this way.'127 The certainty of Aristotle's categorical 
demonstrations, therefore, was ultimately derived from a belief in the accuracy ofthe 
universal principles which we derive from our observation of particular external 
objects. Some principles, such as the law of non-contradiction, though apprehended by 
means of the senses, are recognized to be self-evident; these conclusions are called 
axioms. Others, however, such as the disputed definitions (theses) of the philosophers, 
never obtain this se1f-evidency, and remain bound to the fallible perceptions and 
questionable inferences from which they were derived. 
According to Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, the Stoic defmition of the [ekton 
verified its correspondence to reality in much the same way as Aristotle's explanation 
of the role of perception in the establishment of universals had verified our natural 
capacity to differentiate particulars, retain these differentiations in memory, and 
abstract universals from them. 128 The underlying assumption is that our perceptions are 
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reliable enough to yield by induction accurate abstractions of universals. 129 The 
mechanism which insures the accurate correspondence of the lekton with its object in 
Stoic epistemology is phantasia. As Cicero explains in Lucullus' defense of Stoic 
dialectic, to avoid the condition of uncertainty (akatalepton), we must assume that the 
perceptions which we receive through our senses are accurate, and therefore, are 
capable of producing an accurate presentation (phantasia). The Stoic definition of 
phantasia, as Cicero and Diogenes render it, resembles Aristotle's definition of 
perception in De Anima. 130 According to Cicero, Zeno' s definition of phantasia is 'a 
presentation impressed and moulded from the object from which it came in a form such 
as it could not have if it came from an object that was not the one that it actually did 
come from,.131 Diogenes gives the Stoic definition as 'an imprint on the soul: the name 
having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the 
wax.,132 Diogenes continues by distinguishing presentations which reflect reality and 
those which do not, but indicates later, when summarizing the view of Chrysippus, that 
the proper Stoic definition of phantasia is 'that which comes from a real object, agrees 
with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, 
as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object'. 133 As we will see when we 
examine his discussion of Aristotle's theory of perception in relation to the discovery 
of the first principles of ethics, Aquinas' epistemology could not accept that the human 
mind was incapable of certain knowledge of universal principles because of their 
apparent derivation from the senses. Because of his mistrust of the senses, however, 
Sextus could not approve the correspondence between our perceptions and external 
objects, and therefore, rejected the capacity ofthe lekton to provide the objective 
confirmation of the propositions which comprised the Stoic unprovables. 134 Without 
this capacity, his two modes of sceptical dissent, reciprocity and infinite regress, cannot 
be refuted; the result, we recall, is that 'the whole of dialectic is overthrown,.135 If 
dialectic is the art of disputing well, the surest way to overthrow it is to show that no 
single line of reasoning is more convincing than any other; and the way to demonstrate 
this equipollence is to be able to argue convincingly on either side of a given question. 
Cicero had celebrated this ability in his praise of the sceptic's use of dialectic in the 
Academica, but his insistence on our ability to perceive likenesses to truth (aliquid 
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verisimile) allowed him to maintain that dialectic, though unable to prove one position 
to be true and another false, was still capable of helping its practitioner to discern the 
universal issues underlying particular circumstances and to determine which of many 
options was most likely to be correct. It is for this reason, we will see, that he 
considers dialectic to be ars omnium artium maxima. 136 
7 
The Scepticism of Gorgianic Rhetoric 
Gorgias boasted of his ability to speak persuasively on any subject, not in order 
to exhibit the virtue of dialectic but to illustrate its impotency with respect to the power 
of his sophistical rhetoric. 137 Though Gorgias' Encomium of Helen does not explicitly 
attack the dialectical procedure which he and his followers had found so deceptive in 
Plato's Gorgias, it does assert that the mind may easily fall prey to the deception of 
appearances. As a preface to his defense of Helen's submission to her physical desire, 
he states that 'things that we see do not have the nature which we wish them to have 
but the nature which each of them actually has; and by seeing them the mind is 
moulded in its character too. ' 138 Gorgias is not expressing the realist view that our 
perceptions correspond accurately with external objects here, for he makes clear that he 
believes that the nature of the 'things that we see' is bestowed upon them by whomever 
or whatever is creating the image. Hence, he goes on to instance how the mere vision 
of an army fully prepared for battle may instill a fear which causes 'people [to] flee in 
panic when some danger is imminent as if it were present. ,139 He says that these 
mistaken impressions 'moulded' on the mind are so powerful that they have driven 
many 'into groundless distress and terrible illness and incurable madness; so deeply 
does sight engrave on the mind images of actions that are seen. ,140 The love which 
compelled Helen's infidelity, he likens to the fear which has driven so many to commit 
mad deeds, but more importantly to our discussion, he maintains that the skillful orator 
may also 'mould ... the mind in the way it wishes' and cause emotions like those by 
which the fearful and the love-struck are persuaded to action. 141 Furthermore, such 
skillful (and deceitful) orators are not to be found speaking only in rhetorical 'contests 
conducted by means of speeches' where persuasion irrespective of truth is to be 
expected, but they will also be found speaking with equal disregard for the truth in 
debates on topics of astronomy and philosophy. 142 Like the paradoxes of Melissus or 
Zeno cited by Aristotle and Isocrates, and those of the Stoics, which Cicero will 
examine in his philosophical works, the doctrines of the astronomers succeed in 
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, [making] the incredible and obscure become clear' by 'demolishing ... and establishing' 
beliefs, while those of the philosophers prove equally unstable by relying on their 
'quick-wittedness' .143 Though Gorgias explains that none of these doctrines constitute 
anything more than an opinion which may be manipulated to appear more or less 
credible depending on the agenda of the speaker, he never identifies who he thinks 
speaks truth or how that truth might be spoken. 
In the now lost On What is Not, Gorgias might have revealed why he was 
reluctant to make such an identification. According to the pseudo-Aristotelian 
Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, in On What is Not, Gorgias argued that 'nothing 
exists; and even if anything were to exist, nothing is knowable; and even if anything 
were knowable, no one could indicate to another; firstly because things are not words, 
and secondly because no one can have in his mind the same thing as someone else.' 144 
According to this account of Gorgias' treatise, the arguments 'are concerned with 
difficulties raised by earlier philosophers, so that in examining their views these 
questions have to be discussed. ,145 In Against the Mathematicians, Sextus also 
discusses the arguments of On What is Not. His account of the arguments themselves 
is essentially the same as that reported in Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, but his 
conclusion regarding the ramifications of the arguments reveal the radically sceptical 
ends toward which he believes Gorgias may have been working. In keeping with 
Aristotle's description of the paradoxical beliefs of the philosophers, the account of the 
Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias maintains only that Gorgias' arguments in On 
What is Not were intended to indicate specific incompatibilities within the body of 
controversial philosophy, and therefore, were not attempting a demonstration of the 
groundlessness of all truth claims. Sextus, however, concludes that 'if we go by them 
[the difficulties raised by Gorgias] the criterion of truth is swept away; for there can be 
no criterion of that which neither exists nor can be known nor is naturally capable of 
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being explained to another person.' 146 As we have seen, Sextus' attack on the existence 
of external criteria focuses primarily on the inability of dialectic, such as that which 
underpins the dogmatic ethics of the Stoics, to correspond with reality, ultimately with 
an eye toward demonstrating the Pyrrhonist ethical principle of suspension of belief 
(epoche).147 Hence, if Gorgias' philosophical treatise did indeed radically undermine 
Stoic ethics with a sceptical critique amenable to Sextus' Pyrrhonism, the difference 
between the Gorgianic paradox and the Stoic paradoxes defended by Cicero becomes 
clear; for Cicero's more moderate Academic scepticism permitted him to defend the 
probability (aliquid veri simile) of the Stoic paradoxa without committing him to an 
acceptance of their certainty, a certainty which the Stoics believed the logical necessity 
of their dialectical demonstrations secured. 148 
By the time Donne was writing his Paradoxes, the distinct ends to which 
Academic and Pyrrhonist scepticism could be applied had been clearly delineated. 149 
The probabilism advocated by Cicero's Academic scepticism remained the underlying 
epistemology of ecclesiastics and lawyers alike arguing for and against the 
controverted points of both civil law and case divinity. This underlying distrust of 
human reason's ability infallibly to apply general laws to particular circumstances 
derived support in the realm of civil law from the model of the scrupulous republican 
lawyer, Cicero, and in the realm of case divinity, from the Aristotelian ethics of 
Aquinas. The authority of Cicero, Aquinas and Aristotle could be invoked to promote 
a program of prudence based on rationally discoverable probabilities, which answered 
sceptical attacks on certain moral knowledge, but only if it was conceded that some 
notion of moral truth was within the grasp of human reason. As we will show, though 
Donne rej ected the universal applicability of the law prohibiting suicide in Biathanatos, 
he does so in order to demonstrate how some particular deductions from divinely 
instituted moral laws, which are discerned in the clear light of nature, and therefore 
known with certainty, may contravene human laws, derived solely from custom. The 
closer the deductive proximity of human laws to their source in the first principles of 
God and nature, Donne argues, the greater the degree of probability they may claim. 
Implicit in this argument is a confidence in the self-evidency of certain 
fundamental principles and the likelihood of conclusions deduced from them which 
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neither Donne's nor Cicero's ethics will ever question; what their sceptical misgivings 
will question, however, is the means by which such fundamental principles can be 
established as certain and the extent to which dialectic can reliably be utilized to 
deduce solutions to particular moral problems. As we will see, Cicero follows 
Cameades in his rejection of the certainty of all truth claims, and on this point, Donne, 
not surprisingly, will have to stray from Cicero. However, Cicero also followed 
Cameades in his acceptance of the probability of some truth claims, and on this point, 
Donne could, both as lawyer and divine, also follow. Contrastly, the Pyrrhonist 
position outlined by Sextus, could not admit assertions of probability because such 
assertions implicitly rely on an unattainable knowledge of the criteria of truth. As we 
will see, sixteenth-century sceptics who employ the destructive dialectical techniques 
of Pyrrhonism to attack Aristotelian logic do so at the peril of rationally derived human 
knowledge, and consequently, will be forced to seek another source of knowledge to 
insure the possibility of right moral action. These issues will be examined at length 
below and are briefly mentioned here to emphasize the gravity of the threat posed by 
Gorgias' scepticism to ethical systems which defend their principles dialectically. As 
this study proceeds it will become increasingly clear that the gulf which divided 
Gorgias' sophistical rhetoric and Socrates' analytical dialectic continued to separate 
Academics and Pyrrhonists throughout the sixteenth century, and will ultimately find 
expression in Donne's choice in Biathanatos of an ethical program informed by 
Thomist rather than Augustinian epistemological principles. 
8 
Gorgianic Rhetoric and Socratic Dialectic 
In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates' critique of the capacity of Gorgias' rhetoric to 
lead his pupils to a discovery of virtue exposes the insufficiency of rhetoric as a reliable 
guide to truth and establishes dialectic as the means to demonstrating that insufficiency. 
In the process of his inquiry into the real end of rhetoric, which all agree is to persuade 
regardless of philosophical concerns about ethics, Socrates announces that the mode of 
discourse which he practices is above all concerned with the elimination of falsehood 
through instruction. He says that he is: 
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One of those who would gladly be refuted if anything I say is not true, and 
would gladly refute another who says what is not true, but would be no less 
happy to be refuted myself than to refute, for I consider that a greater benefit, 
inasmuch as it is a greater boon to be delivered from the worst of evils oneself 
than to deliver another. ISO 
The worst of evils, Socrates goes on to explain, is a 'false opinion' on the subject of 
ethics, the science of good and bad. It is this commitment to truth, irrespective of the 
rhetorical goal of persuasion typical of forensic oratory, which most clearly marks the 
distinction between Socratic dialectic and Gorgianic rhetoric. According to Socrates, it 
is a characteristic ability of forensic oratory (the class of rhetoric most consistently 
attacked in the Gorgias) to defend the evil-doer in such a way as to prevent him from 
being justly punished. lSI Gorgias' irritable pupil, Callicles, retorts by asserting that 
despite its disregard for the truth of the matter, only rhetoric can provide the good and 
the evil man alike protection from punishment, and emphasizes his point by claiming 
that the brevity of Socrates' method of dialectical questioning will leave him ' [reeling] 
to and fro and [gaping] openmouthed, without a word to say .. .if anyone should ... drag 
[him] off to prison, claiming [he] is guilty when [he] is not' .IS2 It is this opposition 
between the truth-seeking method of Socratic dialectic and Gorgias' forensic 
rhetorician's ability to argue persuasively for or against any position which moves 
Cicero to complain in De Ora tore that rhetoricians have been left nothing more than 
the convoluted legal problems of the forensic causae (controversiae) to occupy 
them.IS3 The general philosophical issues underlying these particular legal cases are to 
be analyzed in the form of theses by dialecticians, such as the Stoics, who have little 
regard for positions argued oratorically. We will say more about the difference 
between controversiae and theses when we discuss the effort to reconcile the interests 
of rhetoric and dialectic initiated by Cicero and Quintilian. 
What we must observe at the moment is that the Gorgianic rhetorician judges 
the dialectic of Socrates to be inadequate for the same two reasons for which Cicero 
will condemn the dialectic of the Stoics in his preface to the Paradoxa Stoicorum. The 
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first and most conspicuous reason is that it lacks rhetorical elaboration, and thus, will 
fail to arouse the emotions necessary to move its hearers to a sympathetic position; a 
purely dialectical exposition consists solely of a series of brief questions 
(interrogatiunculae, quaestiunculae) and answers (conclusiunculae) designed to test 
the truth and validity of the assertions comprising the premises and conclusions of 
specific arguments. In the Gorgias, Socrates conspicuously juxtaposes his dialectical 
procedure to the elaborate rhetorical procedure of his interlocutors by requesting that 
they 'continue [their] present method of conversing by question and answer, 
postponing to some other occasion lengthy discourses of the type begun by Polus 
[Gorgias' pupil]' .154 After Gorgias complies with Socrates' wishes, Socrates responds 
delighted, 'By Hera, Gorgias, I marvel at your answers; they could not be briefer.' ISS 
Though we will certainly want to acknowledge a touch of sarcasm here, the brevity of 
the dialectical method was one of the similarities which Cicero noticed when, in the 
preface to the Paradoxa Stoicorum, he claimed the Stoic paradoxa 'to be in the highest 
degree Socratic' .156 There he complained, as Callicles had in the Gorgias, that Cato' s 
method of demonstrating his case 'by means of tiny little interrogatory pin-pricks 
[minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis]', was, at least potentially, ineffective in the 
law-courts or assembly. 157 
The second reason that Cicero condemns the dialectical exposition of the Stoic 
virtues is that such an exposition, stripped of the rhetorically elaborated explanations of 
the senses in which their various terms are being deployed, results in the appearance of 
a paradox. For Polus, a faithful adherent to Gorgias' principle that the majority view 
constitutes the standard of truth, the paradoxicality of Socrates' ethical assertions is 
sufficient for their refutation. He asks, 'Do you not consider yourself already refuted, 
Socrates, when you put forward views that nobody would accept?' 158 Callicles 
similarly attacks the divergence of Socrates' positions from the common opinion when 
he says, 'If you are serious and what you say is true, then surely the life of us mortals 
must be turned upside down and apparently we are everywhere doing the opposite of 
what we should.' 159 Yet Socrates remains unperturbed, constantly insisting that the 
opinion of the majority cannot falsify the conclusions which he has reached through the 
rigor of his dialectical process. 160 As we have seen, Cicero noticed that these startling 
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conclusions did not merely resemble the Stoic ethical tenets in their paradoxicality; 
they are, in fact, exactly the same tenets in substance. 161 Over the course of his debate 
in the Gorgias, Socrates asserts the Stoic ethical principles that knowledge is sufficient 
for virtue (460b), and its contrary, that ignorance is the cause of vice (488a), that virtue 
is sufficient for happiness (470e, 507c), that order insures goodness and disorder, evil 
(506c-507a, 508a), and that those who do evil are mad (507a_b).162 Like the Stoic 
paradoxa, Socrates' paradoxes follow as a consequence of his dialectical exposition; 
they are, to use his words, 'buckled fast and clamped together ... by arguments of steel 
and adamant' .163 We should see by now that the Gorgianic paradox described by 
Aristotle, Isocrates and Sextus, which at worst denied the possibility of verifiable 
external truth and at best called such truth into question, differed fundamentally from 
the Socratic paradox, which asserted a conclusion contrary to the common opinion but 
which followed necessarily from its premises. 164 The former, as we have already 
indicated, exploits any and all rhetorical resources to elicit the necessary emotional 
response to persuade its listeners in order to illustrate that we, like Helen, are unable 
accurately to perceive the truth through the impressions which our deceptive senses or 
a deceptive speaker has moulded on our mind. The Gorgianic paradox, as Sextus 
suspected, belies an underlying Pyrrhonism. The Socratic paradox, which as we have 
seen and will see further, is fundamentally the same as the Stoic paradoxa expounded 
by Cicero, and therefore, relies on a dialectical exposition denuded of any rhetorical 
elaboration which extends beyond the clarification of potentially ambiguous critical 
terms. 165 Its confidence in the power of dialectic to justify its paradoxicality indicates 
its reliance on an external standard of truth to which reason must submit in spite of the 
opposition of the common opinion. The Socratic paradox, as both Cicero and the 
Stoics recognized, pointed to a truth which Pyrrhonism could not acknowledge. 166 
9 
Truth and the Confidence of Socratic Paradox 
We have already observed that Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum must have been 
intentionally omitted by Erasmus from his list of precedents justifying the levity of the 
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Praise of Folly because of the underlying dialectical procedure upon which it was 
attempting to expand. This is not to say that Erasmus' Praise has nothing to say about 
the presumptions of logicians who have attempted to manipulate the various senses of 
terms to fit a dialectical demonstration which is supposed to prove a certain moral 
principle. For Erasmus, any attempt to manipulate terms for the sake of rhetorical 
persuasion or dialectical demonstration may result in a false and sophistical claim to 
moral knowledge, which Folly, no longer speaking ironically, roundly condemns. 
Solemnly rehearsing the Christian fideist's deprecation of knowledge, Erasmus says: 
To the same effect is the prohibition of God, the architect of the world, that they 
should not eat any fruit from the tree of knowledge, as if knowledge would 
poison their happiness. For that matter, Paul openly condemns knowledge as 
dangerous because it puffs men up. St. Bernard, I imagine, was following Paul 
when he interpreted the mountain on which Lucifer established his throne as the 
mountain of knowledge. 167 
It is hard to imagine a statement more contrary to the Socratic and Stoic paradoxes 
defended by Cicero in the Paradoxa Stoicorum; if Cicero was genuinely defending the 
views that knowledge is sufficient for virtue and that virtue is sufficient for happiness, 
it is no wonder that Erasmus neglected to include Cicero in his list of models. Erasmus 
was defending another sort of paradox, however, one that would invert the rationalist 
ethics of the Stoics by justifying assertions such as 'only the ignorant are wise' and 'the 
wise man is mad'. As ever, Erasmus is careful to explain that the madness and 
ignorance of the wise man enlightened by the wisdom of God are not to be equated 
with the insanity and anti-rational sensuality of Socrates' fool. On the contrary, he 
says, 'Christians essentially agree with Platonists that the mind is buried and bound in 
bodily chains and that it is prevented by the body's grossness from contemplating and 
enjoying things as they truly are.' 168 Here we begin to detect a trace of that pious 
scepticism, which, when combined with the neoplatonic contempt of the body, will 
allow Erasmus to declare so confidently that the 'happiness which Christians strive for 
with such great effort is no more than a certain kind of madness and folly' .169 When 
we come to our examination of other sceptical sixteenth-century neoplatonists such as 
Agrippa and Lando, we will discover on what points Donne's scepticism differed from 
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theirs and why its expression in dialectical disputations would have appeared to them to 
be a threat to faith. 
Erasmus' familiarity with the paradoxes of Socrates and of the Stoics would 
have been derived from his knowledge of the various classical authors who recorded 
them, writers, such as Cicero, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius, whose 
work comprised the staple diet of students of the sixteenth century. That Donne was 
familiar with these writers needs no argument; nor, therefore, does the claim that he 
was familiar with Gorgias' reputation for maintaining paradoxes which disregarded 
truth in their sophistical rhetoric and Socrates' for maintaining paradoxes which exalted 
the pursuit of truth. 170 Stephen Gosson's comment in The Ephemerides of Phialo 
(1579) reveals a knowledge of the sophist Gorgias, which Donne must certainly have 
shared. 171 When challenged by Philotimo to dispute with the Gorgianically subtle 
Signiora Polyphile, Phialo responds, 'I was neuer Leontinus Gorgias scholer too 
dispute any question on the sodaine, yet if I may haue the trueth on my side, little 
studie shall serue me to wrastle with women.'172 The key to Phialo's victory, as both 
Socrates and Sextus knew, is the firm conviction that there is an objective truth to 
which all arguments must correspond. It is only when we recall Gorgias' comments in 
his Encomium of Helen on the power of sight to overcome the perception of this 
objective truth, that Donne's quibble on 'love' in his sixth paradox 'That the guifts of 
the body are better than those of the mind or of Fortune' reveals its reference to the 
Pyrrhonist scepticism attacked by Socrates in the Gorgias. There Donne says, 'For 
nourishing of Civil Societies and mutual Love amongst men, which is one chiefe end 
why we are men, I say the beauty, proportion, and presence of the body hath a more 
masculine force in begetting this Love than the vertues of the mind.' 'For', he 
continues, 'it strikes us sodainly, and possesseth us immediately' .173 According to 
Gorgias, Helen deserves to be acquitted of her crime precisely because her love was 
begotten by the masculine force of the beauty, proportion and presence of Alexander's 
body.174 The Gorgianic principle, which underpins Donne's statement about the 
persuasive force of the body, is given a few lines later. 'For it is the same to be and to 
seeme vertuous.' 175 In view of the orthodox sixteenth-century assumption that truth, no 
matter how degraded or confused it may appear to the human mind, must be sought 
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with a conviction of its unity, objectivity and universality (as Socrates advised), 
Gosson's reference to Gorgias in The Ephemerides of Phialo reveals the common 
opinion against which Donne's mock Gorgianism must be contrasted to appear 
paradoxical. 176 Donne himself facetiously dismisses this common opinion when he 
criticizes the ability of even 'sound judgement' to discern a true understanding of the 
virtues of chastity, temperance and fortitude without resorting to 'fayth and beleefe ... to 
assure our selves that these vertues are not counterfayted' .177 
In his consideration of the education of the young in the second part of his 
Euphues (1578), 'Euphues and his Euphoebus', John Lyly, following Plutarch's 
'Education of Children', praises the Socratic/Stoic paradoxes.178 'It is vertue', he says, 
'yea, vertue, gentlemen, yt maketh gentlemen, yt maketh poore rich, ye base borne 
noble, the subiect a soueraigne, the deformed beautiful, the sicke whole, the weak 
strong, the most myserable most happy.' 179 To illustrate these paradoxes he cites 
Socrates' response to Gorgias' unparadoxical claim that the mighty king of Persia must 
surely be happy in his riches. 
Unto ye like sence may the answere of Socrates be applyed when Gorgias asked 
him whether he deemed the Persian kinge happy or not, I knowe not sayd he 
how much vertue or discipline he hath, for happiness doth not consist in ye gifts 
of fortune, but in the grace of vertue. 180 
The title of Donne's sixth paradox alone, 'That the guifts of the body are better than 
those of the mind or of Fortune,' should suffice to illustrate that this paradox is simply 
an inversion of this Socratic/Stoic paradox, which had always been and continued to be 
orthodox in Christian ethics. But if there remains any doubt, we may read to the end, 
where Donne explicitly inverts the popularly accepted Socratic/Stoic view. 'So that 
vertue which must be lovd for her selfe and respects no further end, is indeede 
nothing' . 181 There are many such comparisons to be made between Euphues and 
Donne's Paradoxes; so many that their common topics and opposing treatments of 
them must be understood not as evidence of Lyly' s influence on Donne but of a general 
interest in the Socratic/Stoic ethical doctrines of antiquity and the methods of sceptical 
critique which developed in opposition to them. 182 Although Lyly's Euphues was 
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valued in the late sixteenth century principally for its introduction into English of the 
Gorgianic (and Attic) rhetorical techniques of antithesis and balance, it also represents 
a shift away from the piously didactic interest of humanists (such as Erasmus and 
Melanchthon) in putting Greek and Roman wisdom to use in the education of the 
young Christian, and toward a courtly educational interest (exemplified in Lyly and 
Donne) in exploiting the various (and often contradictory) philosophical and ethical 
commonplaces of antiquity, not chiefly as conduits to truth, but as material for the 
exhibition of wit and learning. 
10 
The Clarification of Contraries 
Like Erasmus, however, both Lyly and Donne still maintain a morally edifying, 
instructive purpose for their works. 183 In the 'Epistle Dedicatory' of Euphues, Lyly 
maintains that his antithetical style will 'nothing delight the dayntie eare', but that it is 
all the more valuable for its 'harshnes' .184 Significantly, this harshness arises from an 
antithetical style, which Lyly says, is best suited to convey plain truth. This ability, 
like the ability of the inversions of Donne's Paradoxes to serve as an 'alarum to truth', 
consists in the juxtaposition of contraries. 18S Lyly describes the power of his 
antithetical style to convey plain truth by rehearsing aphorisms whose content defends 
it and whose style illustrates it. 'Thinges of greatest profit are sette foorth with least 
price. Where the Wyne is neete there needeth no Iuie-bush. The right Coral needeth 
no colouring. Where the matter it selfe bringeth credit, the man with his glose winneth 
smal commendation. ' 186 Though he was not writing a paradox, Lyly's awareness that 
truth is most clearly displayed by the contrast of contraries, and that 'neyther is ther any 
thing, but yt hath his contraries', led him to treat subjects such as constancy, perfection, 
the body and the mind, and genuine and apparent virtue, with a sceptical consciousness, 
which implicitly questioned the authority of aphorisms to express more than a relative 
truth. 187 The inexperienced Euphues finds himself caught between the extremes of the 
(true) aphorism spoken by the inconstant Lucilla, 'that she that hath bene faythlesse to 
one will neuer be faythfull to any', and simultaneously encourages her faith (to him) 
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and her faithlessness (to Philautus).188 Euphues, having succeeded in instigating 
Lucilla's inconstancy, foolishly ignores this 'tryall ofhir lyghtenesse', and concludes 
that 'no mortall creature can exceede [her] in constancie' .189 Upon this conclusion he 
declares aphoristically, 'I finde it nowe for a setled truth, which earst I accompted for a 
vaine talk, that the Purple dye will neuer stain, that the pure Cyuet will neuer loose his 
sauour, that the greene Laurell will neuer chaunge his coulour, that beautie can neuer 
bee blotted with discourtesie' .190 The truth of these aphorisms as they relate to Lucilla 
is not just contradicted by the fact of her betrayal of Euphues; they have their own 
contrary aphorisms, which Lucilla, certain of the fact of her inconstancy, recognizes 
must truly and finally contradict Euphues. 'As for feruent loue', she says, 'you knowe 
there is no fire so hotte but it is quenched with water, neyther affection so strong but is 
weakened with reason' .191 
Lucilla's conclusion that her inconstancy was precipitated by reason is precisely 
the argument of Donne's eleventh paradox, 'A Defense ofWomens Inconstancy'. 
There, Donne argues that because those who change most, have most reason, the 
inconstancy of women can be defended on grounds of rationality. Neither Donne nor 
Lyly seriously believe that the inconstancy of women is due to their rationality; such a 
conclusion, to the sixteenth-century mind, is a paradox which can only be validly 
defended if the terms, rationality and inconstancy, are unambiguously defined in senses 
which do not contradict each other. Both Socrates and Cicero defend their paradoxes 
by such manipulation of senses, as do Gorgias and the rest of the eristical sophists 
whom Isocrates in his Helen faulted for 'verbal quibbling'. The difference between 
Socrates' and Cicero's defenses and those of the sophists consists in the former's 
elimination of ambiguity in the interest of truth and the latter's exploitation of 
ambiguity in the interest of novelty. Hence, as Donne advises in his letter to Wotton, 
we must 'resist' paradoxes when we encounter them just as Socrates had when he 
refuted Gorgias and his pupils, and as Cicero had when he defended the Socratic 
paradoxa of the Stoics, by eliminating the ambiguity of the critical terms of their 
arguments. Despite their exhibitions of verbal dexterity, both Lyly and Donne intend 
to eliminate the ambiguity that results in the appearances of paradox by the 
juxtaposition of contraries. 192 Lyly presents his contraries clearly distinguished so that 
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the reader may easily recognize that they do not in fact coexist, and therefore, do not 
result in paradox. Lucilla simply never was constant, and so the aphorisms which 
Euphues used to extol her undying faith were not contradicted by Lucilla's aphorisms; 
they were simply not true of Lucilla, and consequently do not appear to coexist with 
their contraries. Donne leaves to the reader what we will find to be the rather easy task 
of distinguishing his intentionally and obviously combined contraries. 193 
In his ninth paradox, 'That by Discord things increase' , he defers to the 
clarification achieved by Aristotle's juxtaposition of the contraries of generation and 
corruption to argue the relativist position that it is the discordant tension between 
contraries that informs our knowledge of them, that, for example, we only know black 
in contrast to its contrary, white. He asks: 
yf this unity and peace can give increase to things, how mightily is Discord and 
warr to this purpose, which are indeed the only ordinary parents of peace. 
Discord is never so barren that it affords no fruit, for the fall of one State is the 
increase of another; because it is impossible to find a discommodity without any 
advantage as corruption without generation. 194 
Hence, Donne gives his reader a clue to how to resist the conflated contraries of his 
paradoxes; simply identify in what sense one term is contrary to another, and then 
discriminate it from other senses which are not discordant with its contrary term. 195 In 
his Panathenaicus, Isocrates presented a similar paradox of concord. In order to 
reconcile the truth of the principle that 'things which are in themselves always the same 
and never different are to some helpful and to others harmful' with that of the law of 
non-contradiction, that 'it is not conceivable that each thing should have a nature which 
itself is contrary to itself and not the same', Isocrates declares that he will have to run 
the 'risk of appearing to some to say what is quite contrary to the general opinion 
[paradoxa].,196 Isocrates, devoted as he is to speaking truly, makes his listeners aware 
that it is the apparent conflation of contraries that is responsible for any perceived 
paradoxicality. If we recall his complaint about the sophistical arguments of eristics 
such as Melissus and Gorgias, it is small wonder that Isocrates has been so careful to 
warn his listeners not to be fooled by the appearance of a paradox. This warning is 
against an acceptance of the type of absurdity in which the paradoxes of the sophists 
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result, and is clearly echoed in Donne's warning in his letter to Wotton to 'take heed of 
allowing any of them [his paradoxes] least you make another.' 
As Isocrates' speech proceeds, it becomes clear that he is using the term 
'concord' in two senses, one to denote the single-minded commitment of war-mongers, 
such as the Spartans and the Triballians, to the destruction of their enemies, and another 
to denote the contrary of discord. Hence, in so far as the destruction of their enemies 
constitutes discord, Isocrates shows that the concord of the Spartans is the discord of 
their enemies. We should have little difficulty recognizing Isocrates' example of the 
combination of contraries of discord and concord in the passage quoted above from 
Donne's paradox on discord. Isocrates says of the Spartans: 
For by being of one mind amongst themselves regarding the outside world they 
have always striven to set the Hellenes at variance with each other, reducing 
this practice, as it were, to a fme art; and they have always looked upon the 
cruellest of evils which befel the other states as the greatest of boons to 
themselves; for when the states were in such stress, they found it possible to 
manage them as they pleased. 197 
In the end, even Isocrates is not sure whether he has sufficiently dispelled the seeming 
paradox to make the truth of the matter clear to his listeners. To help him to assess 
exactly what position he was arguing, he asks one of his pupils to read his speech. It is 
from the student that ambiguities embedded in paradoxes such as Isocrates' of concord 
are praised for their ability to encourage a philosophical analysis of terms and the 
concepts which they are intended to signify. He says that Isocrates has presented: 
arguments of double meaning, which lend themselves no more to the purpose of 
those who praise than of those who blame, but are capable of being turned both 
ways and leave room for much disputation-arguments the employment of 
which, when one contends in court over contracts for his own advantage, is 
shameful and no slight token of depravity but, when one discourses on the 
nature of man and of things, is honourable and bespeaks a cultivated mind. 198 
Upon theoretical questions, therefore, where clarification is the objective, the 
presentation of paradoxes which appear to collapse the space separating contraries may 
prove to be a useful exercise in the analysis of ambiguous argument. For Isocrates, as 
well as for Donne and Lyly, once this task of discriminating complex contexts and 
ambiguous expressions is complete, the true natures of the various relevant contraries 
must appear much more clearly. 
11 
The Conflation of Contraries 
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However, neither Donne nor Lyly will venture any conclusion regarding these 
true natures which is any more certain than that they are not what is contrary to them; 
this reluctance, as we will see, is the hallmark of Ciceronian sceptic, who, recognizing 
that natures are unknowable in themselves, seeks first, to clarify the senses of 
potentially ambiguous terms through an analysis of context, and then, to deduce 
conclusions which achieve, not certainty, but a degree of probability. Lyly himself 
makes this distinction between probabilities and certain proofs operative in the 
confounded situations of Euphues, reminding the reader that the issues treated there do 
not admit of proof but only of the sceptic's uncertain probabilities. 199 It should not 
surprise us, therefore, that we fmd many of the same issues treated in Donne's 
Paradoxes, and that these issues all bear an essential resemblance to those 
Socratic/Stoic paradoxes defended by Cicero in the Paradoxa Stoicorum in their 
resistance to certain proof and their potential to appear paradoxical through the 
manipulation of ambiguous terms.200 In his first paradox, 'That all things kill 
themselves' , Donne manipulates the Aristotelian idea that after the perfection of a 
particular nature, it ineluctably begins its progress toward death?OI He argues that the 
progress of anything beyond its perfection 'changes the natures and the names', and 
that because 'the best things kill themselves soonest (for no perfection indures) and all 
things labor to this perfection, all travaile to their owne Death' .202 When Lyly writes 
that the 'pestilence doth most ryfest infect the cleerest complection, and the Caterpiller 
cleaueth vnto the ripest fruit' or 'when the prayses of women are at the best, if you 
leaue not, they wyll beginne to fayle', he makes a similar use of Aristotle's idea, as 
does Shakespeare when he writes in his sixth sonnet 'Then let not winter's ragged hand 
deface / In thee thy summer ere thou be distilled. / Make sweet some vial; treasure thou 
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some place / With beauty's treasure ere it be self-killed. ,203 As we will see later in this 
study, the proposition that death follows perfection is true only given a particular 
understanding of the terms 'death' and 'perfection' just as the Socratic/Stoic paradox 
that virtue is sufficient for happiness is only true when the senses in which 'virtue' and 
'happiness' are being deployed are clarified, as Cicero had in the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum?04 
When arguing in his sixth paradox 'That the guifts of the body are better than 
those of the mind or of Fortune' , Donne asserts the typically sceptical view that 'the 
body which thou lovst and esteemst fayre is fayre certainly, and yf it be not fayre in 
perfection, yet it is fayre in the same degree that thy judgement is good. ,205 Here 
Donne is urging precisely the same credulity with respect to the appearances of things 
as he did when he insisted in his second paradox that '[the] Starrs, the Sun, the 
Skye ... are faire because they seeme color'd' .206 From these mock principles of 
gullibility, Donne concludes that: 
in a faire body I do seldome suspect a disproportiond mind, or expect a good in 
a deformed. As when I see a goodly house I assure myself of a worthy 
possessor, and from a ruinous wytherd building I turne away, because it seemes 
eyther stuffd with varlets as a prison, or handled by an unworthy negligent 
tenant. .. 207 
Lyly's Euphues, arguing more conventionally, asks whether outward beauty or inward 
virtue move women to love. He answers, inverting Donne's paradox: 
Certes by how much more the mynde is to be preferred before the body, by so 
much the more the graces of the one are to be preferred before the gifts of the 
other, which if it be so, that the contemplation of the inwarde qualitie ought to 
be respected more, then the view of the outward beautie, then doubtlesse 
women eyther doe or should loue those best whose virtue is best, not measuring 
the deformed man with the reformed mynde.208 
To serve the ends of his scheme to win Lucilla from Philautus, Euphues promptly 
refutes his own conclusion, albeit facetiously, when he infers the virtue of his pawn, 
Livia, from her physical beauty. 'True it is that the disposition of the minde, followeth 
the composition of ye body: how then can she be in minde any way imperfect, who in 
body is perfect in euery way? ,209 Though with some trepidation, the conventional 
Christian conclusion is affirmed in the end, that the beauty of the mind is not 
necessarily reflected in the beauty of the body. 
57 
InPandosto (1588), Lyly's disciple, Robert Greene, also examines the 
uncertain space between visible and invisible beauty, but his inquiry focuses on the 
politically more sensitive issue of the physical manifestation of noble lineage. As a 
result, his conclusion that so 'exquisite' was Fawnia's 'perfection, both of body and 
mind, ... [that] her natural disposition did bewray that she was born of some high 
parentage', must be understood with respect to the courtly romantics it was intended to 
please.210 As Shakespeare's Perdita (who was modelled on Greene's Fawnia), as well 
as his Miranda and Caliban, were created to illustrate, neither physical deformity nor 
physical beauty should be understood to indicate a base or a noble mind respectively. 
But while a humble Christian could confidently defend the Socratic/Stoic virtue which 
exalts beauty of mind above all else by citing examples of great ugly, but noble, men 
such as Socrates and the Stoic Zeno, there is no reason why the coincidence of inward 
and outward beauty ought not to be praised for its decorous concordance of 
complementary qualities, or at least, so authors of romances such as Shakespeare and 
Greene thought. It is with these romantic considerations in mind that we must 
understand Dorastus' amazement at the 'modest reverence and sharpness of wit' of the 
apparently low-born, Fawnia. 'Dorastus thought her outward beauty was but a 
counterfeit to darken her inward qualities, wondering how so courtly behaviour could 
be found in so simple a cottage, and cursing fortune that had shadowed wit and beauty 
with such hard fortune.'211 It should need no argument to conclude that Donne's claim 
in his sixth paradox, that a 'goodly house' betokens a 'worthy possessor' while a 
'ruinous wytherd building' betokens a 'varlet' or 'negligent tenant', was intended to 
assert the moral, unromantic view defended in the Paradoxa Stoicorum and the 
Gorgias, by inverting Cicero's adage from De Officiis, 'the owner should bring honour 
to his house, not the house to its owner. ,212 What must be made explicit, however, is 
that the analysis of the difference between true and seeming reality is fundamental to 
the procedure of the paradox; it is what makes it, as Erasmus and Nashe recognized, a 
fundamentally philosophical enterprise, and one which will, like the paradoxes 
defended by Socrates and Cicero, involve the careful application of the philosopher's 
instrument, dialectic.213 
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Such a careful application of dialectic could be employed to judge the truth or 
falsity of propositions by clarifying the senses of their terms (as with Socrates, 
Isocrates and Cicero) or to obfuscate the line separating truth from falsity by exploiting 
verbal ambiguities and specialized terminologies (as with sophists such as Gorgias and 
dogmatists such as the Stoics). As a dialectician, therefore, the paradoxist seeks to 
defend a thesis with a full acknowledgement of the contentiousness ascribed to it by 
Aristotle, a contentiousness which he may choose either to exacerbate, by affirming the 
paradoxicality of his thesis in the manner of Gorgias or the Stoics, or to alleviate by 
dispelling the apparent paradox and explicating the validity of the argument's inference 
from its premises in the manner of Socrates and Cicero.214 As we will see, much of the 
ability of dialectic to clarify or obfuscate relies on its ability to manipulate ambiguous 
terminology, and in this respect, we are not at all surprised to fmd champions of wit of 
the late sixteenth century, such as Lyly and Donne, occasionally subordinating 
dialectic's function of clarification to the less edifying but more entertaining delights of 
equivocation.21s Lucilla vows that, because Philautus had prematurely claimed her as 
his wife based simply upon her courteousness to him, she will thenceforth 'frame 
[herself] to be coy'. She fears, she says, that 'if euery gentleman be made of the metall 
that Philautus is ... [that she] ... shall be challenged of as many as I haue vsed to company 
with, and bee a common wife to all those that haue commonly resorted hether. ,216 
Lucilla's admission of her promiscuity is barely half veiled even from her father, for 
though the primary sense of 'common' refers specifically to Philautus' premature 
claim, and thus may be rendered 'communal', it is impossible to ignore the sense which 
indicates her proven willingness to share her favors and courtesies in common with 
many men. In this second sense, she is very aptly called a 'common wife'. Her 
ambiguous use of the term 'used' confirms our suspicions of her commonality. She has 
not merely been accustomed to keeping the company of the likes of Philautus and 
Euphues; she has, in a quite sexually suggestive sense, used them as entertaining 
company.217 In his eighth paradox, 'That good is more common then evill', Donne 
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extends Lucilla's equivocal identification to encompass the term 'good' as well as 
'common' and 'use'. 
So good doth not only prostitute her owne amiableness to all, but refuseth no 
ayd, no, not of her utter contrary evill, that she may be more common to us ... For 
the fashions of habits, for our movings in gestures, for phrases in our speech, 
we say they weare good as long they weare usd, that is as long as they weare 
common.}18 
Donne ends his paradox with the expected quibble on 'common' and 'promiscuous' 
reminding us ofLucilla's concern that the more 'courteous' she is, the more 'common' 
she will be considered to be. 'But I remember nothing that is therfore ill because it is 
common but women; of whom alIso they which are most common are the best of that 
occupation they profes. ,219 Cicero's first paradox, 'That only what is morally good is 
noble', is a serious investigation into the nature of the 'good' (bonum), which 
discriminates, rather than conilates, the various senses of the term.220 He has 
undertaken this task to correct the regrettable errors of those most prudent wise men of 
the past 'who thought that...unreliable and transitory [commutabilia] things deserved 
the nominal title of "goods" [bona],.221 These 'unreliable and transitory things' are 
material goods, things which, as the term commutabilia suggests, are common in their 
moral indifference. It is this moral indifference, Cicero argues, that must distinguish 
these material goods from 'the good'. 'Can a thing that is a good be for anybody an 
evil? or can anybody amidst an abundance of goods be himself not good? Yet all that 
list of things we see to be of such a nature that even wicked men possess them and 
virtuous men derive harm from them. ,222 
This characterization stands in conspicuous contrast to Donne's quoted above, 
which maintained the cooperation of the contraries, good and evil, and which 
ultimately could assert that 'in subjects poysond with evill, she [good] can humbly 
stoope to accompany the evill. ,223 Cicero acknowledges that amidst all the confusion 
caused by the opinion of common people (opinio vuigi), 'true reason' (vera ratio) must 
determine precisely what is the good. He concludes, as Socrates had in his rejection of 
Callicles' identification of luxury, intemperance and license with virtue and happiness, 
that the good is 'what is right and honourable and virtuous. ,224 Both Callicles and 
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Socrates had accused each other of defIning words to suit the ends of their respective 
arguments.225 Cicero, conscious of his promise to elaborate the barren syllogistic 
demonstrations of the Stoic paradoxa in order to avoid the terminological dispute into 
which Socrates and Callicles fell, concedes that 'wordy discussion of them [the views 
that support Cicero's defInition of the good] seems to be excessive subtlety.'226 Donne, 
mocking Socrates, Callicles, Aristotle and Cicero, provides his own defInition of the 
good, one which the false reasoning of his own rhetorical elaboration could hardly 
support. 'All faire, all proffItable, all vertuous is good.' 227 This defInition makes the 
most of the 'excessive subtlety', which Cicero and Socrates sought to avoid by 
discriminating ambiguous senses of the term 'good', by confiating the three classes of 
goods observed by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics and Cicero in De Partitione 
Oratoria.228 These three classes, external goods, goods of the mind and goods of the 
body, correspond to profitable, virtuous and fair respectively in Donne's equivocal 
defInition of the good. Again, Donne has taken both the matter and the form of his 
Paradoxes from the tradition of the disputed thesis, a tradition the propriety of which 
Cicero would recognize was itself disputed between the destructive, sceptical 
objectives of sophistical rhetoricians and the positive, truth-seeking objectives of the 
dialecticians. 
Notes to Chapter I 
1 T. W. Baldwin has shown that the Paradoxa Stoicorum fonned a fundamental part of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth-century grammar school curriculum. The Paradoxa appear in the directions of the master of 
the New College of the Winchester School, Christopher Johnson, in 1530. They also appear on a list of 
grammar school texts, which Baldwin believes was compiled by Gabriel Harvey in 1581. They were 
included in John Brinsley's Ludus Literarius (1612), and owned by James I (VI). See Baldwin, 1944, v. 
l,pp.325,436,555;v.2,p.299. 
2 According to S. F. Bonner, Aristotle's is the earliest definition of the thesis. He goes on to say that the 
'paradoxical element [derived from Aristotle's definition of the thesis in Topics 1 04b 19-1 05al] survives 
in the essays of Cicero entitled Paradoxa Stoicorum ... These essays are, in fact, philosophical theses 
rhetorically developed, and it is noteworthy that in his preface to them (§5) Cicero says: "degustibus 
genus exercitationum earum quibus uti consuevi, cum ea quae dicuntur in scholis 8EtlKtDS ad nostrum 
hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus".' See Bonner, 1949, p. 2. 
3 Paradoxa 2, 4 
4 See Liddell and Scott, 1980, p. 521. 
5 De Finibus IV, 74 
6 In her attempt to emphasize Donne's sceptical use of paradox as a means to demonstrate the futility of 
the rational attempt to acquire knowledge, Rosalie Colie fails to observe that Puttenham was translating 
from Cicero's admirabilia when he called paradox 'the wondrer'. See Colie, 1966, pp. 134-135. For 
similar reasons, T. G. Bishop fails to acknowledge Puttenham's debt to Cicero in his discussion of 
Shakespeare's use of paradox. See Bishop, 1996, pp. 91-92. 
7 Puttenham, 1589, p. 189 
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8 Peacham, 1577. It should be noted that paradoxon in both Puttenham and Peacham expresses the 
Greek singular, nominative. In his discussion of Peacham's and Puttenham's comments on wonder, it is 
surprising that James Biester fails to notice their definitions of paradox. This failure, however, is 
characteristic of his study's neglect of the influence Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum, and its translation of 
the Greekparadoxa. See Biester, 1997, pp. 58-66. 
9 The contrary, and therefore, potentially paradoxical, relationship between fire and water was a 
commonplace example of paradox on. See for instance Donne's 'A Burnt Ship', 11.1-5: 'Out ofa fired 
ship, which, by no way / But drowning could be rescued from the flame ... So all were lost, which in the 
ship were found, / They in the sea being burnt, they in the burnt ship drown'd'; and 'Hero and Leander': 
'Both rob' d of aire, we both lye in one ground, / Both whom one fire had burnt, one water drownd'. 
10 Lewis and Short note that paradoxa referred specifically to 'the apparently contradictory doctrines of 
the Stoics' and quote only Cicero's uses of the tenn in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Finibus and the 
Academica for illustration, though Cicero also gives a Greek fonn of paradoxa in Tusculan Disputations, 
IV, 16. See Lewis and Short, 1995, p. 1301. 
II Cooper, 1565, sig, TItt. It should be noted that Cooper's paradoxus is entered as a masculine 
adjective and not as a masculine noun in the nominative case. In this fonn it corresponds to the adjective 
admirabilis which he gives in his definition. The plural, neuter paradoxa that follows, however, is a 
neuter noun in the nominative case and refers to the Stoic ethical doctrines described by Cicero as 
admirabilia. In Thomas Thomas' Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae (London, 1587), 
admirabilis is defined as: 'adiect. Marvelous, wonderfull, to be wondered at', and 'Paradoxum, xi n.g' 
as 'A marvelous, wonderful, and straunge thing to heare, and is contrarie to the common opinion: an olde 
opinion maintained by some one man or some fewe sectaries'. See Thomas, 1587, sig. Bii, Ssiii. 
Though it is impossible to say for certain to whom Thomas intends to attribute this' olde opinion', it does 
not seem unlikely that he means Zeno and his adherents, those 'fewe' Stoics who Cicero had claimed 
were opposed to the common opinion. 
12 Elyot, 1538, sig. Qiii, Niii. Elyot seems not to have noticed that while he gives 'paradoxa' in the 
plural, he renders its equivalent, 'a sentence', in the singular. 
13 As Thomas' Dictionarium illustrates, the tenn admirabilis (defined by Thomas as 'marvelous, 
wonderfull'), could be used interchangeably with mirabilis. See Thomas, 1587, sig. Bii. In the 
Academica, Cicero himself uses the tenn mirabilia as he had admirabilia in the preface to the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum. He says of the Stoic paradoxa, 'sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum '. See 
Academica II, 136. 
14 Cicero, 1569, sig. Aii. Newton's edition of Seneca was entitled Seneca his Tenne Tragedies (London, 
1581). 
15 Cicero, 1569, sig. Ail. 
16 See Baldwin, 1944, v. 1, pp. 325,436,555; v. 2, p. 299. In the Summale Logicales, of the thirteenth-
century logician and later Pope John XXI, Peter of Spain, a work which continued to be used as an 
introduction to logic throughout the seventeenth century, inopinable is defined in keeping with Cicero's 
use of the tenn. 'Inopinabile est quod contra opinionem omnium aut plurium aut sapientium.' See Peter 
of Spain, Summale Logicales, VII, 16. 
17 Paradoxa 35 
18 Cicero, 1569, sig. Ciiii 
19 'Inopinatum, Paradoxum, napaBoSo/l, ... Est cum negamus nos potuisse vel supicari, vel 
opinari ... Eiusmodi sunt, in quibus mirandi verbis utimur. Libenter autem, ut a reliquis adfectuum verbis, 
ita a paradoxo seu dubitatione ordimur'. See Susenbrotus, 1562, p. 64. In his examination of 
Shakespeare's use of the tenn 'paradox' in Hamlet (III, 1,109-116), T. W. Baldwin has noted the 
difference between Susenbrotus' definition of the rhetorical paradox and Cooper's definition of the 
dialectical paradox, which he derived from the Paradoxa Stoicorum. He does not, however, notice that 
both the rhetorical and dialectical paradox achieve their wondrous effects through the apparent violation 
of the law of non-contradiction. See Baldwin, 1944, v. 2, pp. 598-599. For an overview of the directions 
of Susenbrotus' Epitome, see Baldwin, 1944, v. 2, pp. 138-175. 
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20 Barbara C. Bowen has shown that paradoxes were not the only things described as admirable and 
inopinable by Renaissance rhetoricians. See Bowen, 1998, pp. 409-429, esp. pp. 412, 415. In his 1542 
translation of Erasmus , Apophthegmata (London), Nicholas Udall recognized that the paradoxical 
encomiast, as well as the defender of uncommon opinion, could speculate on 'matiers inopinable'. As 
we will see when we examine Nashe's comments on paradoxical encomia in his Lenten Stuffe, however, 
Udall also recognizes that the approach for the paradoxical encomiast is rhetorical. He says, 
'Rhetoricians are woont for exercise to take feigned arguments of rna tiers inopinable, and suche are 
properly called declamacions and not oracions ... So did Homere write the battaill betweene the fogges & 
the myce, Erasmus wrote the praise of foolyshnesse, an other the praise ofbaldnesse, an other of 
drounkenshippe'. Quoted in Vickers, 1968, p. 307. In her consideration of Udall's and Nashe's 
comments on paradoxical encomium, M. T. Jones-Davies does not acknowledge the restriction of 
paradoxical encomia to rhetorical treatment and consequently does not distinguish it from the' debat pro 
et contra' of the disputed paradox or thesis (p. 108). See Jones-Davies, 1982, pp. 105-123. 
21 Dickenson, 1589, sig. G3 
22 Theaetetus 170c. See also Aristotle, Categories 4a10-25. M. T. Jones-Davies has noted Vives' 
observation of how wonder may be produced by an ambiguously deployed middle term. See Jones-
Davies, 1982, pp. 105-123, esp. 112. Joel B. Altman has noted that 'the paradox that witless is better 
than witty' in John Heywood's Witty and Witless issues from 'the third term, which unites apparent 
opposites'. Despite his announcement that his book 'is about the exercise of wonder', Altman never 
discusses the relation of paradoxes, such as he observed in Heywood's play, to the dialectical procedure 
of arguments pro or contra theses. Although he discusses Aristotle's description of wonder in the 
Metaphysics (982b12-18), the Rhetoric (1371a31-35) and the Poetics (1448b15-18), he does not observe 
that, in the sixteenth century, the term 'wonder' was understood in terms of Cicero's translation of the 
Greek paradoxa. Because Aristotle's Greek term for wonder is thaumaston, Altman never notices the 
fundamental relation between the paradox and the wonderful. See Altman, 1978, pp. 1-2, 112, 349. For 
a discussion of thaumaston and wonder-making, see Bishop, 1996, pp. 21-32; and Biester, 1997, pp. 6-7, 
18,24-25,43, 130-133. Though Dennis Quinn does recognize that Cicero translated the Greek term 
paradoxa with admirabilia, he does not acknowledge any more than a rhetorical purpose for the paradox. 
See Quinn, 1969, pp. 626-647. 
23 See De Interpretatione 18a28-20bll, Metaphysics 1011b23-1012a28; Isocrates, Panathenaicus 224ff; 
and Donne's ninth paradox, 'That by Discord things increase'. In his discussion of the varieties of 
logical paradox, W. V. Quine observes that the appearance of paradox depends on the apparent 
coexistence of contradictory or contrary propositions. He goes on to show that many arguments that 
appear self-contradictory (and therefore, paradoxical), have commited some fallacy or other, and thus, 
retain the wondrous appearance of paradox only so long as their fallacy remains undetected. Paradoxes 
in which no fallacy is detected, such as his distillation of Epimenides' Liar paradox, Quine calls 
'antinomies'. See Quine, 1966, pp. 1-18. Paul Stevens has noted that, in her massive study of 
Renaissance paradox, Paradoxia Epidemica, Rosalie Colie is unable to conceive of the paradox as 
anything other than an antinomy, and as a result, she tends 'to see impasses and aporias where there are 
none' (p. 211). As we will see, such a restrictive understanding of the Renaissance notion of the paradox 
has caused scholars and critics to neglect the important variety of paradox which is investigated in this 
study, the philosophical thesis. Despite his observation of Colie's misunderstanding both of Quine and 
of the Renaissance paradox, Stevens himself does not recognize the serious function of paradox in the 
defense of theses, and claims that the 'penchant [of Renaissance writers] for paradox often suggests not 
so much a rigorous skeptical intelligence as a desire for mystification-at its least harmful, wonderment, 
and its most doubtful, equivocation' (p. 211). Stevens' account fails to recognize, as we will shortly, that 
the argumentation of Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum was intended to dispel the wonder aroused by the 
bare syllogistic demonstrations of the Stoic ethical theses. As a model for Renaissance paradoxists, 
therefore, the Paradoxa teach the method of eliminating wonder by avoiding or exposing equivocations. 
See Stevens, 1996, pp. 203-224. 
24 Marbeck, 1581, p. 343. Marbeck's translation reads 'Upon the Seas he hath founded the whole earth, 
and upon the floudes he hath stabilised it. ' 
25 Ibid., p. 344. The orthodox opinion regarding the natures of the four elements and their arrangement 
by God to which Marbeck contrasts the apparent paradox from Psalm 24 (23) was detailed by Cicero in 
Tusculan Disputations I, 40. Marbeck might also have referred to Job xxvi, 7 as more evidence of God's 
marvelous power to establish truths contrary to natural reason. 'He it is who stretched out Zaphon 
[heaven] over chaos, / Who suspended earth over emptiness' . 
26 Topics (Aristotle) 1 04b 19-1 05a1 
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27 We recall that Donne called his Paradoxes' alarums to truth' and that he claimed that the role of 
Biathanatos was 'to find the truth' by debating and vexing it. Although he recognizes that Renaissance 
writers followed Aristotle's opinion on the role of wonder as a catalyst for investigation, James Biester 
does not notice the role of the paradox as a dialectical defense of a thesis which seeks to provide 
probable arguments in its favor. As a result, Biester's discussion of wonder in Donne focuses on either 
his equivocal wit or his advocacy of mystical interpretations of sacred mysteries in his religious writing. 
The reason that Biester has overlooked the importance of the disputed thesis in Renaissance notions of 
paradox is his failure to recognize the influence of Cicero's translation of the Greekparadoxa as 
admirabilia. See Biester, 1997, pp. 83-93, 118-150. 
28 Paradoxa 4-5 
29 Paradoxa 4; Donne, 1980, p. 19,11. 7-8 
30 See Academica II, 19-45. 
31 Donne, 1980, p. 3,11.21-25 
32 See De Officiis I, 139 and below p. 57. 
33 Donne, 1980, p. 52, 11. 18-19. Helen Peters doubts that Donne's eleventh paradox is genuinely his 
because both she and Grierson have detennined the sole manuscript which contains the full text to be 
unreliable. See Donne, 1980, pp. lxvii-lxviii, 129-131. It should be noted, however, that' A Defence of 
Women's Inconstancy' appears as the first paradox in 1633 edition of the Paradoxes and Problems. 
34 See also Wilson, 1982, pp. 283, 309. 'We shall delite the hearers when theilooke for one answere, 
and we make theim a c1eane contrary' (p. 283). 'But emong all other kyndes of delite there is none that 
so muche comforteth and gladdeth the hearer, as a thyng spoken contrarie to thexpectation of other' (p. 
309). For a discussion of Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique and Donne's use of paradox, see Cornelia, 1984, 
pp.31-43. 
35 Donne, 1980, p. 52, 11.19-21 
36 In defense of his choice of the Academic school, Cicero praises the utility of their disputations in 
utamque partem for, at least, the discovery of probabilities. After dismissing the possibility that he chose 
the Academy for the sake of 'ostentation or combativeness', he explains that he is 'fired with zeal for the 
discovery of the truth' and that, unlike the sophists, he genuinely 'hold[s] the opinions that. .. [he is] 
stating'. See Academica II, 65. 
37 Topics (Aristotle) 104b19-25 
38 Isocrates, Helen, 1 
39 De Ora tore III 66-68 
40 Tusculan Disputations II, 30 
41 Topics (Aristotle)ll4b6-8 
42 On Antisthenes, see Topics (Aristotle) 104b21; and Plato, Republic I, 351c; Laws XII, 963d 
43 Isocrates, Helen, 2-4. See also Isocrates, Antidosis, 268-269. 
44 Isocrates died in 338 B. C. 
45 See Diogenes, Lives, VI, 2. For further references to Antisthenes' doctrine that contradiction is 
impossible see Metaphysics 1024b33-34 and Diogenes, Lives, VI, 3. See also Hankinson, 1995, pp. 55-
56. 
46 Diogenes, Lives, IX, 73. See also Lives IX, 7; and Sextus, Against the Mathematicians VII, 126-7 
(cited in Hankinson, 1995, p. 38). 
47 Diogenes, Lives, IX, 6 
48 See Sextus, Against the Mathematicians I, 301; and Lucretius, De Rerum Natura I, 635-639 on 
Heraclitus' obscurity (cited in Sextus, 1998, p. 332). Donne would likely have been familiar with 
Diogenes' account of Heraclitus' obscurity and may have been alluding to it in his first Problem, 'Why 
are Courtiers sooner Atheists then men of other Condition?' There he asks, 'Doth a familiarity of 
greatnesse, and dayly Acquayntance and conversation with it, breede a contempt of all greatnesse?' (p. 
23, II. 6-8). Diogenes writes in Lives, IX, 6 that Heraclitus made his treatise On Nature 'the more 
obscure in order than none but adepts should approach it, and lest familiarity should breed contempt'. 
Neither John L. Klause nor James Biester notice Donne's possible reference to Diogenes' 
characterization of Heraclitus. See Klause, 1987, p. 53; and Biester, 1997, p. 142. 
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49 Parmenides, 134c. According to Plato's account, however, though Pannenides denied knowledge of 
fonns in themselves, he recognized, like Cicero, that a complete denial of the validity of our apparent 
reality would 'completely destroy the significance of all discourse' (Parmenides 135c). See also 
Diogenes, Lives, IX, 21-23. 
50 Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias 974b20-23. See also Topics (Aristotle) 104bI9-25. 
51 Diogenes, Lives, IX, 51 
52 Theaetetus 152a-e 
53 Diogenes, Lives IX 51. See Academica I, 46, where Cicero says that Plato's dialogues 'in utramque 
partem multa disseruntur'; II, 124 where he refers to the old debates of philosophers 'nam utramque in 
partem multa dicuntur'; and II, 7 where he appropriates the credo for the service of the Academy, 
' ... neque nostrae [the Academics] disputationes quidquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem 
dicendo eliciat et tam quam exprimant aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat'. See 
also II, 108. 
54 Diogenes, Lives, IX 52-3 
55 Isocrates, Helen, 6-7. For a brief comment on the unphilosophical procedure of the sophists, see 
Marrou, 1964, p. 79. For a discussion ofthaumatopoiias and wonder-making, see Bishop, 1996, pp. 21-
32. In his discussion of Isocrates' comments on paradoxon and thaumatopoiias, James Biester notes the 
reference to the 'abstruse philosophical questions' of the sophists, but does not pursue the serious 
tradition of disputation of such questions (theses) with which Donne and his contemporaries would have 
been familiar. See Biester, 1997, p. 56. 
56 In the 1600 letter which accompanied the paradoxes which he sent to Wotton, Donne had said that 
'except I receve by your next letter an assurance upon the religion of your friendship that no coppy 
shalbee taken for any respect of these or any other of my compositions sent to you, I shall sinn against 
my conscience if I send you any more .. .1 am desirous to hyde them with out any over reconing of them 
or there maker.' Quoted in Donne, 1980, p. xxv. In a 1619 letter which accompanied the copy of 
Biathanatos which he sent to his friend, Robert Ker, Donne continued to be concerned about how the 
public might view the unorthodoxy of his paradox, and made explicit his desire to consign it to the 
period preceding his public life as an Anglican priest and royal chaplain to James I. He tells Ker, 'Keep 
it, I pray, with the same jealousie; let any that your discretion admits to the sight of it, know the date of 
it, and that it was a Book written by Jack Donne, and not by D. Donne: Reserve it for me, if! live, and if 
I die, I only forbid it the Presse and the Fire: Publish it not, but yet bum it not; and between those, do 
what you will with it.' See Donne, 1977, p. 22. 
57 For discussion of this issue with respect to the Paradoxes and Problems, see Price, 1996, pp. 51-81; 
and Price, 1995, pp. 149-184. For discussion of this issue with respect to Biathanatos, see Simpson, 
1948, pp. 165-166; Williamson, 1934, pp. 276-291; Donne, 1982, pp. xiv-xviii; and Baumlin, 1991, pp. 
230-262. 
58 Diogenes, Lives, IX, 29 
59 Sophistical Refutations 165b19. William of Sherwood (c. 1200-1210-c. 1266-1271) observed this 
mode of dissent in his Introduction to Logic. It is worth noting that the Latin tenn which he uses to 
translate the Greek paradoxon is inopinabile. For more on William's commentary on Aristotle's 
Sophistical Refutations, see Hamblin, 1970, pp. 116-123. 
60 Physics 239b5-240b7 
61 Problems 969b4-6. Brian Lawn has explained that the Problems ascribed to Aristotle were not 
composed by him, but were likely to have been derived from his work. Throughout the sixteenth 
century, however, the three translations of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems (i.e. Vetustissima, the 
translation of Bartholomew of Messina and the Omnes homines collection) were thought genuinely to 
belong to Aristotle. In his De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623) for instance, Francis Bacon, praised 'the 
noble example in the books [of Problems] of Aristotle'. Quoted in Lawn, 1963, p. 141, n. 1. For general 
discussion of the transmission of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems, see Lawn, 1963, pp. 2-3, 92-113, 
129-155. 
62 C. L. Hamblin has noted that Sextus Empiricus also viewed contradictions as evidence of fallacy. For 
Sextus, however, all logical demonstrations were intrinsically fallacious. The exposure of a 
contradiction in a particular argument, therefore, was symptomatic of the intrinsic inability of dialectic to 
provide even probable proofs. See Sextus, Outlines II, 236-259 (quoted in Hamblin, 1970, pp. 95-97). 
Later Hamblin discusses Sextus' sceptical position on equivocal tenns and examines the consequences of 
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reaching an apparently insoluable contradiction within a syllogistic argument. He says, 'One reaction 
might be to label the inference a "paradox" and regard it as a "difficulty" for the logical system within 
which it is most conveniently analysed, but this would concede the a posteriori nature of logical 
investigation. It is difficult to conceive of any other reasonable reaction apart from simple suspense of 
judgement' (p. 299). These two reactions correspond to the analytical responses of Aristotle, and the 
scholastics considering their sophismata, and to Sextus' sceptical response which employs dialectic 
merely to demonstrate its failures, and which leads ultimately to suspension of judgement (epoche). 
63 Diogenes, Lives, IX, 72 
64 Isocrates, Helen, 14-15 
65 See Rhetoric 1367b35-1368a7; and Quintilian, Institutio, Ill, vii, 6. 
66 For more on the relation between the thesis, equity and the letter of the law, see Trimpi, 1974, pp. 37-
40. 
67 Isocrates, Helen, 8-9. In his Laus Calvitii, Synesius disagrees with Isocrates, maintaining with 
Favorinus (the second-century author of The Praise o/the Fever Quartaine, that the commendation of 
normally despised subjects such as baldness indicates an ability to commend normally preferred subjects. 
'Ifhe [Dion] had undertaken to commend baldnesse, as he hath attempted the contrarie, he had (no 
doubt) gotten him selfe greater credite, and purchased more praise. For, if so be that in a trifling thing, 
he be so well furnished, what shall a man thinke of him, ifhe had a weightie matter in handling'. See 
Synesius, 1579, sig. bii. 
68 Isocrates, Helen, 10 
69 Ibid., 14 
70 Ibid., 13 
71 Plato observed in the Phaedrus that the sophistical mock encomiasts who praise 'evil as being really 
good' are far more dangerous than the innocent paradoxical encomiast who praises a 'miserable donkey 
as being really a horse'. See Phaedrus 260c. This distinction between the 'mock' and 'paradoxical' 
encomiast is the invention of this study, and is not observed in any of the other studies which we have 
consulted. It is drawn to emphasize that the the term 'paradoxical' could refer to a serious process that 
was not contrary to reason, while the term 'mock' seems to signify a critique of that process. 
72 Erasmus, 1979, pp. 2-3. Isocrates responded to Polycrates' apology for Busirus with his own apology 
for Busirus. The Busirus, like the Helen, sought to use the genuinely virtuous qualities, overlooked by 
those responsible for Busirus' infamy, as the material upon which he would base his apology. Like his 
criticism of the impropriety of Gorgias defense ('apology' in Greek), Isocrates claims that Polycrates has 
failed in deploying the techniques of encomium's sister genre, eulogy, in his defense ofBusirus. These 
techniques, as he illustrates, celebrate the nobility ofBusirus' lineage as well as of his city, in an attempt 
to cast the accused villain in a more favorable light. Though the Busirus is unlike the Helen in its 
explicit attempt to make a speech in defense, Isocrates seems to consider the distinguishing feature of a 
speech in defense merely to be a response to an accusation of a crime (see Helen 15). As he says in the 
Busirus, he will 'show out of what elements [Polycrates] ought to have composed the eulogy and the 
speech in defense ['apology' in Greek], (Busirus 9). What distinguishes Isocrates' speech as an apology 
is its explicit response to the accusations of those who have defamed Busirus. This response, as he says, 
may utilize the techniques of eulogy, but is not properly an encomium because its primary objective is 
the exoneration, and not the praise, of the subject. There is no evidence, however, that Isocrates was 
anticipating the forensic controversia which would be declaimed in the Roman schools of rhetoric, nor 
that he recognized an underlying philosophical thesis to be considered behind the circumstantial details 
of Busirus' reputed crimes. 
73 In the voice of Folly, Erasmus again mentions his venerable foolish predecessors. See Erasmus, 1979, 
p.12. 
74 Ibid., p. 2 
75 Thomas O. Sloane has recognized the confusion that a text which describes itself using terms more 
often distinguished than united may arouse. See Sloane, 1985, p. 69. Joel B. Altman suggests that 
Erasmus has combined the prosopopoeia and laus decribed by Aphthonius in the Progymnasmata. His 
reading is plausible but restricts the rhetorical parameters of the Praise artificially and without 
consideration of Erasmus' explicit confessions of its rhetorical heterogeneity and unorthodoxy. His 
claim that Erasmus 'is actually posing the speculative thesis "What is folly?''' ignores the conspicuous 
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omission of Cicero's theses, the Paradoxa Stoicorum, from his list of models. See Altman, 1978, pp. 53-
54. On this point, see also H. K. Miller, 1956, p. 155. 
76 In his Arte or Crafte of Rhetoryke (1530), Leonard Cox used Erasmus as an example when he urged 
the necessity of such disclaimers in the prefatory statements of paradoxical encomia. 'Here must we take 
good hede that yfwe take vpon vs to praise any thynge that is no praise worthy that muste we vse 
insinuacyon and excuse the turpitude either by examples or by argumentes as Erasmus dothe in his 
epistle prefixed afore his oracyon made to the prayse offolysshnes.' Quoted in H. K. Miller, 1956, p. 
153. 
77 See H. M. Adams, 1967, entries 1744, 1746, 1747, 1759, 1776. Editions of Erasmus' Paradoxa 
Stoicorum were published in 1528, 1533, 1538, 1556, 1578 and 1584. 
78 See Erasmus, 1979, pp. 3-4, 142-148. 
79 For a discussion of Lenten Stuffe and its function as a paradoxical encomium, see Cuvelier, 1982, pp. 
181-194. 
80 Nashe, 1910, v. 3, p. 176. See also Nashe, 1910, v. 3, pp. 388-395 for an explanation of possible 
sources for Nashe's list. It goes without saying that we are contesting McKerrow's undefended claim 
that 'we need not...attach much importance to Nashe's calling these authors "philosophers'" (p. 390). 
81 Ibid., v. 3, p. 178. In his fifty-ninth sonnet, Shakespeare also invokes the ancient paradoxical 
encomiasts as justification for his praise. See Sonnet 59,11. 13-14. 
82 In the De Partitione Oratoria, Cicero says that epideictic speeches provide the most abundant 
opportunities for 'copious' rhetoric. See De Partitione Oratoria 20, 69 (quoted in Vickers 1988, p. 57). 
Vickers' discussion of the classical prescriptions for epideictic oratory usefully emphasize both its 
serious ethical purpose and its principally rhetorical character. See Vickers 1988, pp. 54-62. For a 
useful overview of the tradition of paradoxical encomia from Homer to the sixteenth century, see Pease, 
1926, pp. 27-42. It should be noted, however, that Pease makes no attempt to distinguish paradoxical 
encomia from the defense of uncommon opinion, and even goes so far as to suggest that the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum should not be called paradoxical. He describes it as 'philosophic and consolatory' as opposed 
to the 'sophistic and paradoxical' character of paradoxical encomia (p. 39). Moreover, he twice seems to 
suggest, though without confidence, that the paradoxical encomium bears some relation to forensic 
(controversiae) and deliberative (suasoriae) oratory (pp. 34, 38). Pease's confusion over the generic 
dictinctions between the paradox and the paradoxical encomium is characteristic of critical assessments 
of Donne's Paradoxes and Biathanatos, as well as of his 'paradoxical 'poems. H. K. Miller has claimed 
that Donne's 'argument "That by Discord things increase" [is] really [an] encomi[um] of...discord' (p. 
159). He also claims in the same sentence that Donne's 'Defence ofWomens Inconstancy' is an 
encomium. Despite his acknowledgement ofIsocrates' insistance on the distinction between the 
techniques of encomia and defense, Miller continues to discuss paradoxical theses as types of 
paradoxical encomia. Later, however, he states that in the mock defense 'there is some overlapping with 
the encomium, but in the interests of clarity of definition, the defense should be taken as strategically and 
rhetorically ordered in a different frame' (p. 167). See H. K. Miller, 1956, pp. 145-178. For similar 
confusion on this issue, see Roston, 1974, pp. 74-75; and Baumlin, 1991, pp. 254-256, 275-278. 
83 Synesius (c. 370-c. 414) was a philosopher and bishop ofPtolemais. 
84 Erasmus, 1998, p. 117. The term 'declamation' properly indicates an educational exercise to be 
practiced by an, as yet, unaccomplished orator. The term declamare was the Latin term used to translate 
the Greek meletai, which simply means practice or exercise. To declaim, therefore, was a practice 
particularly valuable to the young, though older orators might make use of such exercise to keep their 
rhetorical skills sharp, as the elder Seneca, in the preface to his Controversiae, says Cicero had. See 
Seneca, Controversiae, I, preface 12. According to S. F. Bonner, the term declamatio first appears in the 
anonymous treatise, Ad Herennium (86-82 B.C.), and was used specifically to indicate an exercise in 
delivery (pronuntiatio). He is careful, however, to acknowledge the difficulty in assigning an exact 
Greek source for declamare, and cites other works that argue for different etymylogical derivations. 
Nevertheless, all of the possible Greek sources denote some type of training. See Bonner, 1949, p. 20-
22; Marrou, 1964, p. 277; and Bowen, 1972a, pp. 249-256. As we will see, the themes of the 
controversiae and suasoriae practiced in the Roman schools of declamation as exercises in forensic and 
deliberative oratory respectively were considered by Quintilian to be too trifling to provide much more 
than entertainment for the students they were supposed to prepare for the law-court and the assembly. 
Erasmus makes his reference to these disparaging classical appraisals clear by introducing his list of 
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classical precedents with a reminder and disclaimer that the work to follow is a 'little declamation' 
(declamatiuncula), which approves of the 'levity <and playfulness> of [its] subject matter' (argumenti). 
For more on Erasmus' approval of fun in rhetorical exercises, see Cave, 1979, pp. 21-22. Despite his 
appreciation of its recreational value, Erasmus took part in the revival of the pedagogical use of 
declamation. He prepared an edition of Seneca in 1515 and a revision in 1529, both of which included 
the Controversiae. In his introduction, he said of the Controversiae, 'Of all the great works of Seneca 
none, in my opinion, would be more important for scholarship to exist in its entirety than the books of 
declamations which the Epitome we have declares to have been many. For it would have contributed 
very considerably both to invention and judgement'. Translated by Neil Rhodes in Rhodes, 2000. 
85 Erasmus, 1998, p. 120. Erasmus uses the term adoxa to refer to these insignificant subjects. As 
Anthony Stanley Pease has noted, adoxa, were normally associated with the genre of laudatio, but were 
also valued as sophistic exercises in arguing both sides of a question. In a note, he compares them to the 
forensic equivalent of suasoriae, 'the controversiae of the schools. (p. 31, n. 1). See Pease, 1926, pp. 27-
42. 
86 Erasmus also likens the benefits of his trivial treatment of marriage to the 'scholastic dispute that goes 
by the name obligatoria.' These academic exercises, he explains, are also designed to give the student 
practice in arguingpro and contra. What unites them with Erasmus' declamation is their insincere 
treatment of serious subjects. Erasmus says that despite the fact that in obligatoria 'examples are 
sometimes taken from sacred writings', their pedagogical purpose permits 'many false things' and 'even 
blasphemous' things to be said. See Erasmus, 1998, p. 120. Obligatoria were recorded as an academic 
exercise by William of Sherwood in his De Obligationibus. These disputations required a student to 
provide a valid syllogistic defense for a thesis (positum) which was generally believed to be false, such 
as 'Socrates is black'. The student would be required to construct his defense against the objections of 
an opposing disputant. The serious purpose of the exercise, as Erasmus observed, was to provide 
training in dialectical argument by requiring the disputants to focus on valid modes of inference and the 
fallacies which could infect their argumentation. It is significant that the propositions advanced in 
obligatoria were called theses because it establishes them as the dialectical equivalent of the rhetorical 
derivatives of the thesis, controversiae and suasoriae. What distinguishes them from the type of theses 
defended in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, however, is the triviality of their subjects. Their method, as with 
all medieval and sixteenth-century disputations, continues to be syllogistic, but their objective, unlike the 
theses discussed by Aristotle and Cicero, is never genuinely philosophically speculative. For an 
overview of the scholastic tradition of obligato ria, its relation to the ancient tradition of the thesis and 
the mechanics of its methods of argumentation, see Hamblin, 1970, pp. 123-134,253-282. 
87 Erasmus, 1998, p. 120 
88 Ibid., p. 114 
89 For more on Erasmus' disregard for rhetorical categories, see Cave, 1979, p. 22. 
90 Donne, 1980, p. 20, 11. 31-32 
91 Topics (Aristotle) 105b30-31 
92 Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola appeared to have access to a Greek version of the Outlines when 
he published the Examen Vanitatis Doctrinae Gentium (1520). See Popkin, 1960, p. 20, and Schmitt, 
1964, pp. 105-132, esp. 112-115. 
93 Erasmus' translation of Galen's Contra Academicos was also included with Hervet's 1569 edition of 
Sextus. On Hervet's view that the principles ofPyrrhonsim detailed in Sextus' works demonstrated the 
primacy of faith over reason, see Popkin, 1960, p. 34. In addition to Hervet's Latin translation, there 
appears to have been an English translation made in 1590 or 1591 to which Nashe refers. See Popkin, 
1960, pp. 19,253, n. 10; and Nashe, 1910, v. 3, p. 254ffand 332; v. 4, pp. 428-429; and v. 5, pp. 120, 
122. 
94 Paradoxa 5 
95 Academica I, 22; I, 43. See also De Finibus IV, 20; IV, 60; V, 74. 
96 Rosalie Colie claims that the unelaborated Stoic paradoxes were actually accepted by the common 
opinion, and that Cicero was satirizing the vice of his day in the Paradoxa Stoicorum by presenting them 
as if they needed proof. This mistaken view reflects her deeper misunderstanding of the relation between 
Cicero's Academic scepticism and Stoic dialectic. Cicero showed how the Stoic tenets might be made 
amenable to the common opinion with his rhetorical elaboration, but in their bare form, they appear as 
paradoxical as Socrates' equation of knowledge and virtue in the Gorgias. See Colie, 1966, pp. 11, 14, 
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107. In the wake of Erasmus' attack on the rhetorical excesses of imitators of Ciceronian eloquence in 
Ciceronianus (1528), the sixteenth-century Italian humanist, Marcantonius Majoragius, attacked what he 
perceived to be the rhetorical excesses of the Paradoxa Stoicorum in his Antiparadoxon (1546). In the 
letter dedicatory to Erasmus, Majoragius explains that 'most men have venerated [Cicero's Paradoxa] as 
sacrosanct and ... particularly in agreement with our religion'. His neoplatonic principles, however, lead 
him to argue that Cicero has obscured his fallacious logic with ambiguous rhetorical devices, and 
attributed to reason (with the Stoics themselves) too great a power to discern truth. Needless to say, 
Majoragius did not think Cicero was being ironic in the Paradoxa. Moreover, when he subjects them to 
dialectical analysis, he claims to expose the fallacies by which the Stoic tenets originally would have 
appeared paradoxical. For more on Majoragius' Antiparadoxon see Breen, 1958, pp. 37-48. 
97 See Academica I, 35; II, 16. 
98 Chryssipus studied under Arcesilaus and subsequently abandoned the Academy. 
99 Prior Analytics 24b 18 
100 For a brief summary of Aristotle's theory of the syllogism, see Kneale and Kneale, 1962, pp. 67-81; 
and Bochenski, 1951, pp. 25-27. 
101 It should be noted that Aristotle himself considered only syllogisms constructed in any of the four 
modes of the first figure to be perfect. The modes of his remaining two figures must be proven by 
deduction from the laws established in the first figure. This deductive procedure functions 
predominantly according to the methods of conversion detailed in Prior Analytics 25a1-b25 and 52b36-
53b3. See Bochenski, 1951, pp. 51-54,62. 
102 Jonathan Barnes has noted that akatalepton differed from epoche (suspension of belief) in that the 
former expressed the impossibility of fruitful inquiry, while the latter merely implied an, as yet, 
unfruitful inquiry. See Barnes, 1990, pp. 8-11. 
103 See Hankinson, 1995, pp. 1 16ff. See also Sextus, Outlines 1,180-185,235. 
104 For a discussion of Sextus' application of Agrippa's five modes, see Barnes, 1990, esp. pp. 116-120. 
105 Sextus, Outlines I, 222 
106 Paradoxa 23 
107 For a discussion of the fideist preference for Sextus, see Popkin, 1960, pp, 1-42. See also Academica 
11,32, 108, 127-128; and Augustine, Against the Academicians III, 35. 
108 For a summary of Pi co's attack on Aristotle, see Schmitt, 1968. For a discussion ofPico's Examen 
Vanitatis in the context of sixteenth-century scepticism, see Popkin, 1960, pp. 20-21. 
109 Charles B. Schmitt has observed that Pierre Gassendi's Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus 
Aristoteleos (1624) followed the sceptical method of Pi co's Examen Vanitatis. See Schmitt, 1964, pp. 
105-132, esp. 127-130. 
110 Quoted in Schmitt, 1968, pp. 113-114 
III For a discussion of Sextus' view of the reciprocal mode, see Barnes, 1990, pp. 58-89. For a 
discussion of Sextus' objections to the question-begging procedure of syllogistic in relation to John 
Stuart Mill's observation of the inductive/empirical basis ofuniveral propositions, see Hamblin, 1970, 
pp. 224-252. 
112 On Pico's sceptical critique of the senses, see Schmitt, 1964, pp. 105-132, esp. 108-113. 
113 Sextus, Outlines I, 179 
114 Sextus, Outlines 11,153. Sextus is referring here specifically to the issue of 'connectedness' in the 
formal structure of a syllogistic argument, that is, whether the premises (conditionals) are coherently 
connected with respect to the possible meanings of their three terms. If they cannot be shown to be 
coherently connected, which Sextus claims is always the case in conclusive arguments (e.g. Outlines II, 
145), then their conclusions do not follow. It should be noted that Sextus is attacking specifically the 
Stoic conditional arguments, which they believed constituted the self-evident underlying structures of 
valid logical inference. They differ from Aristotle's organization of his syllogistic principles in that they 
merely seek to establish necessary relations between the unspecified terms of conditional arguments such 
as the five unprovables. Aristotle's syllogistic focuses on the substantial relation (i.e. genus and species) 
between the three terms of his syllogisms, and is, therefore, concerned principally with issues of 
predication. The Stoics' analysis of conditional statements in the context of their unprovables constitutes 
a more fundamental logical activity, and one which informs the inferential rules implicit in Aristotle's 
own logical formulations. For more on the Stoic conditionals and their relation to Aristotle's syllogistic, 
see Mates, 1961, pp. 54-57; and Kneale and Kneale, 1962, pp. 158-176, esp. 175. 
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liS As we will see later in this study, Donne maintains the existence of such first principles in 
Biathanatos, and therefore, claims a foundation in truth for the defense he provides for suicide. Donne's 
position avoids the dogmatism attacked by Sextus, however, by persistently qualifying itself in 
acknowledgement of sceptical misgivings concerning the certainty of conclusions derived by 'our 
discourse' from first principles. It is also worth noting that Jonathan Barnes has provided responses to 
Sextus'appeal to infinite regress as a refutation of the proofs of the dogmatists. These responses attempt 
to show that infinite regressions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of proof. He is careful, 
however, to acknowledge that the common-sense appeal of the sceptical mode of infinite regress against 
proofs was likely to be Sextus' intention. See Barnes, 1990, pp. 44-57. 
116 For a summary of the Stoic notion of the lekton, see Bochenski, 1951, pp. 84-86; Mates, 1961, pp. 11-
26; Kneale and Kneale, 1962, pp. 138-158; and Long, 1996, pp. 75-113. 
117 Sextus, Outlines II, 104-106 
118 Ibid., 96, 134. See also Diogenes, Lives, VII, 79-81. 
119 Sextus, Outlines II, 156. For a description of the five Stoic unprovables, see Mates, 1961,67-74; 
Bochenski, 1951, pp. 97-99; and Kneale and Kneale, 1962, pp. 158-176. 
120 See Sextus, Outlines 11,106 and Against the Mathematicians VIII, 260-261. I. M. Bochenski has 
noted that 'the argument [for the Stoics] must have been conceived as a system of [lekta].' See 
Bochenski, 1951, p. 93. Catherine Atherton confirms this view citing Diogenes, Lives, VII, 63 and 
Sextus, Outlines II, 107. See Atherton, 1993, p. 413. 
121 See Sextus, Outlines II, 157. 
122 See Against the Mathematicians VIII, 262-264. For a brief account of the relation between the lekton 
and the proposition in Stoic logic, see Mates, 1961, pp. 27-33. William and Martha Kneale have noted 
Sextus' sceptical objection, in Against the Mathematicians VIII, 262-264, to the Stoic's attempt to 
demonstrate the truth of propositionallekta through the conjunction of other propositions. See Kneale 
and Kneale, 1962, p. 142. 
123 Sextus, Against the Mathematicians VIII, 223 (cited in Mates, 1961, p. 67) 
124 Prior Analytics 24b23-4, 29a30-1 
125 Topics (Cicero) 57. Cicero gives the Greek dialectice for dialectic. For further discussion of this 
passage, see Mates, 1961, pp. 67-68. See also Topics (Cicero) 55 where the rhetorical value of the 
unprovables is considered; Cicero, following Aristotle on the rhetorical syllogism (Rhetoric 1355a4-18), 
classes them under the heading 'enthymeme'. Boethius, following Aristotle, also distinguishes 
dialectic's use of syllogism and rhetoric's use of enthymemes. See Boethius, De Differentiis Topicis, IV. 
'Item dialectica perfectis utitur syllogism is. Rhetorica enthymematum brevitate contenta est.' 
126 It is interesting to note that the five unprovables of the Stoics were, according to Benson Mates, 
'incorporated into the Peripatetic logic under the title "theory of the hypothetical syllogism".' See 
Mates, 1961, p. 69. 
127 Posterior Analytics 100b3-5. See also De Anima 432a6-7. 'Hence no one can learn or understand 
anything in the absence of sense.' 
128 Posterior Analytics 99b35-100a2. For discussion of the relation between Aristotle and the Stoics on 
the relation of signs and real objects, see Long, 1996, pp. 79-82. For discussion of the difference 
between Aristotelian and Stoic axioms and their relation lekta, see Bochenski, 1951, p. 93; and Kneale 
and Kneale, 1962, pp. 152-153. 
129 The problem of applying information regarding the external world, which has been gathered 
empirically through the senses, in both the minor premise of a deductive argument as a particular 
proposition and in the induction of universal propositions, remains current in discussions of scepticism 
today. See for example, Stine, 1976, pp. 249-261; Vogel, 1993, pp. 235-250; and Falvey and Owens, 
1994, pp. 107-137. 
130 See De Anima 428alff. 
131 Academica II, 18. In his criticism of the sceptical tactics of the New Academy, Lucullus complains 
that the class of arguments called sorites, which exploit the ambiguous nature of relative terms such as 
'few' and 'much', is 'erroneous' and 'captious'. See Academica II, 49-50. In defense of the Stoic 
position, Lucullus argues that such arguments deny our ability to discern the absolute distinctions 
between objects of perceptions, and thus lead to the elimination of any criteria for judging even the 
relative values of external objects. To avoid such a consequence, the Stoics assert the reliabilility of the 
lekton. Lisa Jardine has discussed Lorenzo Valla's response to Lucullus' complaints about the sorites in 
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the Academica. See Jardine, 1977, pp. 143-164. The problem ofthe sorites continues to concern 
logicians today. For a recent discussion of the problem, see Raffman, 1994, pp. 41-74. For an overview 
of the problem, an account of various logicians' attempts at a solution and a guide to further reading on 
the subject, see Read, 1995, pp. 172-202. 
m Diogenes, Lives, VII, 45 
133 Ibid., 50. Epicurus also asserted that 'every presentation is of a real object and is of the same kind as 
is the object which excites the sensation'. See Sextus, Against the Mathematicians VIII, 63. For a 
discussion of the problematic relationship between the lekton and phantasia, see Atherton, 1993, pp. 
223-267. For a summary of the Stoic understanding of the relation betweenphantasia and cognitive 
assent, see Sandbach, 1996, pp. 9-21. 
134 For a discussion of Sextus' critique of the Stoic theory of phantasia in Against the Mathematicians 
VII 242-246, see Shields, 1993, pp. 325-347. 
135 Sextus, Outlines II, 156. On the importance of the lekton for the grounding of Stoic dialectic and 
ethics, see Atherton, 1993, pp. 40-55. For more on Sextus' objections to Stoic dialectic, see Atherton, 
1993, pp. 424-450; and Hamblin, 1970, pp. 91-97. 
136 Brutus 153 
137 See Gorgias, 447c5-8; and Wardy, 1996, p. 58. 
138 Gorgias, Encomium, 15 
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141 Ibid., 13 
142 Ibid., 13 
143 Ibid., 13 
144 Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias 980b18-20 
145 Ibid., 980b20-21 
146 Sextus, Against the Mathematicians, VII, 87 
147 For a brief discussion of the function of epoche in Pyrrhonist scepticism, see Barnes, 1990, pp. 8-11. 
148 Donne jokingly refers to the difference between veri simile and 'undenyable truth' in his eighteenth 
problem, 'Why doe Women delight so much in Feathers?' (11. 3-4). Michael W. Price has observed that 
Donne's creation oflikenesses of truth in his Paradoxes and Problems is intended to lead his reader to 
an awareness of their differences. See Price, 1995, pp. 149-184, esp. 166ff. For a discussion of Gorgias' 
'paradoxologia' in his Encomium of Helen, On What is Not, and Plato's Gorgias, see Wardy, 1996, pp. 
20-93. 
149 M. T. Jones-Davies fails to recognize Cicero's probabilist scepticism in her attempt to demonstrate 
Sextus' influence on sixteenth-century paradox, and as a result makes all paradoxical statements reflect a 
Pyrrhonist critique of knowledge. See Jones -Davies, 1994, pp. 99-109. In an earlier essay, Jones-
Davies stressed the use of the paradox as prescribed by Cicero in the Paradoxa Stoicorum in the quest 
for truth, but there, she failed to distinguish the Ciceronian and Aristotelian probabilism which informed 
the inquisitive nature of the academic and scholastic disputation of paradoxes (theses), and the 
neoplatonic and Augustinian fideism which asserted that faith in the truth of the Christian paradoxes was 
assisted by an attempt to perceive the allegorical correspondence between the universal intelligibles and 
the particular sensibles that particpate in them. As a result of this failure, Donne's paradoxes continue to 
be associated with Lando's Paradossi and Montaigne's Essays. See Jones-Davies, 1982, pp. 105-123. 
150 Gorgias 458a 
151 See ibid., 479b-c. 
152 Ibid., 486a-b 
153 See De Oratore III, 60, 70-72. 
154 Gorgias 449b. See also Gorgias 462a, 475d. Robert Wardy details the evidence from the original 
Greek that this juxtaposition was intentional. My attention to this point and its consequences owes much 
to his analysis. See Wardy, 1996, p. 57. 
ISS Gorgias 449d 
156 Paradoxa 4 
157 Ibid., 2-3. In Petrus Marsi's commentary in his 1499 edition of the Paradoxa Stoicorum, he explains 
that Cicero's intention was to make these interrogatory pin-pricks appear 'probabile' and 'credibile' by 
rhetorical elaboration. See also Wardy, 1996, p. 60. 
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IS8 Gorgias 473e. We recall Aristotle's advice in the Sophistical Refutations 172 b30-31 to 'question 
[one's interlocutor] as to some point wherein their [school of philosophy] doctrine is paradoxical to most 
people'. 
IS9 Gorgias 481b-c 
160 See ibid., 475e-476a, 482a-c. 
161 See Academica I, 22; I, 43; and De Finibus IV, 20; IV, 60; V, 74. 
162 For more instances of the Stoic paradoxicality of Socrates' ethics see Shorey, 1978, pp. 7-34. 
Socrates is traditionally thought to have defended three distinct ethical paradoxes; first, that 'no man 
desires evil', second, that 'no man who (knows or) believes that an action is evil does it willingly-on the 
contrary, all that the actions that a man does willingly he does with a view to achieving some good', and 
third, that 'it is better to suffer injustice at the hands of others that to do unjust acts oneself'. For a 
discussion of the first of these paradoxes (and for the source of the above definitions of them) with 
regard to its formulation in Gorgias and Meno, see Nakhnikian, 1973, pp. 1-17. 
163 Gorgias 508e-509a 
164 In his attempt to show that Socratic dialectic was a vehicle for Platonic idealism, Stanley Fish claims 
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discourse (rhetorical and dialectical alike) was unable to convey the true nature of reality. He goes on to 
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order to persuade his readers/listeners 'to a vision in which all points are one' (p. 39). Not only does 
Fish overlook Socrates' commitment to the power of dialectic to persuade through bare, but valid 
inferences, he also fails to observe, as we will later, Augustine's use of Stoic unprovables as arguments 
against scepticism in Against the Academicians. Finally, Fish mistakenly places Donne in this tradition. 
See Fish, 1972, pp. 1-21 on Plato, 21-43 on Augustine, and 43-77 on Donne. Robert Wardy has shown 
that Gorgias' On What is Not may have served the 'self-consuming' function that Fish imagined Socratic 
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model for Augustine or for Donne. See Wardy, 1996, pp. 21-24. Brian Vickers discussion of Plato's 
criticisms of the sophictical rhetoric provides a more representative and accurate account of the 
philosophical applications of Socratic dialectic. See Vickers, 1988, pp. 83-147, esp. l33ff. Jonathan 
Culler has discussed Fish's theory of the reader's role in the generation and corruption of the meaning of 
a text in the context of the principles of deconstruction from which it is derived. He conludes, as we 
have, that Fish's lack offamiliarity with the traditions ofliterary interpretation with which he is dealing 
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bad that a man who enjoins us to think about reading should have so vague an idea of the nature of the 
conventions by which he himself is reading' (p. 130). See Culler, 1981, pp. 119-131. 
16S Quintilian had noted that Socratic dialectic employs rhetorical amplification in the service of clarity. 
See Quintilian, Institutio V, xiv, 28-29. 
166 For a discussion of the formation of the concept of right reason according to the Stoic/Socratic 
paradox that knowledge is virtue, see Hoopes, 1962, pp. 1-45. 
167 Erasmus, 1979, pp. l30-l31 
168 Ibid., p. l33 
169 Ibid., p. l32 
170 T. W. Baldwin has observed that Isocrates' complaint against sophistical abuses, Contra Sophistis, 
was used as a standard Greek text in sixteenth-century grammar schools. See Baldwin, 1944, v. 1, p. 
400; v. 2, p. 650. 
171 Thomas Wilson referred to Gorgias' 'praisyng unrighteousnes' in Plato's Gorgias. See Wilson, 1982, 
p.48. Neil Rhodes has noted Gosson's animosity to the pretenses of Gorgianic rhetoric in his School of 
Abuse (1579). See Rhodes, 1992, p. 19. 
l72 Gosson, 1579, sig. G4 
173 Donne, 1980, p. 12,11.28-33 
174 See Gorgias, Encomium, 19. James Biester has examined Gorgias' characterization of the force of 
language in his defense of Helen in relation to the production of wonder in Donne's obscure, but 
'masculine' use oflanguage. He makes no mention of Donne's sixth paradox, however. See Biester, 
1997, pp. 109-116. 
17S Donne, 1980, p. 12,11.38-39. In his discussion of Gorgias' seminal characterization of the persuasive 
force of rhetoric, Neil Rhodes emphasizes the concept of the physically potent word, which sixteeenth-
72 
century England inherited through their reading of Plato's and Isocrates' accounts of Gorgianic rhetoric. 
See Rhodes, 1992, pp. 8-19. 
176 For a reading of Donne's Elegy VII in light of the tradition of sophistry recorded by Isocrates and 
Plato, see Bueler, 1985, pp. 69-85. For a reading of the same poem which concludes that Donne was 
defending the claims of the sophists against the ability of language to convey truth, see Brodsky, 1982, 
pp. 829-848. 
177 Donne, 1980, p. 12,11. 34-38. Even for a critic of reason such as Luther, conviction in the objectivity 
of the truth was necessary for rectified Christian belief. Writing against the scepticism which he 
believed was reflected in Erasmus' De Libero Arbitrio (1524), Luther argues, 'A Christian ought...to be 
certain of what he affirms, or else he is not a Christian ... Anathema to the Christian who will not be 
certain of what he is supposed to believe, and who does not comprehend it. How can he believe that 
which he doubts'. Quoted in Popkin, 1960, pp. 6-7. Luther's De Servo Arbitrio (1525) was written as a 
response to Erasmus' De Libero. Melanchthon, Luther's protege in Wittenberg, had taken a slightly 
milder view in a letter to Erasmus. There he claimed that, though certainty is necessary on some points 
of doctrine, 'in extra scriptural disputes', the 'Academic style' which acknowledges doubt is acceptable. 
Quoted in Schmitt, 1972, p. 60. 
178 See Plutarch, 'The Education of Children,' 6 in the Moralia. 
179 Lyly, 1973, p. 270 
180 Ibid., p. 270. Lyly did not get it quite right. It was Polus who asked Socrates about the king of 
Persia, not Gorgias. See Gorgias 470e. 
181 Donne, 1980, p. 13, 11. 60-61. As we will see below, the author of The Mirrour of Madnes (which 
was supposed to have been translated by the English translator of Cornelius Agrippa's Vanity of the Arts 
and Sciences, James Sandford) produced a similar conclusion regarding the nothingness of virtue 
utilizing similarly fallacious syllogistic argumentation. 
182 In a 1624 sermon, Donne again discusses the relative value of the goods of the soul and of fortune. 
See Donne, 1953, VI, p. 234. Coleridge took an interest in his discussion in this sermon, and expressed 
his dissatisfaction with Donne's terminological distinctions. See Brinkley, 1955, p. 195. 
183 For a typically fanciful account of the relation between Donne's, Erasmus' and Lyly's use of logic 
and rhetoric, see Docherty, 1987, pp. 85-104. 
184 Lyly, 1973, p. 180 
185 Joan Webber has considered Donne's antithetical prose style in the context of the emergence of the 
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Chapter II 
The Dialectical Procedure of the Paradoxical Thesis 
1 
The Philosophical Thesis and the Rhetorical Controversia 
We have already observed that the defense of the thesis, as discussed by 
Aristotle and Isocrates, was a specifically philosophical undertaking, which could 
result in the appearance of a paradox. In spite of the sophistical abuses of eristics, 
such as Gorgias and Protagoras, which threatened to render the defense of a thesis 
no more than an exercise in sceptical word-play, Cicero recorded its continued 
serious application in the schools of the Roman Republic, and left for posterity an 
example of such an application in his Paradoxa Stoicorum. Though philosophers 
such as the second-century Stoic, Posidonius, complained that it had been degraded 
by its use by rhetoricians as a mere exercise in deliberative oratory, the utility of the 
thesis as an exercise in both dialectic and rhetoric would continue to be recognized 
without interruption throughout late antiquity, the middle ages and into the sixteenth 
century.l As we mentioned earlier, in the Topics, Aristotle defmed the thesis as: 
a paradoxical belief of some eminent philosopher; e.g. the view that 
contradiction is impossible ... or it may be a view contrary to men's usual 
opinions about which we have an argument...That a thesis is a problem, is 
clear; for it follows of necessity that from what has been said that either the 
mass of men disagree with the wise about the thesis, or that the one or the 
other class disagree among themselves, seeing that the thesis is a paradoxical 
belief. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called theses? 
Apart from suggesting a plausible reason for the appearance of Donne's Paradoxes 
and Problems together in the Juvenilia published in 1633, Aristotle's definition of 
the thesis reveals its fundamental role in dialectic.3 Throughout his writing, 
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Aristotle associates the thesis with the defense of an uncommon opinion maintaining 
that the theses of philosophers are by their very nature potentially paradoxical. For 
this reason, the questioner of an advocate of one of these philosophical theses should 
exploit this potential for paradox. 
The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the 
answerer utter the most implausible of the necessary consequences of his 
thesis; while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is not he who is 
responsible for the impossibility or paradox, but only his thesis.4 
The thesis as Aristotle understood it constituted the principal subject matter for 
dispute; and in so far as disputation was the means by which dialectic judged truth, 
the reduction of a given thesis to the status of the paradoxical in disputation was 
tantamount to demonstrating its falsehood. Aristotle, however, recognized that 
debates upon theses were by their nature contentious and that any demonstration of 
the paradoxical could be manipulated by a deft disputant to appear to be a 
demonstration of the probable, and therefore, common, opinion. 5 
The paradox as a defense will continue to be associated by Cicero and Donne 
with the thesis, most conspicuously in Donne's case, in his description of 
Biathanatos as both a paradox and a thesis. We must take care, however, not to 
confuse paradoxes, which, like theses, are defended according to the principles of 
dialectical exposition familiar to both Cicero and Donne, with the exercises in 
Roman forensic rhetoric called controversiae, which were practiced in order to give 
pupils practice in preparing and delivering a defense before the law court. 6 The 
controversia represented a specific type of declamatory exercise in which a 
circumstantially complex situation is presented, and the declaimer required to defend 
a position for or against conviction or acquittal. According to Quintilian, the 
controversia, as well as the closely related suasoria, may have begun to be 
declaimed as early as the fourth century B.C. during the time of Demetrius of 
Phalerum, the master of Athens from 317-307 B.C., though their specific use as 
exercises in forensic (controversiae) and deliberative (suasoriae) rhetoric is not 
recorded until the elder Seneca wrote his own Controversiae, which included 
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examples ofboth.7 Though Seneca claims that controversiae had not come into 
practice by Cicero's time, their equivalent, causae, were certainly in use by then.s 
The causa, like the controversia, required the orator to defend a position in light of 
specific circumstantial limits such as time, place, person, etc. Cicero himself 
appears to contradict Seneca's claim that controversiae were not practiced in his 
time and uses the term alternatively with the term causa.9 In this passage, however, 
Cicero contrasts not one but three specifically rhetorical applications of the 
controversia with the unlimited applications of the thesis (quaestio infinita et quasi 
proposita 'consultatio' nominatur), thus indicating that for him a controversia did 
not yet have a purely forensic rhetorical function. 10 Not coincidentally these three 
rhetorical applications (lite aut deliberatione aut laudatione) correspond neatly to 
those delineated later in the Topics, and in the Rhetoric of Aristotle, to the forensic, 
deliberative and epideictic. ll Cicero makes the principally rhetorical objectives of 
causae and controversiae clear when he asserts, 'Tria sunt genera causarum: iudici, 
deliberation is, laudation is. , 12 
When he records the corresponding Greek term for causa and controversia, 
hypothesis, he does so in light of its original opposition to the thesis as described by 
Aristotle in his own Topics. 13 Cicero's recognition of this opposition in this passage 
is important because his summary of Aristotle's Topics in his own Topics represents 
one of the primary sources for medieval commentators, such as Isidore (c. 560-636) 
and Boethius (c. 480-c. 524), on ancient rhetorical and dialectical taxonomy. 14 
Cicero says of quaestiones: 
There are two kinds of inquiry [quaestionum], one general and the other 
particular. The particular is what the Greeks call ... (hypothesis), and we call 
cause or case; the general inquiry is what they call ... (thesis), and we can call 
a proposition. The hallmark of a case is that it involves definite persons, 
places, times, actions, or affairs ... 15 
Though he claims that propositiones (quaestiones) are 'parts of' causae, they 
continue to remain the less restricted of the two in their rhetorical function. The 
orator delivering a forensic speech in defense of a particular act committed by a 
particular person under a particular set of circumstances must draw on the arguments 
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(theses) relevant to the general concerns of the case, and therefore, depends on a 
principally dialectical process of thinking in utramque partem, which seeks only to 
comprehend the contradictory positions available to a disputant of a certain general 
problem. Each position as well as its accompanying argument is a thesis, and for 
Aristotle, represents the often paradoxical results of a philosopher's dialectical 
program. In so far as these results seem to follow necessarily from their premises 
within the framework of a deductive argument, any apparent paradox is rendered 
plausible by the force of the logic by which it is inferred; and therefore, the skilled 
orator declaiming a controversia, causa or hypothesis, must be familiar with the 
dialectical expositions of all of the theses relevant to the specific situation, so that he 
can decide how he should rhetorically manipulate the presentation of these theses 
such that their paradoxicality is suppressed or exposed. 
After the fall of the Republic and the passing of Cicero's notion of the orator 
scrupulously trained in utramque partem dissere, controversiae became subjects 
upon which the speaker could display his verbal ingenuity, without consideration of 
the original rhetorical purpose of the exercise, to make a convincing defense of an 
action taken under complex circumstances. The Elder Seneca tells us, mistakenly, 
that in Cicero's time, the thesis had ceased to be debated as it had been by the 
philosophers mentioned by Aristotle in the Topics. 16 In a letter to his brother 
Quintus, Cicero admits both his preference for a 'more scholarly and 
argumentative ... system of instruction' as well as his view that the declamatory style 
[declamatorio genere] of instruction is more' charming' to the young. 17 The 
pedagogical value of declaiming controversiae continues to be recognized by 
Favorinus of ArIes in the second century because it is 'very useful in arousing the 
imagination, sharpening the mind and accustoming the mind to difficult cases.' 18 
However, the convoluted themes of controversiae, as well as the slightly less 
convoluted themes of suasoriae, which were designed as hortative exercises in 
deliberative oratory, were less favorably received by Quintilian, Tacitus and 
Petronius. 19 The increasingly complex circumstances of the subjects of 
controversiae made their complementary relation to the dialectically expounded 
subjects of theses now quite remote. By the time Seneca was writing his 
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Controversiae, controversiae had become mere declamatory exercises, which were 
designed ostensibly to instruct pupils in legal oratory, but which were equally, if not 
more, valued as a source of entertainment. The heavy emphasis placed on legal 
education during the early Empire restricted the considerations of declaimers of 
controversiae to the rhetorical advantages of a certain line of argumentation; the 
dialectical considerations of the thesis, which sought, as Socrates' dialectic had in 
the Gorgias, to judge the truth or falsity of the philosophical positions relevant to a 
particular controversia, had all but vanished amid the displays of verbal wit so 
highly prized as ingenious and novel ways of defending a position. 
2 
The Use of Dialectic and the Thesis 
Unlike controversiae, theses were never wholly absorbed into a specifically 
rhetorical program of education because their subjects were recognized to demand 
first, a philosophical treatment, and then, a rhetorically appropriate presentation. In 
Orator, Cicero describes the rhetorical value of arguing theses, and attributes to 
Aristotle the practice of using theses to train the young 'not for the philosophical 
manner of subtle discussion, but for the fluent style of the rhetorician, so 
that...[theyJ ... might be able to uphold either side of the question in copious and 
elegant language. ,20 Though Aristotle certainly valued the ability to argue in 
utramque partem, Cicero here seems to overestimate the rhetorical value he attached 
to creating arguments pro and contra. In the Topics, Aristotle advises his pupils of 
both the rhetorical and philosophical benefits of arguing theses: 
Select...arguments relating to the same thesis and range them side by side; 
for this produces a plentiful supply of arguments for carrying a point by 
force, and in refutation is of great service, whenever one is well stocked with 
arguments pro and con-for then you find yourself on guard against contrary 
statements. Moreover, as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic 
wisdom the power of discerning and holding in one view the results of either 
of two hypotheses is no mean instrument; for it then only remains to make a 
right choice ofthem.21 
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Cicero himself moderates his view of the rhetorical primacy of the thesis in De 
Oratore. Though his characterization of the thesis remained consistent, a question 
'propounding an unlimited subj ect of inquiry' , his names for it varied.22 He 
alternatively used the Greek thesis, quaestio, infinUa quaestio,proposUum or 
consultatio.23 When he says, in De Oratore, that the orator must be expected to 
speak on the philosophically ranging subjects of theses (quaestionem) such as 'good 
and evil', and 'things to be preferred and things to be shunned', he does not require 
him to do so in the dialectical manner of the philosophers, 'one by one', because an 
exposition of the 'verbal controversies' of dialecticians is ineffective in persuasive 
speech.24 Nevertheless, as has been said, a familiarization with the philosophers' 
dialectical treatment of theses is indispensable in the training of an effective orator 
because it is through such a process that the fundamental and general issues relevant 
to the more specific circumstances of controversiae and suasoriae are discovered. 
Cicero complained that the Academic and Peripatetic schools had 
appropriated the thesis as a means for expounding their system of philosophy and 
that orators were left with the relatively insignificant task of arguing controversiae 
irrespective of any relevant general philosophical concerns. He says of the thesis 
(here rendered disputationes, in quibus de universo genere in utramque partem 
disseri copiose licet), that it is 'now considered the special province of the two 
schools [Academic and Peripatetic] of which I spoke before'. The orators, he 
continues 'have been ousted from ... [their] own estate and left in occupation of a 
trifling little property, and that contested, and ... [they] ... who are the defenders of 
other people have been unable to hold and safeguard our own possessions' .25 It is 
Cicero's goal, therefore, to return to rhetoric its philosophical content, to collapse 
the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric imposed by Socrates in his attack on 
the inability of the verbal subtlety of sophists such as Gorgias to guide their listeners 
to an understanding of ethical truths?6 He says: 
if you are content with these rules [of forensic rhetoric]. .. , you are making 
the orator abandon a vast, immesureable plain and confine himself to quite a 
narrow circle. If on the other hand you chose to follow the famous Pericles 
of old, or even our friend Demosthenes with whom his many writings have 
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made us better acquainted, and if you have grown up to love that glorious 
and supreme ideal, that thing of beauty, the perfect orator, you are bound to 
accept either the modem dialectic of Carneades or the earlier method of 
Aristotle. For, as I said before, the older masters down to Socrates used to 
combine with their theory of rhetoric the whole of the study and the science 
of everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics?7 
As we have seen, the sceptical dialectic of Carneades was used to demonstrate how a 
valid contradictory position could be advanced against any of the assertions of 
dogmatic logicians such as the Stoics. The 'earlier method of Aristotle' mentioned 
here refers to the instructions given in Topics, which advise the disputant to prepare 
for his debates by collecting arguments for and against a number of theses.28 
Cicero's probabilism, which he also inherited from Carneades, leads him to 
recommend the dialectic of Carneades because, while it demonstrates the doubt 
inherent in any syllogistically defended position, it also clarifies the critical terms of 
that position making it easier for the disputant to perceive its probability with respect 
to its various conflicting positions?9 As we have seen, and will see further, Donne's 
dialectical presentation of his positions in both the Paradoxes and Biathanatos 
serves this same interest of clarification, and therefore, can only be understood in 
light of the practice of the disputed thesis articulated by Cicero and Aristotle. 
The reason Cicero approves the use of the thesis as an exercise in dialectic in 
De Oratore, a use which he seemed to reject in Orator, is because he recognized that 
Aristotle's dialectic was not at odds with his rhetoric; Aristotle's rhetoric, unlike the 
merely verbal rhetoric of his contemporaries, was a conduit to truth.3D In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle explains that the rhetorician should prepare himself in the same 
manner, and to the same end, as the dialectician preparing deductions for and against 
a given thesis. 
We must be able to employ persuasion, just as deduction can be employed, 
on opposite sides of the question, not in order that we may in practice 
employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), 
but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another 
man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of 
the arts draw opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this.3l 
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In light of Aristotle's unsceptical view that 'men have a sufficient natural instinct for 
what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth' , the use of rhetoric or dialectic to 
advocate false opinions becomes an intentional and culpable act of deception, a 
considered 'choice' to deceive.32 It is his propensity to make this choice to mislead 
that distinguishes the sophist from the dialectician. Furthermore, sophists such as 
Gorgias who practice misleading dialectic have, as a result, been classified by honest 
dialecticians such as Socrates as mere rhetoricians because of their concern only to 
persuade. It is for this reason that Aristotle acknowledges two senses of the term 
'rhetorician', one which denotes the legitimate knowledge of the art, and the other, 
the potential for the sophistical 'choice' to deceive. No such division exists in 
dialectic because, as Socrates established, sophistical dialectic is not dialectic at all, 
but rather a species of rhetoric. 
What makes a man a sophist is not his abilities but his choices. In rhetoric, 
however, the term 'rhetorician' may describe either the speaker's knowledge 
of the art, or his choices. In dialectic a man is a sophist because he makes a 
certain kind of choice, a dialectician in respect not of his choices but of his 
abilities.33 
Like Cicero, Quintilian complains of the divorce between rhetoric and 
philosophy initiated by Socrates' rejection of the rhetoric of Gorgias.34 He blames 
the orators for abandoning their general inquiries into the natures of things and 
allowing the philosophers to restrict their treatment of such subj ects (theses) to the 
dialectical method of close reasoning. He identified the frivolity of the schools of 
declamation of his time as the principal reason that such a divorce between rhetoric 
and dialectic persisted. Though far from calling for the elimination of 
ornamentation in the exposition of philosophical subjects, Quintilian believed that 
the orator should take a greater interest in reality and that his ' [ declamation], 
therefore, should resemble the truth. ,35 His belief in the propriety of rhetoric's 
claim to the subject matter of the philosophers stems from another belief which he 
shared with Cicero, that dialectic was really just a class of oratory. Given this 
subordination of dialectic, Quintilian asks, 'Since the discussion of whatever is 
brought before it is the task of dialectic, which is really a concise form of oratory, 
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why should not this task be regarded as also being the appropriate material for 
continuous oratory?,36 Later in the Institutes, he gives examples of the ways in 
which the enthymeme, a syllogism with one or both of its premises missing, may be 
employed by the orator. His advice is guarded, however, because of his recognition 
of the confusion with which syllogistic proof is likely to be met by the listener 
untrained in dialectic. Unlike the discourse of trained philosophers who 'subject 
everything to a minute and scrupulous inquiry with a view to arriving at clear and 
convincing truths' , orators 'must speak before an audience of men who, if not 
thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic' .37 Cicero's 
justification of his more rhetorically elaborated presentation of the Stoic syllogisms 
which purport to demonstrate their paradoxa reveals precisely the same concern 
with rendering dialectical proofs comprehensible to the untrained. 
In the preface to the first book of his Controversia, the elder Seneca indicates 
that the Paradoxa Stoicorum cannot be as easily classified rhetorically as his 
declamations because they are neither suasoria nor controversia; they are, as Cicero 
himself explains in the preface of the Paradoxa, his transpositions of the astounding 
logical demonstrations of Stoic ethics, their paradoxa. 38 Cicero describes these 
demonstrations as Aristotle had described the paradoxical arguments of the 
philosophers in the Topics, 'quae dicuntur in scholis {)&TlKlUr;. And though Cicero 
explains that he will defend these Stoic theses in the 'oratorical style of discourse 
that is [his] own', none of the three rhetorical classifications (epideictic, deliberative, 
forensic) adequately explain the method or objective of his arguments. The simple 
reason for this lack of neat rhetorical classification is that the Paradoxa Stoicorum is 
not primarily a rhetorical work; it is a consideration of theses, and as such, 
fundamentally a philosophical work. When discussing Hermagoras' distinction 
between theses and hypotheses in De Inventione, Cicero makes clear that hypotheses 
(causae), as they are concerned with 'definite individuals' (personarum certarum), 
are to be treated under the appropriate rhetorical heading, 'judicial, deliberative, [ or] 
epideictic', while theses (quaestiones), as they are concerned with circumstantially 
unrestricted philosophical issues such as the shape of the world and whether the 
senses can be trusted, are not limited to any of the three rhetorical categories. He 
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says, referring to the relative triviality of rhetorical hypotheses to philosophical 
theses, 'It seems the height of folly to assign an orator as if they were trifles these 
subjects in which we know that the sublime genius of philosophers has spent so 
much labour' .39 Quintilian follows Cicero on the division of the thesis and the 
hypothesis, and expresses his relief that in Orator, De Oratore and Topics, Cicero 
retracted the view expressed in De Inventione, that only philosophers ought to 
consider theses.4o The relationship between the thesis and hypothesis, he explains, is 
one of genus to species; and therefore, the orator speaking on a particular matter 
(hypothesis) must be aware of the underlying general question (thesis) in order to 
execute his rhetorical objective effectively. Quintilian offers an example of how this 
process of abstraction functions, and implies that it is only the hypothesis that is 
restricted by the prescriptions of the three rhetorical categories. 'The question 
"Should a man marry?" is indefinite [infinita]; the question "Should Cato marry?" is 
definite [jinita], and consequently may be regarded as a subj ect for a deliberative 
theme [suasoria].'41 Ungoverned as they were by rhetorical agendas, the 
investigation of the subjects of theses were subject only to the demands of proof. It 
is for this reason, therefore, that we must turn to rhetoric's counterpart, dialectic, for 
an explanation of the ways in which a thesis may be demonstrated. 
3 
Doubt and the Thesis 
Cicero's main objection to the Stoic ethical tenets treated in the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum was the manner of their exposition; the logic according to which Stoic 
dialectic functioned was simply unpersuasive.42 It is important that we recognize 
that this lack of persuasiveness does not result primarily from a specifically 
rhetorical shortcoming, though Cicero undoubtedly implies that the barren dialectic 
of the Stoics may be rendered more acceptable by the sort of rhetorical elaboration 
found in his speeches in the law-courts or before the Senate. In Thomas Newton's 
translation of the Paradoxa Stoicorum, Cicero's description of his transposition of 
the Stoic theses is rendered from the Latin 'cum ea quae dicuntur in scholis f}e71Kli7( 
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ad nostrum hoc oratorium trans/ero dicendi genus' as 'when I select and excerpe 
suche sayings as amonge the Philosophers in their schooles are called their positive 
and peculier arguments [B&1"lKtllS], and interlace the same into the Rhetorical trade 
that we use in pleadynge and traversinge causes and matters Iudicial. ,43 Newton's 
supplemented translation suggests that Cicero will utilize his skill in forensic oratory 
to provide the Stoic paradoxa with the rhetorical adornment necessary to convince 
his imagined audience.44 We may be tempted to conclude from Newton's addition 
to the Latin text that Cicero considered the dialectical proofs of the philosophers to 
be unpersuasive without rhetorical elaboration, but this conclusion overlooks the fact 
that the Paradoxa Stoicorum is a defense of philosophical conclusions (the theses of 
the Stoics), which as such, is principally bound to submit to the demands of logical 
proof. 
None of the three general rhetorical classifications provide for these demands 
specifically. Only deduction and induction, the two classes of proof outlined by 
Aristotle in the Topics and Cicero in De Inventione, are necessary to the 
demonstration of theses; the particularly rhetorical considerations regarding both the 
partisan objectives of the speaker and the circumstances in which those objectives 
are couched are not relevant to the general investigation of the thesis. 45 This is not 
to say that Cicero thought that arguments for or against certain theses did not benefit 
from rhetorical elaboration. As we have seen, Cicero insisted that the claims of 
rhetoric and dialectic to the use of logical structures such as syllogisms were not 
mutually exclusive. When Cicero deploys a syllogism in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, 
for instance, the procedure of the deduction from major to minor premise to 
conclusion is properly analyzed by dialectic while the relation of the deduction to 
information, such as examples, provided in its support is properly analyzed by 
rhetoric. Even in the defense of theses, which by defmition are concerned with 
natures or values irrespective of the specific rhetorical objectives to which they 
might be applied, the principles of rhetoric can assist in confirming the likelihood of 
conclusions reached through dialectical arguments. However, such rhetorical 
confirmation must follow the clarification and order which only a dialectical 
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analysis of the issue under consideration may provide. Cicero emphasizes this point 
as an introduction to his discussion of induction and deduction in De Inventione. 
It is the embellishment of the argument once it has been discovered 
(inventa), and the arrangement of it in definite divisions, which make the 
speech attractive to the audience ... For that reason it seemed necessary to us 
to speak about the rules for this [embellishment] and to do so at this point so 
that the subject of invention of arguments may be combined with the theory 
of argumentation.46 
It is because of his observation of this process of discovery and arrangement 
that Cicero, in his Brutus, rates the forensic oratory of Servius Sulpicius superior to 
that of Lucius Crassus and Quintus Scaevola. There, he praises the ability of 
Crassus to extrapolate from both the circumstances in which the prescriptions of a 
particular law are relevant and the wording of that law, the underlying general issue 
of equity. In legal cases, issues of equity (aequitas) bear the same relationship to the 
specific circumstances of the case (e.g. who, when, where, etc.) as theses bear to the 
specific circumstances of controversiae and suasoriae. Crassus, therefore, unlike 
Scaevola who remained ever faithful to the letter of the law, exhibited a more 
penetrating insight into the general philosophical content relevant to the specific 
legal case and was able to incorporate that content into his legal pleading. Cicero 
prefers Crassus' ability to discern the general behind the particular to Scaevola's 
scrupulosity, but seems to imply that Crassus could have benefited from Scaevola's 
thorough knowledge of the particulars of the law. Servius, though not as attentive to 
the details of the law as Scaevola, knew 'as much of the civil law as was requisite 
for the orator' and combined that knowledge with an ability to discern the general 
and the particular that surpassed even Crassus.47 Cicero explains that Servius' 
exceptional ability is derived from: 
that art which teaches the analysis of a whole into its component parts, sets 
forth and defines the latent and implicit, interprets and makes clear the 
obscure; which first recognizes the ambiguous and then distinguishes; which 
applies in short a rule or measure for adjudging truth and falsehood, for 
determining what conclusions follow from what premises, and what do not.48 
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This art, Cicero calls the art of all arts (ars omnium artium maxima), dialectic.49 As 
we have seen, Cicero objects to the dialectical procedure which purports to 
demonstrate the Stoic paradoxa absolutely and with certainty; his rhetorical 
objections stem from objections to the exposition of the arguments, and therefore, 
are merely a function of his philosophical objections. He says when describing the 
difference between his and Cato' s (the Stoic) speeches in the Senate that he (Cicero) 
'[makes] more use of a system of philosophy which is the parent of oratorical 
fluency' .50 His philosophical views, therefore, prescribe the rhetorical elaboration of 
his dialectic. 
Similarly, in contesting theses, the debater must utilize dialectical analyses to 
penetrate any ambiguous rhetorical elaboration. In the Sophistical Refutations, 
Aristotle advises debaters that an effective way to render an opponent's argument 
unpersuasive is to demonstrate that its paradoxicality does not follow as a logical 
necessity, and therefore, is soluble under dialectical scrutiny. 
Again, to draw a paradoxical statement, look and see to what school the 
person arguing with you belongs, and then question him as to some point 
wherein their doctrine is paradoxical to most people; for with every school 
there is some point of that kind. It is an elementary rule in these matters that 
you have a collection of the theses of the various schools among your 
propositions. The solution appropriate here, too, is to show that the paradox 
does not come about because of the argument: whereas this is what your 
opponent always really wants. 51 
Cicero's defense of the Stoic paradoxes requires just such an attempt to show that 
their startling conclusions are not necessary consequences of the arguments, but 
merely reflect the laconic manner in which they were presented. 52 It is because 
Zeno believed his surprising ethical tenets could validly be deduced from first 
principles by necessary consequence according to his sophisticated rules of logical 
inference that he presumed to term these tenets paradoxa. 53 By attempting to make 
a persuasive case for the Stoic paradoxes, however, Cicero had to expose what he 
considered to be their false claim to logical necessity and argue for their mere 
probability. Naturally, such an argument for probability would be advanced with 
respect to the relative likelihood of competing positions, and thus, amount to an 
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argument for preferability. Due to the influence of Cicero's defense of the Stoic 
theses according to the principles of his probabilist scepticism, arguments for 
preferability were to become the proper subjects of theses in sixteenth-century 
textbooks of rhetoric and dialectic. The thesis would not lose its essentially 
philosophical character, but its advocates would often acknowledge the doubt 
intrinsically associated with its exposition by stating their theses in relative terms 
(e.g. it is better to marry than not to marry). Such an acknowledgement indicates the 
disputant's awareness of the contentiousness of the point under examination, while 
the lack of such an acknowledgement indicates either a genuine belief in the 
certainty of the thesis proposed (as with the Stoics) or an attempt to make a doubtful 
proof appear certain (as with the sophists). 
4 
Aphthonius and the Thesis 
While Cicero and Quintilian had preserved the distinctively philosophical 
character of the thesis against the more mundane concerns of its rhetorically 
prescribed progeny, the controversia and suasoria, they had simultaneously insisted 
upon an end to the antagonistic applications of dialectic and rhetoric. 54 
Philosophical inquiry was to be undertaken employing the analytical techniques of 
dialectic as well as the argumentative strategies of forensic and deliberative rhetoric. 
The declamation of theses, therefore, became a part of an educational program 
which sought to cultivate the student's knowledge of the general issues underlying 
particular cases (i.e. hypotheses, causae, controversiae, suasoriae) by introducing 
those issues, abstracted from the particular circumstances in which they may be 
relevant, as independent subjects of both dialectical and rhetorical treatment. Hence, 
in the fourth-century compilation of the exercises of the Greek schools of 
declamation, the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius (a textbook, it should be said, 
whose influence upon the humanist educational program was rivaled only by those 
collected out of Quintilian and Cicero), the thesis is included among the fourteen 
minor works which must be mastered by the student before he can proceed to the 
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study of oratorical compositions which incorporated elements of these minor works 
in various combinations. 55 In keeping with their use in the ancient Greek schools of 
declamation, the exercises of the Progymnasmata were presented by their most 
widely read Latin translators, Rudolph Agricola and Johannes Maria Cataneus, as 
introductions to rhetorical schemata, but as the supplementary scholia of Reinhard 
Lorich indicate, the student practicing these exercises would have to recognize when 
the assistance of dialectic would be required to clarify the issues under 
consideration. 56 It for this reason that Lorich included a reminder to the student of 
the particular and complementary functions of dialectic and rhetoric. 
vel ut naturam cuiusque rei explicet, nunc quae obscura sunt, definiendo, 
nunc quae multa & confusa, dividendo, nunc quid cuique vel consequens vel 
repugnans sit, colligendo, quam vim dialecticem vocant: vel ut proprie 
distincte, copiose, ornate, de quauis re proposita cum quadam audientium 
admiratione dicamus, quaefacultas proprie est oratorum.57 
Such a division oflabor follows the order which Cicero had described and, with 
respect to dialectic, is particularly reminiscent of his discussion of Servius' superior 
oratory in Brutus. 58 In his Foundacion of Rhetorike (1563), which was modeled on 
the Progymnasmata, Richard Rainolde urges precisely the same comprehension of 
logic and rhetoric upon the aspiring orator. 
In the one [rhetoric], as a Oratour to pleade with all facilitee, and copiously 
to dilate any matter of sentence: in the other [logic] to grounde profunde and 
subtill argument, to fortifie & make stronge our assercion or sentence, to 
proue and defend, by the force and power of arte, thinges passing the 
compasse & reach of our capacitee and witte. 59 
In his guidebook to grammar school education, Ludus Literarius (1612), 
John Brinsley recommends the thesis as the most valuable of Aphthonius' fourteen 
minor works because it provides the general training in controversial argument with 
which the orator must be furnished before he can proceed to the more rhetorically 
specific tasks (i.e. forensic or deliberative) of the lawyer or counselor.6o As an 
example of a thesis which may be both affirmed and denied, he cites Aphthonius' 
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'Uxor est ducenda, Uxor non est ducenda'. 61 As we will see, Aphthonius followed 
Cicero's definition of the thesis as a consultatio, and hence, preserved the 
involvement of logic which Cicero had insisted must be present in the investigations 
of theses. Brinsley, in following Aphthonius, follows Cicero on the nature of the 
thesis, and confirms his allegiance, when he conspicuously offers his praise for those 
'singular pattemes of true Rhetoricke', Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum, immediately 
after he recommends the Aphthonian thesis as the most valuable declamatory 
exercise in guiding students to attaining that 'singular patteme' .62 But Brinsley is 
careful to mention that in using Aphthonius, the instructor must be aware of the 
difficulties which the student unfamiliar with logic may encounter in attempting to 
declaim upon philosophical questions such as he fmds in the Paradoxa Stoicorum. 
He explains that 'to follow the Logicke places in Aphthonius in a Philosophical 
discourse, doth require some insight in Logicke, and reading in such Authors as have 
written of such morall matters.'63 Brinsley, like Rainolde and Lorich before him, 
continues to observe Cicero's and Quintilian's belief that the orator must be 
prepared to speak on philosophical matters, and therefore, must cultivate his skills in 
both rhetoric and dialectic.64 
Hence, it is Brinsley's, as well as Rainolde's and Lorich's, opinion that when 
Aphthonius says that the thesis is 'rei alicuius inuestigandae per orationem 
consideratio, vel disquisitio', the process of oratory (oratio) is neither exclusively 
nor primarily rhetorica1.65 As Aristotle had stated in the Poetics, speech (oratio) 
embraces both the probative interests of dialectic and the persuasive interests of 
rhetoric. 'The thought of the personages [of a tragedy] is shown in everything to be 
effected by their language-in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion 
(pity, fear, anger, and the like), or to maximize and minimize things. ,66 Cicero 
reiterates this view when explaining to his son the dual function of invention, the 
process by which the orator discovers arguments to support his case. 
C.Jun. Inasmuch then as the first of the speaker's functions is to invent, what 
will be his aim? 
C.Sen. To discover how to convince the persons whom he wishes to persuade 
and how to arouse their emotions. 
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c.Jun. What things serve to produce conviction? 
C.Sen. Arguments, which are derived from topics that are either contained in 
the facts of the case itself or are obtained from outside.67 
Invention, as Agricola had emphasized in his De Inventione Dialectica (1515) and as 
Ramus would confIrm, was as much a function of dialectic as rhetoric.68 It is critical 
that we do not make the mistake of reducing speech (oratio) to rhetoric when 
interpreting Aphthonius' defInition of the thesis, for if we do, we will misrepresent 
his appreciation of Cicero's reconciliation of the divergent interests of dialectic and 
rhetoric. When Aphthonius equates the thesis with the consultatio (' Thesis, id est, 
consultatio'), therefore, we must recognize the reference to Cicero's De Partitione 
Oratoria.69 There, Cicero explains that the quaestio has two divisions, 'infinitam, 
quam consultationem appelio, et dejinitam, quam causam nomino. ,70 These 
divisions correspond exactly to those described by Aphthonius, the thesis, as we 
have seen, being called consultatio, and the hypothesis, causa.71 From these 
divisions, Aphthonius continues to follow Cicero's distinctions in De Partitione 
Oratoria, dividing the thesis into questions concerning being and natures, and 
questions concerning action and duties.72 As we might expect by now, in the 
remaining discussion of De Partitione Oratoria, Cicero classifIes hypotheses 
(causae) under the three rhetorical headings, forensic, deliberative and epideictic. In 
his discussion of the fIrst type of theses, those which seek to resolve questions of 
being or natures (which he calls cogitation is, 'ofleaming'), he distinguishes a 
further three classes of treatment which fIrmly establish the affInity of the 
consultatio to Donne's Paradoxes and Biathanatos, as well as to other paradoxes of 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In so far as these classes persist in 
Aphthonius' exposition of the thesis, they serve to mark a point of continuity 
between Aristotle's understanding of the function of the thesis and that which, we 
have seen, would inspire the general philosophical inquiries to which Nashe referred 
in his Lenten Stuffe. 
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5 
The Cogitatio and Arguments for Preferability 
The first class of the cogitatio is concerned to discover answers to 
ontological and aetiological questions such as 'Is a certain result possible?' and 
'How is a particular result produced?' Cicero suggests that such investigations are 
properly the business of natural philosophers. Affrrmative propositions regarding 
such questions should remind us of the theses of those philosophers associated by 
Aristotle and Isocrates with paradoxical assertions (e.g. Zeno ofElea and Melissus). 
The second class of the cogitatio begins to take the interest in more particular ethical 
matters which will characterize the third class. It seeks to establish the relative and 
intrinsic definitions of qualities such as 'pertinacity', 'perseverence' and 'pride'. 
Cicero's question in his first paradox, 'Quid est igitur ... bonum?', belongs to this 
class of inquiry. As we have seen, Donne's eighth paradox, 'That good is more 
common than evill' , also examines the nature of good, and therefore, may be 
categorized under this heading. In this paradox Donne asserts, following Aristotle, 
that 'good ... must of necessity be more common then evill, because it hath this 
Nature and end, and perfection to be common.' 73 The third class of the cogitatio 
has specifically to do with ethical questions of honor (honestas), utility (utilitas) and 
equity (aequitas), and is by Cicero's admission the most explicitly contentious.74 
For the question asked is not only the simple inquiry, what is honourable, 
what is useful, what is equitable, but it also involves comparison-what is 
more honourable or useful or equitable, and also what is most honourable or 
useful or equitable-a class of consideration which comprises the supreme 
value of life.75 
If we recall Cicero's praise of the ideal forensic orator's ability to discern general 
matters of equity behind the particulars of his case, we should see that this third class 
of the cogitatio is of especial interest to the lawyer. And though it is unlikely that 
Donne was seriously studying for a career in law while he was writing his 
Paradoxes at Lincoln's Inn, his abiding interest in the legal and doctrinal 
controversies of his day and their relation to ethical conduct would suggest an 
94 
intimacy with Cicero's instructions concerning this specifically ethical type of 
thesis.76 Whatever the case, Donne's arguments for preferability in the Paradoxes 
may be categorized under this third class of the cogitatio. When he argues 'That the 
guifts of the body are better then those of the mind or Fortune', 'That women ought 
to paint themselves', 'That Nature is our worst Guide', 'That old Men are more 
Fantastique then younge', that 'the best things kill themselves soonest' or that 
women have most reason, he acknowledges his involvement in an inquiry which by 
its nature can only state its conclusion in comparatives or superlatives such as 
'more' or 'most'. It is neither informative nor contentious to state, for instance, that 
there are gifts of the body, mind and fortune; what Donne wants to show, albeit 
facetiously, is that one of these gifts is preferable to the others. Such a project 
requires that the criteria by which that preferability will be judged are clear and 
univocal; if we want to prove that gifts of the body are superior to those of the mind 
or fortune, we must, as Donne does, maintain that physical health is superior to 
mental health or material wealth, which of course requires further proof according to 
other criteria. In Donne's Paradoxes, this search for clear and univocal criteria is 
the medium in which his wit seizes and misapplies the critical ambiguous terms of 
his arguments. For Cicero, however, this search, as it leads to the consideration of 
natures and causes, utilizes the other two classes of the cogitatio; and therefore, he 
concludes that this third class 'is a class of consideration which comprises the things 
that constitute the supreme value of life. ,77 
Relative conclusions are a natural consequence of Cicero's moderately 
sceptical adaptation of the Stoic paradoxa. For instance, his concern for equity, 
which arises out of his relativist ethics, moves him to conclude that the Stoic thesis 
that all transgressions are equal must be analyzed under his third class of the 
cogitatio; the absoluteness of their claim is derived from special definitions of good 
and evil which, he argues, are valid only in a restricted way. Therefore, he expands 
the defense of the Stoic thesis by applying the principles of the third class ofthe 
cogitatio maintaining that if 'you posit those cases without qualification, their real 
nature cannot easily be judged,.78 After comparing the relative gravity of an 
unjustified murder of one's slave and an unjustified murder of one's father, he 
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concludes that because many transgressions are committed when one kills one's 
father (i.e. 'violence is done to the author of one's being, to him that gave us nurture 
and education and a place in his house and a home in the state') 'the parricide stands 
fIrst in the number of his transgressions and therefore deserves a greater penalty. ,79 
Cicero, further clouds the issue by introducing intention as the paramount criterion 
by which the gravity of the crime must be judged. He explains that 'it is the motive 
that distinguishes these actions, not the nature of the action' .80 Notwithstanding the 
diffIculty of establishing another's intention, this criterion introduces the further 
problem (to be treated by the third class of the cogitatio) of establishing the relative 
value of motives, and so on ad infinitum. It should be said that the success of 
Donne's defense of suicide in Biathanatos will depend fundamentally on his 
establishment of the reliability of right reason's determinations of these relative 
values; right reason, he will argue, is suffIcient to discern the truth of some universal 
moral principles from which valid deductions regarding particular ethical questions 
may be drawn.8l Cicero's moderate scepticism, following its doctrine of 
probabilism, is not committed either to the abolition of a criterion of truth (as Sextus 
and the Pyrrhonists were) or to its establishment (as dogmatists such as the Stoics 
were). His objective was probability (veri simile), and the inquiries of theses, 
particularly those of the third class of the cogitatio, conduce to that objective. It is 
for this reason that the Academic values arguing pro and contra paradoxical theses. 
It is, as Cicero's Latin term for theses concerned with being or nature (cogitationis) 
indicates, his desire 'of learning' which establishes the paradoxical as the Academic 
method of inquiry. 82 
Aphthonius did not further divide his classifIcation of the thesis 
contempliuae as Cicero had his thesis cogitation is , perhaps because he thought the 
three classes of the cogitatio did not contribute more information about the types of 
questions which theses raise. His ciuiles, which correspond to Cicero's action is (of 
action), function as the third class of the cogitatio had; they argue that one position 
is preferable to another. Aphthonius gives an example of such an argument when he 
poses the standard thesis, An ducenda uxor? 83 The argument proceeds alternating 
from solutio, a reason for marriage, to contradictio, an objection to marriage. The 
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same structure of argument pro and contra is observed in Lorich's examples in his 
scholia. The advocacy of the relative preferabilility of the positions argued follows 
naturally from the contentiousness of the question under investigation. Hence, 
Aphthonius claims in favor of marriage, 'Rectius ergo est matrimonii bona laudare, 
quam accusare mala' and 'Quando enim enumerare nuptiarum bona cogis, laudator 
matrimoniifactus eo potius quam reprehensor' .84 The objective of the student 
advocating the Aphthonian thesis, that one should take a wife, therefore, is to argue 
that it is 'most' justifiable to favor rather than to reprehend marriage. In the 
Epilogus, Aphthonius piously refers the contested question to the authority of God, 
denying the claim of oratory to settle such a question. 'Adeo non est oratione 
recensere quanta matrimonium deferat bona.'85 Lorich's two examples of theses, 
quod senectus non molesta, nec onus Aetna grauius and the suspiciously 
Socratic/Stoic diuitias non esse summum bonum, continue to argue the preferability 
of positions with respect to their alternatives. The conclusion of his second thesis, 
that riches do not comprise the highest good, translates neatly into a title of a 
paradox which Socrates, Cicero (defending the Stoics) or Donne (by inversion) 
might have proposed. 'Ergo non in diuitiis, unde malorum (ut aiunt) mare projluit, 
sed potius in virtute summum est bonum collacandum.' 86 Rainolde's list of 
examples of theses follows Aphthonius' characterization of them as questions on 
which one must argue the preferability of one of two opposing positions, and 
provides yet more evidence that Donne's Paradoxes were derived from the thesis 
both in form and matter. After presenting the standard Aphthonian definition of the 
thesis, Rainolde lists Lorich's second thesis in question form, 'Whether are riches 
chieflie to be sought for in this life, as of all good thynges, the chief good' , then 
proceeds to the Stoic thesis, 'Whether is vertue the moste excellente good thynge in 
this life', and then to the thesis from which Donne would have derived his paradox 
on the same subject, 'Whether dooe the giftes of the mynde, passe and excelle the 
giftes and vertues of fortune and the bodie' .87 
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6 
Inventio, Dispositio and the Problem of Verification 
In addition to the advice given by humanist educators such as Lorich on the 
proper procedure of arguments of theses pro and contra, Donne would have had the 
use of a logic that was growing ever more independent from rhetoric in its 
operations. The reconciliation of rhetoric and dialectic which Aristotle, Cicero and 
Quintilian had sought was being severed again by the beginning of the sixteenth 
century. No one denied that three of Cicero's rhetorical categories, (i.e. eiocutio, 
memoria, pronuntiatio) properly belonged to rhetoric. But whether the remaining 
two categories, inventio and dispositio, fell under the heading of dialectic or rhetoric 
was not entirely clear.88 The confusion is due largely to Cicero himself. After 
introducing the five categories of rhetoric in De Inventione, he proceeds to define the 
special functions of inventio and dispositio with respect to the methods of 
argumentation. 'Invention is the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments 
[rerum verarum aut veri similium] to render one's case plausible. Arrangement is 
the distribution of arguments thus discovered in the proper order. ,89 After referring 
the speaker in search of arguments to the categories of Aristotle, Cicero begins his 
discussion of dispositio, the part of rhetoric which, he says, has been greatly 
neglected by writers on the art of rhetoric. ,90 This neglect resulted from the 
appropriation of dispositio by the Academic and Peripatetic dialecticians about 
which Cicero had complained in De Oratore.91 In keeping with his commitment to 
the cooperation and unity of rhetoric and dialectic in the service of oratory, Cicero 
does not classify his subsequent discussion of dispositio under the heading of 
dialectic despite his admission that the division and arrangement of arguments must 
accord with the logical demands of induction and deduction.92 Though Cicero's 
exposition of the procedure of inductive and deductive arguments is presented with 
an eye to its application in persuasive speech, its analysis is still fundamentally the 
task of dialectic. This fact is acknowledged when he names those philosophers with 
whom the two methods of proof are most closely associated. The' form of argument 
which proceeds by induction was practiced particularly by Socrates and the 
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Socratics' and that 'which is elaborated in the fonn of a syllogism [per 
ratiocinationem], was most largely used by Aristotle and the by the Peripatetics and 
Theophrastus' .93 It is only after the principles of dialectic as an independent set of 
rules governing the methods of proof had been established that they could be 
adopted 'by the teachers of rhetoric who have been regarded as the most precise and 
accomplished in their art.' 94 Weare reminded again of the praise which Cicero 
lavished on Servius Sulpicius in Brutus, a lawyer who used dialectic, 'ars omnium 
artium maxima', to arrange 'all that had been put together by others without system, 
whether in the fonn of legal opinions or in actual trials. ,95 
Although the sceptical attack on scholastic logic waged by quattrocento 
Italian humanists such as Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) and Gianfrancesco Pico della 
Mirandola (1469-1533) was familiar to the northern European humanists of the early 
sixteenth century, Melanchthon's Rhetoric (1546) did not seek to undermine the 
cooperative relationship between rhetoric and dialectic of which Aristotle and Cicero 
had approved.96 He says: 
So close is the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric that a division can 
scarcely be discovered. For some consider that inventio and dispositio are 
common to both arts, consequently that the topics for finding out arguments, 
which the rhetoricians are accustomed to use, ought to be taught in dialectic. 
But they do say that there is this difference, that dialectic presents the bare 
facts. But rhetoric adds elocution as a gannent.97 
In his De Inventione Dialectica (1515), a work which revived the interest in the role 
of logic in the operation of rhetoric which had been lost by centuries of scholastic 
domination of the teaching of dialectic, Rudolph Agricola had appropriated inventio 
and dispositio to dialectic.98 In his Arte of Rhetorique (1553), which was modelled 
on Agricola's De Inventione Dialectica, Thomas Wilson continues to list inventio 
and dispositio with the other three Ciceronian rhetorical categories, but like 
Melanchthon and Agricola, he also uses inventio and dispositio to represent the two 
parts of dialectic in his English logic, the Rule of Reason (1551). Significantly, 
Wilson places inventio before dispositio in his discussion of the parts of rhetoric, but 
inverts that order in his treatment of dialectic.99 Though his definitions of them 
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remain roughly the same in the two works, it is apparent that dialectical inquiries are 
more properly served by dispositio, which according to Wilson, 'is nothyng els, but 
an apt bestowyng, and orderly placyng of thynges, declaryng where every argument 
shalbe sette, and in what maner every reason shalbe applied, for confirmacion of the 
purpose.,100 Not surprisingly, in the Arte of Rhetorique, Wilson makes no mention 
of the four arguments (i.e. syllogism, enthymeme, induction, example) which 
constitute the bulk of his discussion of dispositio in the Rule of Reason. The simple 
reason for this omission is that Wilson considers the subject of proof proper to 
dialectic. It is for this reason that he says that 'thei that will prove any cause and 
seke onely to teache thereby the truthe, must searche out the places of Logique'; in 
other words, the rhetorician who seeks to demonstrate a truth by proof must consult 
Aristotle's Organon, and hence, must consult logical, not rhetorical, 
commonplaces.101 Such consultation in the context of dialectical inquiry returns us 
to the problem of the priority of dispositio or inventio, which, as we will see, Wilson 
solves by asserting the primacy of judgment in inquiries regarding truth. With 
regard to the investigation of theses, which Wilson, like Rainolde, defines according 
to the model derived from Cicero, Quintilian and Aphthonius, Wilson makes explicit 
the critical role which dispositio, as the adjudicative function of dialectic, must 
play.102 'Thynges generally spoken without al circumstaunces [i.e. theses], are more 
proper unto the Logician, who talketh of thynges universally, without respect of 
persone, time, or place' .103 If theses are to be treated by logicians, then it follows 
that the tools of argumentation employed by dispositio, syllogism, enthymeme, 
induction and example, will be required to provide proof for the position advocated. 
Furthermore, according to Wilson, this position will be argued as Aphthonius, 
Lorich and Rainolde had specified, as one preferable to an opposing position. 
Wilson's examples of theses are typical in this respect: 'whether it is best to marie, 
or to live single. Which is better, a courtier's life, or a scholar's life' .104 Though 
preferability also characterizes Wilson's examples of hypotheses, which he claims 
are the proper subjects for orators, he recalls Cicero's advice in Orator, 'that 
whosoever will talke of a particuler matter, must remember that within thesame also, 
is comprehended a generall.' 105 Wilson's orator, like Cicero's, must not neglect 
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dispositio in favor of inventio. The arguments pro and contra general theses are 
always implicit in the rhetorician's hypotheses. Therefore, to advocate positions on 
defmite questions such as 'Whether now it be best here in Englande, for a Prieste to 
Marie, or to live single', the rhetorician must first analyze the preferabilities of the 
underlying general questions according to the rules of dialectic; he must first provide 
arguments for or against the preferability of any priest being married at any time, 
anywhere. These arguments, as Wilson explains in his Rule of Reason, are collected 
out of the logical commonplaces by inventio, but more importantly, are confirmed 
by dispositio. It is for this reason that he recommends, as Cicero had when he 
praised Servius Sulpicius, 'that every manne should desire and seke to have his 
Logique perfect, before he looke to profite in Rhetorique, consideryng the grounde 
and confirmacion of causes, is for the moste part gathered out of Logique' .106 
As we have seen, Cicero's exposition of inventio and dispositio in De 
Inventio provides ample authority to support the view that invention is as 
fundamentally proper to dialectic as judgement. The question, briefly put, is 
whether a utilization of Aristotle's ten predicaments, which comprised the ten 
general categories under which a subject could be described, was prior to the 
judgement of propositions constructed of these predicaments and arguments 
constructed of conjunctions of them. The utilization of the predicaments to generate 
an assertion such as 'Socrates is white' requires that the speaker 'discover' this way 
of predicating the subject, Socrates, by choosing in which of the ten categories the 
relationship between the subject and the predicate is described. In this case, the 
speaker invents his assertion by recognizing that he wants to say something about a 
'quality' of Socrates, and therefore, must invest his assertion with the generic logic 
of the predicament of quality, that some distinct genus (i.e. quality) of the primary 
substance, Socrates, is described by the predicate, white. However, as many 
sixteenth-century theorists of rhetoric and dialectic will object, the question of 
priority remains because it is not clear how an assertion, which has been invented 
out of one of the ten predicaments, can be made without the implicit and 
simultaneous assertion of its truth. Assertions of truth, as such, are the objects of 
judgement, which, as Cicero noted in De Inventione, are therefore subject to the 
analytical scrutiny of dialectic. 
7 
Dialectic, Credibility and the Paradox 
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The history of the controversy over the priority of inventio and dispositio is 
extensive, and as it has already been more than adequately recorded by others, we 
shall restrict our attention only to those aspects which are relevant to the dialectic 
exhibited in paradoxes such as Donne's. The most prominent of these relevant 
aspects is the persistent problem of verification which the conjunction of rhetoric 
and dialectic always seems to raise. If, as Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian had 
insisted, rhetoric is not an art of deception, its utterance must be governed by the 
limits of verifiability imposed by dialectic. Despite his view that dialectic is the art 
which secures all the other arts, Cicero claimed that dispositio was second in the 
order of nature after inventio.107 He makes this claim in the context of his criticism 
of the Stoic neglect of inventio, and without any intention to consider the sceptical 
problems introduced by allowing inventio to operate prior to dispositio. 'The 
Stoics', he says, 'have worked in only one of the two fields. That is to say, they 
have followed diligently the ways of judgement by means of the science which they 
call ... ( dialectic), but they have totally neglected the art which is called ... (topics), an 
art which is more useful and certainly prior in the order of nature.' 108 In light of his 
criticisms of Stoic dialectic, it is clear that Cicero is not concerned about the infinite 
regress or reciprocity to which an extreme application of sceptical dialectic may 
reduce any argument. 
Cicero's complaints about the Stoics' excessive attention to dialectic reflect 
their commitment to eliminating ambiguities which only a sceptical application of 
dialectic to even the simplest of assertions could expose. Once the ambiguity of a 
particular term was identified, precise definitions could be assigned from which 
deductions could be drawn with confidence. 109 Both parts of this process, however, 
are subsumed under dialectic, both the analysis of composite propositions into their 
fundamental component propositions as well as the synthesis of new composite 
propositions based on true premises (such as arise from the Stoic unprovables). 
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Stoic dialectic, unlike the dialectic of Socrates, Aristotle and Cicero, was committed 
to a dogmatic program which sought the establishment of unambiguous and 
irrefutable truths discoverable through reason. The dialectic which Cicero identifies 
with the process of dispositio advances arguments in the hope only of credibility. 
He says summarizing the respective operations of inventio and dispositio, 'Itaque 
licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei 
dubiae faciat fidem [credible].' 1 \0 Similarly, Aristotle, whose own ordering of 
dispositio and inventio in the Topics begins with the enumeration of the categories to 
be consulted by inventio, delimits the role of dialectic to the investigation of 
doubtful matters which do not admit of the possibility of knowledge, but only of 
more or less credible opinions. 'For purposes of philosophy we must treat things 
according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to opinion.' III This is not 
to say that Artistotle thought that dialectical proofs could not draw necessary 
conclusions, or that those conclusions could not be true. In the eighth book of his 
Topics, in which he explains the arrangement of arguments (dispositio), he makes 
the distinction between philosophical and dialectical inquiry which both confirms 
their affinity with respect to rhetoric and their difference with respect to truth. 
how to go on to arrange his points and frame his questions concerns the 
dialectician only; for in every problem of that kind a reference to another 
party is involved. Not so with the philosopher, and the man who is 
investigating by himself: the premisses [sic] of his reasoning, although true 
and familiar, may be refused by the answerer because they lie too near the 
original statement and so he foresees what will follow if he grants them; but 
for this the philosopher does not care. Indeed, he may possibly be even 
anxious to secure axioms as familiar and as near to the question in hand as 
possible; for these are the bases on which scientific deductions are built 
up.ll2 
What distinguishes a dialectical from a philosophical inquiry is the former's 
dialogic form and attending contentiousness. As Aristotle is careful to mention, the 
dialectician's premises may be 'true and familiar', and hence, grounds upon which 
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to deduce true conclusions, but that does not make him a philosopher, because in a 
debate, even grounds which are commonly believed to be true will be contested. In 
light of the function of dialectic in disputation prescribed by Aristotle and Cicero, it 
is not surprising that the thesis and its progeny, the paradox, became associated with 
the pro and contra procedure of dialectic. The rhetorician, unlike both the 
philosopher and the dialectician, is not investigating the subject upon which he is 
speaking; his position is fixed and may be advanced without incorporating the 
modifications suggested by the objections either of the interlocutor of a dialectical 
inquiry or of his own philosophical misgivings. It must be acknowledged that in this 
light Donne's description of the function of his paradoxes in his letter to Wotton 
quite explicitly specifies their role as dialectically expounded theses, for he says that 
'if they make you to find better reasons against them they do there office'. 
Sixteenth-century works on logic recognized the contentious function of 
dialectic, but also its potential for misuse by those who would pervert the truth by 
exploiting doubts and ambiguities to obscure fallacies in their argumentation. We 
recall that Aristotle had said, 'In dialectic a man is a sophist because he makes a 
certain kind of choice, a dialectician in respect not of his choices but of his 
abilities.,I13 It is against these deceitful choices that Ralph Lever advised the student 
of his Art of Reason (1573). When he discusses the way to handle 'doubtfull 
Questions', he adamantly opposes dialectical treatment of any question which is 
'either so manifestly true, or so manifestly false, that no man can doubt of it.. .Suche 
questions then, are only disputable, as admit some doubt, and offer shew of matter to 
argue of and on.' 114 The 'choice' which Lever hopes to preclude by these directions 
is that which seeks to deceive in the manner of sophistical paradoxists such as 
Gorgias and Melissus. He says condemning the abuse of dialectic committed by 
such sophists, 'And here by the waye yee maye see, that they whych thynke, that a 
man cunnyng in this Arte, is able to proue, the snowe to bee blacke, and the Crowe 
to bee white, iudge unskilfully of this worthye facultie, which purposely forbiddeth 
the propounding of such fond stuffe.' 115 In the first three books Lever had outlined 
the forms of inductive and deductive argumentation rejecting the view of those who 
would place inventio before dispositio in the teaching of dialectic. As we will see 
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when we examine the innovations to Aristotelian dialectic introduced by Peter 
Ramus, with the increase of confidence in the power of dialectic to distinguish 
absolutely the true from the false, so grew the opinion that dispositio, the judging 
part, is naturally inherent in inventio, contrary to Aristotle's presentation in the 
Topics and Cicero's statement in his own Topics .116 Lever makes his confidence in 
the power of 'the deceming part' of dialectic clear when he restricts the role of 
inventio to the finding of a middle ('prouing') term for a deductive argument. In the 
syllogism, All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal, 
inventio need only present 'man' as a possible middle term through which some 
relationship between the extreme terms, Socrates and mortal, may be proven. We 
should be on the alert for the sceptical objection, which Cicero had disregarded in 
his ordering of dispositio and inventio in the Topics but apparently entertained in his 
reversal of that order in De Inventione, that the act of judgement is implicit in the 
invention of the middle term, and therefore, naturally precedes it. As we saw above, 
however, when such precedence is attributed to the role of dispositio as a verifier of 
proofs, the sceptical critique begins its ineluctable dialectical analysis, which seeks 
above all to discredit the grounds from which syllogisms proceed by constantly 
requiring their proof. The result of this analysis, as Sextus argues, is the exposure 
of reciprocally proven grounds or an infinite regress of verification. When he 
condemned the use of dialectic to prove that the snow is black, Lever expressed his 
distrust of eristics who would introduce the sceptical critique by attempting to 
collapse the distinction between contraries as Gorgias had in On What is Not and as 
wits such as Lyly and Donne had, albeit disingenuously, in Euphues and the 
Paradoxes. To further prevent any such sceptical abuse, Lever explains that 
dispositio should precede inventio 'not only for that it iudgeth of the forme of an 
argument: but also for that it descryeth the truth and falsehode of al sentences: and 
noteth the force, and signification ofwordes ... For how can a man eyther inuent or 
teach any good reasons, to proue matters that lye in doubt, the nature of sentences 
and wordes, being not first knowne. ' 117 For Lever the appearance of a paradox, 
such as the snow is black, belies a fallacy which may be exposed by the truth-
discerning power of dialectic, dispositio; in this respect, he is entirely faithful to 
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Aristotle's and Cicero's characterization of paradox as an argument which only 
appears validly to draw an absurd but necessary conclusion from true premises, but 
which actually has committed some fallacy such as equivocation. As a conclusion to 
his manual, Lever says that we must first suspect this fallacy when we conduct a 
dialectical analysis of a doubtful question such as those proposed in theses or 
paradoxes. 'First learne by the Storehouses the force of euery worde that is in your 
question: and if there bee wordes of double understanding in it, laye forth their 
sundrie and diuers significations.' 118 
The Rule of Reason (1551) written by Lever's contemporary, Thomas 
Wilson, was the first work in English to attempt to summarize the principles of 
Aristotelian logic. Like Lever's Art of Reason, it places dispositio before inventio, 
but Wilson's explanation for this organization makes more explicit the view that the 
judgement of an argument's truth is naturally inherent in its discovery as such. He 
says, 'ArId now some wil say, that I should first speake of the fmding out of an 
argument, before I should teache the waye how to frame an argument. Truthe it is 
that naturally we find a reason or we beginne to [ fashion] the same.' 119 The 
arrangement of arguments occurs while we seek through inventio to fmd them, and 
therefore, the structures of that arrangement, enthymeme, induction, example and 
most importantly, syllogism, are operative in all dialectical processes. In so far as 
inventio may consider any term fit for service as the middle term of an argument, it 
is clear that it is no longer operative after it has delivered its subject to the scrutiny 
of the proofs of dispositio. Wilson declares the indifference of inventio to the 
discovery of true arguments when he explains how the study of dialectic will expose 
the wiles of the sophist who employs it to deceitful ends. Like Lever's sophist who 
would prove 'the snowe to bee blacke, and the Crowe to bee white', Wilson 
describes the sophist as one who 'is euer occupied eyther in prouing the truthe 
alwayes to bee false, or els that whiche is false to be true'; but also like Lever, 
Wilson is confident 'that a skilful artificer mai [the] soner put the vayne Sophister to 
silence by opening the fraude, & declaring the crafte of his inuencion' .120 Though it 
is assumed that even the sophist may discern the truth or falsity of his arguments, 
'his inuencion' need not be bound to the dictates of his true judgement and may 
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proceed to deliver middle terms which are likely to be equivocal. The result, as we 
might expect, is a paradox; something that appears true is actually false or vice 
versa. It is illuminating to read another part of Donne's letter to Wotton in the 
context of Wilson's direction to the 'skilful artificer' who silences the paradoxes of 
sophists by opening and declaring their fraud. Donne calls his Paradoxes 
'swaggerers' which are 'quiet enough' when resisted by the 'better reasons' of 
dialectic rightly applied, and stresses that the apparent validity of their arguments is 
exposed for fraud when their fallacies are 'hatcht' under the pressure of logical 
inquiry. As Wilson and Lever (and Aristotle) had prescribed, those who hope to 
refute the conclusions of Donne's Paradoxes must utilize dispositio to judge where 
and to what end fallacies were committed. Of course this refutation may involve 
recognizing when the commonplaces of inventio have been improperly combined or 
arranged, but again, such judgement presupposes a knowledge of the structures of 
argument through which the generic propriety of the commonplaces are 
established. 121 
When Wilson comes to his third book, 'The places of false conclusions, or 
deceitful reasons,' he reiterates the priority of dispositio in the refutation of 
sophistical arguments. He says that Other is no argument so deceitful but thee al mai 
easly be auoyded, if the rules be marked, that are rehersed before, concerning the 
true makyng of an argument' .122 To illustrate this point, Wilson likens the 
relationship between deceitful and true arguments to the opposition of contraries. 
Just as the painter who is able to render perfectly the likeness of a lion is also able to 
recognize any defect in any other painting, so, Wilson says, 'if one can make an 
argument, accordyng to the rules aboue rehersed, in his due fourme and mode, he 
can tell also, when an argument is other wise made then the rules [ can] beare.' 123 He 
supports this claim, as he had in the Arte of Rhetorique, on the authority of the 
Aristotelian principle that' contrariorum eadem est doctrina .. . of contraries there is 
one maner of doctrine' .124 Later in the Arte of Rhetorique, Wilson again 
recommends the opposition of contraries as a means to gaining a clear perception of 
the object under scrutiny. 'Contraria inter se opposita magis elucescunt. That is to 
say, Contraries beyng set, the one against the other, appeare more evident.' 125 To 
107 
maintain that the opposition of contraries contributes to the clarification of the true 
nature of an issue under consideration presupposes a belief that the human mind can, 
in fact, discern true natures as such. Again, we are reminded of the sceptical issues 
raised by Gorgias' sophistical conflation of contraries in On What is Not, Isocrates' 
clarifications in his paradox of concord inPanathenaicus, Lyly's instructions to the 
young wit in Euphues and Donne's equivocations in the Paradoxes. As we will see, 
in light of the two strains of scepticism available to sixteenth-century thought, 
claims about the clarity which the juxtaposition of contraries yields begin to reflect 
the general epistemological views of their claimants, views, it must be said, that bear 
heavily not only on our understanding of their philosophical positions, but on their 
theological allegiances as well. 
8 
Clarification by Refutation 
Though Donne and his fellow paradoxist, Ortensio Lando, both disavow the 
seriousness of their theses by emphasizing the illumination which results from the 
observation of their manipulation of contraries, we must ask whether such 
manipulation could be applied to the same epistemological end by one who wrote 
from within the scholastic logical framework derived from Aristotle (Donne) and 
another who repudiated that framework for overestimating the power of human 
reason to attain a vision of truth (Lando ).126 In his prefatory epistle to the reader, 
Lando, like Wilson, stresses the virtue of the opposition of contraries. He says: 
Gentle Reader, euen as contrarie thinges compared one with another, do giue 
the better euidence of their value and virtue: so the truth of any matter 
whatsoever, appeareth most cleerly, when the different reasons against the 
same, is equalled or neighboured therewith ... For this intent, I haue 
vndertaken (in this book) to debate on certaine matters, which our Elders 
were wont to cal Paradoxes: that is to say, things contrary to most mens 
present opinions: to the end, that by such discourse as is helde in them, 
opposed truth might appeare more cleere and apparant. 127 
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As we will see, Lando's paradoxes do not attempt to make unorthodox conclusions, 
such as ignorance is preferable to wisdom, appear true by deploying the critical 
terms of his arguments ambiguously. Their conclusions, like those of the 
Socratic/Stoic paradoxes, appear contrary to common opinion only when presented 
without their qualifying argumentation; just as happiness may only consist in virtue 
given a specific definition of happiness, so may ignorance only appear preferable to 
wisdom given a specific definition of ignorance. Lando's paradox of ignorance, 
therefore, is no more a disparagement of wisdom than Erasmus' in the Praise of 
Folly; he argues for ignorance only in so far as it advances his defense of the moral 
wisdom of the pious Christian. When those 'different reasons against' the truth of 
the superiority of wisdom are 'equalled and neighboured' with the reasons of an 
orthodox defense of wisdom, only those reasons which may be utilized to support an 
uncontroversial but clarified statement of the superiority of wisdom remain. Hence, 
Lando's defense of ignorance becomes a specific defense only of the ignorance of 
those things which undermine the attainment of true wisdom, just as the defense of 
the student lawyer who 'must adventure to defend such a cause, as they that are most 
imployed, refuse to maintaine', proceeds by emphasizing only those actions of the 
accused which accord with justice. 128 The 'true' distinction between the contraries 
of ignorance and wisdom, injustice and justice, is never obscured. Donne's 
Paradoxes, on the other hand, require his readers to apply the analytical techniques 
of dialectic to discriminate the ambiguous terms which permit his unusual 
conclusions to follow. To the extent that Donne's arguments proceed by such 
ambiguities, they provide precisely the practice in refutation for which readers of the 
first two books of the Rule of Reason were supposed to be prepared. 
Wilson, like Lever, is explicit about the priority which attention to ambiguity 
must take in the refutation of apparent paradoxes. Though this concern with the 
utilization of dialectic to eliminate ambiguity originates in Aristotle's discussion in 
the Topics and Sophistical Refutations, it became all the more acute as a response to 
the sceptical critique, both radical and moderate. Though the certainty of the 
schoolmen's syllogisms was under attack by sceptics guided by the methods of 
dissent outlined by Cicero in the Academica and Sextus in the Outlines of 
109 
Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians, there was no shortage of English 
manuals of logic defending the power of Aristotelian syllogistic to demonstrate 
truths. Lever, Wilson, Ramist logicians such as Dudley Fenner and Abraham 
Fraunce, as well as anti-Ramist Aristotelians such as Thomas Blundeville, all 
explicitly promoted the power of dialectic to eradicate doubt on the authority of 
Aristotle. 129 Wilson says that 'to confute, is nothyng els but to Judge false packyng, 
and to unlose by reason, thynges knit together by craft'. It is the duty of the 
logician, he explains, not simply to defend his own position, but also to 'ouerthrow, 
the assercion of other, and also by [reason], proue their saiyngs [sic] to be false, 
whiche by deceipte, would inueigle the weake.' 130 In the Sophistical Refutations, 
Aristotle had required his dialectician to expose precisely this pretense to truth. 'For 
it is a general rule in fighting contentious persons [sophists], to treat them not as 
refuting, but as merely appearing to refute; for we say that they don't really deduce 
anything, so that our object in correcting them must be to dispel the appearance of 
it.,m If we recall Aristotle's claim that the sophist wants to create the appearance 
that his opponent's argument generates a paradoxical conclusion by necessary 
consequence, the relationship between apparently necessary deductions and sophism 
becomes clear.132 Just as it was Cicero's objective to eliminate the impression that 
the Stoic paradoxa were deduced by necessary consequence from true and 
unambiguous premises, so it is the objective of both Lever's and Wilson's 
dialectician (following Aristotle) to discredit the apparent truth of the sophist's 
arguments. In describing the distinction between a genuine and apparent refutation, 
Aristotle reveals the principal fallacy committed by arguments which merely appear 
to deduce a valid conclusion. 
If refutation is a non-homonymous contradiction arrived at from certain 
premisses [sic], there will be no need to draw distinctions against ambiguity 
and homonymy; for they do not effect a deduction. The only motive for 
drawing further distinctions is that the conclusion reached looks like a 
refutation. What, then, we have to beware of, is not being refuted, but 
seeming to be, because of course the asking of ambiguities and of questions 
that turn upon homonymy, and all other tricks of that kind, both conceal a 
genuine refutation and make it uncertain who is being refuted and who is 
not. 133 
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A genuine refutation is one that is deduced from certain and unambiguous (non-
homonymous) premises, and as such, does not require the analysis of the various 
senses of its critical terms which Lever and Wilson claim sophistical deductions 
require. However, what Aristotle emphasizes, which Lever and Wilson do not, is 
that an increased attention to the various senses of terms can obscure as well as 
clarify genuinely valid deductions. As we have seen and will see further, the 
deductions of Donne's arguments in the Paradoxes clearly rely on ambiguously 
deployed terms, and therefore, demand the kind of dialectical analysis (by 
dispositio) recommended by Aristotle, Lever and Wilson. Though the apparent 
paradoxicality of Donne's arguments will be dispelled after such analysis, the 
awareness of the multiplicity of meanings which results does not necessarily serve to 
clarify that the contraries of Donne's theses are true. Though it may be paradoxical 
to assert, as Donne does in his fourth paradox, 'That Nature is our worst Guide', 
after discriminating the various senses in which the term 'nature' is used, it is clear 
that the contrary thesis, that nature is our best guide, can be made to appear 
paradoxical as well, if 'nature' is understood as the impulse to indulge our appetites. 
To Donne, nature was a particularly slippery term. Before attempting to restrict its 
meaning by identifying it with reason within the context of his argument in 
Biathanatos, he complained, 'This term "the law of nature" is so variously and 
unconstantly delivered, as I confess I read it a hundred times before I understood it 
once, or can conclude it to signify that which the author should at that time mean. ' 134 
In light of his consciousness of the difficulties which such variability and 
inconstancy present to accurate interpretation, his claim that his Paradoxes are 
'alarums to truth to arme her then enemies' appears considerably less confident. 
Though Donne characterizes his Paradoxes as 'nothings' in his letter to Wotton 
because the conclusions of their arguments do not follow validly from their 
equivocal premises, their contrary positions are far from proven by the elimination 
of the appearance of paradox. As Aristotle had explained in the Sophistical 
Refutations, a paradox is dispelled when it is shown not to follow as a necessary 
consequence of the argument, but as he also explained, the elimination of an 
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apparent paradox by the analysis of ambiguous terminology assists only in exposing 
falsity, not truth. Therefore, Donne's Paradoxes merely claim to alert truth to the 
presence of falsehood by encouraging a dialectical exposition of fallacy which 
demonstrates what is not true. Though Donne's reserve with respect to the power of 
logic to establish truth becomes evident by contrast to Wilson's example of the 
fallacious use of the term 'nature', we will see that we must be wary of concluding 
that Donne thought that dialectic was of no use whatever for the discovery and the 
application of truth. 
9 
Equivocation, Paradox and the Libertine Threat 
Of the thirteen 'deceitful arguments' which Wilson recognizes, only six have 
specifically to do with ambiguous words, while the rest he calls 'subtilties without 
the worde'. \35 Nonetheless, the result in all cases is an ambiguity in the meanings of 
the critical terms of the argument. A false conclusion which follows from the 
confusion of two or more senses of the term 'nature' (e.g. 'sensuous appetite' and 
'right reason') is a case of equivocation by homonymy, and one which follows from 
the confusion of two or more senses of an ambiguous sentence is a case of 
equivocation by amphiboly. These two fallacies clearly have to do with ambiguous 
words. However, when Wilson comes to the seventh fallacy of things 'without the 
worde', the last of the thirteen fallacies to be discussed in his section on the 
refutation of sophistical arguments, he explains that this seventh 'deceipt', 
Aristotle's 'ignoratio elenchi', is 'a mistakyng of contradictorie propositions ... which 
comprehendeth in it selfe al other aboue rehersed subtilties. ,136 The conclusion of an 
argument that commits this fallacy will be of the form 'p is q and not q'; we are 
reminded again of the amazement of Theodorus at the consequence of Pythagoras' 
relativism, and of Marbeck at the founding of the earth upon the sea. The fallacy 
which embraces all other fallacies, therefore, is that which confuses contradictory 
senses of the same term in order to generate a conclusion which seems to affirm that 
the law of non-contradiction may be validly violated. Such a conclusion appears all 
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the more amazing when the united contradictory states are also contraries, as may be 
the case in conclusions such as 'p is good and not good' when 'not good' is 
synonymous with the contrary of good, evil. Wilson's example of an argument 
which makes a fallacious use of the term 'nature' presents just such an amazing 
conclusion, that 'to synne is not euill'. The argument reads: 
What soeuer is naturall, that same is not euill. 
To synne is a thyng naturall. 
Ergo to synne is not euill.137 
Of course, as the conclusion stands, there appears only to be a contradiction given 
the common understanding of the term 'sin' as 'evil'; it does not assert that sin is 
good, only that it is not evil. Wilson maintains that in this argument, the fallacy 
arises because 'the wordes of either proposicion ... signifie diuerse thynges, or be 
diuersly applied', and recommends that it be flatly denied 'as folishe, or els dissolue 
it, as doubtfull.' 138 In his own refutation of this argument, Wilson chooses to deny 
the second premise rather than to take the weaker and more controversial position, 
that it is doubtful that sin is natural. This weaker position would require the kind of 
drawing of distinctions between the various senses of nature which Aristotle had 
warned could result in even further confusion. As Wilson is not willing to concede 
that the proposition that sin is natural is true in any sense of the term 'nature', he will 
not even acknowledge that the question is doubtful, and therefore, worthy of the 
kind of inquiry initiated by the argument of theses. To begin his denial of the 
second premise, he first transforms the predicate of the first premise, not evil, from a 
contradiction of evil into the contrary of evil, good. He defends this transformation 
explaining that 'God did create the nature of man, pure and cleane, and saied, that all 
was good, whiche he made, at the firste creacion'. The transformed first premise 
now asserts the stronger position, that whatever is natural is good, thus eliminating 
the possibility that a sin, which by definition is at least not good, may be identified 
with a natural thing. As the first premise stood originally, it was possible to have 
indifferent natural things, which are neither evil nor good. 139 Given this possibility, 
the second premise could be translated: there is a thing which is not good (to sin) 
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which is also a thing which is not evil (natural), hence allowing the conclusion to 
follow: to sin is not evil. This conclusion, however, would assert the valid yet 
paradoxical view that to sin is a thing indifferent. Wilson's transfonnation from 
contradictory to contrary in the first premise requires that the second premise assert 
the contradiction: a thing which is not good (to sin) is a thing which is good 
(natural), which, as we have seen, falls under his seventh fallacy, ignoratio elenchi, 
and thus, is a violation of the law of non-contradiction. He could have obtained the 
same result without transforming the first premise had he explicitly extended the 
definition of sin beyond 'a thing which is not good' to 'a thing which is evil'. In 
either case, the amazing conclusion, that to sin is not evil, is proven to be false and 
the apparent paradox dispelled. 
As we will see when we examine his argument in Biathanatos that suicide is 
'not so naturally Sin that it may never be otherwise,' Donne's concern to draw 
distinctions between the various meanings of the tenn 'nature' indicates that the 
position which he is advocating is, as he states on the title page, both a paradox and 
a thesis. Opponents of Biathanatos, such as the Cambridge Regius Professor of 
Divinity circa 1655, Anthony Tuckney, the Provost of Eton in 1700, John Adams, 
and Charles Moore, in 1790, will argue vehemently against this paradox, 
maintaining the dangers of Donne's manipulation of ambiguous tenns in the service 
of what the mid-seventeenth century will consider to be the 'libertine' argument for 
the individual's power to justify any and all sinful actions. 140 Even in 1551, twelve 
years before the earliest recorded use of the tenn in English, Wilson recognized this 
threat and was using 'libertine' to refer to the sophistical practice of proving by 
syllogism that both nature and reason permit and approve what custom and doctrine 
have condemned as sinful. The syllogism proving that sin is not evil, he calls 'the 
libertines reason' .141 Wilson's categorical denial of the libertine's claim that sin is 
natural is characteristic of the Aristotelian logician's defense of Christian first 
principles against the sceptic's attempt to reveal the paradoxical conclusions which 
may be deduced from such unqualified universal propositions. As Lever had 
advised, when a paradoxical conclusion is encountered, the Aristotelian dialectician 
suspects an ambiguous use of 'sundrie and divers significations' which may be 
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exposed by the analysis of dispositio. 142 And as Wilson had illustrated, when one 
discovers a particular sense of a tenn which threatens to qualify a fundamental moral 
law, one should judge that sense to be false. Had he contested the view that 
whatever is natural is not evil on the grounds that it makes a universal statement 
where only a particular is defensible, he would have had to concede that some 
natural things are not evil, a proposition which he would not deny, but which leaves 
the issue unsettled and still under threat of sophistical abuse. The sceptic could 
continue to argue that the natural things which are not evil cannot be considered 
sins, and would defend his position with respect to his own criteria for sinfulness. If 
these criteria are to be able to serve as objective standards by which to judge evil and 
sinful things, they will in turn require further proof which does not lead to regress or 
reciprocity. The Pyrrhonist will maintain that such criteria do not exist, while the 
probabilist sceptic will argue, as Cicero does in the Paradoxa, that it is the 
responsibility of the individual agent to utilize his reason to determine what is and is 
not sinful in any given set of circumstances, to terminate the process of reciprocity 
or regress by deciding when criteria have been clarified enough to serve as 
sufficiently (though not perfectly) objective standards of judgement. 
It will not suffice according to Cicero, merely to define what is sinful as what 
is evil or vice versa. He says in his third paradox, 'It is unquestionable that 
transgression is not allowed to anybody; but what is not allowed depends upon the 
single point of being proved not to be allowed' .143 After providing further examples 
of the Stoic polemical practice of circular reasoning (reciprocity), he asserts the 
relativist principle, 'If you posit...cases without qualification, their real nature cannot 
easily be judged' and concludes, 'Consequently, it is the motive that 
distinguishes ... actions, not the nature of the action' .144 As we will see, Donne's 
argument in Biathanatos that the 'seeming' good of particular 'ends' justifies a 
reasonable person's decision to act contrary to the law, advocates a similarly 
intentionist position that is easily confused with the fonn of relativism which Wilson 
and Adams had condemned in the libertine and which would later be associated with 
Montaigne. 145 What initiates this progression to relativistic conclusions is the doubt 
intrinsic in the exposition of a paradox or thesis, a doubt which questions the 
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grounds upon which absolute ethical definitions are based. According to Wilson and 
Adams, the response to motions of doubt which wi11lead to the moral chaos of 
relativism and libertinism must be swift and peremptory. Wilson preempts the 
further inquiry of the 'libertine' argument into the nature of sin, evil and nature by 
deferring to a definition derived from scripture, that anything natural is good 
because it was created by God. Adams employs a similar strategy, arguing that there 
are universal ethical principles which are evident in themselves to everyone, such as 
the law prohibiting suicide. Adams' comments are worth quoting here because they 
reflect the same dogmatic insistence on reason's ability to discern first principles 
which, we will see, Ramus and his followers offer as the solution to the unnecessary 
verbal subtleties of scholastic disputation. 
Wherefore if there can be no ignorance as to these Fundamental Principles 
[e.g. law of self-preservation]; and if there can be no want of Power to 
observe and practice' em, to what purpose is it to plead for particular Reason, 
and for the privilege of Judging for ones self? A man cannot do so safely 
without some Rule, and that Rule must be universal publick Reason ... 146 
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Chapter III 
Ramist and Aristotelian Responses to Doubt and Paradox 
1 
Ramus and the Establishment of Certainty through Dialectic 
Peter Ramus' innovations to the system of rhetoric and dialectic which the 
humanists of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries had adapted from the 
principles of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian are so comprehensive that they could 
not be adequately summarized in this study. Fortunately, studies which have more 
than adequately accomplished this task have long been completed. 1 We will restrict 
our discussion of Ramistic dialectic, therefore, to those issues which bear directly on 
its treatment of potentially inconclusive questions such as we have found examined 
in paradoxes and theses. Unlike Lever and Wilson, Ramus is not concerned to 
respond to the threat posed by the sceptical critique of Aristotelian logic. In the 
preface to his Dialectique (1555), he reviews the various dialecticians of antiquity 
and concludes that the Pyrrhonists and the New Academics (i.e. Carneades and 
Cicero) have abused dialectic by applying it to expose the uncertainty of all things 
and offering verisimilitude as the most objective standard of judgement attainable by 
human reason. As we have seen, the exposition of uncertainty was properly 
associated with the destructive enterprise of the Pyrrhonists, and judgement by 
verisimilitude, with the constructive ethics of Cicero. In his Dialectique, Ramus, 
like Lever and Wilson in their manuals of logic, is not interested in making such 
distinctions in sceptical practice because his logic is devised to eliminate the 
obscurity and ambiguity with which sceptics, sophists and scholastics alike have 
plagued the disputation. He says, 'ArIaxarque et tous ses sectateurs Pyrrhoniens et 
nouveaux Academiciens l' ont exers:e, mais imprudement, en renversant la certitude 
et science de toutes choses et laissant a 1 'hornrne une seu11e et similitude de verite 
pour toute guide et conduicte de jugement.,2 In his Scholae Dialecticae (1548) he 
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does distinguish the Pyrrhonists from the New Academics, but continues to associate 
the abuse of dialectic with both schools.3 
His criticism of the New Academics is less bitter than his condemnation of 
the destructive practices of the Pyrrhonists. Cameades is blamed for turning Stoic 
logic against its most prolific developer, Chryssipus, and for introducing the habit of 
unrelenting dissent to Academic disputation.4 Every sect derived from Pyrrho (i.e. 
aporetici, sceptici, ephectici, zetetici), however, has taken as its sole aim the 
establishment of suspension of assent to any positive assertion because of the 
ungraspability (akatalepsiae) of all objects ofknowledge.5 Ramus' list of the ten 
causae according to which Pyrrhonist dialectic attempts to contradict any and all 
positive statements betrays a knowledge of the ten modes of scepticism enumerated 
in Sextus' Outlines, though his list strays in matter at times from Sextus'. Most 
importantly to our discussion, Ramus observed a startling quality in sceptical 
dialectic which was achieved by setting logic viciously upon itself. He had noted 
this combative use oflogic in the New Academic dialectic of Cameades, which, as a 
derivative of the Stoic dialectic that produced the paradoxa, could have produced 
similarly wondrous arguments had its objective been dogmatic rather than 
probabilistic. For Ramus, the probabilism of Cicero and the New Academy was not 
unreasonable; it was simply unnecessary in light of the appreciable certainty of the 
first principles of the arts and nature. Pyrrhonists, on the other hand, as they have no 
positive logical agenda, may use their vicious dialectic to produce amazing, if 
nihilistic results. Ramus says, 'Atque ut mirabilis est hominum narura, cum logicas 
artes conveliere velie videantur', and continues to explain the method by which this 
false wonder is produced. 'Colligebant enim varias causas [the ten modes], atque; 
ex contrariis demonstrare conabantur persuadentibus aequales probabilitates, 
aequalitatemque; & contradiction em rationum confirm are rationibus,.6 Here we 
see contraries applied in dialectic to obscure rather than to clarify distinctions; the 
Pyrrhonist, like the sophistical dialectician of Gorgias' On What is Not, employs 
logic not as Wilson had recommended in his dictum 'Contraria inter se opposita 
magis elucescunt', but as Sextus had noted in his comments on Gorgias' argument, 
to destroy the criterion of truth. 7 
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Like Wilson, Ramus believed that it was the task of dialectic alone to ground 
the principles of all the other arts, and thereby, to preempt the specious contentions 
of unscrupulous dialecticians such as the Pyrrhonists. In his Scholae Rhetoricae 
(1569), he went to considerable lengths to establish the role of dialectic as the 
governor of the other arts, and most importantly, of rhetoric. In so far as rhetoric 
was concerned with rendering mere opinion plausible, its strategies, like those of the 
sceptics and the sophists, were suspect. 8 According to Ramus' dialectical method, 
no question was insoluble, and therefore, the special arguments of deliberative, 
forensic and epideictic oratory, which were informed by their acknowledgement of 
the contentiousness of the issues to which they were addressed, presented the 
misleading impression that their respective quaestiones finitae could not be solved 
with certainty. It was against this misleading impression that Ramus complained 
when he quoted Antonius' criticism of the ignorant teachers of oratory who 
advocated a distinction between the argumentation with which the specific questions 
of controversiae were debated and the dialectical rigor of the philosophers' 
arguments for and against theses. 9 Certainly Ramus could approve Antonius' 
conclusion that 'any debate whatsoever can be brought under the notion and quality 
of the general kind [quaestio infinita]'; what he could not approve was the view that 
general questions, such as are investigated in theses, fell most generally under the 
heading of oratorical subj ects, that the commonplaces of inventio were 
fundamentally rhetorical, and not dialectical. Without explicitly referring to his 
characterization of dialectic as a class of oratory in the Institutes, Ramus rejects 
Quintilian's view that the dialectician presented proof for his theses according to a 
method of demonstration which was too purely logical to be persuasive to the typical 
member of the orator's audience by dismissing his identification of dialectic with the 
laconic syllogistical demonstrations of philosophers such as the Stoics. 10 He notes, 
as we have, that both Quintilian and Cicero located the strength of dialectic in the 
logicaljudgrnent of dispositio, but insists that inventio (as well as memoria) is 
equally proper and necessary to the discourse of dialectic. 11 Ramus declares, 
'Dialectica mentis & ration is tota est, rhetorica & grammatica sermonis & 
orationis: Dialectica igitur inventionis, dispositionis, memoriae ... artes proprias 
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habebit.,12 Having appropriated inventio to dialectic, Ramus can claim that when 
the orator refers the special questions (controversiae) to the commonplaces in which 
the general questions (quaestiones infinita) relevant to the case are enunciated, he is 
engaged in a dialectical, and not a rhetorical, process. 
2 
Dispositio, Method and the Vanity of Contention 
Any question, therefore, no matter how convoluted, may be submitted to 
dialectic for resolution. And once the student of his dialectic has mastered the 
analysis of certain arguments by dispositio and their synthesis by inventio, he will 
have acquired the method which enables him to eliminate the two-stage treatment of 
similar arguments through the immediate perception of their order and significance. 
In his famous example of the power of this method, which he called the 'Method of 
Nature' in the Dialectique of 1555, Ramus imagines that all of the defmitions, 
distributions and rules of Grammar are written on various tablets and mixed-up in a 
confusing bundle, and then submitted to dialectic for reorganiztion. 13 The resultant 
action, or lack thereof, taken by the method of nature upon this problem reveals the 
confidence with which Ramus believed his dialectician could approach any question 
whatever. 'Premierement', he says, 'ne sera besoing des lieux d'invention car tout 
est ja trouve: chacune enonciation particuliere est prouvee et jugee. II ne fauldra ny 
premier jugement de I' enociation ny deuziesme du syllogisme. La method seulle 
reste, et certaine voye de collocation.' 14 A little later he extends the explanatory 
power of the method of nature to all inquiries, not just questions about the arts and 
doctrine. 'Or ceste methode n'est seullement appliquee en matiere des ars et 
doctrines mais en toutes choses que nous deliberons enseigner facillement et 
clerement. ,15 The entire process of discovery and arrangement could be avoided if 
the clear light of the method of nature were shining equally on us all, but as the 
human mind needs assistance in organizing, applying, and most importantly, 
teaching, its knowledge, the divisions of inventio and dispositio must be retained. 16 
Donne was deprecating of such attempts to reduce the discourse of natural reason to 
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its bare and supposedly unerring first principles when he asked in his fourth paradox, 
'That Nature is our worst Guide', 'Ifby Nature we shall understand our essence, our 
definition, our reasonableness, then this, being alike common to all men (the ideot 
and the wisard being equally reasonable) why shall not all men having one nature, 
follow one course?' Ramus' Method of Nature represented the ideal of common 
reason because it claimed to eradicate all the ambiguities and uncertainties with 
which partisan philosophers had plagued disputation since Socrates' confrontations 
with the sophists. As we have seen, the most culpable of the wrangling philosophers 
of antiquity are the sceptics, whom Ramus was recalling out of Sextus' Outlines 
when he referred to the 'infinies contentions et procf:s entre les hommes' which, he 
suggested, could be resolved by his system of judgement. 17 In the Scholae 
Dialecticae, Ramus had listed such 'contentions' as the fifth causa on which the 
Pyrrhonists maintained suspension of assent: 'quinto ex legibus & institutis, & 
musicis persausionibus, & artificiosis decretis & opinionibus dogmaticis, quibus 
idem aliis bonum, aliis malum videtur' .18 Such differences of opinion were 
indicative of unnecessarily complex and partisan methods of demonstration which 
denied the self-evidency and simplicity of the Method of Nature. When he 
celebrated the fertility of discord in his ninth paradox, and the power of paradox to 
conduce to this fertility, Donne simultaneously denied the putative benefits of 
Ramus' homogenizing Method of Nature. 
Abraham Fraunce's Lawier's Logike (1588) was an adaptation of Ramistic 
logic to the ends of the lawyer, and was the most current and relevant Ramist 
dialectic in English while Donne was writing his Paradoxes at Lincoln's Inn. 19 In 
the Preface, Fraunce enthusiastically supports Ramus' efforts to illuminate the 
power of common reason to discover and prove truths, the certainty of which had 
been imprudently obscured by subtle sceptics and divisive Aristotelians. In his 
praise of this common reason, Fraunce sets-up Ramus' Method of Nature as yet 
another target for Donne's exploitation of the ambiguity of the term 'common' in his 
eighth paradox, 'That good is more common then evill'. 
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Coblers bee men, why therefore not Logicians? and Carters haue 
reason, why therefore not Logike? Bonum, quo communius, eo melius, you 
say so your selves, and yet the best thing in Logike you make to be the 
woorst, in thinking it lesse commendable, because it is more common. A 
spytefull speach, and a meaning no lesse malitious, to locke vp Logike in 
secreate comers, who, as of her selfe is generally good to all, so will shee 
particularly bee bound to none.20 
Donne's argument, of course, perverts Fraunce's Latin dictum to defend the 
indifference of good generally. This indifference, Donne argues, arises from the 
ability of good to be found commonly in both its contradictories, 'worse' things, and 
its contrary, evil. We have already seen how Wilson's 'libertine argument' can 
validly conclude that something (sin) is both not good and not evil, that the same 
thing can possess opposing contradictories without entailing their contraries. The 
nature of such a thing with respect to good and evil is indifferent. What makes 
Donne's argument surprising is his conclusion that 'good doth not only prostitute her 
owne amiableness to all, but refuseth no ayd, no, not of her utter contrary evill, that 
she may be more common to us. ,21 Here he argues, though with transparent 
equivocation, that the same thing may be both good and evil; the law of non-
contradiction is thus violated and either our admiration or, more likely, our 
resistance is aroused. Whether Donne was denying the facility of Ramus' logic by 
constructing paradoxical arguments depends on whether he thought that the 
dialectical resistance which he explicitly invited as a response to the obvious 
fallacies of the Paradoxes could produce a clear knowledge of the true significance 
of each sense of the various terms which he deployed ambiguously?2 Merely raising 
the 'alarum to truth' may alert us to fallacy and falsehood, but it does not insure that 
we will consequently perceive the truth.23 To assert that no rhetorical manipulation 
of ambiguous terms, such as is practiced in Donne's Paradoxes, can obscure the 
univocal truth of each sense of these terms, attributes to dialectic, and particularly to 
dispositio, a demonstrative power so extensive that paradoxical arguments present 
no more of a challenge than the shuffled defmitions and distributions of grammar. 
Ramus argued that the tradition which advocated the intellectual value of arguing 
paradoxes and theses, the tradition of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and Aphthonius, 
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only advocated this practice because their rhetorical and dialectical systems were too 
confused and complex to guide their practitioners to the truths which his orderly 
dialectic exposed to anyone who used it. 
Much of this confusion arose because Cicero and Quintilian had permitted 
the orator the use of inventio and dispositio. In his invective against Cicero's 
ordering of the subjects of dialectic and rhetoric, Ramus asks, 'Primum enim quale 
est quod jubes, ut genera verborum & singulorum & eopulatorum in Dialeetiea 
videantur?' Without acknowledging Cicero's characterization of dialectic as ars 
omnium artium maxima, he answers his own question by affirming dialectic's proper 
possession of inventio and dispositio, and insisting upon its precedence in the 
inquiries of other arts such as grammar. 
Hoc enim Dialeetieae nihil est, quae tota rationis est & mentis, ut saepe iam 
dico, orationis nullam euram habet: nee istud ad invention em aut 
dispositionem reum, quae solae Dialeetieae partes sunt.24 
Despite the promise of his method to clearly expose truth and falsity, the analytical 
task of Ramus' adjudicative art, dispositio, remained paramount in the confirmation 
of the truth of the consequences that followed from the application of the first 
principles of all things, which he called axioms or 'enonciations'. Inventio places no 
adjudicative demands on Ramus' dialectician; it is comprised of the commonplaces 
of argument, which should be consulted when one seeks a middle term to unite the 
extreme terms of a syllogism. Dispositio, on the other hand, is comprised of 
axiomatic and syllogistic judgement, the former requiring the dialectician to 
recognize the self-evident principle (i.e. enonciation or axiom) relevant in a given 
inquiry, the latter providing the various deductive procedures by which particular 
conclusions could be drawn. Once all of the genera of arguments were learned, all 
particular derivatives could be classified by inventio.25 Once classified, any 
remaining questions could be submitted to axiomatic judgement to be resolved in 
light of the universal principles located by inventio. If any questions still remained, 
they could be arranged in the form of a syllogism to see what conclusion necessarily 
followed from the valid conjunction of the premises containing the middle or third 
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term. Fraunce confirmed this relation between dispositio and inventio in the 
Lawier's Logike, emphasizing that axioms which have had their truth approved by 
dispositio represent the 'fruites of Judgement', which henceforth, are catalogued in 
inventio to be consulted as rules by which to judge any future relevant question. Of 
course, Fraunce never entertains the possibility that any doubt will remain after 
dispositio has examined the axiom under scrutiny, and concludes confidently that 
'euery precept of euery art' (which, we will see, Ramus explicitly associates with 
theses) 'because it is an axiome' represents one of: 
the fruites and examples of that Logicall judgement appeering in the orderly 
constitution of every art. And so in Inuention, euery rule is an axiome, euery 
rule doth judge, but euery rule teacheth not how to frame an axiome, euery 
rule sheweth not how to judge, which onely is the peculiar duetie of Logicall 
. d 26 JU gement. 
3 
The Doubtful Axiom and the Thesis 
In his Latin edition of Ramus, Dialecticae Libri Duo (1574), Roland 
MacIlmaine emphasized the power of syllogism's arrangement of its three terms to 
resolve doubtful propositions. As we will see, MacIlmaine's name for doubtful 
propositions, axioma dubia, reflects a distinction between axioms (which are certain 
and self-evident) and theses (which are obscure), which Ramus had observed in the 
1555 edition of the Dialectique, but which did not appear in the later Latin editions 
from which MacIlmaine may have been working. MacIlmaine says, 'Nam cum 
axiom a dubium sit, quaestio efficitur, & ad eius fidem tertio argumento opus est cum 
quaestione collacato' .27 Weare reminded here of Cicero's description, in the 
Topics, of the power of dispositio to eliminate doubt. 'Itaque licet definire locum 
esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem' .28 
However, in light of MacIlrnaine's advocacy of Ramus' belief in the power of 
syllogism to clarify the truth of even doubtful axioms, his use offidem must be 
distinguished from Cicero's.29 For Cicero, credibility, and not certainty, was the 
epistemological limit of logical demonstration. Dubious questions could never be 
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definitively resolved, and thus, the utility of advancing paradoxical theses as 
subjects for debate always remained. For Ramus and his followers, however, the 
middle term of a syllogism that clarifies the true meaning of a doubtful axiom 
provides the proof which justifies its acceptance as a certain principle. Though we 
will see that he expresses considerably more confidence in the certainty of these first 
principles than Aristotle had in the Posterior Analytics, Ramus does not contradict 
the formulation of the syllogism in the Prior Analytics in maintaining that it follows 
necessarily that an axiom which is deduced as a conclusion from known premises is 
true.30 Because a syllogism establishes truth soundly (ad eiusfidem), no attempt to 
defend a thesis which contradicts the resolved axiom could be useful in further 
clarifying the matter; the paradoxical thesis, therefore, has no dialectical value. In 
the same year as his Latin edition was published, MacIlmaine produced the first 
English translation of Ramus' dialectic, The Logike of P. Ramus (1574).31 In his 
own translation of the Latin comment on axioma dubia, he writes, 'For if a 
proposition be doubtfull, it is made a question: And to prove the question, we take 
an argument and dispone it with the question' .32 The process described here yields 
not just probability or credibility, but proof. Dudley Fenner's translation in the next 
Ramist logic in English, The Arte ofLogicke (1584), emphasizes even more strongly 
the ability of syllogistic judgement to render doubtful axioms certain. 'Therefore 
when an axiome is doubtfull, it is made a question, and for proofe of the trueth, we 
must inuente a thirde reason and place it with the question after the forenamed 
order.'33 Both MacIlmaine and Fenner were following Latin editions of the Ramus' 
Dialectic which contained substantial differences from the French edition of 1555. 
Andreas Wechelus' 1572 Latin edition of the Dialecticae Libri Duo provides 
precisely the same explanation verbatim of the judgement of doubtful axioms as 
MacIlmaine's Latin edition.34 
In his 'Peroration du Premier Jugement' of the 1555 of edition of the 
Dialectique, Ramus provides an interpretation of the thesis which was omitted in 
subsequent editions, but which was a clear consequence of his anti-sceptical 
epistemology.35 As Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian had before him, Ramus 
recognized that universal propositions about which there was some doubt were to be 
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analyzed by dispositio. The procedure of dispositio, he regularly called analysis or 
judgement because the exposition of the question in the structure of a syllogism 
indicated more than just what could necessarily follow if the premises were true; it 
demonstrated that what followed was necessarily true because the premises were, in 
fact, known to be true. Unlike Aristotle, Ramus believed all knowledge could be 
both learned and taught by syllogism. Inductive proofs could be used, but they 
never were the sole grounds on which the knowledge of their conclusions was based. 
Given his high estimate of the pedagogical value of syllogism and his confidence in 
the demonstrability of the truth of all things, Ramus had to assign a corresponding 
certainty to the principles from which the manifold particulars of every art, science 
and doctrine are deduced. Hence, the first part of dispositio, axiomatic judgement, 
operated simply through the recognition of the self-evidency of the axiom which 
explains the universal nature of the particular in question. For example, if we 
wonder what number represents two particular objects added to two other particular 
objects, we need only recognize the truth of the relevant universal mathematical 
axiom: two and two make four. In both the 1555 and the 1576 editions of the 
Dialectique, the axiom and its form of judgement are defined in the same way, and 
with respect to Aristotle's defmition in the Posterior Analytics.36 In the 1555 
edition, he says of the axiom: 'Axiome est principe representant son intelligence 
incontinent qu'il est enonce, comme "Le tout est plus que sa partie. Deux fois deux 
sont quatre." et toutes telles intelligences qui sont bien cleres a nostre premiere et 
naturelle raison sans observation ny experience de sens aucun' .37 In the 1576 
edition, he says of axiomatic judgement, 'Et Ie Jugement faict de telle sorte est sans 
discours de l'axiome manifeste de soymesme' .38 When a proposition is to be 
analyzed by syllogism, discursive judgement begins; such discursive judgement is 
only necessary, however, when the dialectician is confronted with a doubtful axiom. 
Once treated by the discursive judgement of syllogism, the doubt is dispelled and the 
truth or falsity of axiom known. In Biathanatos, Donne, though far from embracing 
the scepticism about which Ramus complained, held a less confident view of the 
reliability of rational discourse, warning that deductions regarding doubtful axioms 
such as that categorically prohibiting suicide, may be 'corrupted or bastarded by 
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fallacy' .39 Ramus, unlike Lever and Wilson who included sections corresponding to 
Aristotle's book recognizing fallacies, Sophistical Refutations, was evidently not 
concerned about the corruption of fallacy infecting his syllogistic judgements; any 
fallacy could easily be spotted by the diligent dialectician trained in the method. 
In the 1555 edition of the Dialectique, the doubtful axiom is called a thesis 
(these), and is opposed to the axiom on the authority of Aristotle. Ramus explains 
that an axiom is a self-evident principle, while a thesis 'est principe qui n'est pas 
incontinent apperceu ains requiert Ie sens et experience de quelque exemple 
familier' .40 The principle expressed by a thesis, like the doubtful axiom, requires 
proof, but, in this passage, this proof appears to be gained by induction. Aristotle 
was not concerned to eliminate the inductive basis of universal principles, and was 
happy to recommend that' one should cross from the particulars to the universals' 
for the sake of clarity.41 Ramus agreed with Aristotle on the use of induction for 
clarity, but was careful to add that the clarification of doubtful axioms (theses) was 
inductive only in so far as it was the result of a comparison to examples. These 
examples, however, were not of similar particulars to be compared to the thesis 
under question, for the thesis is a universal, not a particular, proposition. The 
examples to which a doubtful thesis could be compared were universal principles 
themselves which 'ont este apperceuz'. The process by which this knowledge is 
acquired may involve the examples of our experience to the extent that they report 
the presence of a particular and exceptional case which seems to support the 
assertion of a strange, even paradoxical, thesis. Such would be the case for one who 
observes the apparent motion of the sun around the earth, and draws the strange (by 
today's knowledge) universal conclusion that the sun, indeed, does revolve around 
the earth. In such a case, Ramus recommends that the doubt aroused by such a 
strange axiom be eliminated by reference to the already known and undeniable 
axioms of the science which govern the motions of the heavens. Through a series of 
syllogistic demonstrations, which begin with known major premises such as objects 
ofless mass revolve around objects of greater mass, the observer of the strange 
phenomenon learns that his doubtful axiom is false, and therefore, no axiom at all.42 
It is in this way, that Ramus, in the 1555 edition of the Dialectique, instructs his 
dialectician to clarify theses. 
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Pour esclerissement d'iceux [theses], nous avons recours aux exemples par 
lesquels ilz ont este apperceuz et, pour ce, en tout I' art de dialectique et 
toutes ses reigles que nous suyvons, nous n'avons tenu ny tiendrons autre 
voye de declaration sinon d' exemples les plus insignes et familiers que nous 
avons peu choisir par long estude et recherche du naturel usage et de la vraye 
practique de raison.43 
The procedure here is from the more known (i.e. the self-evident axioms) to the less 
known, which for Ramus, is from universal to particular.44 In the 1576 edition, this 
passage no longer refers to the clarification of theses and is moved to the beginning 
of the second book as an introduction to the axiom. The passages of the two editions 
are identical, except that in the 1576 edition, it is not theses that are clarified by 
reference to things more known, but the countless defmitions and distributions of the 
arts and sciences, which we have seen in the case of the jumbled defmitions and 
distributions of grammar, are all discernible by Ramus' method. All reference to 
this difficult process of clarifying theses, and deducing definitions and distributions 
is omitted from Wechelus' edition of 1572, both of MacIlmaine's editions of 1574 as 
well as Fenner's edition of 1584. 
4 
Ramus against the Paradoxical Thesis 
In the Scholae Dialecticae, Ramus discusses the definition of the thesis 
which Aristotle gives in the Topics, 'a paradoxical belief of some eminent 
philosopher'. In the Dialectique (1555), he insisted that the thesis, though 
potentially uncertain, is soluble under the analysis of dialectic, which, according to 
the principles of dispositio, submits the doubtful proposition to syllogistic 
judgement. In subsequent editions, the definitions and distributions of the arts and 
sciences replace theses as the uncertain subjects of such analysis. As we have seen, 
Ramus could not permit the persistence of the paradoxical thesis, which had 
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traditionally been argued pro and contra by dialecticians and rhetoricians, because 
valid demonstrations of such positions could conclude only their falsity or absurdity. 
To maintain the viability of such positions as valuable exercises in disputation was 
to deny the penetrating simplicity of his analytical method. To begin his repudiation 
of the paradoxical thesis, he cites Aristotle's defInition of the thesis in the Posterior 
Analytics. 'An immediate deductive principle I call a posit [thesis] if one cannot 
prove it but it is not necessary for anyone who is to learn anything to grasp it: and 
one which it is necessary for anyone who is going to learn anything whatever to 
grasp, I call an axiom' .45 In the Dialectique (1555), Ramus cited the same passage 
stating 'Toutefois, comme les couleurs par soy visibles, ainsi les principes par soy 
intelligibles sont plus clers les uns que les autres, qui a este cause a Aristote de faire 
deux especes de principes: Axiome et These' .46 Clearly, the thesis is the less evident 
of the two types of indemonstrable principles, but because Ramus wanted to 
maintain that they were first principles of the same type as the defInitions of the arts 
and sciences, he needed to de-emphasize the obscurity with which their self-
evidency is perceived. In the Topics, Ramus explains, the thesis was defined in a 
variety of ways which produced a 'homonymia' which, as a result of the mistaken 
interpretations of scholastic commentators, severely obscured Aristotle's notion of 
first principles.47 One of the homonymous meanings of thesis which these 
commentators should have clearly distinguished from that signifying the uncertain 
axiom, was the paradoxical belief described in the first book of the Topics. Though 
he does not explain why he thinks that the thesis understood as opinio incredibilis 
cannot agree with its definition as an 'immediate deductive principle', it is clear 
from his subsequent discussion of the two species of the thesis described in the 
Posterior Analytics, the hypothesis and the definition, that he believed that any first 
principle is immediately credible, even if its certainty is not so easily ascertained.48 
In light of his association of the definitions of the arts and sciences with theses, we 
should not be surprised that he was committed to eliminating any understanding of 
thesis which could threaten the certainty of the principles upon which he believed all 
learning was founded. 
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Aristotle is not troubled by the prospect of theses functioning both as first 
principles upon which valid syllogistic demonstrations are based and as paradoxical 
propositions from which incredible conclusions are drawn because neither of these 
functions pertain to the fundamental knowledge required to attain any understanding 
whatsoever. As Ramus notes, axioms, such as 'the whole is greater than its parts' 
and 'two times two are four', serve this function. Aristotle, however, is careful to 
distinguish both forms of the thesis, the hypothesis and the definition, from axioms 
by virtue of the former's recognized uncertainty and potential contentiousness. He 
says, 'A posit [thesis] which assumes either of the parts of a contradiction-i.e., I 
mean, that something is or that something is not-I call a supposition [hypothesis]; 
one without this, a definition' .49 The difference between the respective claims of 
hypothesis and definition is ontological; the former says that something is or is not, 
the latter what something is or is not. 50 Not surprisingly, Ramus adopts Aristotle's 
definition of the axiom stressing that such first principles are not known by 
demonstration, but in themselves. His concern to establish that axioms are not 
generated by human reason is informed by the threat which Aristotle recognizes the 
sceptical critique poses to first principles such as axioms. This threat takes one of 
the two forms to which Sextus reduced the modes of sceptical dissent in his 
Outlines; either the sceptic continually requires knowledge of a prior principle to 
inform the knowledge of a conclusion deduced from it, thereby reducing any 
demonstration of an axiom to an infinite regress, or he claims that any demonstration 
of the axiom in question is informed by another axiom which itself is informed by 
the initial axiom, thus reducing the demonstration to reciprocity.51 Aristotle's 
solution was simply to acquiesce to the obvious necessity that we obtain knowledge 
of the universal first principles by induction. Such inductive knowledge does not 
provide proof of their certainty, however. Only syllogism can provide this certainty. 
Our awareness of the truth of these first principles is generated by inductive methods 
which ultimately rely on the accuracy of the senses, an accuracy which we have 
already seen questioned by Donne in his paradoxes on cosmetics and the gifts of the 
body, and which we have seen was the crux upon which the Stoic and Academic 
debate over knowledge turned. Ramus was just as content to permit our awareness 
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of the first principles to arise from inductive proofs, just as long as the truth of these 
principles remained independent of these proofs.52 Donne was referring to the 
difference between syllogistic demonstration and inductive proof observed by 
Aristotle and Ramus, when he said of the syllogisms of his tenth paradox, 'These or 
none must serve as reasons: and it is my great happiness that Examples prove not 
rules, for to confirme this opinion the World yields not one Example.' 53 Of course, 
neither Ramus nor Aristotle thought that the respective conclusions of inductive 
proofs and syllogistic demonstrations should be contradictory. Donne's paradox, 
despite its insincerity, performs the traditional function of the thesis as defined in the 
Topics (paradoxical belief) by providing deductive arguments for an opinion that 
conflicts with the inductive arguments which are comprised of examples denying it. 
In Biathanatos, he earnestly sought to illustrate that 'Examples prove not rules', by 
denying the second reason against suicide which Augustine gave Donatus, 'none of 
the faithful ever did this act' .54 Donne will show that some of the faithful have 
indeed done this act (e.g. Eleazar, Razis, Samson), and conclude that though 
examples may be used to disprove the universality of a law, they may not be used to 
ground its universality. 55 He begins by citing the church's allowance of divorce 
after hundreds and even thousands of years during which it was prohibited on the 
grounds that there was no precedent examples justifying its lawfulness. He asks, 
simultaneously questioning the validity of universal conclusions which are based 
upon induction and those which are based upon sense data: 
Are not St Augustine's disciples guilty of the same pertinacy which is 
imputed to Aristotle's followers who, defending the heavens to be inalterable 
because in so many ages nothing had been observed to have been altered, his 
scholars stubbornly maintain his proposition still, though by many 
experiences of new stars, the reason which moved Aristotle seems now 
utterly defeated?56 
Aristotle, himself, distrusted the information of the senses sufficiently to recognize 
that conflicts between examples and laws could occur, and therefore, reserved a 
place for principles, such as theses, which were not clearly understood to be either 
true or false. 57 Ramus, on the other hand, entertained no such misgivings about the 
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reliability of the senses, as his comparison of Aristotle's axioms and theses to colors 
more and less clearly perceived indicates. 58 
Ramus's denial of the paradoxical thesis relies on his rej ection of the 
distinction which Aristotle draws between the hypothesis and the definition. The 
hypothesis, which claims that something is, Ramus claims, simultaneously makes an 
assertion about what the nature of that thing is, and therefore, may be considered a 
proposition which also performs the function of the defmition. He explains that, as a 
proposition which makes an ontological assertion, the hypothesis is enunciated (' est 
enunciato'). To claim, as some scholastic commentators have, that a defmition is 
not a proposition because it does not make a claim about the ontological status of its 
subject is a vain distinction. 59 Contrary to Aristotle, Ramus maintains that 
definitions, such as those of mathematics, are, in fact, enunciated and are, therefore, 
propositions.6o Having collapsed the distinction between the hypothesis and the 
definition by insisting that they both make ontological claims about the nature of 
their subjects, Ramus dispenses with hypotheses and identifies the thesis with the 
definition. Out of all the inconstant and conflicting accounts of first principles which 
Aristotle gives throughout the Organon, Ramus says that he will choose that of the 
Posterior Analytics, which reduces all principles to axioms and theses. He then 
proceeds to reduce theses to the more particular, yet still immediate and primary, 
definitions of the arts and sciences, which, as such, cannot be understood to be 
opinions about which there may be insoluble doubts. 61 To emphasize the urgency of 
this view, he declares, 'Omnes scientiae definitionefiunt, est item verum, tanquam 
definitio per se doceat quamplurima, & sine definitione demonstratio nihil' .62 The 
power of the definition established, he may conclude confidently, 'Principia enim 
artium omnium sunt definitiones & partitiones.'63 As we have already observed, the 
thesis of the 1555 edition of the Dialectiqueperforms the same function as the 
definitions of the arts and sciences in the 1576 edition, and as the doubtful axioms of 
Wechelus', MacIlmaine's and Fenner's Latin and English editions of the Dialectic. 
Between the publications of the Scholae Dialecticae (1548) and of Fenner's Arte of 
Logicke (1584), any acknowledgement of the problem of Aristotle's account of 
theses had been removed in favor of the less controversial classification of the 
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doubtful axiom. Though he acknowledges the variety of senses in which the 
definition may be understood, in his Lawier's Logike, Fraunce confirms Aristotle's 
view that the 'Logicall defmition ... expoundeth the nature of a thing'. To this view, 
he opposes the views of others who have 'mistook the woord' by intending 'breuem 
& circumspectam quandam iuris sententiam, quam iurisconsulti regulam, Dialectici 
Thesin, seu positionem; Medici Aphorismum nominant' .64 Here, Fraunce observes 
the original distinction between the definition and the thesis, which Aristotle had 
established in the Posterior Analytics and the Topics, and thus appears to question 
Ramus' identification of the two terms on the grounds that the Dialecticians' theses 
and positions, like the physicians' aphorisms and the lawyers' rules, do not provide 
universal defmitions from which necessary conclusions may be drawn. He raises 
this concern in the context of the lawyer's attempt to apply logical defmitions to the 
execution of legal cases, and concludes along with Cicero in the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum, that 'who so attempteth to make Logicall definitions in the Law, shall 
finde it somewhat dangerous, because it is very difficult' .65 Despite his misgivings 
about the identification of the thesis and the definition, Fraunce is not prepared to 
abandon his attempt to apply Ramist logic to the law, but his acquiescence to 
Aristotle's defmition of the thesis indicates that Ramus' innovations were not 
comprehensively embraced even by his disciples. As we have mentioned already, 
Donne unequivocally rejected Ramus' reformulation of the Aristotelian thesis by 
calling Biathanatos both a paradox and a thesis, and as we will see, advocates of 
traditional Aristotelian logic, such as Thomas Blundeville, explicitly retained the 
distinction between the thesis and the definition. 
5 
Blundeville's Recognition of the Paradoxical Thesis 
In the postscript to his Art of Log ike (1599), Thomas Blundeville says that he 
was convinced by friends to publish the work, which he had written 'many yeares 
past', to provide ministers who 'had not beene brought up in any Vniversitie' with a 
logical training which would help them 'to defend the truth of Gods worde, and 
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orderly to confute such false conclusions as peruerse Schismatikes and Heretikes are 
wont to gather out of the very wordes of holy Scripture' .66 Blundeville's ordering of 
dispositio and inventio reflects the order traditionally derived from Aristotle's 
ordering in the Topics, though the ten predicaments are discussed as part of his 
introduction to the proposition.67 The commonplaces of argument are typically 
assigned to inventio, and since, Blundeville says, 'by order of Nature it is meete to 
find out matter before we go about to form, frame, or order the same', his treatment 
of dispositio follows his enumeration of the commonplaces.68 Despite his reversal 
of Lever's order, Blundeville remained committed, as did all of his contemporary 
Aristotelian logicians, to the view that dispositio is the 'chiefest fruit of Logike' 
because it provides the means to judge truth or falsity.69 The burden resting on the 
shoulders of dispositio in light of the sceptical critique should be clear; if the various 
forms of deductive and inductive argument fail to demonstrate truth reliably, there 
will be nothing to prevent the result which Sextus warned necessarily followed from 
the three theses proposed by Gorgias in On What is Not.70 Aware of this threat, 
Blundeville is careful to confirm the power of syllogism to verify the truth of 
conclusions derived from the universal first principles of human knowledge. Of the 
four general types of argument available to dispositio, syllogism, enthymeme, 
induction and example, the syllogism, Blundeville explains, 'is the chiefest, 
whereunto all others are referred as thinges vnperfect, vnto a thing perfect' .71 
Provided we are equipped with true first principles that do not themselves require 
proof, which Blundeville assumes, we may feel confident that 'God hath shewed us 
an order, and prescribed certaine boundes and limites ofnecessitie to bee obserued 
in such composition, which boundes are Syllogisms rightly made: for so doe the 
Consequents plaine1y appeare.,72 Fittingly, this statement is made as a conclusion to 
his chapter entitled 'Of the certainty of mans knowledge'. As we have seen, 
however, under the scrutiny of the sceptical critique neither the first principles, 
which Blundeville claims, on the authority of Aristotle, '[have] credite of 
themselves, and need no other proofe', nor the syllogisms which employ them retain 
their claim to certainty. 73 
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Blundeville recognizes that the adjudicative task of dispositio is not so 
simple as his confident statements about the power of fIrst principles and syllogisms 
would lead us to believe. Following Aristotle, he distinguishes three types of 
syllogism, the demonstrative, the dialectical and the sophistical. The demonstrative 
syllogism begins with a supposedly true proposition in its major premise such as 
, All men are mortal'. It then proceeds uncontroversially to conclude from the 
particular minor premise, 'Socrates is a man', that 'Socrates is mortal'. As long as 
the premises are accepted to be true, the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism is 
necessarily true. The dialectical syllogism and the sophistical syllogism, however, 
may appear indistinguishable because they both operate within the uncertain sphere 
of opinion. It is under these categories of syllogism, concerned as they are with 
opinion (doxa), that Blundeville discusses the respective functions of the thesis and 
the paradox. As Aristotle had emphasized in the Topics, dialectic is conducted 'with 
an eye to opinion', and so, Blundeville defInes the dialectical syllogism as 'that 
which is made of probable and credible propositions.,74 The sophistical syllogism, 
however, may be 'made of false Propositions, or els of such as seeme probable, and 
be not in deede, or els of probable premises not rightly concluding' .75 When he 
defmes the proper matter (materia propinqua) of the dialectical syllogism, 
Blundeville reveals its affinity both to the Aristotelian problem and to the 
philosophical thesis, and establishes what we suspected earlier, that Donne's 
Paradoxes and Problems were collected together not because of their youthful 
frivolity, but because they were recognized to fall under the same generic heading.76 
Blundeville says that the dialectical syllogism is concerned with a dialectical 
proposition, a problem or a position. The dialectical proposition raises, as Aristotle 
had defIned, a basically uncontroversial question such as 'whether the mother loueth 
her childe: which', Blundeville adds, 'is no question in deede, but to him that 
asketh.,77 His defmition of the problem will remind us of Cicero's and Aphthonius' 
defmition of the thesis of thought (cogitatione and contempliva). 'A Probleme is a 
doubtfull question uttered with a double Interrogatorie, as whether the least fIxed 
starre in the fIrmament be greater then the Moone or not? or whether that the Sunne 
bee bigger then the earth or not.' 78 What Blundeville calls the 'position' is his 
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translation (from the Greek) of the thesis of Aristotle's Topics, and as such, 
represents one of the two contradictory positions expressed in the' double 
Interrogatorie' of the problem; the position (thesis), therefore, is merely a 
subcategory of the problem.79 Moreover, Blundeville's definition of the position 
also emphasizes precisely the same quality ofparadoxicality, with which Aristotle 
invested the thesis and which Ramus denied in his interpretation of Aristotle in the 
Scholae Dialecticae. 
Position is a wonderfull opinion maintained by some excellent Clearke, as to 
say, that all thinges are but one essence or being, as Melissus affirmed, or 
that all things do continually flowe and change as Heraclitus heIde, or that 
the earth moueth and not the heauens, as Copernicus supposeth, onely to fmd 
out thereby the true motions of the planets, and not for that he thought so in 
deede.8o 
Again, we should recall Donne's advice in his letter to Wotton; his paradoxes, like 
the theses discussed by Aristotle and Isocrates, and especially the supposedly 
insincere thesis of Copernicus, only perform their office if they make us find better 
reasons against them. 81 
Blundeville's defmitions for the three types of syllogism are derived from 
Aristotle's list, in the Topics, of the three types of deduction, the demonstrative, 
dialectical and the contentious.82 The demonstrative syllogism proceeds by 
deduction from premises which are assumed to be 'true and primitive' self-evident 
principles.83 The remaining two definitions in Aristotle's list shed light on the fine 
line separating a dialectical from a sophistical argument. A dialectical syllogism 
proceeds by deduction from premises which constitute 'reputable opinions', while a 
contentious syllogism 'merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be 
reputable.,84 In the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle clarifies the role of the 
dialectical syllogism with respect to the disputation of theses. There he says that 
dialectical syllogisms 'are those that deduce from reputable premises, to the 
contradictory of a given thesis' .85 Bearing in mind that the thesis against which the 
dialectical argument is directed is paradoxical (,wonderfull'), the role of dialectic, as 
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Aristotle and Blundeville represent it, is to eliminate the paradoxical, to refute, for 
the sake of the clarification of the issue under consideration, preposterous views 
such as Copernicus' heliocentric theory or those expressed in Donne's Paradoxes. 
When Donne directs Wotton in his letter to 'quiet' the 'swaggering' paradoxes by 
'resisting' them, he simply suggests that dialectical arguments should be deployed to 
eliminate the appearance ofparadoxicality. The contentious or sophistical argument, 
however, is deployed precisely to create such an appearance of paradox. As 
Aristotle had stressed when discussing the virtues of drawing paradoxical statements 
in disputation, the objective of the sophist is to create the impression that a 
paradoxical conclusion may follow necessarily from true premises, while that of his 
opponent, the dialectician privy to the strategies of the sophist, is to show that the 
paradox results from a fault in the argumentation. Blundeville, borrowing 
Aristotle's example of the happy yet wretched king, illustrates the manner in which 
the dialectician may expose the fallacy responsible for the illusion of such a 
paradox.86 
The Sophister will make you grant that a rich and happy king is wretched, by 
force of argument thus: whosoever is subiect to sinne is wretched: but all rich 
and happy kinges are subiect to sinne, ergo all rich and happy kinges are 
wretched and miserable, in this is also a fallax, because that happiness is 
spoken here in two respectes, for there is worldly happines and heauenlie 
happines.87 
The 'fallax' is, of course, the fallacy of four terms, the very same which we observed 
creating the appearance of copresent contraries which so amazed Marbeck and 
Dickenson, and which would raise the suspicions of Theodorus in the Theaetetus 
and of readers of Lyly.88 Significantly, the two respects in which happiness is 
spoken in Blundeville's sophistical syllogism reflect two contradictory theses, the 
Epicurean, that happiness consists in worldly pleasure and the Socratic/Stoic, that 
happiness consists in virtue alone (i.e. not subject to sin). Aristotle advises 
disputants 'to have a collection of the theses of the various schools among [their] 
propositions' because he recognizes the potential of these theses to be marshaled in 
the interest of drawing paradoxical statements. Not surprisingly, he refers to the 
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debate between Callicles and Socrates in Gorgias as a clear case of one thesis 
(Socrates' that happiness consists in virtue) appearing paradoxical in opposition to 
another (Callicles' that happiness consists in pleasure) which claims to be 
representative of the common opinion.89 For Blundeville and Aristotle, therefore, 
the difference between the thesis and the paradox is really just a matter of proof; a 
thesis, though contrary to common opinion, may attempt to render itself credible by 
restricting the terms deployed in dialectical syllogisms which purport to prove it, 
while a paradox that advances exactly the same view as a thesis indicates that these 
terms have not yet been restricted sufficiently to render it amenable to the common 
opinion. Hence, while Donne's description of Biathanatos as both a thesis and a 
paradox reveals his rejection of Ramus' distinction between the paradox and the 
thesis, it simultaneously refers to the fineness of this distinction observed by both 
Aristotle and Blundeville. 
6 
Harvey and N ashe on Ramism 
Ramus' rej ection of the contentiousness of the thesis was just another in a 
series of innovations which contributed to the simplification of dialectical procedure, 
a simplification that appeared to many in the late sixteenth-century England as an 
oversimplification. Ramus' influence on the teaching of rhetoric and dialectic at 
Oxford and Cambridge during the 1580's and early 90's is fully recorded, and so, 
will not be rehearsed in great detail here.9o However, as Donne was certainly at 
Oxford and possibly at Cambridge while the debates between the Harvey brothers 
and Thomas Nashe over Ramism raged there, it is likely that he was familiar with 
the various senses in which, we will see, the term 'paradox' was used in the context 
of these debates. 91 In the introduction to his mock library catalogue, The Courtier's 
Library (1650), Donne referred to Ramus as an inspiration for paradoxists; to 
discover precisely what type of paradoxist he thought was influenced by Ramus, we 
must examine the details of the Harvey-Nashe quarrel over Ramus' innovations in 
both dialectic and rhetoric.92 In the controversy which emerged between the Harvey 
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brothers, Gabriel, Richard and John, and the Cambridge wits championed by Nashe 
and Greene, Ramus' simplifications became a particularly sore point of dispute, the 
Harveys defending the advantages to oratory which Ramus' orderly rhetoric 
provided, and Nashe and Greene objecting that such order required intelligent and 
learned writers to observe puerile distinctions, which were more fitting for grammar 
school students than university scholars.93 In the Ciceronianus (1577), his 
companion to the Rhetorica (1548) of Ramus' colleague, Orner Talon, Gabriel 
Harvey writes, 'Discite ab Erasmo rerum copiam cum verborum copia conglutinare: 
dis cite a P. Ramo P hilosophiam cum eloquentia coniunctam amplexari'. 94 Though 
Harvey utilized Ramist principles more to expound rhetorical than philosophical 
views, it is evident that he recognized the primary and comprehensive role which 
Ramus had allocated to dialectic.95 After affIrming Ramus' view that the 
fundamental precepts of any particular art, such as Grammar, are proper to that art 
once they have been identified, he is careful to note that dialectic, of all the arts, 
provides the means to distinguish their precepts, just as it was dialectic that 
distinguished the definitions which Ramus had argued should not be mistakenly 
confused with paradoxical theses. He says, 'Rhetorica a Grammaticis; Dialectica 
ab vtrisque internoseere. ,96 
Harvey, however, remains faithful to Cicero by advising students of oratory 
not to rely solely on dialectic to assist them in their pursuit of eloquence. In the 
Topics, Cicero had urged his orator to avoid the strict observance oflogical 
exposition which rendered Stoic rhetoric so sterile, and to cultivate a knowledge of 
all the arts and sciences which would make his speeches not only more generally 
persuasive, but also more reflective of his wisdom and eloquence. Though the 
distinctions which separate the various spheres of knowledge of the arts and sciences 
are determined by the analytical procedure of dispositio, Cicero maintains that it is 
by inventio that the fullness of true eloquence is achieved.97 Harvey has Cicero's 
discussion in the Topics in mind when, in Rhetor (1577), he explains, 'Nee vero 
dialecticam solum adiungit eloquentiae, sed velut ad cumulum accedere vult 
omnium maximarum disciplinarum facultate, scientamque rerum prope 
innumerabilium', and then exclaims, '0 artem artium, 0 doctrinarum doetrinam 
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eloquentiam' .98 In his praise of eloquence, Harvey inverts Cicero's appraisal of 
dialectic in Brutus and De Ora tore as ars omnium artium maxima, and as a result, 
places the analytical applications of dialectic and dispositio at the disposal of the 
more constructive enterprises of rhetoric and inventio.99 Harvey adopted Ramus' 
terms for dispositio and inventio, analysis and genesis respectively, and emphasized 
the necessity of genesis to coherent composition. lOO Once analysis has completed 
the deconstructive task of distinguishing definitions and partitions under its 
dialectical scrutiny, it remains for genesis to reassemble and apply these various 
pieces to the rhetorical end demanded of the orator. 'Sed ecce vobis in altera manu 
Genesin: per pulchrum illud etiam perquam necessarium instrumentum: & sine quo 
vetera tantum retexere, nihil noui contexere quisquam potest' .101 For Harvey the 
unraveling process of analysis (retexere) is not as fertile as genesis' process of 
recombination (contexere), the process by which new things are generated by 
learned invention. 102 Harvey's attention to the fecundity of invention attainable by 
the orator whose knowledge encompasses all disciplines, leads him to conclude his 
Ciceronian us with an exhortation to his students to emulate Cicero by incorporating 
a knowledge of all the arts and sciences into their oratory, and not just the principles 
of the rhetoricians and grammarians. 
Si vere Ciceroniani, non simulate esse velitis; vt estis Ciceronianae 
eloquentiae, prudentiaeque auditores; eo animo ad Ciceronem vestrum; 
institutoque venire debetitis, nunquam vt ad illum accedatis quin discedatis 
non modo Grammatici, atque rhetores: sed etiam Dialectici, Ethici, Politici, 
Historici; interdum etiam Physici, Iuroconsulti, atque adeo Cosmographi in 
quibusdam meliores. 103 
Though the spirit of Harvey's advice to his students is Ciceronian, the 
structure and language of his rhetoric are manifestly Ramist, and are, accordingly, 
simplified by the application of the dialectical principles of analysis and genesis. 104 
This simplification provoked the criticism of Harvey's young adversary, Nashe, who 
would not tolerate any divergence from the authority of Cicero or Aristotle, no 
matter how obscurely or inconsistently they sometimes expressed their views. 
Nashe attacked Harvey's submission of Cicero's Orator to the demands of Ramist 
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rhetoric, condemning the arrogance of those who would presume to undermine such 
ancient foundations of learning. Responding to the accusation that his Pierce 
Penniliesse (1592) is impious, Nashe says, 'No more is Pierce Pennilesse to be cald 
the Deuils Orator for making a supplication to the Deuill, than hee is to bee helde for 
a Rhetoritian, for setting foorth Gabrielis Scuruei Rhetor, wherein he thought to 
knockt out the brains of poore Tullies Orator' .105 Nashe seldom, if ever, comments 
on the substance of his disagreement with Harvey's Ramism, and ventures no further 
in his attack than to denounce him on the charge of innovating. It does not trouble 
him that Harvey repeatedly accuses him, on an abundance of strong evidence, of like 
abuses with regard to the verbal novelties which he and his fellow wits produced for 
their mutual entertainment. 106 In his preface to Greene's Menaphon (1589), Nashe 
asserts the affinity of Greene's 'extemporall ... inuention' to the archetype sketched in 
Orator against the sterile and mechanical metrical formulae which Ramist pedants 
such as Harvey dispense to their students as easy means to eloquence. 
I come (sweet friend) to thy Arcadian Menaphon, whose attire (though not so 
stately, yet comely) doth intitle thee aboue all other to that temperatum 
dicendi genus which Tully in his Orator termeth true eloquence ... giue me the 
man whose extemporall veine in any humour will excell our greatest Art-
maisters deliberate thoughts; whose inuentions, quicker then his eye, will 
challenge the prowdest Rhetoritian to the contention of like perfection with 
like expedition. 107 
Nashe goes on to insist that ready inventions such as Greene's (and his master, 
Lyly's) are only acquired after years of studying the unabbreviated, uncondensed 
masters of antiquity. Even such a protracted course of study does not guarantee 
useful results as Nashe claims the example of 'Peter Ramus sixteene yeeres paines' 
expended composing 'his petty Logicke' illustrates. lOB Harvey, as we will see, will 
respond to Nashe's praise of the fullness of Greene's (and his own) invention, by 
criticizing its neglect of precisely that order which Ramus' logic brought to all the 
arts and sciences. 109 
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7 
The Value of the Paradox of Ramism 
Though Ramus himself was committed to eliminating paradoxes, which 
appeared neither able to be proven true nor false, from his logic, the reformulations 
of Aristotelian principles which he introduced to achieve this elimination were 
considered by his antagonists to be themselves, paradoxes, in so far as they ran 
counter to the common opinion that accepted the authority of Aristotle. Had Nashe 
understood Ramus' explicit argument against the paradoxical thesis, he may have 
wanted to seize the opportunity to comment wittily upon the paradox of Ramus' 
denial of paradox. However, he betrays his ignorance of this argument when, in his 
first published work, The Anatomie of Absurdity (1589), he associates Ramist 
dialectic with novel systems of acquiring knowledge, which, he suggests, only 
appeal because they are uncommon or paradoxical. 
I am not ignorant, that farre more ardent is the desire of knowing vnknowne 
thinges, then of repeating knowne things: this we see happen in Stageplayers, 
in Orators, in al things, men hast vnto nouelties, and runne to see new things, 
so that whatsoever is not vsuall, of the multitude is admired, yet must 
students wisely prefer renowned antiquitie before newe found toyes, one line 
of Alexanders Maister, before the large inuective Scalia of the Parisian 
Kings Professor. 110 
Presumably Nashe would not have needed to be reminded that Aristotle himself 
praised the virtue of the wonder aroused by strange things to stimulate the pursuit of 
knowledge. 111 Nevertheless, Nashe has little to say in commendation of the doubtful 
or paradoxical. Deferring to authority of the most dogmatic of dialecticians and 
most dialectical of dogmatists, the Stoic logician, Chrysippus, Nashe advises 
students, 'If thou be desirous to attain to the truth of a thing, first learn determinate 
conclusions before thou dealest with doubtful controversies: he shall neuer enter into 
the reason of the trueth, who beginneth to be taught by doubts.' 112 Despite the 
startling resemblance of this sentiment to the views of Ramist pedagogues such as 
Fraunce, Nashe persists in his associations of paradox and Ramism. In his typically 
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Ramist rej ection of the exposure of infinite regress by the sceptical critique of 
axiomatic judgement, Fraunce tacitly approves the use of syllogisms, which employ 
axioms as their major premises, for the clarification of students' doubts, and the 
elimination of the possibility of paradox. 
But if these axiomes bee not playne inough of themselves, they must bee sent 
to syllogisme, there to bee discussed, and to methode, there to bee ordered. 
So that, whatsoever is eyther by syllogisme, or methode iudged, it is all 
iudged by the helpe of this first and axiomatic all iudgement. For if the 
premisses [sic] in a syllogisme bee not sometimes certayne and so iudged by 
axiomatic all iudgement, and graunted; there will bee no ende of making 
syllogismes: when still wee call the groundes thereof into controversie, for 
want of axiomatic all iudgement. 113 
Again, Nashe seems unaware of the similarity in logical practice between his 
'determinate conclusions' and Ramus' and Fraunce's axioms. In his criticism of 
Anthony Chute's contribution of verses to Harvey's Pierce's Supererogation (1593), 
Nashe writes, 'He was such a peruerse Ramisticall heretike, a busie reprouer of the 
principles of all Arts, and sower of seditious Paradoxes amongst kitchen boys.' 114 
Both Richard and Gabriel Harvey, Nashe maintains, are as guilty as Chute of 
spreading the paradoxes of Ramism. In Pierce Peniliesse His Svpplication to the 
Divell (1592), to which Harvey's Pierce's Supererogation was a response, Nashe 
refers to the reprimand which Richard Harvey received while a student at Cambridge 
for advocating Ramus' alterations of Aristotle. He says addressing Richard, 'Thou 
that hadst thy hood turnd ouer thy eares when thou wert a Batchelor, for abusing of 
Aristotle, & setting him vp on the Schoole gates, painted with Asses eares on his 
head'. 115 
While himself a batchelor at Cambridge (1573), Gabriel was denied his 
degree for, among other reasons, maintaining paradoxes against the authority of 
Aristotle. Harvey responded in his letter of complaint to the Master of Pembroke 
Hall, John Young, that the positions which he chose to argue in the academic 
disputations in question were not so strange that they had no precedent advocates of 
generally accepted authority, and therefore, were not rightly termed paradoxes if 
such a term connoted dangerously innovative opinions. He is careful to assert that 
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though he has been accused of being 'a great and continual patron of paradox is and a 
main defender of straung opinions, and that comunly against Aristotle', the term 
'paradoxis' had been attributed to his positions by his accuser, Thomas N evil.116 He 
says defending the lack of originality of his so-called paradoxes, 'I never yit tooke 
uppon me the defenc of ani quaestion which I culd not shew with a wet fingar out of 
sum excellent late writer or other; and especially out of Melanchthon, Ramus, 
Valerius and Foxius,.117 To the charge that he was excessively critical of his 
fellows, he answered similarly that he had 'never...discommendid ani of those, that 
haue in the most and best mens iudgements bene thout commendable.' 118 As we 
will see, Harvey was as suspicious of contentiousness and its expression in paradox 
as Nashe, yet he was still able to recognize that respected and influential scholars 
such as Ramus had raised legitimate objections to established principles which 
resulted in genuine controversy, and that such objections argued in the context of 
formal disputation are strictly speaking, paradoxes. Such paradoxes may be argued 
cogently on reputable authority, though neither they nor their opposing more 
orthodox positions emerge definitively and unanimously approved. Hence, while 
Harvey is speaking ironically when he refers to his own informed objections as 'nu 
fresh paradoxis', he is serious when he recommends that 'it were more fruteful for 
us and commodius for our auditors to handle sum sad and witti controversi' than the 
'stale quaestions' of 'popular and plausible theams, de nobilitate, de amore, de 
gloria, de liberalititate' and the like. 119 Writing twenty years later in response to 
Nashe's repeated accusations of 'paradoxisme', Harvey continues to defend the 
virtues of the learned debate of problems and their sister disputations, paradoxes. 120 
I could yet take pleasure, and proffite in canuassing some Problems of 
naturall Philosophy, of the Mathematiques, of Geography, and 
Hydrography ... and I would vppon my owne charges, trauaile into any part of 
Europe, to heare some pregnant Paradoxes, and certain singular questions in 
the highest professions of Learning, in Physic, in Law, in Diuinity, 
effectually and thoroughly disputed pro & contra ... What conferences, or 
disputations, what Parliaments, or Councels, like those, that deliberate vpon 
the best gouerment of Commonwealthes, and the best discipline of churches; 
the dubble anchor of the mighty shipp, and the two great Luminaries of the 
world? 121 
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As Cicero, Aphthonius and sixteenth-century commentators such as Lorich had 
recognized in their characterization of the thesis, Harvey recognizes the value of 
constructing arguments for and against the preferabililty of certain ethical positions, 
which the disputation of serious paradoxes occasions. 
8 
Vain Contention and Frivolous Paradoxes 
Harvey also recognizes that the disputation of paradoxes may promote 
frivolity and needless contention however. Immediately following his praise of 
'pregnant Paradoxes' , he warns that 'other extravagent discourses, not materiall, or 
quarrelous contentions, not auailable, are but wastinge of winde, or blotting of 
paper. ,122 Even more disconcerting are the controversies which have arisen out of 
the religious differences of the day, controversies whose respective partisans have 
deployed paradox as a term of censure. Harvey, himself, uses the term in this 
pejorative sense when he advises the various factions to reconcile their differences in 
recognition of the common principles on which they all can agree, and which, being 
more universal, should marginalize disagreement upon particulars. Nashe, as 
Harvey repeatedly indicates, resembles these schismatics in his ceaseless 
contentiousness, and uses paradox accordingly, as a term to discredit Harvey's 
opinions as well as those of his other adversaries. Warning against the dangers of 
stubborn disputation, Harvey says: 
Serious matters would be handeled seriously, not vpon simplicity, but vppon 
choice; nor to flesh, or animate, but to disgrace, and shame Leuity. A 
glicking Pro, and a frumping Contra, shall haue much-adoe to shake handes 
in the Ergo. There is no ende of girdes, & bobbes: it is sound Argumentes 
and grounded Authorities, that must strike the defInitive stroke, and decide 
the controuersy, with mutuall satisfaction. 123 
Harvey's complaints against the levity of disputations which neglect 'sound 
Arguments' and 'grounded Authorities' could easily have been directed at Donne's 
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Paradoxes, which effect their levity precisely by advancing fallacious arguments 
and questioning grounded authorities. We have already seen and will see further 
how Donne exploits ambiguity to create fallacious arguments which draw 
paradoxical conclusions. In his third paradox, 'That old Men are more Fantastique 
then younge', he attacks the reliability of purported authorities. 'So are these 
uncertaine elders, which both call them fantastique which follow others inventions, 
and them allso which are led by ther owne humors suggestion, more fantastique than 
eyther.,124 Here, we are reminded of the serious concern which Donne expresses in 
his third satire when he reiterates Moses' demand to 'Ask your father, he will inform 
you, / Your elders, they will tell you' .125 Donne's demand betrays his lack of 
confidence in the divisive elders of the modem church, and echoes the foreboding 
with which Moses uttered his own demand. God had warned Moses that' [this] 
people will ... go astray after the alien gods in their midst...; they will forsake Me and 
break My covenant that I made with them. ,126 As we will see, Harvey, Nashe and 
Donne will complain that the vogue for the development of novel doctrines has 
given rise to vain contentions and frivolous paradoxes which have unnecessarily 
caused division in the affairs of both church and state. Such unnecessary disputation 
leads to schism, which both Augustine and Aquinas explain, is a willful breach of 
God's demand for a church united by the principle oflove (charitas).127 Donne's 
response in his third satire to those who blindly follow their partisan authorities into 
religious controversy reflects the insistence with which he will assert the authority of 
the conscience in Biathanatos and Pseudo-Martyr. 'Or will it then boot thee / To 
say a Philip, or a Gregory, / A Harry, or a Martin taught thee this? / Is not this 
excuse for mere contraries, / Equally strong; cannot both sides say so?' 128 
Though Harvey admitted that the argumentativeness with which he was 
charged while a student justly needed correction, his scholarly, civic and religious 
opinions never sought to stray from an orthodoxy rooted in accepted authorities. 129 
Harvey's deference to authority and contempt of vain controversy produced in him a 
wariness of the dangers of paradox, which Donne would also recognize in his 
criticisms of the Jesuits in Ignatius His Conclave (1610), Catholics generally in 
Pseudo-Martyr, mystical neoplatonists in the Essays in Divinity and casuists in 
Biathanatos .130 Harvey writes: 
155 
It is a bold subject, that attempteth to binde the handes of sacred maiesty: and 
they loue controuersies well, I trow, that call their Princes proceedinges into 
Controuersie. Altercations, and Paradoxes, aswell in Discipline, as in 
Doctrine, were neuer so curiously curious, or so infInitely infInite: but when 
all is done, and when Inouation hath sett the best countenance of proofe, or 
persuasion, vpon the matter. 131 
Nashe, remembering both Richard's and Gabriel's charges ofparadoxism for 
supporting Ramus against Aristotle, does not fInd a profItable place for paradox as 
an exercise in disputation as Harvey (Gabriel) had. For Nashe, to argue a paradox 
belies a superfIcially learned mind which seeks either to make a pretense to 
knowledge or to create new doctrines by which it may justify its heretical 
combativeness. In his preface to Greene's Menaphon, he complains that the novel 
opinions of divinity, which plague both church and state, are constructed of faulty 
argumentation by controversialists who have been tempted to dispute the contested 
issues of religion before they have acquired the rudiments of logic. In academic 
exercises such negligent disputants, 'that spit ergo in the mouth of euery one they 
meete', deserve to be answered in kind, their fallaciously and hastily drawn 
paradoxical conclusions met with equally brief and dismissive rebuttals. 132 
However, when these innovators, with their faulty logic, begin to debate issues of 
genuine gravity such as the improvement of the commonwealth, the paradoxist will 
cease to appear a marvel because his uncommon opinions will have escaped the 
confInes of the university and become regular public policy. 
I will not deny but in scholler-like matters of controuersie a quicker stile may 
passe as commendable, and that a quip to an Asse is as good as a goad to an 
Oxe: but when the irregular Ideot, that was vp to the eares in diuinity before 
euer he met with probabile in the Vniversitie, shallleaue pro & contra 
before hee can scarcely pronounce it, and come to correct common-weales, 
that neuer heard of the name of Magistrate before hee came to Cambridge, it 
is no maruaile if euery Alehouse vaunt the table of the world turned vpside 
downe, since the child beateth his father, and the Asse whippeth his 
Master. 133 
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It is apparent that Nashe could not approve those 'pregnant Paradoxes ... vpon the 
best gouennent of Commonwealthes, and the best discipline of churches' which 
Harvey had distinguished from the vain paradoxes and innovations of the 'bold 
subject, that attempteth to bind the hands of sacred Majesty'. Nor could he approve 
the novel opinions of 'refonners of the Arts' such as Ramus, Talon, and their 
disciple, Harvey who, like the sophists of Gorgias and Euthydemus, he claims, 
'respect not so much the indagation of the truth, as the ayme of their pride' .134 
Again, the threat to truth issues from the pursuit of novelty and paradox. 
Coveting to haue newe opinions passe under their names, they spende whole 
yeeres in shaping of sects. Which their pudled opinions are no sooner 
published, but straight way some proude spirited princocks, desirous to differ 
from the common sort, gets him a liuerie Coate of their cloth, / and slaues it 
in the seruile sutes, enlarging the wilful errors of their arrogancie. 135 
As he had noted when he distinguished the paradoxical encomium from the paradox 
in Lenten Stuffe, N ashe maintains that the manufacture of paradoxes is, and has 
always been, a specifically philosophical process which functions according to 
corrupt dialectic. In the Anatomie of Absurditie, he attacks the vain theses of 
philosophers upon the metaphysical and ontological condition of the soul, which, he 
says, are of no benefit to virtue, and thus dispenses with paradoxes of the sort 
recorded by Aristotle in the Topics, taught by Pythagoras and argued unprofitably by 
scholastics ever since. 136 
Innumerable such vnnecessary questions, according to Philosophy, are made 
as touching the soule, as whence it is, what maner of one it is, when it doth 
begin to be, how long it may bee, whether it passeth not from his first 
mansion els where, and so alter his abiding, or shift into other fonnes of 
brute Beastes ... What do al these / things auaile vnto virtue?137 
We may wonder what Nashe would have thought of the interest which Donne took 
in Pythagorean doctrine in his Metempsychosis (1601).138 
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The Syllogistic Structure of Paradox in Harvey, N ashe and Donne 
Whatever he thought of its treatment in poetry, Nashe viewed such paradoxes 
as sophistical abuses of philosophy, abuses which are manifest most evidently in the 
syllogistic arguments of formal disputation. In his parodic account of Harvey's 
early education in Have with Yov to Saffron-Walden (1596), Nashe clearly associates 
the young Harvey's supposed skill in constructing and applying syllogisms with his 
ability to defend paradoxes. Nashe explains that Harvey's school master, impressed 
by his promise, 'cryde out 0 acumen Carneadum! 0 decus addite diu is ! and swore 
by Susenbrotus and Taleus that he would prooue another Philo Iudeaus for 
knowledge and deep judgement, who in Philo sophie was preferd aboue Plato' .139 
Nashe's comparison of Harvey to Carneades recalls Cicero's advocacy of the 
synthesis of the respective techniques of dialectic and rhetoric in De Oratore. 
There, Cicero argued that the ideal orator must embrace 'either the modem dialectic 
of Cameades or the earlier method of Aristotle'; both methods, we have seen, teach 
the deductive procedures necessary either to prove or to refute paradoxes. 140 
Nashe's reference to Susenbrotus and Talon is ironic here and employed 
sarcastically to suggest that Harvey was taught not out of the full texts of Cicero and 
Aristotle, as his school master's comparison of his pupil to Cameades at first 
implies, but out of grammar school rhetorical manuals such as Susenbrotus' 
Epitome, and abbreviated and simplified rhetorical treatises such as Talon's 
Rhetorica (1548).141 Moreover, to recommend the eloquence ofCameades or 
Aristotle on the authority of Talon is contradictory, especially in light of Cicero's 
passage from De Oratore. Ramus had imposed a division between dialectic and 
rhetoric, separating the five traditional elements of oratory precisely where Cicero 
had insisted synthesis was lacking. Ramus' dialectic was comprised of inventio, 
dispositio and memoria, and his rhetoric of elocutio and pronuntiatio alone. Talon's 
Rhetorica provided the simplified companion rhetoric to Ramus' simplified 
dialectic, and therefore, taught a manner of speaking and writing which was not 
explicitly informed by the rigors of dialectic. If Harvey had learned his oratory from 
Susenbrotus and Talon, he would not have learned anything about formal 
argumentation. When Harvey undertakes his study of logic at Cambridge, N ashe 
claims, his comprehension is correspondingly superficial, as is evidenced by his 
ridiculously pedantic application of the syllogism. 
So vpon his first manumission in the mysterie of Logique, because he 
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obseru 'd Ergo was the deadly clap of the peece, or driu 'n home stab of the 
Syllogisme, hee accustomed to make it the Faburden to anie thing hee spake; 
As, if anie of his companions complained hee was hungrie, hee would 
straight conclude Ergo you must goe to dinner; or if the clock had stroke or 
bell towld, Ergo you must goe to such a Lecture; or if anie stranger said he 
came to seeke such a one, and desir'd him he would shew him which was his 
chamber, he would foorthwith come vpon him with Ergo he must go vp such 
a paire of staires: whereupon (for a great while) he was cald nothing but 
Gabriell Ergo up and downe the Colledge. 142 
Nashe goes on to suggest ironically that this introduction to the syllogism prepared 
Harvey to defend the 'pregnant' academic paradoxes which he had praised in 
Pierce's Supererogation. Nashe recalls one such paradox which he imagines 
Harvey was required to defend. 
But a scolfe which longer dwelt with him than the rest, though it argued his 
extreame pregnancie of capacitie and argute trans persing dexteritie of 
Paradoxisme, was that once he would needs defend a Rat to be Animal 
rationale, that is, to haue as reasonable a soule as anie Academick, because 
she eate and gnawd his bookes, and, except she carried a braine with her, 
she could neuer digest or be so capable of learn ing. 143 
The syllogism underlying this obviously fallacious argument is worth 
extracting and comparing to a similar syllogism constructed by Donne to support the 
claim of his eleventh paradox, 'A Defence of Womens Inconstancy', that women 
have more reason than men. There, Donne says, 'Soe in Men they that have the 
most reasonn are the most alterable in there dessignes, and the darkest and most 
Ignorant do seldomest change. Therfore Women changing more then menn have 
alsoe more reason' .144 It is important to recognize that both Nashe's and Donne's 
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syllogisms proceed by making relative propositions (i.e. rats are as reasonable as 
academics; women are more reasonable than men), and thus, employ the 
predicament of relation described by Aristotle in the Categories, and by every 
logician thereafter who adopted his conceptual framework, even Ramus. Because 
the conclusions ofNashe's and Donne's syllogisms make relative statements, the 
arguments claim to prove that the compared terms (i.e. rats and academics, women 
and men) may be described by a common predicate (i.e. reasonable). In the 
Categories, Aristotle explains that relative terms derive their significance from the 
natures of things known defInitely and in themselves. 'It is plain, therefore, that 
anyone who knows any relative definitely must know definitely that also in relation 
to which it is spoken of.' 145 Defmite knowledge differs from relative knowledge in 
that the former may be known 'without necessarily knowing definitely that in 
relation to which it is spoken of' as it is not necessary to know 'whose this head is, 
or whose the hand' to know defInitely what a hand is. 146 
The term which informs the middle terms of both Nashe's and Donne's 
syllogisms is 'reasonable'. It is by the standard of this term that the related terms are 
compared; and therefore, according to Aristotle's explanation, the nature of 
'reasonable' must be asserted definitely in order to inform the relative statements 
which predicate it of the related terms. N ashe's syllogism relies on his definition of 
reasonable as the ability to 'digest' or learn the information contained in books. His 
identification of his middle term, 'digest', with reasonable, in tum, explicitly betrays 
the equivocal deployment of the middle term which ultimately invalidates the 
syllogism. By claiming Harvey's failure to notice the equivocal use of 'digest', 
Nashe ridicules both Harvey's knowledge of dialectic and implies that paradoxes 
generally are the result of equivocal use of middle terms in syllogism. In the 
syllogism of his eleventh paradox, Donne's definition of reasonable is the ability to 
be 'alterable in ... dessignes' .147 Unlike Nashe, Donne does not provide the term with 
which 'alterable in design' will be identified to render the middle term, 'change', 
equivocal, though it is always evident that it is something like 'unpredictable'. 
Nashe's syllogism reads: 
Those who digest most books are most reasonable. 
Rats and academics digest the same amount of books. 
Therefore, Rats are as reasonable as academics. 
Donne's reads: 
Those who change most are most reasonable. 
Women change more than men (i.e. women change most). 
Therefore, women have more reason than men (i.e. women are most 
reasonable). 148 
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The conflation of contraries, rats and women with reason, is here demonstrated in 
the form of a syllogism. To reach a conclusion which asserts such a conflation is to 
propose a paradox, as we have sufficiently illustrated above. Nashe's description of 
Harvey's generation of a paradox by deploying the middle term of a syllogism 
equivocally, however, makes explicit the relation of the paradox and the syllogism, a 
relation which governs the generation of the paradoxical conclusions of both 
Donne's Paradoxes and Biathanatos. Furthermore, by locating the fallacy 
responsible for the invalidity of their syllogisms in the attempt to establish a 
univocal middle term, Nashe and Donne raise the epistemological problem of the 
criterion of truth to which both Academic and Pyrrhonist applications of Sextus' two 
general modes of sceptical dissent (infinite regress and reciprocity) led, and as a 
solution to which, Aristotle, the Stoics, Ramus and his followers offered their 
purportedly reliable methods of verification and definition. 149 
Despite Nashe's account of Harvey's failure to notice the equivocation of his 
syllogism of the rat (or perhaps as a response to it), Harvey is concerned to 
distinguish between vain paradoxes which rely on restricted or unusual senses of 
terms and profitable paradoxes which indicate issues of justifiable scholarly 
contention. Harvey, like many who had written against the excessive verbal subtlety 
of the schoolmen's syllogisms, followed Ramus in the view that the controversies 
arising from religious disputes could be resolved if both parties employed simple 
fundamental definitions which were not rhetorically distorted to serve their 
respective polemical agendas. Unlike the sceptical critics of scholastic syllogistic, 
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however, Harvey merely advocates Ramus' simplification of Aristotelian dialectic 
by promoting the uncritical utilization of axioms and definitions in the construction 
of deductive arguments; he is not interested in undermining the ability of syllogism 
to generate true statements. 150 He recommends that: 
Reconciliation settle itselfe to examine matters barely, without their veales, 
or habiliments, according to the counsell of Marcus Aurelius: and to defme 
things simply, without any colours, or embellishments, according to the 
precepts of Aristotle and the examples of Ramus: and the most-endlesse 
altercations; being generally rather verb all, then realI, and more 
circumstantiall, then substantiall; will soon grow to an ende. 151 
It is no accident that his call for a return to reliable first principles and definitions 
cites the authority of three opponents of scepticism, the Stoic emperor, Marcus 
Aurelius, Aristotle and Ramus. Such a return to first principles also explains his 
submission of the individual conscience to the universal and irrefutable demands of 
Ramus' method of judgement. According to these demands, individuals could be 
assured that their ethical choices were taken upon sound and objective reasons which 
were verifiable in the clear light of the axioms and definitions from which they were 
deduced. Ramus' simplified Aristotelian logic provided the basis for such a 
doctrine, a doctrine which Donne would question implicitly in his defense of the 
individual conscience in Biathanatos. Harvey describes the Ramistic basis of his 
doctrine of conscience, and warns against the dangers of exercising a 'priuate 
conscience', which, he suggests, can only lead to the lawless libertinism with which 
John Adams had charged Donne in Biathanatos. When the conscience encounters a 
problem, the agent must attempt to resolve it by analyzing it according to the 
principles which most properly govern it. He must be 'in diuinitie ruled by 
Diuinitie, in law, by Law, in art, by Art, in reason, by Reason, in experience, by 
Experience.' 152 This Ramist approach to the resolution of ethical problems reveals 
how syllogistic judgement operates in the exercise of what Harvey calls the 
'publique Conscience'. The necessary point of departure for this operation is the 
uncritical acceptance of the primary definitions governing particular ethical 
decisions, which may, in turn, be resolved by referring the action in question to its 
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relevant definition in the manner of a minor premise to a major in a syllogistic 
analysis. This process of syllogistic analysis in ethical decisions is not to be 
employed for the destruction or qualification of these primary defmitions; for 
Harvey, we will see, such attempts bear the mark of the libertine, the innovator and 
the vain paradoxist. 
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Chapter IV 
The Epistemological Limits of Paradox 
1 
Harvey's Defense of the Profitable Paradox 
As we have seen, Harvey is careful to distinguish between the profitable and 
the contentious paradox; the bulk of his attack on N ashe in Pierce's Supererogation 
is comprised of accusations of the latter. Even less tolerant of contentious paradoxes 
than Harvey, Nashe denied the apparent clarification which the dialectical method of 
Ramistic analysis claimed to provide not only in its application to the arts and 
sciences, but also to the more serious ethical disputations concerning right 
government. While Harvey could praise the pro and contra debate of serious 
paradoxes of the 'best gouernment of Commonwealthes', Nashe condemned any 
debate conducted according to the principles of Ram is tic analysis for being 
misleadingly simplistic and unable to yield the 'detenninate conclusions' which only 
the unabridged and faithful use of Aristotelian logic could discover. Again, Nashe 
gives no example of how such use of Aristotelian logic functions, and as a result, his 
uncritical confidence in the truth of its proofs draws a striking, and certainly 
unwelcome, resemblance to Ramus himself. As we have seen, it was left to 
traditional Aristotelians such as Thomas Blundeville to reassert the principles of 
such a logic in the wake of Ramus' critique. After criticizing the 'Epitomes' and 
'abbreuiations of Arts' from which he would claim Harvey had been taught in Have 
with Yov to Saffron-Walden, Nashe attacks those who submit the arts, sciences and 
ethics to Ramus' facile analytical method. 
Even so these men, oppressed with a greater penurie of Art, doe pound their 
capacitie in barren compendiums, and bound their base humours in the 
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beggarlie straites of a hungry Analysis .. . How is it then such bungling 
practitioners in principles should euer profit the Common-wealth by their 
negligent paines, who haue no more cunning in Logicke or dialogue / Latine 
then appertaines to the literall construction of either?l 
Harvey found Nashe's presumption to a fuller knowledge of the complexities of 
disputation than such influential and scholarly controversialists as Talon and Ramus 
objectionable, and voiced his objections in his ironic commendation ofNashe's 
acumen in debate. After cataloguing the players in the great philosophical conflicts 
from the 'Old Philosophers' to Aristotle to Ramus, and admitting sarcastically that 
before he had seen Nashe, he had vainly 'floted in a sea of encountring waues; and 
deuoured many famous confutations', Harvey suggests the source of his adversary's 
power to expose the triviality ofthese once revered conflicts. 
But alas silly men, simple Aristotle, more simple Ramus, most simple the 
rest, either ye neuer knew, what a sharpe-edged, & cutting Confutation 
meant: or the date of your stale oppositions is expired, by this braue 
Columbus of tearmes, and this onely marchant venturer of quarrels; that 
detecteth new Indies of Inuention, & [like Odysseus] hath the winds of 
Aeolus at commaundment.2 
Nashe's power both to dispense with the 'stale oppositions' of the philosophers and 
to succeed in his own dispute with Harvey relies on a utilization ofthe resources of 
invention which is unbridled by the principles of its partner in dialectic, dispositio. 
Without this governance, consistent usage of terms cannot be determined and 
paradoxical arguments which parody proper syllogistic procedure, such as Nashe's 
of the reasonable rat and Donne's ofthe reasonable woman, may be shamelessly 
advanced. 
Echoing Isocrates' complaints in the Helen against the vanity of the sophists, 
Harvey continues to attribute Nashe's contentiousness to an invention unchastened 
by the rigorous judgement of dispositio. 'The Arte of figges, had euer a dapper witt, 
a deft conceite, a flick forhead, a smugg countenaunce; a stinginge tongue; a nipping 
hande; a bytinge penne; and a bottomlesse pitt of Inuention, stoared with neuer-
fayling shiftes of counterfeite crankes'.3 Isocrates had said that 'on trifling and 
insignificant topics whatever the speaker may chance to say is entirely original'. 
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The sophists believe that 'if they can speak ably on ignoble subjects, it follows that 
in dealing with subjects of real worth they would easily find abundance of 
arguments. ,4 Harvey's association ofNashe and the sophists not only places Nashe 
in the company ofIsocrates 'verbal quibblers' who argue paradoxical theses such as 
Gorgias' in On What is Not, but also distinguishes him from those 'vniversallest 
schollars' who, in their recognition of the elusiveness of demonstrable truth, have 
humbly praised the ignorance of the ass. 5 Harvey promises throughout Pierce's 
Supererogation that he, himself, will formally undertake to praise the ass, and write 
an encomium ofNashe, but he will defer the project to give point to his final affront, 
that only Nashe himself, the 'Autor of Asses' and the 'Asse of Autors' is competent 
to execute the task adequately.6 The joke is, of course, that Nashe's competence 
consists in his ignorance. Not only is Nashe ignorant of those subjects of which he 
professes to be expert, but in his arrogant profession of knowledge, he betrays his 
ignorance even of his own ignorance. He is like 'the Greeke Sophisters [who] 
knowing nothing in comparison [to Aesop], (knowledge is dry water) professed a 
skill in all things' and unlike 'Socrates [who] in a manner knew all things, (Socrates 
was a springing rocke) professed a skill in nothinge', like 'Lullius, and his sectaryes, 
[who] haue the signet of Hermes, and the admirable Arte of disputinge infinitly de 
omni scibili' and unlike 'Agrippa, one of the vniversallest schollars, that Europe hath 
yeelded'.7 
It is important to recognize that Harvey is not advocating the virtues of the 
scepticism traditionally associated with Socrates and with Cornelius Agrippa's 
Vanity a/the Arts and Sciences (1526). His defense of his intention to praise the 
ignorance ofNashe by citing the examples of famous wise men who have also 
praised ignorance is designed to emphasize the genuine knowledge ofthose who 
recognize the limits of their understanding and the genuine ignorance of those who 
claim a knowledge of all things. Hence, Socrates is said to know 'in a manner all 
things' and Agrippa is called the 'Omniscious Doctour'. The sophists and the 
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Lullists represent perversions of the legitimate pursuit of knowledge, the sophists by 
preparing the way for the abject scepticism ofthe Pyrrhonists and the followers of 
Raymond Lull by claiming to realize a rational certitude in spiritual inquiries which 
threatened the necessity of faith. Harvey's Ramism would not permit him to 
recognize the extensiveness of Socrates' sceptical critique as Cicero had, nor the 
attack of Agrippa's Vanity upon scholastic syllogistic. Though he takes comfort in 
the knowledge that a scholar as renowned as Agrippa could 'penneth the Apology of 
the Asse' as an epilogue to his learned Vanity, he will ignore its denial of syllogistic 
proof. Agrippa had said of the Schoolmen that 'they suppose that they can find out 
the truth, and falsehood of al things, by a certain infallible Demonstration (as they 
think,) that is, with a Syllogism, that is, a perfect argumente'. 8 The principles from 
which these syllogisms proceed must either be accepted upon the 'forepassed 
authority of the wise ... or els with experience we allowe them by the senses.'9 As 
Agrippa's own use of the views and examples of prominent figures from the past 
illustrates, a consensus of historical opinion could be found to support any assertion 
and could easily be manipulated to serve specific polemical ends. As evidence for 
the universal truth of a first principle, the wisdom ofthe ancients was insufficient, a 
point which we have seen Harvey would have been reluctant to concede. Needless 
to say, sceptical objections to inductively grounded first principles would have been 
abundantly familiar to Harvey, but he does not marshal these objections in behalf of 
his discussion of the virtues of ignorance because his interest lies not in showing that 
sceptical forms such as paradox further the ends of sceptical or dogmatic 
epistemologies, but in showing that they may assist in the clarification of genuinely 
contestable issues. 
2 
'Sawcie' Paradoxes and Occult Methods 
Despite his admiration for Ramus' scholarship, Harvey's position with 
regard to paradox is akin to Donne's. Donne can as easily disparage the proud 
rationalist who asserts the power of the human mind to know all with certainty as 
174 
Harvey; and, as we will see when we examine Biathanatos in detail, he can also 
acknowledge the benefit of arguing the 'pregnant paradoxes' which Harvey valued 
so highly. In his praise of the 'right Asse', which is so termed to distinguish it from 
the type of ignorance represented by Nashe's asininity, Harvey locates himself on 
the middle ground between the fideist scepticism of fellow advocates of ignorance 
such as Agrippa, Erasmus, and Lando, and the logical dogmatism of the Stoics, 
Lullists and the Schoolmen. He can suggest the wondrous combination of contraries 
characteristic of the mystical paradoxes when he claims that he 'that can play the 
right Asse, .. .in pouerty [will find] wealth, in displeasure fauour, in ieoperdy 
security, in bondage freedome, in warre peace, in misery felicity.' But before all 
else, Harvey maintains, 'the right Asse, in ignorance will finde knowledge'.10 Donne 
describes this middle ground between omniscience and abject ignorance in the 
preface of The Courtier's Library, and as Nashe had in his description of Harvey's 
tutelage, explicitly associates the epitome and the paradox. 
Our lot is cast in an age in which open illiteracy is supremely disgraceful, full 
knowledge supremely rare; every one has a smattering of letters, no one a 
complete mastery of them. For the most part, then, men move along a 
middle way, and in their efforts to shun the disgrace of ignorance and to save 
themselves the tedium of reading they all use one art that they may keep up 
the appearance of knowing the rest ofthe arts. Hence the taste for epitomes 
and paradoxes and for the itchy outbreaks of far-fetched wit. 11 
We wi111eam little about Donne's views on the issues debated by Harvey and Nashe 
from the low regard with which he held the epitome. As we have seen, Nashe had 
criticized such abbreviated methods of learning, but so had Fraunce in his Lawier 's 
Logike and the Earl of Essex in a letter to Fulke Greville. 12 Despite his appreciation 
for Ramus' contribution to scholarship, and Nashe's association of Ramism and 
epitomes, Harvey's undeniable erudition scarcely supports the suggestion that he 
approved the use of epitomes as a means of creating the appearance of learning. 13 
But like Donne, he recognized that paradoxes (as well as paradoxical 
encomia) are often composed to exhibit the apparent fullness of their author's 
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knowledge, a pretense which Harvey had condemned in the spirit ofIsocrates' attack 
on the sophists.14 Furthermore, both Donne and Harvey identify authors who have 
attempted comprehensive treatments of the various arts and sciences as either 
paradoxists themselves or as the inspiration for other paradoxists. Such 
comprehensive treatments naturally expose the incompatibilities of the various 
disciplines, incompatibilities which inevitably raise questions about the possibility of 
knowledge in the face of equally valid contradictory claims. As we have seen, 
questions of this type are implicit in any defense of a paradox as such, whether it 
seeks to show the impossibility (as with Gorgias' On What is Not and sophistical 
dialectic in general) or the possibility of certain proof (as with Stoic, scholastic, 
Lullist or Ramist syllogistic). Only moderate epistemological positions, such as 
Cicero's sceptical probabilism, recognize that 'paradox' is a relative term 
intrinsically bound to the realm of opinion. In this realm, where logic cannot 
absolutely and necessarily discriminate the true and the false, the paradox may 
appear orthodox, and vice versa; it is precisely this relativity that Cicero illustrates in 
his rhetorical transformation of the Stoic paradoxa. Harvey is warning against the 
invidiousness of such relativity, and the temptation to eradicate it through innovative 
methods of inquiry, when he says: 
Agrippa, Cardan, Trithemius, Erasmus, and diuers other notable Schollar, 
affecting to shew the variety of their reading, and the omnisufficiencie of 
their learning, haue bene boulder in quoting such reuerend examples, vpon as 
light, or lighter occasion: but humanitie must not be too-sawcie with 
diuinitie: & enough is better then a Feast. 15 
The 'reuerend examples' to which Harvey refers are authors, such as the neoplatonist 
and reputed Latin translator of Hermes Trismegistus, Apuleius, who have written in 
praise of the admirable ignorance of the simple ass. 16 Such ambitious humanists 
such as Cornelius Agrippa, Girolamo Cardano, Johannes Trithemius and Erasmus, 
must be wary of upsetting the sensitive balance between Christian faith and reason 
when, in their critiques of learning, they expose the incompatibilities of the disparate 
faculties of human knowledge. They threaten the necessity of faith if they seek to 
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reconcile these incompatibilities according to a general logic discernible to human 
reason, and they threaten the rational powers required to furnish the conscience with 
the necessary ethical knowledge if they conclude, with Sextus, that such 
incompatibilities betray the inability of human reason to know anything whatsoever. 
Though Erasmus praises those who openly declare the failure of Aristotelian 
cognitive theory to conduce to knowledge of the divine because it makes the 
conceptual powers ofthe soul dependent upon the senses, he does not openly 
advocate the use of a novel cognitive system to acquire such knowledge. When he 
praises ignorance, he praises the Platonist who seeks with Augustine a knowledge of 
the divine through a contemplation of the purity of God's nature. Such knowledge, 
however, will be indemonstrable by the Aristotelian methods of the Schoolmen, and 
will consequently make those who claim to possess it appear mad to those stubborn 
rationalists who reject the power of faith to conduce to knowledge. In the Praise of 
Folly, he maintains that the 'pious strive with all their hearts to reach God himself, 
who is purest and simplest of all; this world takes second place, and even here they 
place most stress on what comes closest to him, namely the mind; they pay no 
attention to the body' .17 After condemning any manifestation of the corporeal 
affections (in the same spirit which would inform his neoplatonic disparagement of 
the material world in De Contemptu Mundi [1521]), which Aristotle had argued in 
the Nicomachean Ethics were merely to be moderated in the soul by the virtuous 
man, Erasmus asserts that if the pious 'are forced to deal with such [wordly] things, 
they do so with reluctance and aversion. ,18 Erasmus' position with regard to the 
syllogistic demonstrations of the scholastics was clearly hostile, as we will see 
shortly, but in spite of his criticisms, he did not advocate a novel alternate method of 
demonstration. 
It is precisely this claim to have introduced an innovation in learning which 
led Nashe to reject 'upstart reformers of Arts' such as Ramus who seek no more than 
'to haue newe opinions passe under their names' .19 As we have seen, the debate 
between Harvey and Nashe over the utility of paradox centered on the legitimacy of 
contention. In Christ's Tears Over Jerusalem (1593), which was a warning against 
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the mounting irreligiousness of the age, Nashe had called contention 'the fift Sonne 
of Pryde' . He then proceeds to attribute to this son of pride the same sophistical 
techniques against which Aristotle and English Aristotelians such as Wilson, Lever 
and Blundeville wrote in their respective logics' sections on sophistical refutations. 
'On words, amphibologies, aequivocations, quiddities and quantities, he stands. Hee 
hunteth not aftertruth but strife. ,20 These contentious sophists, Nashe complains, are 
ever at work in the interest of paradox. Some seek only novelty, to 'be different in 
paradoxism from all the world ... [by arguing] philosophicall probabilities ofthe 
Trinities unexistence'; but there are others, much more dangerous than these mere 
quibblers, who, on the authority of 'prophane Authors', maintain that 'damnable 
paradoxe', that God does not exist.21 For Nashe, the paradoxist could never aspire to 
more than the illusory subtlety and vain novelty for which Isocrates had condemned 
Gorgias, Melissus, Zeno (ofElea), Antisthenes andProtagoras. 22 Their theses, as 
Aristotle had stated in the Topics, were specifically philosophical undertakings, 
which Nashe, translating Cicero's Latin for theses, quaestiones, had complained 
were of no use to virtue. Speaking specifically of theses regarding the soul, he says, 
'Innumerable such unnecessary questions, according to Philosophy, are made as 
touching the soul, as whence it is, what maner of one it is, when it doth begin to 
be ... what do al these things auaile unto virtue?,23 As we have seen, while Harvey 
valued the utility of paradoxes argued upon genuinely controv.ersial issues, he also 
recognized the danger of unnecessary contention. Despite Nashe's complaints 
against innovators, Harvey singles him out as both an innovator ('brave Columbus of 
tearmes') and a vain quibbler {'marchant venturer of quarrels ').24 In the context of 
such a bitter quarrel, it is not surprising that each side describes the arguments of the 
other as paradoxical; what must recognized, however, is the consistent association of 
the dangerous innovator and the paradox.25 The other three names in Harvey's list of 
'notable Schollar[ s]', Agrippa, Cardano and Trithemius, had, like Erasmus, earned 
the esteem of their contemporaries for the breadth oftheir learning. They exceeded 
Erasmus' pious neoplatonism and his humanist confidence in the perfectability of 
the Christian awakened to the harmony of God's creation through faithful 
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contemplation and grace, however. Each had advocated the use of alternative, occult 
methods of discovering the truths which had eluded the traditional scholastic 
demonstrations so widely criticized in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 
In his Commentaries on the Four Books of Ptolemy's 'Books Concerning 
judgements o/the Stars J (1555), Cardano had asserted the reliability of astrological 
divination; so confident was he that such divination could provide the key to 
understanding the natures of earthly creatures that he provided a horoscope of Christ. 
Needless to say, to subject the divine nature of Christ to astrological influence was 
for Harvey to 'be too-sawcie with diuinitie', despite Cardano's disclaimer stating 
that he would not be understood 'to say that either the divinity in Christ, or His 
Miracles, or the sanctity of His life, or His promulgation of the law depends on the 
stars' .26 The renowned humanist monk, Johannes Trithemius, had also earned a 
reputation for innovation when he approved the conjuration of spirits in his work on 
steganography, Steganographia (1499). Though Trithemius, as Cardano had in his 
defense of astrology, maintained that the art of steganography (a form of cryptic 
writing) was a natural process, which involved none ofthe instruments of black 
magic, his work on the subject was condemned for providing a guide to the 
acquisition of forbidden knowledge.27 Describing his reaction after reading a 
manuscript ofthe Steganographia in a visit to Trithemius in 1503 or 1504, the 
French philosopher, Charles de Bouelles, said, 'I instantly cast it away out of my 
sight, because such wonders and unintelligible and unaccustomed names of spirits 
(should I not rather say demons?) began to terrify me. ,28 Bouelles, who had devoted 
himself to the reclamation of Aristotelian logic from the muddled and sophistical 
abuse of the scholastics, uses terms which we have by now become accustomed to 
hearing attributed to paradoxists; not only was Bouelles accusing Trithemius of new 
and dangerous doctrine, as Nashe was accusing Ramus, but more fundamentally, he 
was accusing him of claiming access to a knowledge of startling truths by a means 
hidden from natural reason. Bouelle's intention to rid the pursuit of knowledge 
from the confusion into which scholastic logic had led it, and his subsequent mistrust 
of wondrous and unintelligible names with correspondingly mysterious 
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significations, did not, however, exclude Trithemius from criticizing scholastic 
logicians for precisely the same reason. Despite his admiration for the 'simple 
eloquence' of medieval scholastics such as Nicholas of Lyra, which he contrasts to 
the merely rhetorical eloquence of the neociceronians, Trithemius can still object to 
Peter Abelard's introduction of 'curious novelty of words and meanings' into 
theological discourse.29 The source of both Trithemius' and Bouelle's criticisms is 
the same dissatisfaction with the rational instruments currently utilized by 
philosophers and theologians alike. Trithemius' sought a solution in the logic of 
magical arts such as steganography, a logic akin to the Cabalistic logic practiced by 
his contemporaries, Pico, Paracelsus, Francis George and his teacher of Hebrew, 
Johann Reuchlin.30 Bouelles' implication of the demonic paradox of Trithemius' 
epistemological innovations issues from his preference for the neoaristotelian logic 
of Raymond Lull, of whom he wrote the first biography in 1511.31 As we will see 
shortly, Lull's own innovations in his new logic focus on the same issue with which 
paradoxists since Gorgias had been concerned, the demonstrability of knowledge. 
3 
The Paradoxist as Innovator 
In The Courtier's Library, Donne cites authors who have exposed the 
contradictions and inconsistencies of the body of human learning as the inspirations 
for those frivolous paradoxists who represent the'mentally lazy [who] think they 
know enough if they can show credibly that other people's knowledge is 
imperfect. ,32 He cites Lull, Frisius Gemma, Raimond Sebond, Sextus Empiricus, 
Trithemius, Agrippa, Erasmus and Ramus, all of whom have attempted either to 
exalt (Lull, Gemma, Sebond, Trithemius, Ramus) or to deprecate (Sextus) the 
powers of human reason, or in some cases both (Erasmus, Agrippa). What 
distinguishes these authors is not that they have written paradoxes (though Erasmus' 
Praise of Folly and Agrippa's 'Digression in Praise of the Ass' have been described 
as such), but that they have advocated innovative positions which, in the spirit of 
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Nashe's criticism of Ramus, could be condemned for their paradoxicality.33 Donne's 
satire against the Jesuits, Ignatius His Conclave (1610), made innovation the chief 
criterion for entrance into hell; 'the entrance into this place may be decreed to none, 
but to Innovators' .34 Copernicus, whose heliocentric theory was described by 
Blundeville as a paradoxical 'position' (thesis), was denied access to hell because he 
has no response to Ignatius' question, 'what new thing have you invented?,35 So too 
is Paracelsus dismissed because he does not 'truly deserve the name of Innovator'.36 
In his description of Harvey's imagined innovative and paradoxical studies while at 
Saffron-Walden, Nashe places Copernicus in the tradition of those philosophers who 
have hampered the progress ofleaming with their 'unnecessary questions' using, 
significantly, the same verb which Donne used to describe the exposure of his own 
paradoxes in his letter accompanying the copies ofthem which he sent to Wotton. 
Harvey, says Nashe, may be spending his time 'hatching such another Paradoxe as 
that of Nichola us Copernicus was, who held that the Sun remains immoueable in the 
center of the World & that the Earth is moou'd about the Sunne'.37 It is Nashe's 
conservative Aristotelianism which places him at odds both with Ramus and with 
Copernicus. Though a rejection of the heliocentric theory naturally implies a 
preference for Ptolemy, neoplatonists such as Giordano Bruno defended Copernican 
theory as evidence for a divinely ordered universe which Aristotelian philosophy 
was not equipped to explain. As we have seen, Nashe was not sympathetic to 
Ramus' innovations to Aristotle despite his presence in Cambridge at a time when 
interest in Ramus was thriving. His conservatism would have been more welcome at 
the Oxford condemned in Bruno's Ash Wednesday Supper (1584), the Oxford 
concerned to salvage Aristotle from the obscurity into which scholastic theology had 
led it, and the Oxford from which Donne had matriculated in 1584.38 Though 
Donne's own spiritual allegiances may still have been Catholic at this early stage of 
his education, there can be little doubt that his Protestant teachers' insistence on a 
regimen of disputation, which placed authority in Aristotle alone, at the expense of 
his countless scholastic commentators, would have left its impression. In The 
History and Antiquities of the University of Oxford (1661-1668), Anthony a Wood 
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records a decree issued on March 12, 1585-6, which illustrates the commitment of 
Donne's instructors to restricting the theses (questions) to be disputed to matters 
which could be defended out of Aristotle or his conservative advocates. 
The 12 of the said month it was ordered for the future that all Bachelaurs and 
Undergraduats in their Disputations should lay aside their various Authors, 
such that caused many dissensions and strifes in the Schools, and only follow 
Aristotle and those that defend him, and take their Questions from him, and 
they exclude from the Schools all sterile and inane Questions, disagreeing 
from the antient and true Philosophy.39 
Just as Harvey had praised those paradoxes the disputation of which may benefit 
both commonwealth and church, so these Oxford dons condemn those detractors of 
Aristotle who unnecessarily obscure matters with 'sterile ... Questions' upon issues 
which are not recognized to be genuinely disputable by Aristotle.40 Even at 
Cambridge, Harvey's Ramism was criticized because Ramus was perceived to be 
undermining the authority of Aristotle. But neither Ramus nor Harvey intended to 
displace Aristotle. As we have seen in Ramus' argument against the paradoxical 
tradition deriving from Aristotle, and from Harvey's defense against the charge of 
maintaining a paradox against Aristotle, both insist upon their compliance with an 
orthodox Aristotelianism which has become obscured, not by the 'pregnant 
paradoxes' proposed by scholars such as Ramus as corrections to errors in the 
interpretation of Aristotle, but by the 'sterile Questions' of the sophistical and 
contentious Schoolmen who seek to secure their own authority by creating technical 
difficulties in logic which they claim are only soluble by them. 
Erasmus' view that divine knowledge could be acquired through the 
contemplation of the higher forms reflected in the individual soul betrayed a 
neoplatonic epistemology which could tolerate neither the irrelevant uncertainties 
nor the unsubstantiated certainties with which scholastic theology was occupied. 
Regarding the former, Erasmus anticipated the complaints ofNashe against the fifth 
son of pride, contention, its philosophers' 'unnecesary questions', and the dangers of 
paradox. The theologians, says Erasmus, armed with '<magistral definitions,> 
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conclusions, corollaries, explicit and implicit propositions ... many new terms [and] 
monstrous jargon', manufacture the same sort of unnecessary questions and then 
claim to be the only ones learned enough to resolve them.41 
Moreover, they explicate sacred mysteries just as arbitrarily as they please, 
explaining by what method the world was established and arranged, by what 
channels original sin is transmitted to Adam's posterity, by what means, by 
what proportion, in how short a time Christ was fully formed in the virgin's 
womb, how accidents subsist in the eucharist without any domicile. But such 
questions are run-of-the-mill. There are others which they think worthy of 
great and 'illuminated' theologians, as they say ... Whether there is any 
instant in the generation of the divine persons? Whether there is more than 
one filial relationship in Christ?42 
Regarding the unsubstantiated certainties which they offer as solutions to these 
questions, Erasmus accuses the schoolmen of concocting paradoxes as startling as 
the Stoic paradoxes rendered commonsensical by Cicero in the Paradoxa 
Stoiciorum. To illustrate this similarity, he chooses a paradoxical principle common 
both to the Stoics and to the scholastic theologians. 
Also throw in those sententiae of theirs, so paradoxical that those oracular 
sayings which the Stoics called paradoxes seem downright crude and 
commonplace by comparison-such as this, for example: it is a less serious 
crime to murder a thousand men than to fix one shoe for a poor man on the 
Lord's day; or it would be better to let the whole world be destroyed ... than 
to tell just one, tiny, little white lie.43 
As we have seen, Donne manipulated the senses of good and evil in his sixth and 
eighth paradoxes in a way which indicated his knowledge of the Stoic paradoxes of 
good and evil elaborated by Cicero.44 Erasmus dismisses the Stoic and scholastic 
paradox, that all transgressions are equal, on the grounds that it is a conclusion 
reached from fallacious premises which claim to have achieved a univocity in their 
critical terms by restricting the various possible senses of these terms. This apparent 
univocityis achieved through the 'new terms [and] monstrous jargon' in which 
Erasmus claims 'the supersubtleties of our doctors of theology' consist.45 We are 
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reminded, not accidentally, of Cicero's complaints in Tusculan Disputations and De 
Oratoria against the unusual senses of critical terms deployed in order to secure 
univocity in the demonstrations ofthe Stoic paradoxa.46 The association of Stoic 
and scholastic syllogistic, especially with respect to ethical choice, is significant in 
the context of Donne's argument against laws forbidding suicide which ground their 
universality and absoluteness in syllogistic demonstrations, as we will see when we 
examine his critique ofthe terms 'nature' and 'reason' in Biathanatos. 
In the heat of his condemnation of the scholastic theologians, Erasmus 
specifies this process of generating laws out of the conclusions of syllogistic 
demonstrations. 
At the same time, while they are talking nonsense in the schools, they think 
they are supporting the universal church, which otherwise would collapse, 
with their syllogistic props in much the same way that Atlas in the 
mythology of the poets, holds up the world on his shoulders. You can 
imagine how happy a life they lead while they distort and reshape Holy 
Scripture however they like (just as ifit were a lump of wax), while they 
demand that their conclusions (to which some schoolmen have subscribed) 
should be more revered than the laws of Solon and more binding than papal 
decretals.47 
Donne shares Erasmus' distaste for those who misapply and misinterpret the 
scriptures to support their unusual theological opinions.48 In Biathanatos, Donne 
devotes himself not only to a faithful, and therefore, accurate interpretation of the 
scripture's pronouncements concerning suicide, but more broadly, to elaborating the 
fundamental epistemological principles according to which the rectified Christian 
conscience was to operate in order to be assured that its ethical decisions were taken 
in charity. We will examine the essential role which knowledge plays in securing 
the charitableness of moral choices in the final sections of this study; for the present, 
however, it will suffice to say that Donne, like Erasmus, explicitly condemns the 
deployment of improbable interpretations of scripture in the service of contentious 
theological positions. In Biathanatos, Donne says: 
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If any small place of Scripture misappear to them to be of use for justifying 
any opinion of theirs, then (as the word of God hath that precious nature of 
gold, that a little quantity thereof, by reason of a faithful tenacity and 
ductileness, will be brought to cover ten thousand times as much of any other 
metal), they extend it so far, and labor and beat it to such a thinness as it is 
scarce any longer the word of God, only to give their other reasons a little 
tincture of gold, though they have lost all the weight and estimation.49 
It is significant that Donne condemns the practice of misapplying evidence in the 
defense ofa disputed opinion in the context of his own defense of the disputed 
opinion, that suicide is not always a sin; in so doing, he declares that the purpose of 
his paradox is neither to advance innovations designed to obscure the truth, which he 
denounced in Ignatius His Conclave, nor to 'show credibly that other people's 
knowledge is imperfect', which he rejected in his Courtier's Library. The purpose 
of his paradox, therefore, corresponds to that which Harvey had praised in Pierces 
Supererogation as beneficial both to the commonwealth and the church. 
In the preface to Biathanatos, Donne stated the principle which informs this 
purpose, the same principle, we have seen, which he claimed informed the benefits 
of discord in his ninth paradox. 50 'As in the pool of Bethsaida there was no health 
till the water was troubled, so the best way to find the truth in this matter was to 
debate and vex it-for we must as well dispute de veritate as pro veritate.,51 The 
'mUltiplicity of not necessary citations', which Donne admits that he has included in 
Biathanatos, is employed because he intends his thesis to reflect the learning upon 
which 'scholastic and artificial men' have typically grounded their own contested 
opinions. 52 To these men, Donne opposes 'natural men' who he claims 'are 
inclinable of themselves' to his position. We must be wary of suspecting Donne's 
sincerity in advocating the use of scholastic methods of disputation, especially in 
light of its survival in the curricula of both Cambridge and Oxford after humanists 
such as Valla, Fieino, Pico, Erasmus, and Agrippa had insisted on an 
epistemological system manifestly indebted to Christian neoplatonic idealism, which 
sought to expose the fallibility of the Aristotelian dialectic upon which scholastic 
epistemology was so firmly grounded.53 A glance at the divisions, distinctions and 
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parts (the trademark organizational features of scholastic argument) of the Devotions 
upon Emergent Occasio!ls, the Essays in Divinity, Pseudo-Martyr and the Sermons, 
remind us that, though Donne exhibited the influence of Platonic and Augustinian 
traditions in some areas of his thought (particularly those areas which lay outside 
what he believed to be the boundaries of human knowledge), his method of 
argumentation, and the confidence in the possibility of human reason's attainment to 
knowledge which attended it, remained decidedly Aristotelian.54 This allegiance to 
Aristotelian logic, particularly in the exercise of reason in ethics, is evident 
specifically in his preference for a Thomist rather than an Augustinian approach to 
the problem of knowledge and action in Biathanatos, but, as we have seen, it is also 
generally present in the sophistical manipulation of Aristotelian dialectic in the 
Paradoxes.55 Before we examine this preference in the thesis and paradox, 
Biathanatos, it remains to sketch the relevant logical and epistemological positions 
with which Donne associated the innovative and sceptical paradoxists which he 
condemned in Ignatius His Conclave and The Courtier's Library. 
4 
Donne and the Necessity of First Principles 
Donne included Ramus in his list of sources for paradoxists in The Courtier's 
Library because of his attempt to systematize all ofthe arts and sciences according 
to the general governing principles of his dialectical method. Had Harvey not been 
so impressed with Ramus' modifications, particularly with respect to the teaching of 
Ciceronian rhetoric and Aristotelian dialectic, he might have included him with 
Erasmus, Trithemius, Cardano and Agrippa in his list ofthose who have been 'too-
sawcie with diuinitie'. But despite the innovations reviled by Nashe, Ramus' 
dialectical method remained fundamentally Aristotelian, particularly with respect to 
the distinction he believed existed between the principles, definitions and 
distinctions of the various arts and sciences, and the particular objects over which 
they presided. Like Aristotle, Ramus' confidence in the certainty of his logic 
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remained restricted to its theoretical applications and therefore reserved an 
epistemological place for faith in the cognizance of the mysteries of both divine and 
earthly reality.56 Two and half centuries before him, Raymond Lull (c. 1233-c. 
1315), another of Donne's sources for those paradoxists who seek to 'show credibly 
that other people's knowledge is imperfect', made a similar attempt to modify 
Aristotelian logic's demonstrative power. As we will see, however, his innovations 
made substantially more comprehensive claims for the ability of the human mind to 
attain knowledge of the divine through a process of syllogistic reason alone. Harvey 
recognized the excesses of Lull's ambitions and associated it with the similarly 
excessive ambitions of the early sixteenth-century neoplatonic physician and 
alchemist, Paracelsus (1493-1541). In an apostrophe intended simultaneously to 
affirm the orthodoxy of his humility with respect to the limits of human knowledge 
and the dangerous heterodoxy of those (i.e. Lull and Paracelsus) who propose an 
epistemological system which promises a knowledge ofthe divine, Harvey declares, 
'0 Humanity, my Lullius, or 0 Divinitie, my Paracelsus. ,57 Keen as he is to 
associate Harvey with paradoxical doctrines such as Ramus', Nashe does not miss 
the opportunity to invert the intention of Harvey's apostrophe by paraphrasing it as a 
declaration of his allegiance to Lull and Paracelsus. Nashe says, '0 Humanitie, my 
Lullius, and Diuinitie, my Paracelsus ... As much to say as all the humanitie he 
[Harvey] hath is gathered out of Lullius, and all his diuinitie or religion out of 
Paracelsus. ,58 As we have seen, Donne made Paracelsus, along with Copernicus and 
Machiavelli, plead for a place in deepest hell with Ignatius Loyola on the grounds 
that he was a genuine innovator intent on obscuring, rather than illuminating, the 
truth. And though his ultimate dismissal from hell may indicate some sympathy 
with his ideas, Donne's epistemological position with regard to the rational 
accessibility ofthe divine mysteries remained faithful to an Aristote1ianism which 
his model in ethics,·Aquinas, would insist provides only for a rationally based 
knowledge of the first principles of nature, and valid deductions from them.59 
Paracelsus embraced a mystical epistemology which claimed that our 
knowledge ofthe natural world relied on our knowledge of ourselves as organic 
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participants in the natural world as a whole, and similarly, that our knowledge of 
God relied on our knowledge of ourselves as organic participants in the divine world 
as a whole. An individual's knowledge, therefore, increases with his ability to 
recognize the general fonns of nature and ofthe divine as reflected in himself 
Paracelsus' account of the way in which humans acquire knowledge is typically 
neoplatonic in its utilization of the doctrine of Ideas and typically mystical in its 
affinnation of rational access to the divine. As we will see when we examine 
Erasmus' and Ortensio Lando's insistence on the individual's contemplation of its 
soul's divine qualities as the means through which to gain access to mystical 
knowledge, neoplatonic epistemology's attempt to establish intercourse between the 
separated Ideas and the human mind does not include the development of a logic 
designed to adjudicate absolutely between contradictory claims. Platonic dialectic, 
as Archesilaus, Carneades and Cicero had developed it, was a means to demonstrate 
the uncertainty of Stoic syllogistic by attacking its first principles. Because these 
first principles could not, themselves, be known, no particular deductions from them 
could ever be absolutely affinned or denied. The solution to this problem for 
Christian neoplatonists was to adapt Plato's theory ofIdeas, which provided a 
mechanism by which the mind could perceive (though not perfectly according to 
Plato) absolutes corresponding to the first principles of both Stoic and Aristotelian 
dialectic, to the notion of a divinely imposed natural order revealed in its shadowy 
and figurative manifestation in the phenomenal world. 60 Such an adaptation could be 
dangerous, however, because the source and content of human knowledge acquired 
in this way is ultimately divine, and as Aristotle knew, not confinnable with 
reference to the laws of the natural world alone. 61 In the natural world, confinnation 
is achieved through the logical process of definition and deduction; recalling 
Aristotle's acknowledgement ofthe uncertainty and indemonstrability of definitions 
in the Posterior Analytics, it is not surprising that he identifies as the source of 
Plato's mistaken theory ofIdeas his 'inquiries in the region of definitory fonnulae' .62 
If it is necessary to have knowledge ofthe definitions from which we derive 
knowledge ofthe particular things which fall under those definitions, it is essential, 
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Aristotle argues, that our minds can gain access to these definitions. Because 
Aristotle places the source of knowledge ofthe universal genera and species in the 
particular sensible objects of which they are predicable, he explains that the debate 
over Platonic Ideas must ultimately focus on how they can be both separated from 
the sensible world and yet permit the participation of sensible objects in them, a 
participation, it must be said, which defines what the perceived sensible object is. In 
the introduction to his rej ection of the theory of Ideas in the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
says: 
Above all one might discuss the question what on earth the Forms contribute 
to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into 
being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor any change in 
them. But again they help in no way towards the knowledge of the other 
things (for they are not even the substance ofthese, else they would have 
been in them), nor towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which 
share in them ... 63 
For Aristotle, the definition of a genus or species must be derived from our 
observation of its causal influence on the function or nature of various particular 
substances united in kind under it; a definition derived in this way cannot exist 
separate from the substances in which it is recognized. It is this separation which 
necessitates the explanation that substances 'share' in the Ideas as particular sensible 
manifestations of imperceptible patterns. Aristotle rejects this explanation in much 
the same terms in which Donne will reject the interpretive practices of allegorists 
who take liberties with the literal meaning of a scriptural text in search of what they 
imagine to be its hidden, spiritual meaning. Aristotle says, 'And to say that they [the 
Ideas] are the patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and 
poetical metaphors.,64 Summarizing the Socratic basis of Plato's theory of Ideas, 
Aristotle confirms that Plato's mistake was the separation of definitions from their 
particulars. 
And Socrates gave the impulse to this theory [that sensible particulars were 
in a state of flux and that the universal was apart from these and different], as 
we said before, by means of his definitions, but he did not separate them 
from the particulars; and in this he thought rightly, in not separating them. 
This is plain from the results; for without the universal it is not possible to 
get knowledge, but the separation is the cause ofthe objections that arise 
with regard to the Ideas.65 
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Though Donne is referring specifically to Paracelsus' brutal medical experiments, 
his condemnation of the Paracelsian art, an art which does not operate according to 
first principles which are accepted as certain and proper to it, reminds us of Ramus , 
insistence upon the certainty of the definitions of the first principles of the arts and 
sciences. Defending his fitness for acceptance into deepest hell, Paracelsus explains, 
'This also was ever my principal purpose, that no certain new Art, nor fixed rules 
[canones certos] might be established, but that al remedies might be dangerously 
drawne from my uncertaine, ragged, and unperfect experiments' .66 As we have seen, 
Ramus had eliminated the potential for uncertainty in Aristotle's notion of the 
definition, rendering it as certain as the axiom. Nonetheless, his desire to establish 
the certainty ofthe first principles of the arts and sciences was a particularly 
Aristotelian impulse, and one which traditional, pre-Ramist Aristotelians such as 
Ralph Lever, shared.67 The threat, as usual, is vain contention and scepticism. Lever 
explains as would the Ramist, Abraham Fraunce, nearly forty years later: 
Ther are rules in euery arte, which authors use as groundes and sure 
principles, riot to be denyed or doubted of 
For ifnothing shoulde be c1eare and certaine of it selfe: then should 
we be driuen by wranglers from point to point, to make reason uppon reason 
infinitely, and neuer come to issue of any matter. 
Therefore hath God appoynted some things to be euident and certaine 
of themselves, that they mighte be as stayes to mans wit, and as helpes to 
fynde out and to discusse things that are not so euident as they are.68 
Paracelsus' obstruction of the establishment of first principles in the art of medicine 
created the uncertain atmosphere necessary for him to introduce his alchemical 
innovations, his paradoxes. It is this obstruction which Donne condemns; and it is 
this condemnation which places him in the company of those Aristotelians who 
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sought to establish first principles from which valid deductions could confidently be 
drawn, but which did not promise rational access, either Platonic or syllogistic, to 
divine mysteries.69 
5 
Lull's Neoplatonic First Principles 
Raymond Lull also recognized the importance of establishing first principles 
from which valid deductions concerning the various arts and sciences could be 
drawn. He sought, as did his scholastic contemporaries Duns Scotus (c.1266-1308) 
and William of Ockham (c.1285-1349), a solution to the problem of correspondence 
between universals (i.e. Ideas, genus, species) and the particular objects of which 
they are predicable.70 Unlike neoplatonist critics of Aristotelian logic such as 
Agrippa, Lull's attempt to establish a real correspondence between the universals 
constituting the divine order conceived in the infinite, eternal and immutable 
intellect of God, and their manifestation in the particulars which we perceive in 
sensible substances, did not dispense with Aristotle's logical distinctions. Thus, 
when Lull describes the principles on which the various arts and sciences are 
organized, he can do so in the same Aristotelian terms in which Ramus, Lever and 
Donne conceived them. He says: 
Chaque science a ses principes propres qui different des principes des autres 
sciences; aussi l'intelligence desire-t-elle et reclame-t-elle la constitution 
d'une science qui soit general a l'egard de toutes les autres sciences, d'une 
science dotee de principes generaux en lesquels les principes des autres 
sciences particulieres soient impliques et contenus comme Ie particulier l'est 
en l'universel. 71 
Lull's project, like Ramus', was to establish a syllogistic which could proceed from 
first principles to particular conclusions without having to admit the possibility that 
its first principles may not be self-evident, and therefore, in need of demonstration. 
Though the method which Lull introduced in his extensive writing on his new logic 
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and its application to all other disciplines, verified its first principles in a way 
specifically indebted to Anselm's ontological argument, its position on the status of 
fundamental definitions is no different than the Stoics' on their unprovables, the 
Aristotelian schoolmen on their first principles, and Ramus on his definitions and 
distributions; none will allow the possibility of a thesis to be advanced which may 
validly contradict these fundamental truths. As always, the concern is to eliminate 
the invidious doubt which spreads as the sceptical critique inspects the purported 
certainty of un demonstrated principles from which necessary conclusions are 
supposed to be inferred.72 
As all sixteenth-century defenders of Aristotelian dialectic knew, the 
exposure of such doubt was the special aim of those paradoxists who sought to 
expose the fallibility of logic by attempting to construct a syllogism which reaches a 
conclusion which appears to contradict one or both of its premises, or which may be 
validly contradicted by another syllogism. As we will see, Harvey considered the 
supposed French paradox The Mirrour of Madness to be just such a paradox, and 
describes it, in terms reminiscent of Wilson's description of 'the libertines reason', 
as 'stuffed with geere homely enough, fit for a Libertine & frantique Theame'.73 The 
Stoic paradoxes, as well as those Christian paradoxes which must be accepted as 
certain on faith, pose no such threat to the power of syllogistic reasoning to generate 
certain knowledge. The threat is only introduced when the sceptic begins the 
process of regress or reciprocity in his investigation of the grounds upon which the 
Stoic paradoxes are based or when the excessively rational Christian apologist 
attempts to provide logical demonstrations of the Christian paradoxes. Lull's Ars 
generalis ultima (1308), like the rest of his vast writings on his logica nova and its 
wondrous applications, made such an attempt to provide logical demonstrations for 
the mysteries of the Christian paradoxes.74 Like Ramus, Lull denied the possibility 
of insoluble contradiction and attributed the existence of apparent paradoxes to the 
failure of the current scholastic use of Aristotelian logic. He explains: 
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Si quelqu'un dit: Les objections que l'on peut faire contre la foi peuvent etre 
resolues par raisons necessaires, et les preuves que l'on puet donner en faveur 
de la foi peuvent etre egalement brisees par raisons necessaires, nous 
reprondrons: Cela implique une contradiction qui ne saurait tenir sur Ie meme 
sujet, deux conclusions contraires ne peuvent tenir en meme temps.75 
With his new logic, all such contradictions could be resolved, thereby rendering all 
formerly inaccessible knowledge accessible to human reason. 
Like Ramus' dialectic, Lull's new logic represented the general organizing 
principles underlying all of the other arts and sciences, including most significantly, 
divinity. In divinity, the new logic conveyed its practitioner out of the realm of 
opinion (doxa), and therefore of paradox, by providing him with a new mode of 
syllogistic demonstration with which the mere verisimilitudes, which traditionally 
occupied the middle terms of syllogistic demonstrations, could be predicated of their 
corresponding extreme terms with absolute certainty. In the Ars generalis ultima, 
Lull says, 'Logicus [traditional logic] non potest inuenire ueram legem; generalis 
autem artista cum ista Arte inuenit. Nam illa lex est uera, quam principia et regulae 
huius / Artis intrare possunt. ,76 The principles and rules ofthe grand art could be 
utilized to discover the truth (in this case of a law, but generally of any proposition) 
through a type of syllogistic demonstration which claimed the power to convert its 
extreme terms with its middle term. Lull was aware of the problem of paradox 
discussed by Aristotle in the Topics, and that the theses argued by Gorgias, Melissus 
and Parmenides could equally be proven or refuted using traditional syllogistic. In 
response to this problem, he sought to replace such demonstrations, which result 
only in mutable opinions (scientia instabilis siue labilis), with what he called the 
demonstratio per aequiparantiam, or the demonstration by equality.77 The 
demonstration by equality operates within the normal three-term structure of a 
syllogism, but, as we have said, claims to achieve an absolute identification of the 
extreme terms through the middle term rather than a simple attribution of a common 
predicate (middle term) to the extreme terms. Lull claims that such attributions are 
always susceptible to doubt because the middle term in which the likeness is 
supposed to be contained is not itself clearly and absolutely known. The doubt 
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arising from this hazy perception of the middle term permits the possibility of a 
conflation of contrary or contradictory senses which result in paradoxes such as 
Wilson's libertine paradox (that sin is natural), as well as Lyly's and Donne's of 
constancy. Like Ramus, Lull prevents the possibility of paradox by restricting the 
meanings of his eighteen most fundamental principles through which all questions of 
the arts and sciences can be resolved. The result is a definition of each principle 
which can be deployed in a demonstration by equality that shows the essential 
interrelatedness of all inquiry and the subsequent certainty with which questions may 
be resolved according to Lull's first principles. 
As Ramus eliminates the potentially uncertain definitions which Aristotle 
retained in his discussion of theses in the Posterior Analysties, Lull similarly 
restricts definitions to clear and certain statements. In the Logiea Nova (1303), Lull 
says of the definition, 'Definitio est oratio, Esse proprietatum definiti aperiens, 
reetis brevibus, ae dilucidis verbis.'78 From the definitions of the fundamental 
principles ofthe two figures, a demonstration by equality may proceed. Though 
there are three modes according to which such a demonstration may operate, they all 
insist on an equality of the terms of the fundamental principles, which results 
ultimately in an identification of all the fundamental terms. In Lull's examples of 
how the demonstratio per aequiparantiam functions, the fundamental principle 
which occupies the major premise of the syllogism defines the middle term 
absolutely by restricting its denotation to its superlative class. Hence, when Lull 
proposes as a first premise, 'Ubieumque sit infinita bonitas et infinitus intelleetus est 
infinita aequalitas', he not only identifies goodness with understanding, but restricts 
this identification to the supreme forms of goodness and understanding, thus 
insuring an equality of degree in the terms compared.79 This equality of degree is 
expressed in the extreme term of the first premise, infinite equality. Following the 
principles of Anselm's ontological argument which asserts the reality of God as that 
'than which nothing greater can be conceived', Lull may then proceed to his minor 
premise, which states, 'Sed in Deus est infinita bonitas et infinitus intelleetus.'8o 
From the two premises his conclusion that infinite equality is in God follows. 
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Though the syllogistic fonn of Lull's argument betrays the scholastic context in 
which he conceived his new logic, his utilization of a metaphysical scheme which 
makes the divine attributes (what he called the Dignities) convertible reveals his 
preference for the neoplatonic epistemology which will infonn the cognitive systems 
of fifteenth and sixteenth-century humanists such as Ficino, Pico, Erasmus and 
Agrippa, as well as the critic of the sterile Aristotelian logic of Donne's Oxford, 
Giordano Bruno.s1 For Lull, the acquisition of knowledge consists in recognizing 
the degree of the divine attributes (e.g. goodness, understanding) in the objects of 
both the natural and the supernatural world, and then reasoning according to the 
degree in the manner of his syllogism concerning God's goodness, understanding 
and equality. What verifies such demonstrations are not the Aristotelian definitions 
which have given rise to contention and paradox, but a vision of Platonic unity 
which provides a knowledge of the essences of the divine attributes, a knowledge so 
absolute that Lullian syllogisms, like their Ramist counterparts, can claim the means 
to establish clear and certain connections between their middle and extreme tenns. 
With such connections established, the ambiguity necessary to allow Donne to 
conclude in his eleventh paradox that women have most reason is eliminated, and 
with it, the possibility of paradox. 
6 
Donne's Parody of the Superlative 
Though it is impossible to say whether Donne was referring specifically to 
Lull's demonstratio per aequiparantiam or generally to Aristotle's principles of 
relatives and conversion, it should be recognized that Donne's use of the superlative 
to create the illusion of a distributed and univocal middle tenn in the Paradoxes is 
not limited to his eleventh paradox. In his first paradox, 'That all things kill 
themselves', Donne manipulates Aristotle's notions of the final cause and the golden 
mean to create a valid syllogism which purports to demonstrate that it is, in some 
195 
sense, natural that 'all travaile to ther owne Death' .82 In the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
establishes the role of the final cause as the defining principle ofthe end toward 
which a thing strives. Arguing that actuality is prior to potentiality in substance, 
terms which Lull believes express the reciprocal, and therefore convertible, 
relationship of cause and effect, Aristotle explains: 
Because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end. 
For that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is 
for the sake of the end; and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of 
this that the potentiality is acquired. 83 
Later in the Metaphysics, Aristotle describes the ultimate end to which a thing 
strives as its good.84 As Cicero acknowledges in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, Aristotle 
observes that what actually constitutes the good both with respect to individuals and 
to the universal order of all things is an issue upon which many have held divergent 
views. Significantly, Aristotle calls those views which maintain that the good is not 
to be identified with the final end of things 'paradoxical' .85 Bearing in mind 
Aristotle's description of these divergent views as paradoxical, Donne's utilization 
of Aristotle's identification of the final end with the good to argue for the paradox, 
that all things kill themselves, appears all the more paradoxical. The argument of 
Donne's first paradox does not proceed by questioning the authority of the law of 
self-preservation, upon which both Augustine and Aquinas will base their objections 
to suicide, but by translating the superlative form of good from best to perfect. The 
point of Donne's paradox is achieved only with reference to Aristotle's doctrine of 
the final cause and the good, for he makes no attempt to argue that things kill 
themselves out of a desire for the cessation of life as we will see he does in his 
defense of suicide in Biathanatos. 86 Moreover, Donne's argument in Biathanatos 
will declare its conformity with the Aristotelian basis of Aquinas' first principle of 
human action, 'fly evil, seek good'; the basis of this principle is Aristotle's view that 
'the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. ,87 Donne's 
argument in his first paradox, on the other hand, imagines the actualization of the 
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final end of various things, and maintains that because the final end of all things is 
the good, such an actualization must represent the most good, or the perfection of the 
being. Even the least potent of animated creatures, plants, move oftheir own natures 
to this perfection. He says, 'Plants quickened and inhabited by the most unworthy 
Soule, which therfore neyther will, nor work, affect an end, a perfection, a Death. ,88 
The identification of death with perfection is asserted in the next sentence and is 
defended, in this instance, on the grounds that plants begin to die as soon as they 
have reached the apex of their efflorescence. 'This [perfection/death] they spend 
their Spirits to attaine; this attained, they languish and wither. ,89 Later in the 
paradox, Donne constructs a syllogism which is informed by the identification of the 
final cause of a thing, understood as the principle which determines the end toward 
which it strives, with the definition ofthe essence of that thing. As we have seen, 
Aristotle makes this identification himself when he equates the final cause with the 
governing principle. 
To illustrate this identification, however, Donne introduces Aristotle's 
doctrine of the mean and combines it with his translation of the actualized good of a 
thing, its perfection. 
Of our Powers, remembering kills our Memory. Of affections, Lusting our 
Lust. Of Virtues, giving kills Liberality. And if these things kill themselves, 
they do it in ther best and supreme perfection: for after perfection 
immediately follows exces: which changes the natures and the names, and 
makes them not the same things.90 
This combination of Aristotelian doctrines results in the contradiction by which 
Donne's paradox claims to be proven, that the actualization of a thing's final end is 
simultaneous with its death as defined by the principle of its nature. Hence, in the 
case of the plant, the persistence of its existence after its perfection represents an 
excess because, as Donne claims, 'no perfection indures' .91 Donne's claim that no 
perfection indures, however, is only true for perishable things according to Aristotle. 
These perishable things (i.e. plants, animals, etc.) may actualize their final ends and, 
therefore, become what the principle of their nature declares that they should. A 
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perishable thing may also, on the other hand, exist in an imperfect state, which 
Aristotle says is 'the privation of its positive state and the corruption of it contrary to 
its nature'.92 Aristotle never suggests that a being which is actualized, such as a 
living man, exists in this state in an instant which is simultaneous with its 
transformation into an essentially different being as Donne argues. On the contrary, 
as long as the living man is alive, he is the actualization, or to use Donne's term, the 
perfection, of a potentially living man. Moreover, the principle which expresses the 
final cause or nature of the man does not perish when the man perishes, but merely 
the matter. 
It is ... hard to say why wine is not said to be the matter of vinegar nor 
potentially vinegar (though vinegar is produced from it), and why the living 
man is not said to be potentially dead. In fact they are not, but the 
corruptions in question are accidental, and it is the matter of the animal that 
is in virtue of its corruption the potency and matter of the corpse, and it is 
water that is the matter ofvinegar.93 
When Donne claims that no perfection indures, therefore, he is referring specifically 
to Aristotle's ethical theory of the golden mean, which states that virtues such as 
liberality are only realized at the mean between their corresponding extremes.94 
Aristotle says, 'With regard to giving and taking money the mean is liberality, the 
excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. ,95 With respect to this definition of 
liberality, Donne's claim that no perfection indures assumes that the actualization of 
this virtue, its perfection, is accomplished only by some degree of giving. If 
liberality were a perishable thing such as a man, 'the privation of its positive state 
and the corruption of it contrary to its nature' would ensue whenever giving ceased. 
On the other hand, if one persisted in giving continuously, excess would soon 
follow. The state of perfection achieved in the actualization of the principle of 
liberality demands the satisfaction of a mean of giving which, once satisfied, is 
impossible to continue to satisfy. According to the same logic of the mean, Donne 
may draw similar conclusions regarding powers such as memory and affections such 
as lust. Donne's combination of Aristotle's doctrines of the mean and the final cause 
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allow him, though invalidly, to produce the following syllogism. 'If then the best 
things kill themselves soonest (for no perfection indures) and all things labor to this 
perfection, all travaile to ther owne Death. ,96 The best things are those things which 
have achieved the golden means oftheir powers, affections and virtues. Those 
powers, affections or virtues which are actualized first are best because they have 
been most actively utilized in accordance with the demands of the principles which 
define their natures. Having actualized these principles by reaching the mean, any 
cessation or continuation of action in accordance with the demands of the principles 
of their natures results in the corruption and death of the corresponding powers, 
affections or virtues. It would, therefore, be contrary to their natures for the best 
things not to kill themselves. Condensed, the syllogism reads: 
The best things (those which have achieved their perfection) kill themselves. 
All things strive to this perfection (to be the best thing). 
All things strive to kill themselves. 
We have seen that Aristotle would not have approved Donne's claim that all 
perishable things, such as plants, begin the process of corruption and death as soon 
as they have actualized their natures. Aristotle would also have objected to Donne's 
characterization of powers, affections and virtues as perishable things, but as 
imperishable things, they begin to resemble the Ideas which are implicit in Lull's 
nine divine attributes (e.g. goodness, understanding).97 Aristotle's solution to this 
problem is to insist that actualization is achieved in the operation ofthe principle 
which expresses the nature of a thing, not in the result of that operation. He says, 
'For the action is the end, and the actuality is the action. Therefore, even the word 
"actuality" is derived from "action", and points to the fulfillment.,98 The virtue of 
liberality, therefore, does not have an ideal value outside of the ethical world; its 
perfection is achieved only in the continuous activity of the moral agent.99 For the 
sake of creating a middle term, which is restricted in its denotation, Donne 
transforms the continuous activity of Aristotle's virtues, which are ever seeking a 
vacillating good, into the stasis of Platonic Ideas, which Aristotle condemned for 
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their inability to 'help ... towards the knowledge of other things' .100 This stasis is 
expressed in his middle term, perfection, a term which corresponds with Lull's 
Anselmian characterization of the divine attributes. Lull's demonstratio per 
aequiparantiam depends on its user's ability to recognize the degree to which the 
objects under scrutiny participate in the static and ideal divine attributes; without this 
recognition, the denotation of his middle term cannot be restricted with certainty, 
which in tum leaves the convertibility of the extreme terms of his syllogism also in 
doubt. As we have seen, Aristotle's estimation of the possibility of such a 
perception of degree by comparison to the Ideas was not high. 101 Whether Donne 
was attacking Platonists such as Agrippa and Paracelsus for their claims to be able to 
perceive these divine forms in the phenomenal world or reformers of Aristotle such 
as Lull and Ramus for their attempts to rid dialectic of the uncertainty which gave 
rise to the contentions of the scholastics is difficult to say; what is clear is that he 
was using the paradox as a vehicle to discuss precisely those epistemological 
problems which the sixteenth-century critique of Aristotelian syllogistic had 
raised. 102 
7 
Donne's Critique of Neoplatonic Mysticism 
In his consideration of rational accounts of the existence and nature of God in 
the Essays in Divinity, Donne refers to attempts to render a definition of God which 
will accommodate use in logical demonstration, and therefore, provide reason with 
access to the divine. One ofthese accounts summarizes Lull's new logic and its 
utilization of the Anselmian formula for the supremacy of God's nature in the 
demonstratio per aequiparantiam. He says: 
Can it give thee any satisfaction to hear God called by concrete names, Good, 
Just, Wise; since these words can never be without confessing better, wiser, 
and more just? Or ifhe be called Best, etc. or in such phrase, the highest 
degree respects some lower, and mean one: and are those in God?103 
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Though Donne' Essays were the statement of his preparation for ordination and were 
likely completed twenty years after the composition of Paradoxes, his suspicion of 
syllogistic demonstrations which restrict the denotation of terms through the use of 
comparatives and superlatives continued to remain as lively as it had when he was a 
student of such dialectical techniques at Lincoln's Inn. 104 Lullian syllogistic, though 
in form following Aristotle, sought a certainty, particularly with respect to the nature 
of God, which Aristotle would not have countenanced. lOS Donne's unfavorable 
reference to Lull and Ramus in The Courtier's Library and his tacit rej ection of 
Lull's demonstratio per aequiparantiam constitute his recognition of the 
epistemological limits within which Aristotle believed his logic to be contained. On 
the other hand, those who dispense with Aristotle in their rational meditations upon 
the divine, such as Sebond, Paracelsus, Agrippa and Erasmus, and claim to arrive at 
a knowledge of God through the perception ofthe divine forms in creatures, are 
unable to answer Aristotle's objections to the use of the notions of metaphor and 
participation in the establishment of a real correspondence between the universal and 
the particular. Though Donne does not specify the advocates of this allegorical 
method of contemplating universals, nor their sources in Plato, Plotinus and 
Augustine, he completes his opposition of Platonist and Aristotelian methods of 
divinity asking of those Platonists: 
Or is there any Creature, any Degree of that Best, by which we should call 
God? Or art thou got any neerer, by hearing him called Abstractly, 
Goodness; since that, and such, are communicable, and daily applied to 
Princes? Art thou delighted with Arguments arising from Order, and 
Subordination of Creatures, which must at last end in some one, which ends 
in none?106 
Donne may have had Sebond's idea that we come to know God by our recognition 
of the degree to which we are like God (or in Paracelsus' view, the degree to which 
we are God) when he asked what creature could claim such a degree of perfection. 107 
More likely, however, he was simply referring to Christian neoplatonists' 
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appropriation of the idea of the great chain of being imposed by God on all the 
elemental matter of the universe.108 At the head of this chain is God himself, or in 
the terms of the neoplatonic tradition from which the concept of the chain of being is 
derived, the Plotinian One, which Donne says 'ends in none'. In the search for God 
through reason, Donne asserts that both neoplatonists, who 'contemplate him onely 
in his Creatures' and Aristotelians, who seek him in 'seeming Demonstration', must 
recognize the limits of their enterprize and the necessity of faith in the 
comprehension of the divine.109 Again we are reminded of Harvey's rebuke to 
Agrippa, Cardano, Trithemius and Erasmus, and of Donne's list of sources for the 
paradoxist in The Courtier's Library. Rational efforts to eliminate the necessity of 
faith by attempting to prove the existence and nature of the divine are just as 
dangerous as rational efforts to prove that the existence and nature of the divine are 
wholly inaccessible to reason. Both Harvey and Donne implicitly recommend a 
middle way. 
In his appraisal of Raymond Sebond's Liber creaturarum in the Essays in 
Divinity, Donne reveals why he believed him to be a popular source for the 
destructive arguments of paradoxists. Though the Platonic epistemology underlying 
Sebond's view that the recognition ofthe order of nature leads to the recognition of 
the divine truths of scripture is perfectly manifest to Donne, it is not this aspect of 
Sebond's work that he finds dangerous. For he says of this method of perceiving the 
divine: 
Certainly, every Creature shewes God as a glass, but glimmeringly and 
transitorily, by the frailty both of the receiver and the beholder: Our selves 
have his Image, as Medals, permanently, and preciously delivered. But by 
these meditations we get no further, then to know what he doth, not what he 
is. 110 
It is Sebond's claim that the method expounded in his book is 'an Art, which teaches 
al things, presupposes no other, is soon learned, cannot be forgotten, requires no 
books, needs no witnesses, and in this, is safer then the Bible it self, that it cannot be 
falsified by Hereticks,' and his even bolder claim that 'because his book is made 
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according to the Order of Creatures, which express fully the will of God, whosoever 
doth according to his booke, fulfils the will of God. ,111 Not only does Sebond 
promise a perfect guide to the will of God, he also insures that the knowledge gained 
from his book will be so certain that it will not be possible to raise any question 
regarding its conclusions, an assurance that no paradox may be argued which could 
undermine the truth of this knowledge. He says, 'non possU dubitare quaestionem in 
ista scientia. Et ista scientia potest solui omnis quaestio' .112 In the moderately 
sceptical fashion which we will find characteristic of his view of the universal and 
the particular in Biathanatos, Donne expresses his unwillingness to assent to an 
epistemology which promises perfect knowledge of both the first principles of ethics 
as well as the countless particular situations in which these principles are relevant. 
However, Donne is careful to recognize that some knowledge of universal principles 
is natural to all men, Christian or otherwise; this recognition is fundamental to his 
argument against the absolute sinfulness of suicide in Biathanatos because it entails, 
as Aristotle and Aquinas taught, that human reason be contained within definite 
epistemological limits, neither boasting access to hidden knowledge as Sebond and 
Lull promised, nor despairing of its powers to discern any truth whatever as Sextus 
had argued. Citing both the supposed author of the pagan handbook to the occult 
arts, Hermes Trismegistus, and St. Paul, Donne expresses his objection to the 
comprehensiveness ofSebond's system: 
Howsoever, he [Sebond] may be too abundant in affirming, that in libro 
creaturarum there is enough to teach us all the particularities of Christian 
Religion, (for Trismegistus going faIT, extends not his proofs to particulars;) 
yet St. Paul clears it thus far, that there is enough to make us inexcusable, if 
we search not further. 113 
Even Trismegistus, who provided the ancient model of mysticism for those 
neoplatonists seeking knowledge of God in the divine reflection of his creatures, 
does not go so far as to describe the particulars of such a pursuit; those who with 
Sebond and Lull make such audacious claims should be read with suspicion, just as 
Augustine had advised in his condemnation of both Trismegistus and his supposed 
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Latin translator, Apuleius the Platonist. 114 Donne's citation of Paul in defense of his 
reluctance to admit access to hidden knowledge through observation of what he 
considers to be the dim reflection of the divine in creatures is marshaled, in this 
instance, against the more tentative claims of Trismegistus. Paul says in Romans, 
'Deus enim illis manifestavit invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae 
facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas.'115 
Donne concludes from this passage, and in accordance with Paul's exhortation to 
seek salvation through the cultivation of faith in the teachings of Christ, that 
Sebond's estimation of the revelatory power ofthe book of creatures eliminates the 
necessity of faith. 116 As we will see, in Biathanatos, Donne refers to the same 
passage in Romans to advance his position that there are some universal moral 
principles that are intuitively known to everyone, pagan and Christian alike, and 
therefore, uses the same Pauline doctrine of inexcusable ignorance to demarcate the 
boundary separating faith and reason."7 All are bound by their recognition of the 
divine imposition of order in creation to seek the truth of the scriptures assisted by 
the light of faith, but also, all are bound to recognize that certain behaviors (e.g. 
prostitution and homosexuality) are forbidden by natural law alone irrespective of 
any perception of the divine. liB 
8 
Opinion and the Mean between Certainty and Ignorance 
Harvey had warned against the Pyrrhonism of the sophists who 'professed a 
skill in all thinges' and ofthe rationalism of the Lullists who claimed to possess the 
'admirable Art of disputinge infinitly de omni scibili' as a contrast to the genuine 
knowledge attained through the sceptical inquiries of Socrates and Agrippa. 119 
Though he includes Agrippa in his list of those who have been 'too-sawcie with 
diuinitie', Harvey's intention in this opposition of the sophists and the Lullists is to 
recommend a moderately sceptical epistemology which can maintain rational access 
to some but not all knowledge. Agrippa is to be praised, therefore, because, in the 
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Vanity, he ably illustrated the manifold inconsistencies and contradictions which 
undermine the certainty of the principles of the arts and sciences. Ramus is to be 
praised because he attempted, on the authority of Aristotle, to salvage these 
principles from the doubt raised by so many centuries of contention and 
misinterpretation. Agrippa must be suspected, however, of attempting to formulate a 
cognitive system to replace that which has been founded on the principles of 
Aristotelian syllogistic. In his De Occulta Philosophia (1533), which he dedicated 
to Trithemius in gratitude for his tutelage in 'mirabilium effectuum et plenas 
mysteriorum operationes', Agrippa stated that the magical principles outlined in his 
book would comprehend all other objects of knowledge in much the same spirit as 
Ramus had asserted the precedence of his dialectic. 120 
Magica facultas, potesta tis plurimae compos, altissimis plena mysteriis, 
profundissimam rerum secretissimarum contemplationem ... totiusque naturae 
cogitation em complectitur ... Nam, cum omnis philosophia regulativa divisa 
sit in physicam, mathematicam et theologiam ... has tres imperiosissimas 
facultates magia ipsa complectitur, unit atque actuat. 121 
Though Agrippa insists that such comprehensive magic can only be wielded by the 
virtuous man, made so by faith, his neoplatonic explanation of this mystical process 
was bound to provoke the contempt of Aristotelians such as Harvey and Donne. 'Est 
enimfides omnium miraculorum radix, qua sola (ut Platonici testantur) ad Deum 
accedimus divinamque adsequimur protectionem virtutemque.' 122 Hence, Harvey 
condemns the 'sawciness' of Agrippa for the same reason that Donne condemns the 
'abundance' ofSebond.123 
But like Harvey, Donne would also condemn the Pyrrhonist who would 
prove all knowledge to be inaccessible to reason. Citing Sextus, another of his 
sources for paradoxists seeking merely to discredit the knowledge of others, he 
dismisses the Pyrrhonist argument against the creation of the world from nothing. 
For, Omitting the quarelsome contending of Sextus Empiricus the 
Pyrrhonian, (of the Author of which sect Laertius says, that he handled 
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Philosophy bravely, having invented a way by which a man should determine 
nothing of every thing) who with his Ordinary weapon, a two-edged sword, 
thinks he cuts off all Arguments against production of Nothing, by this, Non 
fit quod jam est, Nee quod non est; nam non patitur mutationem quod non 
est. 124 
Though Donne does not mention Gorgias' On What is Not in connection with 
Sextus' arguments against the creation from nothing, we should remember that it 
was Gorgias' manipulation of the concept of nothing in his proof of the paradox that 
nothing is, which led Sextus to observe its potential to eliminate the 'criterion of 
truth' .125 Donne uses conventional language to describe the Pyrrhonist strategies of 
sophists. Their 'quarelsome contending' is dismissed on the same grounds which 
every Aristotelian we have examined thus far, Ramist or otherwise, dismissed it; it 
obscures the distinctions between the true and the false by which dialectic proceeds 
toward knowledge, or at least, probable opinion. In his third paradox, 'That old Men 
are more Fantastique then younge', Donne referred to the Pyrrhonists as the most 
contentious of the philosophers of antiquity. He says, 'Truly, as amongst 
Philosophers, the Sceptique which doubts all is more contentious then eyther the 
Dogmatique which affirmes, or the Academique which denies all' .126 Despite the 
awareness of the ambiguities of definition which the equivocal syllogisms of his 
Paradoxes raised, Donne was not interested in demonstrating the inability of 
Aristotelian syllogistic to act as a reliable guide to truth or likelihood. When he 
advised his readers to resist the sophistry of his arguments in his letter to Wotton, he 
suggested no more than Wilson, Lever or Blundeville had when they provided their 
Aristotelian guidelines to the refutation of sophistical argumentation. The principal 
objective for those who would resist Donne's Paradoxes is to recognize the fallacy 
of four terms hidden within the equivocally identified middle terms. 127 Such 
recognition requires the sort of dialectical inquiry inspired by Socrates' attack on 
Gorgias' sophistical rhetoric, and which resulted in the Socratic/Stoic paradoxes 
defended by Cicero in the Paradoxa Stoieorum. There, as we have seen, it is the 
discrimination and amplification of the terms of the syllogisms by which the Stoics 
prove their paradoxes which renders their conclusions amenable to the common 
206 
opinion, the opinion which is content with probability. While neither Donne nor 
Harvey would deny, as Cicero does, the power of the syllogism to demonstrate truth 
with certainty, both recognize epistemological limits which the aspirations of 
Ramus, Lull, Agrippa and Sebond would not. For Donne and Harvey, as for most 
traditional Aristotelians, there remains a realm of uncertainty in which reason cannot 
hope to discover any more than likelihoods; this realm, as Aristotle taught, is the 
domain of opinion (doxa), both orthodox and paradox. 
It is because of the inevitability of such uncertainty, in both ethics and 
metaphysics, that Harvey can praise the value of the paradox disputed pro and 
contra according to the presiding method of argumentation, Aristotelian dialectic. 
Similarly, Donne can describe his Paradoxes as 'alarums to truth', not because the 
exposure of their fallacies by the resistance ofthe reader clearly indicates the truth of 
the matter, but because such exposure reveals the genuinely doubtful nature of 
Aristotelian dialectic, metaphysics and ethics. His reader may recognize (as we 
have) his conflation of Aristotle's doctrines of the final cause and of the golden 
mean in his first paradox in the equivocal middle term of the syllogism, which 
concludes' all travaile to ther owne Death', but such recognition by no means 
guarantees the certainty of these doctrines as conventionally understood. In his letter 
to Wotton, Donne never promises that the truth will emerge clearly once his 
paradoxes are 'hatcht', nor does he expect his reader to refute them with any position 
more certain than a counter-thesis, which, as we have seen, aspires only to achieve a 
degree of probability; 'if they make you to find better reasons against them they do 
there office'. As we approach our analysis of the thesis of Biathanatos, 'That Self-
Homicide is not so naturally Sin that it may never be otherwise', we must keep this 
description of the office of paradox in mind, because it will prepare us for an 
argument which seeks not to demonstrate the applicability of a universal ethical 
principle to particular circumstances, as in the practice of casuistry, but for one 
which seeks to reveal the uncertainty of such a universal principle by exposing those 
circumstances which countermand its authority. It is a common mistake to classify 
Biathanatos as a work of casuistry, and one which cannot but obscure its 
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significance as a paradox; the objectives of the two types of argumentation are 
diametrically opposed, casuistry aiming to establish at least the probability of the 
universal, and paradox aiming to declare the limits of this probability.128 We must 
remember as we examine Donne's paradoxical argumentation in Biathanatos, that he 
consistently describes casuists as a group to which he does not belong. Further, we 
must remember that the 'little book of Cases' and the 'Cases of conscience' to which 
he refers in two letters of October 1621, to Thomas Lucy and Henry Goodyear 
respectively, represent his only ostensibly casuistical exercises, and, unfortunately, 
are both lost to scholarship. 129 
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should be contrasted to Cicero's sceptical recognition of their inability to achieve more than 
probability. Like Lull after him, Anselm believed that the threat which paradoxes posed to 
knowledge could be avoided by conceiving of the problem in more specific (and perhaps unnatural) 
terms. Evans has shown that Anselm owes much to Augustine's studies in signification in The 
Teacher and On the Trinity. See Evans, 1975-1976, pp. 1-21. 
73 Harvey, 1593, p. 139. No French author of the Mirror is ever named by the English translator, 
James Sandford, and it is possible that he wrote the work himself and attributed it to another in order 
to avoid responsibility for the sophistry displayed in its argumentation. 
74 The ninth-century philosopher, John Scotus Erigena discussed the Christian paradox of God's 
creation ex nihilo and describes it as Harvey had the mysterious knowledge of the 'right asse' and as 
Marbeck had the wondrous paradox of Psalm 24 (23). 'Per generationem quippe Dei ex Deo 
principio facta sunt. Audi divinum et ineffabile paradoxum, irreserabilie secretum, invisibile, 
profundum, incomprehensibile mysterium. Per non factum, sed genitum, omnia facta, sed non 
genita.' See Erigena, 1853, cap. 1, 1-14. On Lull's debtto Erigena, see Yates, 1982, pp. 81-83. 
75 Quoted in Duhem, 1913, v. 6, p. 514 
76 Lull, Ars generalis ultima, 10, 11. 1705-1707 
77 Ibid., 10, 1. 1700. For a brief account of the manner in which Lull believed his demonstratio per 
aequiparantiam resolved the logical impasses inevitably reached by both the sophists and the 
schoolmen, see Hillgarth, 1971, pp. 235-237. 
78 Lull, Logica Nova V, ii 
79 Ibid., V, 11. 7-8 
80 Ibid., V, 1. 9. See Anselm, Proslogion II. On Lull's debt to Anselm, see Yates, 1982, pp. 62-66. 
For an overview of Anselm's ontological argument and Aquinas' rejection of it, see Copleston, 1972, 
pp. 72-79,192-196. 
81 On the neoplatonism of Bruno's Ash Wednesday Supper (1584), see Yates, 1982, pp. 158-161. 
82 Donne, 1980, p. 2, 11. 32-33. Rosemond Tuve claims that Donne's compass image in 'A 
Valediction: Forbidding Mourning' is based on three of the four Aristotelian causes (fmal, efficient 
and formal). See Tuve, 1942, pp. 365-400, esp. p. 374. Una Nelly has noted the influence of both 
Aristotle and Aquinas on Donne's notion of the mean. See Nelly, 1969, pp. 83-88. Terence Cave has 
noted Ronsard's manipulation of the doctrine of the golden mean in the Hymne de I 'Or (1555). Cave 
rightly locates the poem in the tradition of paradoxical encomia, but indicates, albeit tentatively, that 
its function is integrally related to the defense of uncommon opinion. Though the two types 
obviously share some relation, his unwillingness to refine the distinction any further, and his referral 
of the question to Colie' s Paradoxia Epidemica, indicates the need for the clarification on this 
question that this study provides. See Cave, 1979, pp. 233-239, on Colie, p. 233n. 
83 Metaphysics 1050a6-9. See Physics 194a29, 198b10-199b32 on nature and its disposition toward 
ends. Lull makes the reciprocal relationship of actuality and potentiality the basis of the second and 
third modes of his demonstratio per aequiparantiam. 'Secundus modus est, quando fit demonstratio 
per aequalitatem potentiae et per suum effectum. Tertius modus est, quando fit demonstratio per 
aequalitatem actuum potentiarum'. See Lull, Logica Nova V, 11.3-6. For further explanation of the 
relationship between potentiality and actuality, see Logica Nova V, 11. 251-266. 
84 Metaphysics 1075a11-18 
85 Ibid., 1075a25, b3, b6, bll 
86 For the view that this paradox reveals Donne's early fascination with suicide, and discussion of 
psychological issues relating to Biathanatos, see Simpson, 1931, pp. 21-49, esp. 36-39; Roberts, 
1947, pp. 958-976; Bullough, 1972, p. 67; Keynes, 1972, p. 111; Donne, 1980, pp. 70-71; and Carey, 
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1981, pp. 190-191. William W. E. Slights claims that Donne was merely 'showing offhis skill at 
paradoxy' in Biathanatos, and likens this display to Truewit's advice to Morose to kill himselfrather 
than to marry in Jonson's Epicoene (II, ii). Slights mistakenly assumes that Donne was no more 
serious in Biathanatos than he was in the paradoxes on suicide in the Paradoxes and Problems (I and 
V). See William W. E. Slights, 1970, pp. 178-187. L. C. Knights has argued that Donne was serious 
in Biathanatos, and that his seriousness reflects his personal desire for death. See Knights, 1974, pp. 
109-116. S. E. Sprott has shown that the debate on suicide was lively and current while Donne was 
writing Biathanatos and should not, therefore, be viewed as an anomolous production of a 
'melancholy poet' obsessed with thoughts of suicide. See Sprott, 1961, p. 25-27. Jonathan 
Do11imore has continued in the erroneous view that Donne's fIrst paradox reveals his morbid 
attraction to suicide. He also mistakes the way in which Donne was manipulating Aristotle's doctrine 
of the golden mean in that paradox. See Do11imore, 1998, pp. 71-77, esp. 73. Most recently, Jeffrey 
Johnson has correctly emphasized Donne's piety and orthodoxy in his reflections on his death in 'A 
Hymne to Christ'. See Johnson, 1999, pp. 115-123. It is worth recalling on this point, that in his 
comments on a 163 ° letter to George Garret, in which Donne expressed a pious desire to 'die in the 
pulpit', Coleridge remarked that Donne's desire was consistent with the position which he argued in 
Biathanatos, that suicide in is justifIable 'in certain cases.' It is apparent that Coleridge did not 
believe that Biathanatos exhibited a sinful attraction to suicide or an ironic treatment of the issue. 
See Donne, 1977, p. 243; and Brinkley, 1955, p. 431. 
87 Nicomachean Ethics 1094a2-3 
88 Donne, 1980, p. 1,11. 3-6 
89 Ibid., p. 1,11.6-7. In the fIrst sequence of his Sonnets (1-18), Shakespeare makes considerable use 
of this identifIcation of death and perfection in his attempt to warn the young man of his imminent 
decay. See Shakespeare, Sonnets, 1,1. 3; 6, 1. 4; 12,11. 11-12; and 15, 11. 1-2. 
90 Donne, 1980, p. 2, 11.24-30. See Nashe, 1910, v. 2, p. 274. The inscription on the furniture of the 
Knight of the Ow I' s horse reads 'Liberalitas liberalitate perit'. McKerrow notes that this motto 
derives from St. Jerome, Epist. 58.7 and was also mentioned in Justus Lipsius' Politica (1589), ii, 17. 
See Nashe, 1910, v. 4, p. 281. See also Quintilian, Institutio IV, ii, 7; VIII, vi, 36 on the variability of 
the term 'liberality'. 
91 Donne, 1980, p. 2, 1. 31 
92 Metaphysics 1044b33-34 
93 Ibid., 1044b34-1045a2. Aristotle thought that wine had to be reduced into its primary matter, 
water, before it could become vinegar. Aristotle thought similarly of the affection (emotion) of anger 
as a form (principle) which mayor may not be manifest materially. Hence, just as it would be absurd 
to argue that the principle of a man perishes with its material manifestation, so is it absurd to argue 
that the principle of anger ceases to exist whenever anger ceases to be manifest. See De Anima 
403a26-403b13. 
94 Donne mentions the golden mean explicitly in his fIfth paradox, 'That only Cowards dare dye'. 
See Donne, 1980, p. 9, 11. 1-3. See also Eudemian Ethics l220b21-1221a13. 
95 Nicomachean Ethics 1107b9-10. Aristotle gives the example ofliberality again at Eudemian 
Ethics 1221a5. 
96 Donne, 1980, p. 2, 11. 30-33. Donne modifIes this view in his fourth paradox, when he says that 
'all deathes proceede of the defect of that, which nature made perfect and would preserve, and 
therfore are all against Nature.' See Donne, 1980, p. 8, ll. 54-56. 
97 For Aristotle's description of the power of memory, see De Memoria 451aI5-19. 
98 Metaphysics 1050a21-23 (translator's emphasis) 
99 In his attempt to describe Aristotle's doctrine of the mean as a kind of idealism, Sean Kane 
misrepresents both Aristotle's divergence from Plato, and Spenser's dramatization of the ethical 
problems facing Guyon in Book Two of the Faerie Queene. This misrepresentation is responsible for 
what Kane interprets as a 'paradox of idealism'. See Kane, 1983, pp. 81-109. 
100 Metaphysics 991a12; repeated at 1079b25-26 (translator'S emphasis) 
101 See Metaphysics 991a21-21, repeated at 1079b16. 'And to say that they [the Ideas] are patterns 
and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors. ' 
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102 Michael McCanles has noted that the thirteenth-century author of the Summule Logicales, Peter of 
Spain, noted that terms could become distributed 'by adding such qualifiers as "every," "none," 
"such a kind," and "such a size". McCanles claims that this technique of achieving distribution added 
to nominalist terminology, but fails to recognize that Peter was a realist. See McCanles, 1964, p. 96. 
On Peter of Spain, distribution and the realist/nominalist debate, see Kneale and Kneale, 1962, pp. 
234, 263-274. For a discussion of the problem of distribution treated in some medieval sophismata, 
see Kretzmann, 1982, pp. 211-245. For a reading of Donne's fust paradox, which notices its 
reference to Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, and which hints at the epistemological problems its 
manipulation of terms raises, see Lota Brown, 1995, pp. 66-72. 
103 Donne, 1967a, p. 21 
104 See also Donne, 1953, VI, pp. 174-175; I, pp. 210-211; and X, p. 201 on the use of the superlative 
to describe God. Quoted in Stanwood and Asals, 1986, pp. 94-95. 
105 In the Theologia naturalis or Liber creaturarum, Raymond Sebond employs the same Anselmian 
reasoning to assert the intelligibility of God to man. He explains that' deus est totus intellectualis et 
spiritualis immo non est visibilis oculo corporali ... Et cum intellectus hominis sit factum ad videndum 
intellectualia et invisibilia'. This vision is available to the mind of man through his defmition of the 
nature of God in the superlative. 'Deus est maxim quia non possum cogitare maius nec plus. ideo 
deus est tale esse. Et sic est infinitus et habet esse infintus. See Sebond, 1502, sig. Bv, Cv. 
106 Donne, 1967a, p. 21 
107 In the Liber creaturarum, Sebond says, 'Nam dum homo comparat seipsum ad alias creaturas 
inferiores tunc cognoscit se esse nobiliorem creaturam et suam naturam esse digniorem et meliorem 
omnium aliarum rerum'. See Sebond, 1502, sig. Dv. 
108 See Timaeus 27d-29b, 52d-53c. For a reading of 'The Extasie' in light of this neoplatonic idea, 
see Thomason, 1982, pp. 91-105. 
109 Donne, 1967a, p. 20 
110 Ibid., p. 20 (Donne's emphasis). This passage illustrates the limits of Donne's neoplatonism 
neatly. He may imagine the participation of the created world in the nature of the creator, and see 
man as a microcosm of this process, but he will not go so far as to assert that we gain any knowledge 
of the nature of the cause of creation, God. His claim that we may know what the effects of this 
creative activity are ('what he doth') corresponds with an Aristotelian epistemology which maintains 
that we become aware of the nature of causes (i.e. fmal and formal causes expressed in the universal 
defmitions of genus and species) through our observation of their effects. 
III Ibid., pp. 7-8 
112 Sebond, 1502, sig. Av 
113 Donne, 1967a, p. 8. Hermes Trismegistus, the legendary Egyptian mystic and magician, was 
credited with the authorship of the Corpus Hermeticum, a collection of opinions on the nature of the 
divine and man's relation to it. A Latin edition, supposedly translated by Apuleius, Hermetis 
Trismegisti Asclepius sive de Natura Deorum Dialogus, was the source of Donne's knowledge of 
Trismegistus. Not surprisingly, the Corpus Hermeticum is likely to be the work not of the mythical 
ancient Egyptian, but of an anonymous third or fourth-century Platonist. 
114 Significantly, Augustine derives his rejection of Apuleius from Plato himself. He notes that in the 
Symposium, Plato says that 'gods never mix with men', and therefore, would deny the view that there 
are 'man-made gods [daemones]' which act as 'intermediaries and intercessors between the gods 
created by God [i.e. angels] and men' (City of God VIII, 24). Plato says that 'the divine will not 
mingle directly with the human' to emphasize the need for the intercession of mediating spirits 
between man and god (Symposium 202e-203a). Augustine will admit no mediating force between 
God and man but faith, and uses Plato only to deny the possibility of 'man-made gods' (City of God 
VIII, 25). In his rejection of Apuleius on these Platonic grounds, we should detect his doctrines of 
divine illumination and of the inner teacher, doctrines which we will see Donne implicitly denies in 
Biathanatos. For Augustine on Apuleius see, City of God VIII, 14-27; IX; and Plato, Symposium 
202e-203a. Unlike Augustine, Aquinas thought that Apuleius derived the doctrine of mediating 
spirits (daemones) from Plato himself. See Henle, 1956, pp. 417-419. 
115 Romans 1:19-20 
214 
116 See Romans 3:21-31. 
117 Not surprsingly, Donne also thought that the existence of God was known to all through their 
recognition of the causal necessity of a creator. Atheists, therefore, were inexcusable in their claim 
not to know that God exists. See Donne, 1953, IV, pp. 167-170. In her consideration of this sermon, 
Noralyn Masselink seems to overlook Donne's (as well as Aquinas') limitation of the source of this 
knowledge to natural reason's apprehension of the necessity of a cause in its perception of effects. 
See Masselink, 1989, pp. 66-72. On Aquinas' causal prooffor the existence of God and its rejection 
of the sceptical mode ofinfmite regress, see Wippel, 1993, pp. 85-127, esp. pp. 113ff. 
118 See Romans 1:26-27. 
119 Harvey, 1593, p. 29. In the Vanity, Agrippa observes that just as Gorgianic dialectic implicitly 
suggests its own uncertainty when it claims to be able prove all things, so should we suspect the new 
logic of Lull. 'Raimundus Lullius founde out in these later times a monstrous Arte, little differinge 
from Logicke [Aristotelian], by the which as in times paste Gorgias Leontius did auaunte (who fIrst 
in great assemblie of learned men, presumed to reason of every thinge) every man mighte dispute of 
what matter he listed, and with a certaine artificial and huge heape ofNounes, and Verbes, to inuente, 
and to dispute with ostentation ful of trifling deceites on bothe sides, of euery curious 
communication'. See Agrippa, 1569, sig. Giii. 
120 See Agrippa, 1992, p. 70. 
121 Ibid., pp. 86-88. In his introduction, Compagni explains that 'De Occulta Philosophia proposes a 
total reorganization of magic as an umbrella science which, by gathering under a single roof all the 
cognitive data collected in the various fIelds of scientifIc research, would guarantee the effectiveness 
of each branch of research and make explicit its potential for acting upon reality'. See Agrippa, 
1992, p. 16. 
122 Ibid., p. 413 
123 James Sandford, the supposed translator of The Mirrour of Madness, commented in the epistle to 
the reader of his translation of Agrippa's Vanity, that the 'wicked knowledge' exhibited in De 
Occulta Philosphia 'was the cause of his miserable death'. See Agrippa, 1569, sig. iii. 
124 Donne, 1967a, p. 28 
125 See Sextus, Against the Mathematicians, VII, 87. 
126 Donne, 1980, pp. 5-6, 11. 31-34. Donne refers to the distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonist 
scepticism again in his sermon delivered at the funeral of Sir William Cokayne in December 1626. 
See Donne, 1953, VII, p. 260. 
127 See A. E. Malloch's description of the details of this resistance in Malloch, 1956, pp. 192-193. 
128 Charles Moore confuses the objectives of casuistry and paradox in his response to Biathanatos. 
See Moore, 1790, Part VI, p. 36. It is interesting to note that while Moore observes that among other 
scholastic writers on suicide (i.e. Aquinas, Martin Azpilcueta Navarre, Gregory Sayre), Donne is 'the 
only champion' of the deed, he does not suspect the destructive method of the paradox as the reason 
for Donne's singularity. For modem views that Donne reasoned casuistically in Biathanatos and 
other works, see Donne, 1967b, p. 25; Lota Brown, 1995, pp. 76-83; and Lota Brown, 1988, pp. 23-
33; MacMillan, 1971, pp. 179-210. S. E. Sprott has noted that in 1614, Michel Rothard discussed 
"'paradoxes" ... on the "question" of the damnation of Saul [for suicide], (pp. 26-27). Sprott defers to 
Malloch on the relation of quaestiones and paradoxes, and does not distinguish the procedure of the 
paradox from that of casuistry, though he does make it clear that a well-established polemical 
tradition is evident in the destructiveness of the paradoxical argumentation of Biathanatos. See 
Sprott, 1961, pp. 22-27, 86-87. Terry Sherwood has rightly emphasized the destructive quality of 
Biathanatos as a paradox, but does not distinguish this destructive quality from the constructive 
quality of casuistry. See Sherwood, 1969, pp. 143-153. Dwight Cathcart consistently confuses the 
polemical procedure of casuistry and paradox, and repeatedly claims that casuistry is 'the articulation 
of paradoxes' (p. 12). This confusion becomes evident when he uses the term 'paradox' in two 
senses to describe the relation of Donne's Paradoxes to his notion of casuistry as 'the articulation of 
paradoxes'. He says that 'the Paradoxes and Problems, though delightful and certainly paradoxical, 
have more to do with the Renaissance tradition of paradox than with casuistry' (p. 165).' See 
Cathcart, 1975, pp. 12,35,39,69, 103, 139-140, 161, 165. Despite her view that Biathanatos 
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'clearly belongs to the body of casuistical literature " Camille Welles Slights admits, 'just how it fits 
into that tradition is puzzling' (p. 137). In her discussion of the divergence of Donne 's method in 
Biathanatos from the traditional method which she so lucidly described in the first two chapters of 
her book, Slights fmally suggests that the fact that Donne called the work a paradox may have 
something to do with the puzzle (p. 143). Unfortunately, she defers to the opinion of Rosalie Colie 
(which is ultimately derived from Malloch), expressed in her Paradoxia Epidemica (pp. 500-501), 
that Donne's logic in Biathanatos is intended to illustrate its own insufficiency, and is thus, a parody 
of casuistical reasoning. The solution to this puzzle lies in the argumentative procedure of the 
paradox, as we have seen and will see further. It is no surprise that Slights notices that in Pseudo-
Martyr, a work which seeks to establish the authority of the monarch through a demonstration, not 
only of the weaknesses of the Catholic position, but also of the probability of the Anglican position, 
'Donne's attitude toward casuistry is more straightforward than it is in Biathanatos' (p. 146). 
Though Pseudo-Martyr regularly expresses its disdain for the methods of the casuists, its attempt to 
prove the priority and authority of one of two conflicting laws with respect to the conscience, 
corresponds with Slights' description of the casuistical process (pp. 24-27). See Camille Welles 
Slights, 1981, pp. 24-27, 137-149. 
129 See Donne, 1977, pp. 200, 226. In his Life of Donne (1640), Izaak Walton says that Donne kept 
'copies of divers Letters and Cases of Conscience that had concerned his friends, with his 
observations and solutions of them'. See Walton, 1928, p. 44. In a letter to Thomas Lucy in 1607, 
however, Donne had condenmed the probabilism practiced by the Catholic casuists when he 
complained that 'the Casuists are so indulgent, as that they allow a conscience to adhere to any 
probable opinion against a more probable, and do never binde him to seeke out which is more 
probable, but give him leave to dissemble it and to depart from iit, ifby mischance he come to know 
it.' See Donne, 1977, p. 13. A.E. Malloch reviews Donne's animosity toward casuists in Malloch, 
1962, pp. 57-76. Michael Rudick and M. Pabst Battin argue against Malloch's conclusion that this 
animosity was reflected in the 'parody of probabilistic casuistry' which he believed Biathanatos to 
be. See Donne, 1982, pp. xxxvii-xl. Richard E. Hughes mistakenly believes that Donne was 
referring to the Paradoxes and Problems when he asked Lucy about his 'little book of Cases'. Later, 
he calls Biathanatos 'a mockery through and through' and then presents an unconvincing catalogue 
of fallacious enthymemes which Donne is supposed to have intentionally committed with reference 
to Aristotle's discussion ofrhetorical deductions in Rhetoric 1400b34-1402a27. See Hughes, 1968, 
pp. 61-62, 147-157. 
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Chapter V 
Donne and Late Sixteenth-Century Representations of Paradox 
1 
The Critique of First Principles and Sandford's Mirrour of Madnes 
We have shown that the paradox is a fundamentally philosophical enterprise, 
and should be distinguished from the paradoxical encomium on these grounds. We 
have also shown that there are those paradoxists, condemned by lovers of wisdom 
from Socrates to Donne, who seek merely to undermine others' positive assertions of 
knowledge in the service of a Pyrrhonist scepticism. The 'lazy affecters of 
ignorance', decried along with their traditional antagonist, the dogmatic 'malicious, 
prejudged man' in the preface to Biathanatos, belong to this type of paradoxist.! 
The distinction observed between these 'lazy' paradoxists and the 'prejudged man' 
corresponds to the distinction, which we have seen Donne observing between the 
vainly contentious dialectic of the Pyrrhonists and both the negatively dogmatic 
dialectic of the Academics and the positively dogmatic dialectic of the Stoics. In the 
domain of practical reason (ethics), however, the dialectic ofCameades and the New 
Academy, which Cicero had praised for its attainment to probability, is no different 
than the Aristotelian dialectic according to which Donne will construct his 
arguments in Biathanatos. While such sceptical dialectic acknowledges the 
epistemological limits of syllogistic demonstration, it also maintains the self-evident 
likelihood of the first principles of the arts and sciences including ethics. Though 
Donne may be attacking the universality of the law forbidding suicide, he is not 
attacking it in the interest ofPyrrhonist suspension of assent; he is merely 
performing one half of the dialectical process of the Ciceronian ethicist employing 
Aristotelian logical principles. He is disputing not 'pro veritate' but 'de veritate' in 
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accordance with the generic prescription of the thesis and paradox, to argue, as he 
says, 'not contra ius universale, but contra universalitatem iuris. ,2 The other half of 
this dialectical process is the fonnation of universal rule which may be applied to 
particular cases with a confidence in its likelihood; this process is properly the 
activity of casuistry.3 Were it not for the letter to Wotton which accompanied them, 
Donne's Paradoxes could easily have been accused ofthe more radical sceptical 
attempt to demonstrate the inability of Aristotelian dialectic to prove that one of two 
contradictory propositions is even more likely than the other; as with the Gorgianic 
paradox that nothing is, such attempts implicitly deny the possibility of objective 
criteria for truth, and lead, potentially, to the disintegration of the principles upon 
which stands all external authority, secular and ecclesiastical. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that Donne was so concerned to keep both his Paradoxes and Biathanatos 
out of the public eye. Nevertheless, though it perfonns the critical function of a 
paradox, Biathanatos is explicit about the need for first principles, whether they are 
apparent by the light of natural reason or by the revelation of scripture, to provide 
the major premises in the deductive process of practical reason. 
In the dedicatory epistle of his supposed translation of the paradox of an 
anonymous Frenchman's, The Mirrour of Madnes: or a Paradoxe maintaining 
madnes to be most excellent (1576), James Sandford warns of the anarchy which 
would ensue if the universal laws of nature imposed by God were to lose their 
authority to govern the conduct of men. Opening with the orthodox opinion, which 
Donne facetiously denies in both his fourth and sixth paradoxes, that the 'reason 
deuine' of nature is of greater force than fortune, Sandford continues, maintaining 
the equally orthodox opinion that nature is the source: 
Fromwhence all honest actions are deriued as from there foundresse, and by 
whom all thinges are maytayned, as by their Preseruresse. Greatly it is to be 
wished, that nature, mistresse and lady ofliuing thinges, as diuine power, 
which to all men worketh all things for the best, were followed, not 
neglected: were embraced, not dispised: and as euerye particular parson 
respecteth chiefly himself, and preferreth his profit before the commoditie of 
the multitude, so hath, she a special regard of aI, not of some, of manye not 
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of a few, for then her force should faile, and liuing thinges should cease to 
liue, men should become no men, the world no world, all thinges should be 
reduced to that Chaos and confuse mixture, which ... was in the beginning 
before bewtie was giuen to the world.4 
With this statement; Sandford disavows the paradox which is to follow because it 
will attempt to prove out of the first principles of Aristotelian natural philosophy and 
of Socratic/Stoic ethics (as represented in the Paradoxa Stoicorum), such theses as 
virtue and reason are nothing. Taking as his major premise Aristotle's definition of 
the golden mean, the same definition which Donne manipulated in his first paradox, 
Sandford argues that if the vices which represent the extremes between which virtue 
is achieved are nothing, then virtue itself must be nothing. He borrows the 
identification of vice and nothing from the Socratic/Stoic position, represented by 
Cicero in the third paradox of the Paradoxa Stoicorum, that vice arises from the lack 
of system and order. 5 Sandford exploits the potential for lack to be interpreted as 
privation, as Augustine had in his doctrine of sin, and thus asserts the identity of vice 
and nothing.6 He then adopts the Socratic/Stoic identification of reason and virtue, 
and concludes, 'If all anger be naught, then all the contrary is naught: so by 
consequence, Vertue is iacke out of office: & Vertue banished, Reason maye go 
shake his eares, Reason exiled, what foloweth but Madnes?'7 Continuing with the 
same conflation of terms and doctrines by which we saw Donne construct the 
syllogisms of his Paradoxes, Sandford imagines that without reason, everyone must 
necessarily practice vice. 'Therefore all turned to vice, all is starke staring Madnes. 
So is youre maister Zenoes great end come to nothinge. ,8 
Sandford's argument for the identification of virtue, reason and nothing relies 
on a fallacious syllogism from which he will derive proof for other fallacious 
syllogisms advancing other preposterous positions. When he argues against the 
Socratic/Stoic paradox expanded in Cicero's second paradox, 'That the possession of 
virtue is sufficient for happiness', Sandford presents the traditional objections 
against the claims of the gifts of the body or fortune, but when he addresses the 
assertion of the paradox specifically, he simply defers to the authority of his first 
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syllogism's conclusion, that virtue and reason are nothing. 'Let reason surcease in 
mynde, which cannot bee, but where vertue is, whiche is not to bee founde as I haue 
proued, & al is turned topsituruye from discretion to madnes. ,9 The ultimate 
objective of Sandford's series of syllogisms is to prove, albeit disingenuously, that 
'to bee a Mad man is to be a wise man.' 10 Though this conclusion is similar to that 
reached by Erasmus in the Praise of Folly, the dialectical method of its 
demonstration and the conspicuous lack of the neoplatonic influence, which 
underpinned the Praise's concluding commendation offurore, betrays the 
Ciceronian and Aristotelian ethical and logical influences which we have found to 
inform the tradition of the paradoxical thesis. 11 Indeed, Sandford asserts his 
conclusion with explicit reference to Cicero's fifth paradox. 'Cicero hath a Paradoxe 
well knowne ... That all wyse men onely bee free men, and all fooles Bondslaues and 
demaunding ofhimselfe, what libertye is, hee sayth, it is nothing els, but Potestas 
viuendi ut velis: A power to liue as yee list. ,12 In spite of Cicero's assumption that 
the one who has the power to live as he wishes is the wise man who lives according 
to reason, Sandford argues that no one has the power to live as he wishes, not even 
the learned. 
As we have seen in the dialectic of Donne's Paradoxes, Sandford is aware of 
the consequences of his logical inferences and is careful to explicate the relation he 
wishes to establish between the three terms of his syllogisms.13 After simply stating, 
'Ifno man therefore liue as he list, then is no man free, ifno man be free, then is no 
man wise,' Sandford recognizes that this conclusion follows from the proposition 
that the free man alone is wise, not the wise man alone is free. According to 
Cicero's formulation of the Socratic/Stoic paradox, freedom is not a necessary 
condition for wisdom, but vice versa. Thus, it is possible that a wise man exists who 
is not free, if it is possible that there are no free men in existence. However, if there 
were no wise men in existence, it follows necessarily from Cicero's definition that 
there would not be any free men either. Because Sandford wants to conclude that 
there are no wise men (and hence, only fools and madmen) from the proposition that 
only the wise man is free, he must make the terms 'wise' and 'free' entail each other. 
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He makes this identification oftenns explicit without further argument. 'If this be 
true all wise menne are onely free, then is this as true al free men are wyse, but 
freedome and wisedome booth excluded the rest is nothinge but onely folye' .14 
Sandford desists from further discussion of his identification of freedom and wisdom 
because his conversion of the proposition 'Only wise men are free', though valid, 
does not entail the conclusion that there are no wise men because there are no free 
men. It is valid to convert the original proposition and assert that 'All free men are 
wise', but this conversion still does not entail that freedom is a necessary condition 
of wisdom; it merely entails that if there are any free men, they must also be wise. 
Thus, the conclusion, 'freedome and wisedome booth excluded', does not follow 
validly. Sandford's invalid restriction of the denotation of the tenns 'wise' and 
'free' reflects a concern with the same epistemological problem which motivated 
Donne to restrict his tenns by superlatives, the accurate definition of tenns. As we 
have seen, the resolution of this type of problem is the special exercise of the thesis 
as prescribed and illustrated by Cicero; it investigates, as Sandford and Donne knew, 
the nature of the concepts around which we organize our most abstract notions, 
concepts such as wisdom, change, perfection and freedom. It is because Cicero was 
writing a thesis that he asks in his fifth paradox, 'For what is freedom?' Cicero's 
answer is prompt and definitive, but Sandford's intention to overturn traditional 
principles such as are expressed in the Socratic/Stoic paradoxes and Aristotelian 
ethical maxims leads him to investigate these concepts further. 
This investigation leads him to consider Plato's doctrine ofIdeas as a way of 
grounding the supremely unstable definition of the summum bonum. Following 
Aristotle's view on the inductive source of universal concepts, Sandford rejects 
Plato's doctrine because it does not explain how human knowledge of particulars is 
infonned by a prior knowledge of the relevant universal Ideas. 
All Universalles (as the Logitioners weI say) are nothinge els, but Conceptus 
animi, thinges conceiued in mynde, gathered and collected together, by a 
number of singulars, aswel in Accidences as in Substaunces, as by this man, 
and that man, and so forth, from one to an other: I gather a whole nature, 
which is a man ... 15 
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Sandford concludes, along with the Platonist writers on mystical knowledge which 
we have examined, that Plato must have intended his Ideas to be incomprehensible 
to the Aristotelian. 'Perchance', he says, 'Plato mente that, which Aristotle coulde 
not perceaue, for hee hath alwayes recourse Ad Opificem Formarum: To the shaper 
of formes, and to the principall form itself .16 Sandford, however, will not propose, 
with the Platonist mystics, an occult means to acquire this perception of the Idea of 
the summum bonum, and concludes that Plato's insistence that the sovereign good is 
'Bonum inaccessibile ... which cannot be attayned' makes the ethical life of the man 
in search of the good by which he should direct his action 'but mere Madnes' . 17 
After claiming, on the authority of Aristotle's critique of Plato, to have proven that 
the concepts by which we order our practical reason are themselves inaccessible, 
Sandford then proceeds to attack the mental faculties which produce the 'Conceptus 
animi' in which universals are thought to be apprehended. He divides these mental 
faculties into three, according to traditional cognitive theory, the 'fantasie', the 
'place of common distinction' and 'memory' .18 
As we have seen in our summary ofthe role of phantasia in the epistemology 
of Aristotle and the Stoics, it is upon the co-ordinated images of the senses produced 
by phantasia that the cognitive faculty ('place of common distinction') bases its 
judgements. If it is true that universal concepts are derived inductively via the 
senses, as Sandford maintains, then the correspondence of our sense perceptions (as 
organized by phantasia) with their external objects is essential to insure the accuracy 
of the universal concepts derived from them. As we have seen, Aristotle was 
considerably less confident in the accuracy of our perceptions than the Stoics, who 
posited the lekton as the cognitive intermediary which guaranteed the accuracy of 
co-ordinated images of phantasia. 19 Sandford follows Aristotle, and asserts 
sceptically, 'Now manifeste it is that the fantasie is deceyued, and that maketh man 
to offende especiallye when common destinction geueth consent thereto, aswell in 
formes in reasons which it conceiueth'. 20 So persuasive is the unreliable faculty of 
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'fantasie' that 'common distinction' is easily 'ouerthrowen'; its cognition of the 
images of 'fantasie', it then judges to be 'head stronge reason', which in tum, 
'dryueth into straunge quandares, estraunginge if often tymes from the Law of 
nature'.21 Since our cognition of the virtues has been 'before proued Madnes', 
Sandford reasons, 'Seeing the straunge [internal] effectes ofphantasie wee must 
conclude, that neither outwardlye nor inwardly there is ought els but Madnes. ,22 
Having suggested the antagonism of our mental faculties to the law of nature, he 
then provides as his final proof of our natural predisposition to madness, a syllogism 
which identifies reason and 'fantasie' on the grounds that they are both natural in 
respect of their direction toward certain ends. This syllogism, though formally valid, 
is significant as an example of the libertine misuse of the various senses of nature 
against which Wilson wrote in his English summary of Aristotle's Sophistical 
Refutations. After declaring the Aristotelian principle that 'Nature doth al for some 
end', Sandford unites reason and 'fantasie' under this description of nature, arguing, 
'Whatsoever woorketh to ende, is reason, then fantasie ys reason, for it worketh for 
ende'.23 
2 
Harvey, Donne and Mock Paradoxes 
As we have seen in our examination of his first paradox, Donne manipulated 
the same Aristotelian doctrine of the final cause to support his startling conclusion 
about the mandates of nature. 24 Such manipulations, particularly in the interest of 
obscuring the vague distinctions separating the various senses of nature, characterize 
the sophistical reasoning of the libertine. As Wilson complained, the 'libertines 
reason' attempts to obtain the sanction of nature for any behavior; in Sandford's 
case, that behavior is madness, and in Donne's, suicide. In light ofthis 
distinguishing mark of the libertine, we must suspect any attribution of libertinism to 
Biathanatos' argument against the view that suicide is contrary to nature. For unlike 
the equivocal use of the senses of nature in Wilson's 'libertines reason', Sandford's 
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syllogism concluding the identity of madness and reason and Donne's own youthful 
argument for the naturalness of suicide in his first paradox, in Biathanatos, Donne is 
explicitly concerned to distinguish these senses in the interest of designating the 
priority of one. When he complains, 'This term "the law of nature" is so variously 
and unconstantly delivered, as I confess I read it a hundred times before I understood 
it once', he is referring specifically to the confusion of the various senses of nature, a 
confusion which, we will see, he associates with those who have employed 
Augustine's rather than Aquinas' definition of the relation between sin and nature. 25 
And when he concludes a little later that 'all sin is natural', he does so, not in the 
sophistical manner with which Wilson's libertine reached the same conclusion, but 
according to an orthodox reading of the relevant principles established by Aquinas in 
the Summa.26 We will be examining Donne's use of Aquinas to defend the 
paradoxical thesis of Biathanatos shortly, but first, we must describe the type of 
paradox with which Donne's Paradoxes and Biathanatos must not be confused, the 
paradox which, like Sextus' attack on Stoic syllogistic, Erasmus' praise of ignorance 
and Agrippa's dispraise ofthe arts and sciences, rejects the power oflogic to 
conduce to knowledge, particularly of God.27 
To accentuate his contempt for the Euphuism of Lyly, Greene and Nashe, 
Harvey bestowed limited praise on Sandford's paradox, The Mirroure of Madnes. 
Even thatsame very Mirrour of Madnesse, hangeth together with some more 
coherence of reason; and smelleth not no so rankly ofthe Tauerne, the 
Alehouse, the Stewes, the Cuckingstoole, or other such honest places ... And 
although thatsame French Mirrour, be ex Professo deuised in a mad garish 
veyne, and stuffed with geere homely enough, fit for a Libertine & frantique 
Theame: yet doth it not so basely borrow of the Ruffians bagge ... 28 
Had Harvey read Donne's Paradoxes, he may have substituted them for Sandford's 
paradox of madness in his comparison. By Harvey's standards, paradoxes such as 
these fall clearly under the category of those 'curiously curious' and 'infinitely 
infinite' arguments invented by paradoxists who prosper when 'Inouation hath sett 
the best countenance of proofe, or persuasion, upon the matter. ,29 As we have seen, 
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both Nashe and Donne are as quick to condemn innovative paradoxists, but only 
Harvey and Donne illustrate their disapproval with what can only be described as 
mock paradoxes. Donne's mock paradox is 'An Apology for Jesuites', which 
constitutes the end of Ignatius His Conclave. What makes this apology a paradox, 
he explains, is that anything might be said in defense of Jesuits. What makes it a 
mock paradox, however, is that nothing is said in defense of Jesuits. He says: 
Now is it time to come to the Apology for Jesuites: that is, it is time to leave 
speaking of them, for hee favours them most, which saies least ofthem .. .If 
any man have a mind to adde any thing to this Apology, hee hath my leave; 
and I have therefore left three or foure lines: which is enough for such a 
d 30 para ox ... 
Throughout the few remaining lines, no argument is made for Jesuits, the suggestion 
being that only innovators as sophistical as the Jesuits could concoct such a paradox. 
Consequently, the only apology which Donne claims an honest paradoxist hoping to 
defend the Jesuits can offer is silence. 
Throughout Pierce's Supererogation, Harvey promises that he will formally 
praise Nashe in an encomium of the ass. As an introduction to this encomium, 
Harvey maintains the intellectual dignity ofthe irony, which must inform any 
encomium of an ass, and that the skillful deployment of this irony will provide his 
defense against Nashe's accusation of its dullwittedness in Strange News. 3 ) Harvey 
begins by associating his own irony with that displayed in the great paradoxes and 
paradoxical encomia throughout the ages, and then proceeds to accuse Nashe of 
denying the wisdom of those reverend authors in his denial of the wisdom of 
Harvey's irony.32 The implication is that such a denial is tantamount to a dismissal 
of the value of irony generally, and paradoxical encomia and theses particularly. 
Harvey expands Nashe's detractions in Strange News, pretending to agree with them 
as an ironic introduction to his own praise of the ass (Nashe). 
The ironyes of Socrates, Aristophanes, Epicharmus, Lucian, are but Carterly 
derisions: the Ironyes of Tully, Quintilian, Petrarch, Pontane, Sanazarius, 
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king Alphonsus, but the sory iestes of the Counsell-table Asse, Richard 
Clarke: the Ironyes of Erasmus in his prayse of Folly; of Agrippa in 
disprayse of Sciences; of Cardan in his Apology of Nero, like Isocrates 
commendation of Busiris, of Lucians defence ofPhalaris the Tyrant, but 
Good Beare bite not: the Ironyes of Sir Thomas More in his Vtopia, Poemes, 
Letters, and other writings; or of any their Imitatours at occasion, but the 
girdes of euery milk-maide. They were silly country fellowes, that 
commended the Bald pate, the Feuer quartane; the fly, the flea, the gnat, the 
sparrow, the wren, the goose, the asse; flattery, hypocrisye, coosinage, 
bawdery, leachery, buggery, madnesse itself. What Dunse, or Sorbonist 
cannot maintaine a Paradoxe?33 
Again, Nashe is made the victim of the irony when Harvey concludes that, if the 
irony of paradoxical encomia and paradoxes is an indication of dullwittedness, 
N ashe has proven eminently qualified to praise himself, the 'Autor of Asses' and the 
'Asse of Autors'. For this reason, Harvey never attempts his praise ofthe ass. 
Rather, he refers readers interested in such an enterprise to Nashe's own writings 
recommending that they 'giue the young Asse [Nashe] leaue to praise himselfe, and 
to practise his minion Rhetorique vppon other' .34 Despite deferring the promised 
encomium by referring the reader to the testimony ofNashe's own asinine writing, 
as Donne had tacitly referred the reader to the Jesuits themselves for the paradoxical 
defense of their rectitude, Harvey does find space to praise the conventional virtues 
ofthe 'right asse'. As we have seen, the 'right asse' who 'in ignorance wil finde 
knowledge' represents the moderate scepticism against which Harvey opposes 
Nashe's vain contention and the excessive epistemological confidence of 'sawcie' 
divines such as Trithemius and Agrippa. 
Continuing in his ironic tone, Harvey concludes that such conventional praise 
of the 'right asse' is to proceed too 'coldly' and 'dully', and that to do justice to the 
ingenious argumentation which characterizes Nashe's railing, he should compose a 
paradox rather than an encomium. In concluding thus, Harvey recognizes what 
Erasmus in the Praise and Nashe in Lenten Stuffe had noted, the paradox is a 
philosophical composition. This recognition is evident when, in mock deprecation, 
he suggests that even the followers of Duns Scotus (Dunces) and the theologians of 
the Sorbo nne, whom Harvey would have acknowledged to be the most ingenious 
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(though perhaps the least honest) dialecticians of the schoolmen, are capable of 
maintaining paradoxes.35 We should note as well, that Harvey includes Synesius in 
his list ofironists. As we have seen, in his Lenten Stuffe, Nashe also included 
Synesius in his list of philosophers who 'come sneaking in with their paradoxes' and 
who defend normally reviled conditions such as baldness or undignified animals 
such as the stork. We have noted that Abraham Fleming's sub-title for his 
translation of Synesius' Praise of Baldness, A Paradoxe proving by reason and 
example that Baldnesse is much better than bushie haire, reveals that what is to 
follow is an argument for preferability, which, we have seen, is characteristic of the 
thesis. We should expect, therefore, a work composed primarily according to the 
principles of dialectic. When Synesius describes himself as 'a husbandman, or rude 
countrie clowne' who must proceed not 'with smooth and delicate words' but 'as 
plaine as a packstaffe', he is contrasting the Socratic regard for truth, which will 
guide his attempt to use dialectic to demonstrate his position, against the Gorgianic 
rhetoric, which underpins the praise of bushy hair composed by his adversary, 
Dion.36 Dion's praise of bushy hair was organized upon the principles of epideictic 
oratory, and therefore, neglected the fundamental philosophical issues on which any 
legitimate praise should be grounded. As Cicero had taught, it is best to learn to 
handle general issues in the dialectical defenses of theses before proceeding to the 
more particular matters of forensic, deliberative or epideictic oratory. 
Dion, in all his discourse, concludeth not that haire is a good thing to them 
that have it: nor that it is an evill thing to them that have it not. Our treatise 
contrariwise searcheth out the verie secret properties of thinges and findeth 
by reason, that baldnesse is excellent, that it is heavenlie, [and] that it is the 
ende of Nature ... 37 
Synesius restricts himself to dialectical argumentation because he intends, as had 
Socrates in the Gorgias, to illustrate the disparity between philosophy's sometimes 
paradoxical apprehension of truth and rhetoric's consistent appeal to the common 
opinion; it is this philosophically searching quality which Harvey opposes to the 
cold and dull enumeration ofthe conventional virtues of the 'right asse' .38 
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Rather than praise the ass for its humility and pious ignorance, which 
requires only rhetorical treatment and no demonstration, or demonstrate its 
preferability to other animals dialectically by deducing from the superiority of 
humility and pious ignorance, which is tantamount to arguing the perfectly orthodox 
view that humility and piety are superior, Harvey announces that he will produce a 
paradox which will demonstrate the genuinely startling conclusion that the whole 
world is an ass. 
But what an Asse am I, that proceede so coldly, and dully in the 
Apology of so worthy a Creature? What will you say, Gentlemen, in can 
prooue with pregnant arguments, artificially drawen from all the places of 
Inuention, according to Ramus, Rodolphes, or Aristotles Logique; that the 
fire-breathing Oxen, and mighty Dragon, which kept the most-famous 
Golden Fleece, the glorious prize of Iason, were Asses of Colchos ... 39 
To this proof, Harvey promises he will add many other equally pregnant 
demonstrations, all which will proceed according to the principles of Aristotelian 
dialectic expounded by Ramus in his various works on logic, by Agricola in his De 
Inventione Dialectica, or by Aristotle himself. Harvey's description of his 
arguments as 'pregnant' prepares us for the presentation of paradoxes, but his 
admission that his arguments will be drawn specifically from the 'places of 
invention' without any mention of the judgements of dispositio should remind us of 
his criticism ofNashe's 'Arte ofFigges' which employs only a 'bottomlesse pitt of 
Inuention'. Such ungoverned invention results in the sophistical conflation of terms 
about which Isocrates complained in his Helen, and with which Harvey associated 
the 'minion Rhetorique' ofNashe. Paradoxists, such as Synesius, who can produce 
demonstrations for trifling theses, such as the preferability of baldness, are not to be 
censured with the sophists, whom Isocrates condemned for maintaining the view that 
speaking 'ably on ignoble subjects' indicates an 'abundance of arguments' for 
worthy subjects, because the argumentation of the sophists is deceptive and 
equivocal. Synesius' arguments, though ironic, are not equivocal, and therefore, do 
not seek to undermine the power of dialectic to discriminate the true and the false. 
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Again, wise and vain paradoxists are distinguished by Harvey on the basis oftheir 
respective commitment to truth, the same basis on which Donne had distinguished 
himself, as author of the Paradoxes and Biathanatos from the innovating paradoxists 
satirized in Ignatius His Conclave.40 
As Harvey's paradox of the ass unfolds, this distinction between the foolish 
sophists, who deceive the equally foolish majority, and the wise philosophers, who 
are despised by the common opinion for arguing startling, yet true, positions, 
becomes itself the evidence from which he concludes that the world is an ass. After 
comparing the paucity of wise and virtuous men with the abundance of fools 
throughout history, Harvey identifies this paucity with the 'singularity' ofparadox in 
terms which we have seen were derived from Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum. 
Callimachus a sweet Poet, recording the memorable, and wonderful thinges 
ofPeloponesus, termed them Paradoxes. Vertuous Italy in a longer terme of 
dominion, with much adooe bred two Catos, and One Regulus: but how 
many Syluios, Porcios, Brutos, Bestias, Tamos, Vitellios, Capras, Capellas, 
Asinios, and so forth? Other singularities, meete matter for Tullyes 
Paradoxes. The world was neuer given to singularities: and no such monster, 
as Excellency.41 
The paradoxes of Cicero, which were composed to make the startling conclusions of 
the Stoics more acceptable to the common opinion, are simply too excellent for the 
maj ority of the world to appreciate. The irony of Harvey's description of Cicero's 
Paradoxa is, of course, that such excellence as enabled the rhetorically unelaborated 
conclusions of the Stoics to appear orthodox, is now disdained by the common 
opinion for its paradoxicality (singularity). The sophistical abuse of rhetoric and 
dialectic, which caused Socrates to appropriate dialectic for philosophy, and which 
Cicero sought to correct, was now again preferred by the majority. 
He that speaketh, as other use to speake, auoideth trouble: and he that doth, 
as most men doe, shalbe least woondred at. The axe, and the Asse, are good 
fellowes: the Libbard and the Foxe, queint wisardes: whatsoeuer abooue the 
common capacity, or usuall hability, a Paradoxe.42 
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The objective of Harvey's mock-paradox is now beginning to emerge. The world 
has fallen into such a woeful state of ignorance that the eloquence and cogency of 
Cicero's arguments in the Paradoxa are 'aboue the common capacity' and suspected 
to be the product of 'queint wisard' seeking to make trouble. Those vain paradoxes, 
which should be despised for their sophistry and needless contention, have now 
become trusted and preferred by the majority because they are argued by the 
ignorant for the ignorant, while the rare wisdom contained in lucid and honest 
paradoxes such as Synesius' or Cicero's has become unrecognizable, and therefore, 
suspicious. Harvey is referring to this preference for vain paradoxes when he begins 
to bring his mock defense of the ass to a conclusion. 
Were not the world, an Universall Oxe, and man a generall Asse, how were it 
possible, that so many counterfait slightes, crafty conueiances, suttle 
Sophistications, wily coosenages, cunning impostures, and deep hypocrisies 
should ouerflow all: so many opinions, Paradoxes, sectes, scismes, heresies, 
apostasies, idolatries, Atheismes should pester the Church: so many fraudes, 
shiftes, collusions, coouens, falsifications, subordinations, treacheries, 
treasons, factions, commotions, rebellions could disturbe the 
Commonwealth?43 
Donne had attested to this preference for vain paradox when he asked in his eleventh 
paradox, 'Are not your witts pleased with those Jeasts which cozen your 
Expectatyonn?,44 The joke is only on those of his readers, however, who answer in 
the affirmative, for to derive pleasure from such 'jeasts' is to join the ignorant 
majority who prefer to be deceived by sophistical paradoxes. Those who recognized 
the serious intent of the Paradoxes as revealed in the letter to Wotton would have 
appreciated the joke, but would also have denied that they had encountered any 
genuinely startling conclusions.45 Harvey, however, spares no one from his joke. 
The spate of paradoxes which plague the church and the commonwealth, and which 
betray the ignorance of the masses, have supplanted those useful paradoxes for 
which Harvey had professed his enthusiastic support.46 The final, and most 
compelling piece of evidence in support of Harvey's paradox that the world is an 
ass, is that the 'graund General of Asses', 'his confuting Aship', Nashe, is permitted 
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by the press 'to dominere in Print' .47 Hence, unlike the traditional praise or defense 
of the ass, Harvey's paradox ofthe ass is actually an attack on ignorance generally, 
and Nashe specifically. Like Donne's mock paradox of Jesuits, it argues that no 
defense of such profound and detestable ignorance could be concocted by any but he 
who possessed it. Harvey concludes, therefore, that he 'were best to end, before [he] 
beginne; and to leaue the autor of Asses, where [he] found the Asse of Autors' .48 
3 
Donne, More and Erasmus on Casuistry and Moral Knowledge 
Harvey's and Donne's mock paradoxes attack the sophistical argumentation 
of innovators who pervert the application of Aristotle's logic to serve subversive 
ends, to plague the church and state with paradoxes which promote schism. And 
though such paradoxists appear to be proposing new doctrines, their utilization of 
traditional dialectic to advance views contrary to accepted doctrine, do little more 
than illustrate the Pyrrhonist's sceptical principle, that no assertion is more 
convincing than its contrary. Such an illustration is dangerous, as Donne suggested 
in his condemnation of those paradoxists who draw on authors who have developed 
epistemological systems which are at variance with Aristotle's. We must suspect, 
therefore, any interpretation ofthe Paradoxes or of Biathanatos which concludes 
Donne's Pyrrhonism, or his affinity with associated doctrines such as neoplatonic 
Christian fideism or moral relativism. Both rej ect the demonstrative power of 
Aristotelian syllogistic. The former, however, claims that after a declaration of faith 
initiated by the grace of God, the mind is able to discern the first principles of ethics 
through its comprehension of the true significance ofthe allegories of scripture. The 
latter rejects such a power. It argues that no ethical choice is either right or wrong in 
itself, and that each individual agent determines the rectitude of his moral choices 
given his estimation of the circumstances in which they are taken. Advocates of 
both views could argue paradoxes, though those who argue a relativist position run 
the risk of being accused of undermining the authority of external law. Donne 
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recognized the possibility that his argument in Biathanatos could be misinterpreted 
to support a relativist view, and was correspondingly anxious to keep it from the 
press. However, he was equally concerned to keep it from being destroyed because, 
he explained in a letter to his friend Edward Herbert that 'this book hath enough 
performed that which it undertook, both by argument and example. ,49 Donne 
continues by disavowing any attempt to advance the innovations for which he (and 
Nashe) had condemned vain paradoxists. Deferring to Herbert's sound judgement, 
he says, 'If any [of the various authors contained in Herbert's library] grudge this 
book a room, and suspect it of new or dangerous doctrine, you, who us all, can best 
moderate. ,50 As we will see, the arguments of Biathanatos do not advance the moral 
relativism with which he was afraid to be associated and of which he h~s frequently 
been accused.51 Because of their obvious lack of seriousness, the Paradoxes have 
escaped such accusations. They have not, however, been adequately distinguished 
from fideist paradoxes, which rejected the determinations of natural reason guided 
by Aristotelian logic in favor of the acceptance of the orthodox Christian virtues 
which are revealed through contempt of the physical world and faithful 
contemplation of the divine. 
Erasmus' exhortation to ignorance in The Praise of Folly was specifically a 
call to those whose consciences had become entangled in or alienated by the moral 
and theological complexities of the schoolmen. Such complexities obscure the 
truths intelligible to the mind guided by faith and to the soul insensible to all but its 
spiritual affinity to the divine. Erasmus' friend and Donne's great uncle, Thomas 
More, shared this desire to liberate the 'narrow' conscience of the 'scrupulous 
person' as a prelude to his conventional condemnation of suicide in his Dialogue of 
Comfort Against Tribulation (1534). The scrupulous conscience which becomes 
confused by its consideration of the degrees of sin (venial and mortal) into which its 
thoughts and deeds might carry it, becomes increasingly susceptible to mortal sin 
because in fearing that even venial sins are mortal, and yet committing them, he acts 
against his own conscience (however mistaken), and therefore, sins mortally. What 
results is a timorous soul that cannot rejoice in the promise of God's mercy which is 
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supposed to be the joyful impetus to repentance and to the contempt of the flesh. 52 
Even more to be feared, however, is that through weariness of such scrupulosity, the 
devil will tempt this soul 'with some subtle suggestion or false wily doctryne of a 
false spiritualllibertie' so that 'he shuld for the false ease & pleasure that he shuld 
sodenly fynd therin, be easely conveyd from that evill faute into a much worse' .53 
Evident here is a mistrust of the 'libertines reason' which claims to prove that what 
many call sin is really no sin at all. Though he categorically rejects suicide under 
any circumstances, because no conscience can be assured that it has truly received a 
divine dispensation from the law prohibiting it, More advises perplexed consciences 
to seek some 'good vertuouse folke' and examine with them 'some casis of their 
own conscience' so that they may learn by example how to apply precept to 
circumstances.54 More's advice here is precisely the opposite as that given in 
Biathanatos. Casuistry, the discovery of universal precepts from the examination of 
a number oflike particular cases, is the means to secure the conformity ofthe 
conscience with external authority; it is, therefore, a rejection of that 'false wily 
doctrine of a false spiritual liberty' , which represents the relativist ethics of the 
libertine. As a paradox, Biathanatos will question the universality ofthe precept 
prohibiting suicide by examining a number of particular cases which contradict it; it 
will champion the rectitude of the individual conscience whose judgement in foro 
interiori commands it to act against the mandate of external authority. 
Though we will see that Donne was not defending a relativist position in 
Biathanatos, it is important that we recognize his difference from More with respect 
to their approaches to ethical dilemmas. In Biathanatos, Donne rejected the utility of 
Augustine's definition ('dictum, factum, concupitum contra aeternam legem Dei') of 
sin in practical divinity (ethics) because the 'surnmists' and 'casuists' exploited its 
generality to serve their specific polemical ends. In his rejection of Augustine's 
definition of sin, Donne calls casuistry the 'art of sinning [which entangles] 
wretched consciences in manifold and desperate anxieties' and complains that the 
casuists make 'all our actions perplexed and litigious inforo interiori ... [by] applying 
rules of divinity to particular cases' .55 In his attempt to resolve the perplexities into 
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which the casuists have led these wretched consciences by following Aquinas' more 
precise definition of sin ('Peccatum est actus devians ab ordine debiti finis, contra 
regulam naturae, ration is, aut leges aeternae') and analyzing it upon the principles 
of Aristotelian ethics, Donne declares that the thesis of Biathanatos is representative 
of the tradition of paradox first described by Aristotle in the Topics, expanded by 
Cicero and Quintilian, taught by Aphthonius, praised by Brinsley, dismissed by 
Ramus, and distinguished from the vain paradoxes of the sophists by Harvey.56 It is 
concerned to investigate a genuinely controversial issue which has seen a 
conspicuous lack of advocates for its less commonly held position. And as the 
Paradoxes identified the conflation of ambiguous tenns in syllogistic argument as a 
threat to truth by constructing obviously invalid arguments, so Biathanatos will 
attack the derivation of casuistical precepts by the exploitation of the ambiguous 
tenns of Augustine's definition of sin. Though More acknowledged the value of 
arguing for and against theses as an academic exercise, he warned against the danger 
of introducing paradoxes into affairs of church and state. In the Utopia (1516) he 
maintains that the doubt into which philosophical paradoxes lead is inappropriate at 
Court, 'where great matters are debated with great authority'. The 'academic 
philosophy which thinks that everything is suitable to every place' must submit to a 
philosophy 'more practical for the statesman, which knows its stage, adapts itself to 
the play in hand, and perfonns its role neatly and appropriately'. 57 This 'academic 
philosophy' (philosophia scholastica) may refer as easily to that practiced by 
Cicero's sceptical academics or by the Aristotelian schoolmen. Both maintain the 
pedagogical benefits of disputing for and against theses. As More was painfully 
aware, however, the exigencies of the current affairs of the state require the 
application of universal precepts upon which political leaders can agree, however 
artificial and fallible they may be. In Biathanatos such precepts comprise the ius 
gentium, which Donne insists represent the efforts of authorities to control certain 
behaviors arising under a particular set of circumstances (e.g. the suicide of 
prisoners) which have been perceived as damaging to the state. In the spirit of the 
paradoxist and the academic/scholastic philosopher mentioned by More, Donne 
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exposes the artificiality and fallibility of the ius gentium when divorced from its 
relevant circumstances in order to cast doubt on the precept prohibiting suicide. 
More is sympathetic to the paradoxical claims of the Christian against the sinfulness 
of both the secular and ecclesiastical authorities because these claims, though 
unpopular, are not doubtful. Despite the certainty ofthese paradoxical claims, their 
truth must be adapted by 'crafty' preachers to meet the demands of the corrupt 
authorities who will not be subject to it; what is left, More laments, is an ethical 
system which allows men 'to be bad in greater comfort' .58 
Though More was criticizing the adaptation of Christian ethics to changing 
political circumstances, his recommendation that the scrupulous conscience should 
seek the advice of 'good, virtuous folk' to guide them through the casuistical process 
of' applying rules of divinity to particular cases', raises the question of reliable 
authority. For the conscience troubled by doubt must judge the virtuousness of those 
it would seek to assist in the resolution of its dilemma. Presumably, More would 
advise such a conscience to avoid the 'ingenious preachers' whose casuistry allows 
'people to sin with a clear conscience', but only a conscience capable of 
discriminating sinful from unsinful actions is capable of identifying such preachers. 59 
Donne's summary of the contradictory opinions of presumed authorities in 
Biathanatos is characteristic of the academic/scholastic variety of philosophy which 
More had reluctantly, ifnot satirically, observed was impracticable in the actual 
affairs of church and state. Under the scrutiny of this variety of philosophy, 
however, it is possible that the autonomy of the individual conscience rectified by a 
contestable standard of right reason may be asserted, which was an assertion which 
More's Catholic orthodoxy and deference to the hierarchical authority of the church 
could not countenance, despite his misgivings about their temporal interests. 60 
Unlike More, Erasmus' combination of a sceptical distrust of the schoolmen's 
syllogistic method of demonstration with a constructive neoplatonic epistemology 
which employed allegory as the rational means to knowledge, produced a much 
more optimistic view of the perfectibility of human knowledge, particularly moral 
knowledge.61 Where his Praise dismissed the Aristotelian vanities of scholasticism, 
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the Enchiridion Militis Christiani (1503) proposed the neoplatonic solution. To the 
'swanns' of schoolmen who maintain that their precepts 'lay down precisely what he 
[the Christian] owes in the way of reward and punishment for every action,' Erasmus 
can provide the relativist's answer. He explains, in his prefatory letter to Paul Volz, 
that if the schoolmen are questioned in detail regarding the application of these 
percepts, they can neither 'agree among themselves' nor 'explain the point 
clearly ... So great is the variety in men's natures and circumstances. ,62 But stripped 
of recourse to the casuistical reasoning recommended by More, he will not leave the 
moral agent in the uncertain state of Cicero's probabilist or even more uncertain 
state of the fideist. Though he is careful not to deny the prerogative of princes, 
Erasmus asserts that the Christian must sometimes spurn the common practices of 
his society in order to comply with 'the philosophy of Christ' .63 This philosophy, 
though founded on a motion of faith against the doubt raised by the intractability of 
circumstances, provides a knowledge in which the possessor can claim a confidence 
superior to the disputed casuistical precepts of the schoolmen. 'If only we have the 
single eye filled with light of which the gospel speaks, if our minds are like a house 
with the lamp of true faith set on a lamp stand, these minor points will easily be 
scattered like a mist. ,64 
In proposing such a philosophy, Erasmus declares himself a disciple of 
Augustine's doctrine of illumination, a doctrine which, we will see, Donne rejects in 
Biathanatos. The source of Donne's dissatisfaction is not the emphasis which 
Augustine had placed on the necessity of faith where logical demonstration fails, but 
the claim that a mind illumined by faith can derive moral knowledge through a 
figurative reading of scripture.65 As we have seen, this dissatisfaction was the basis 
of Aristotle's rejection of Plato's doctrine ofIdeas; and as we will see, Donne's 
obj ection on the same basis indicates his participation in a reaction against the 
similar use of Augustine's doctrine of illumination by dogmatic Puritan rationalists. 
Erasmus' advice throughout the Enchiridion encourages the Christian to disdain the 
scholastic obsession with the literal sense of scripture and to 'choose [as his 
mentors] those especially who depart as much as possible from the literal sense, such 
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as, after Paul, Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. ,66 Of pagan philosophers, 
only Plato's figurative representation of knowledge ofthe Ideas corresponds with the 
allegorical style of scripture. 'Of the philosophers I should recommend the 
Platonists because in much of their thinking as well as in their mode of expression 
they are the closest to the spirit of the prophets and of the gospel. ,67 Not only in our 
acquisition of moral knowledge should we practice this allegorical interpretation, but 
even in our study of the natural world. 
Since we are but pilgrims in the visible world, we should never make it our 
fixed abode, but should relate by fitting comparison everything that occurs to 
the senses either to the angelic world or, in more practical terms, to morals 
and to that part of man that corresponds to the angelic ... namely, the spirit.68 
Finally, Erasmus explicitly subordinates Aristotle, and the contention into which the 
schoolmen have brought his logic and natural philosophy, to the mystical avenues 
opened by the epistemology of Plato, Pythagoras and Augustine. After citing their 
disregard of eloquence in the exposition of mystical knowledge, Erasmus continues 
his explanation of the schoolmen's neglect of allegory. 
The second reason is that they are satisfied with Aristotle alone and banish 
the Platonists and pythagoreans from the schools. But Augustine preferred 
the latter two, not only because many of their ideas are perfectly consistent 
with our religion, but also because their figurative mode of expression, as I 
mentioned, and frequent use of allegory are very close to the language of 
Sacred Scripture. 69 
Recalling Donne's suspicion ofthe bold epistemological claims of Sebond, Lull and 
Agrippa, it is small wonder that he included Erasmus in The Courtier's Library's list 
of sources for the contentious paradoxist. 
In the Essays in Divinity, Donne once again locates himself on the middle 
ground between the Platonic mystical epistemology of Erasmus and the sophistical 
Aristotelianism of the schoolmen.70 Like the liberties with allegorical knowledge 
which resulted in the paradoxical innovations that justified Paracelsus' suit to 
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Ignatius in Ignatius His Conclave, Donne identifies the schoolmen's wrangling over 
the senses of terms as the source of the innovations by which they have 'added 
Suburbs to Hell'.71 On this point, Donne can agree with Erasmus, and confirm 
against sceptical controversialists that 'we kill our souls certainly, when we seek 
passionately to draw truth into doubt and disputation' .72 However, Donne cannot 
sanction Erasmus' allegorical solution to the problem of discovering univocal and 
certain meanings in scripture. After suspecting Nicholas of Lyra for being 'too 
Allegoricall and Typick' in his interpretive practices, Donne argues that neither the 
verbal sophistications of the schoolmen nor the equally confusing allegorical 
readings of the fathers recommended by Erasmus (i.e. Origen, Jerome, Augustine) 
should be permitted to obscure the literal and univocal signification of the words of 
scripture.73 For his defense of the literal interpretation of God's word, Donne 
explains that because the word of God must be univocal, it can only be understood in 
its literal sense. He is careful to discriminate, however, between the literal sense 
which derives from the language in which the word is expressed, and that literal 
sense which may be communicated univocally to 'diverse understandings' .74 It is 
this latter literal sense which is to be preferred to both the verbal sophistications of 
the schoolmen and to the 'curious refinings of the Allegoricall Fathers' .75 
4 
Donne's Use of Aquinas against the 'Affecters of Ignorance' 
Donne's decision to use Aquinas' more precise definition of sin as the 
organizing principle of his tripartite analysis of suicide in Biathanatos is precipitated 
directly by his concern to eliminate the ambiguity of which the 'summists'and 
'casuists' had taken advantage in their applications of Augustine's definition. Donne 
complained that Augustine'S definition of sin (,dictum, factum, concupitum contra 
aeternam legem Dei') requires the moral agent to possess a knowledge of the eternal 
law of God.76 He then observes, on the authority of Aquinas, that 'this eternal law is 
ratio gubernativa Dei, which is no other than His eternal decree for the whole world, 
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and that is providence. ,77 Though Aquinas regularly uses Augustine's definition of 
sin to defend his own ethical positions, he is aware that without delimiting the 
denotation of the term 'eternal law', the agent is left at the mercy of the 
contradictory interpretations of 'summists' and 'casuists', or ofthat anxious 
scrupulosity of his own interpretations decried by More.78 He considers specifically 
Augustine's definition of sin when he asks whether sin 'is fittingly defined as a 
word, deed, or desire which is against the eternal law' ('dictum vel factum vel 
concupitam contra legem aeternam ,), and concludes that cSt. Augustine more aptly 
defines sin as being contrary to the eternal law rather than contrary to human reason, 
especially since the eternal law includes many things beyond the scope of reason, 
such as matters of faith. ,79 Here, Aquinas establishes the distinction from which 
Donne will derive his justification for reason's independent (of faith) involvement in 
the determination of the sinfulness of suicide. The eternal law comprehends matters 
of both reason and faith, the former admitting the apprehension of knowledge upon 
the principles of Aristotelian logic, and the latter requiring the assent of faith to those 
laws revealed in scripture which do not appear to have a clear basis in natural or 
rational law. 
Aquinas further refines Augustine's definition of sin by clarifying the distinct 
functions of the will and reason with respect to the commission of sin. Addressing 
the will's relation to sin, he concludes ( citing Augustine) that 'moral evil in willing 
is the root of sin,' and therefore locates sin in the intention of the perpetrator. 
Intention to sin, of course, is only possible when the perpetrator has knowledge of 
the sinfulness of the action, but according to Augustine's unrefined definition of sin, 
the knowledge which is required (ratio gubernativa Dei) is beyond the powers of 
human cognition, as dictated by Aquinas' Aristotelian epistemology. Aquinas, 
however, offers an account of human reason's relation to the lex aeterna which 
explains precisely how human reason can know something about the eternal law. He 
says that although 'as dwelling in the divine mind the Eternal Law is unknown to us, 
nevertheless in some fashion it becomes known to us either through natural reason, 
which issues from the divine mind as its proper image, or through some revelation 
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given to us over and above the powers of reason. ,80 For there to be sin, therefore, 
there must be knowledge derived either from revelation or from reason. The former, 
Donne tells us, has not spoken to the countless sins (such as suicide) which may 
arise; and so, it is by natural reason alone that the sinfulness of acts not explicitly 
revealed to be sinful in scripture are to be judged. To emphasize his intention to 
approach the exposition of his paradox by clarifying, rather than conflating, 
potentially ambiguous terms, Donne expresses his preference for the latter of 
Aquinas' two definitions of sin, which he quotes in order to illustrate that they are 
more precise than Augustine's definition. The first definition he mentions ('omnis 
defectus debiti actus habet rationem peccati') accords with a purely rational analysis 
as it requires a knowledge of what one is 'obligated'(debiti) to do.8! However, the 
second, in which the tripartite division of the work is represented, is even more 
precise because it provides for the involvement of reason in the determination of the 
sinfulness of any act not expressly forbidden by the law of God as it is revealed in 
scripture. 82 
Donne explains that because Aquinas' tripartite definition makes the eternal 
law 'a member and part of the definition', it allows an analysis of the sinfulness of 
suicide through the other parts of the definition which are the knowable rules of 
nature and reason (regula naturae, regula rationis).83 And, as lex aeterna is opposed 
to regulae naturae et ration is, Donne naturally assumes that it refers more 
specifically than Augustine's use ofthe term and will, therefore, avoid 'that vast and 
large acceptation which it could not escape in the description of St. Augustine'. He 
concludes, based on the purported exhaustiveness of Aquinas' definition, that 
beyond the laws of nature and reason there can only be left the law of God. Hence, 
the eternal law 'in this place [Aquinas' definition] be necessarily intended ... lex 
divina. '84 The law of God, as Donne will explain in the opening remarks of his 
section of the same name, has been given in scripture, and therefore, like the laws of 
nature and reason may be investigated. The accuracy of the results of such an 
investigation may be far from certain, however. 
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As weak, credulous men think sometimes they see two or three suns, when 
they see none but meteors or other appearances, so are many transported with 
like facility or dazzling, that for some opinions which they maintain they 
think they have the light and authority of Scripture, when, God knows, truth, 
which is the light of Scriptures, is diametrally under them and removed in the 
farthest distance that can be.85 
Donne's distrust of the 'credulous' man's knowledge of scripture betrays his belief 
that even the laws of God revealed in the scriptures require rational analysis because, 
in their practical application to particular circumstances, two laws may command 
contradictory actions; in which case, one law must be given precedence over the 
other. And this decision can only be made by the individual agent's comparative 
analysis of the laws in question, an analysis, we will see, founded on the principles 
of Aristotelian practical reason and ethics. To support his case for the rational 
determination of the jurisdiction of the various laws of God (and particularly the 
Decalogue), Donne asserts the harmony of the three laws, natural, rational and 
divine, which he perceives in Aquinas' definition of sin, when he says in opposition 
to the 'exquisite and violent distinctions' of 'school-limbecks' that 'that part of 
God's law which binds always bound before it was written, and so it is but dictamen 
rectae ration is, and that is the law of nature. ,86 He then proceeds by citing Isidore 
on the identification of natural and divine law, and human law and custom.87 This 
identification complete, Donne may proceed syllogistically to conclude that if 
natural law and divine law are one, and natural and rational law are one, all the laws 
are one. It is critical that we acknowledge this identification of the laws of nature, 
reason and God because it reveals Donne's intention to refine Aquinas' definition of 
the law of nature by choosing amongst many (three of which, we will see, are given 
by Aquinas himself: fly evil, seek good, generation and corruption and self-
preservation) one which not only accords with but is identifiable with the law of 
reason. The first part of Biathanatos, in which Donne sifts through these various 
definitions, begins a process of clarification of terms which seeks precisely the 
opposite dialectical objective as did his conflation of terms in the Paradoxes. What 
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remains the same, however, is the logical principles by which this clarification and 
conflation operates. 
Donne's mistrust of the 'weak, credulous' man who falsely imagines that he 
has apprehended the truth of scripture represents his rejection of exegetical theories, 
such as Erasmus', which emphasize the Augustinian notion that faith alone, 
uncontaminated by the confused, controverted and uncertain syllogistical 
demonstrations of the philosophers and schoolmen, secures reason's accurate 
comprehension of the divine knowledge hidden in both scripture and creation.88 
Erasmus' denial of the value of scholastic logic was a consequence of his 
dissatisfaction with the attempt of scholastic theologians to resolve the mysteries of 
faith through dialectical analysis. 89 In the marginal commentary of his 1522 edition 
of Moriae Encomium, Gerard Lister amplified Erasmus' dissatisfaction in terms 
reminiscent of Cicero's complaint against the Stoic dialecticians in the Paradoxa 
Stoicorum. Cicero had criticized the persuasiveness of Stoic syllogistic because of 
its utilization of unelaborated interrogatiuncula, which were meant to lead the 
respondent to recognize the necessity of the Stoic paradoxa after he had agreed, in 
his answers to their little questions, to the unusual terms of their argumeneO So, 
Lister says in terms faithful to Cicero, do the theologians manufacture 'maxims' 
which are called paradoxical or 'inopinatas' by proposing a series of ' inept a 
quaestinculas,.91 In the Vanity of Arts and Sciences, Agrippa accuses the schoolmen 
of manufacturing paradoxical syllogisms by precisely the same means. According to 
Sandford's 1569 translation, Agrippa says that scholastic divinity 'is written with a 
certaine newe kinde of teaching contrary to the use of the auncientes, by briefe 
questions, and subtill Syllogisms without any eloquence'.92 Continuing to complain 
of the innovations (paradoxes) of the schoolmen, Agrippa observes that they go: 
from schole to schole, mouing questions, forging opinions, and wrong the 
Scriptures with intricate woordes geuinge them a contrarie sence, redier 
craftly to deceiue, then plainely to trie out the truthe, they haue also 
presumed to inuente infinite seede plottes ofbrawlinge, with the whiche they 
minister matter of contention to wranglinge sophisters ... 93 
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Donne could just as easily agree with Agrippa's characterization of the innovative, 
paradoxical and contentious 'school-limbecks' as he could with Erasmus' 
description of the schoolmen in the Praise and the Enchiridion. The point upon 
which Donne must dissent from Agrippa, however, is the eschewal of traditional 
logic in the interpretation of scripture. Agrippa specifies the use of syllogism as a 
particularly heinous affront to faith. The scholastics 'presume also that they are able 
with their Syllogisms to finde out, and declare suche thinges as are beleued by faith 
alone' .94 Following Augustine, Agrippa concludes that: 
the truth and understandinge ofthese Scriptures (I meane Canonicall) 
dependeth upon the onely authoritee of God reuelinge the same, whiche 
cannot be comprehended by any iudgement of the senses, by any compassing 
reason, by any syllogisme of demonstration, by any science, by any 
speculation, by any contemplation, and finally with any force of man, sauing 
by the onely faithe of Jesus Christe poured into our soule from God the father 
by the holy ghost.95 
Like Sebond, Agrippa also believes that the faithful may obtain a vision of God, the 
creator, through a study of his effects in the created world. Opposing this study of 
the book of creatures to the beatific vision of God himself after death, he says: 
An other vision there is wherein the hinder partes of God be seene: that is to 
saie, when with cleare sighte the creatures be perceaued, whiche be the 
hinder partes & effectes of God, by the knowledge of whiche the creatoure 
shaper of all thinges, and the firste cause which maketh all thinges is 
knowne ... 96 
As Agrippa makes abundantly clear, and as his 'Digression in Praise of the Asse' 
confirms, knowledge of the mysteries of scripture and the natural world can only be 
attained when the philosophy of Aristotle is rejected along with the fallible and 
contentious natural, civil and canon laws.97 As we have already begun to observe, 
Donne's project in Biathanatos is to establish a consistent and univocal 
understanding of the laws of nature, reason and God that eliminates the ambiguity 
which has rendered natural, civil and canon law so unreliable, and which reasserts 
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the value of Aristotelian ethics in practical reason's consideration of moral action. 
Agrippa's conclusion to the Vanity finds the ignorance of the simple ass most worthy 
of emulation because he lacks the presumption to knowledge which the sceptical 
critique so easily destroys. Agrippa himself employs the critique as both Cicero and 
Sextus had taught it, insisting, against those, such as Lull, Lever, Ramus and 
Fraunce, who remain faithful to the Aristotelian organization of the various faculties 
of human knowledge, that the first principles of the arts and sciences are forced upon 
us by philosophers who will 'compel us to confesse that, which they should teache 
by reason' .98 The suggestion is, of course, that any attempt to teach these first 
principles results either in infinite regress or reciprocity; Agrippa complains that the 
philosophers, powerless as they are to demonstrate first principles, require that they 
'must be beleued' .99 Nor can the senses or authority be trusted to deliver the criteria 
for truth, necessary for the confirmation of knowledge. Those who will see 'the 
secretes of God' will 'understande not with [their] eies and outwarde eares, but [will] 
perceaue with better senses ... to receaue in truth from the marrowe of the holy 
Scriptures, which ... was hidden from the wise men of this world' .100 In short, if we 
do not repudiate the knowledge of this world, and declare our faith as the means to 
understanding, we will never be turned into that ass which is most 'able to carrie the 
diuine misteries. ,101 
For Donne, to apply the sceptical critique to expose the ignorance of all who 
claim to have acquired knowledge by syllogistic demonstration is as vain a pursuit as 
'passionately to draw truth into doubt and disputation'. Both are the practice of 
'lazy affecters of ignorance' who relieve themselves oftheir responsibility to seek 
truth no matter how 'cragged and steep' the hill upon which it stands.102 The 
Augustinian response to the sceptical critique is insufficient to guide the Christian 
through his circumstantially complex ethical life because it divorces the traditionally 
knowable laws of nature and reason from the law of God, rendering God's will 
scrutable only to those illumined by the faith granted by the grace of God. What 
results is a 'weak, credulous' man who believes that he can assert his moral rectitude 
dogmatically because he interprets his faith as the sign of his salvation through 
244 
grace. This dogmatism, which propounds the irrefutability of its precepts in spite of 
the sceptical critique on the grounds of the confirmation of faith, is characteristic of 
the Calvinist adoption of the Augustinian doctrines of predestination (implicit in 
God's foreknowledge), divine illumination and the grace enjoyed by the faithful 
elect. In Biathanatos, Donne explicitly rejects Calvinist epistemology, a rejection 
which is consistent with his affirmation of Aquinas' Aristotelian ethics and his 
denial of Augustinian epistemology. After observing that the 'dangerous opinion' of 
predestination entails an 'impenitab1eness and an impossibility of returning to God', 
Donne cites Calvin as a 'strong authorizer, ifnot an author' of this opinion. 103 
Certainly Calvin developed the doctrine of predestination, but ultimately, as Donne 
indicates, he has merely 'authorized' the opinion of Augustine. Donne notes the 
dependence of predestination on the doctrine of God's foreknowledge when he says 
that he will understand their doctrine of impenitab1eness 'proportionally and 
analogically to their other doctrine' and 'place this impenitab1eness only in the 
knowledge of God' .104 Augustine, affirming Paul's predestinarian conclusion that 
the predisposition to receive or refuse God's will is established by God himself 
through the granting or witholding of grace, had said: 
Item verum est, Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei; quia 
etiamsi multos vocet, eorum tamen miseretur, quos ita vocat, quomodo eis 
vocari aptum est, ut sequantur. Fa1sum est autem si quis dicit, Igitur non 
miserentis Dei, sed volentis atque currentis est hominis: quia nullius Deus 
frustra miseretur; cujus autem miseretur, sic eum vocat, quomodo scit ei 
congruere, ut vocantem non respuat. 105 
Nor could man hope to solicit God's grace through the declaration of faith; those 
unsuited to receive God's grace were unable to make such a declaration. In his 
Retractions, Augustine recognized that he had been mistaken when he claimed that 
man could take an active part in his salvation. Commenting on I Corinthians 12:6, 
he said that 'profecto non dicerem, si iam scirem etiam ipsam fidem inter Dei 
munera reperiri, quae dantur "in eodem Spiritu". ,106 Though Donne was anxious 
about the possibility that he might not receive the gift of God's grace and be 
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abandoned to his own sin, he also recognized that it is impossible to know if oneself 
or any other possesses a genuine faith granted by God.107 Without this knowledge, 
the 'weak, credulous' man, though confident in his faith, is no more likely to have 
access to the true meaning of scripture than the Thomist who applies Aristotle's 
rational principles to his reading of scripture. 108 
5 
Ambiguity and Lando's Paradossi 
Donne's condemnation of those who profess a pious ignorance which 
conduces to a faith in the certitude of Christian ethics distinguishes his theory of 
knowledge from that which informed Erasmus' Praise and Agrippa's 'Digression in 
Praise of the Asse'. Though Harvey disapproved of the libertine and sophistical 
perversion of syllogistic in the Mirrour of Madnes, his praise for Synesius' Praise of 
Baldness argues his approval of its syllogistic method and illustrates that, for him, 
the paradox was not a vehicle for the dismissal of Aristotelian logic. As Harvey 
knew, genuinely controversial paradoxes (theses) could only be debated according to 
the principles of dialectic outlined by Aristotle in the Organon. Without the use of a 
dialectic which deduces both assertions and their refutations from first principles, in 
the manner of Aristotelian and Stoic dialectic, none of the paradoxes of the 
philosophers mentioned in the Topics, or ofthe Stoics, or of wits such as the author 
of the Mirrour of Madnes, or of Synesius, or of academics and students arguing 
theses, or, finally, of Donne's Paradoxes and Biathanatos could claim to advance 
unexpected positions. Any theory of knowledge which will not admit first principles 
because of sceptical misgivings, discredits the concordance of opinion which could 
sanction such principles, and therefore, proposes a system of demonstration which is 
ever conscious of its own inability to attain any more than Cameadan probability. 
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As Cicero illustrated in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, such a system eliminates the 
appearance of paradox by recognizing that the manner of argumentation can be 
rhetorically manipulated to render the startling amenable to common sense. Nor can 
this process be reversed; the common-sensical cannot be made to appear startling 
through demonstrations grounded on probabilities, provided that the likelihood of 
both the premises and the conclusions of a deductive argument is acknowledged. 
Such an acknowledgement, of course, betrays the inductive basis of the deductive 
argument, and refers our judgement to its own fallible powers of verification rather 
than to a self-evident, universal and indubitable first principle. One is never 
surprised, therefore, if one never asserts more than likelihood, for exceptions to the 
probable, though unlikely, are always consciously expected. As we will see when 
we examine his rejection of scepticism in Against the Academicians, Augustine 
identifies the probabilism which underlies relativism as the source of potential moral 
anarchy. The Christian who, by faith and grace, understands the truth of scripture, 
neither suspects its mere likelihood nor is daunted by the prospect of discovering its 
paradoxical ethical implications. He may often be required by the truth of scripture 
to believe and act contrary to the common opinion. The paradoxist arguing within 
the Aristotelian tradition, takes a more moderate position with respect to probability 
by asserting the certitude and self-evidency of some universal principles (axioms), 
while acknowledging the contentiousness of other universal principles 
(definitions/positions/theses). As we have seen, reforming Aristotelians, such as 
Ramus, committed to eradicating the strife caused by the scholastic disputation of 
paradoxes denied this distinction, while others, such as Blundeville, warned against 
the sophistry of paradoxists who argued startling theses such as Copernicus'. The 
Aristotelian paradoxist is ever conscious of this tension between certain axioms and 
contentious definitions, and constructs his arguments according to dialectical rules 
devised for testing them. The paradoxist committed to demonstrating his positions 
with the comprehensive certitude of the Stoics, the mystical Platonists or the 
illumined Augustinians, however, must embrace an epistemology which places the 
confirmation of such certitude within the power of the understanding, and dispense 
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with precisely those contentious definitions from which the paradoxical theses of the 
philosophers first arose. 
We have seen from Donne's disparaging remarks about those who utilize 
critics of Aristotelian philosophy such as Erasmus, Agrippa, Lull and Sebond as 
sources for paradoxes that undermine any claims to knowledge that he could not 
tolerate the 'mentally lazy [who] think they know enough if they can show credibly 
that other people's knowledge is imperfect.' 109 We must conclude, therefore, that 
Donne's paradoxes do not follow in the tradition of the encomiasts of ignorance (of 
conventional Aristotelian wisdom) or of the advocates of allegorical or mystical 
knowledge. As a consequence ofthis conclusion, we must further conclude that 
Donne was not influenced by the Erasmian and Agrippian Paradossi of Ortensio 
Lando, despite his popularity as a writer of paradoxes in the mid-sixteenth century. 
Lando's thirty Paradossi were first published in Lyon in 1543. Another edition was 
printed in Venice in the same year, and reprinted there in 1544 and 1545. Another 
Lyon edition was printed in 1550. In 1553, the Paris publisher, Charles Estienne, 
presented his edition of Lando's Paradossi under the title Paradoxes, ce sont propos 
contre la commune opinion: debatus, en forme de Declamations forenses: pour 
exerciter lesjeunes advocats, en causes difficiles. By 1638 twenty-six more editions 
had been published in France, Italy and England. They were clearly the most 
popular paradoxes ofthe period. The first English translation ofthe Paradossi was 
done by Antony Munday in 1593, and reprinted in 1603. Munday's version 
contained only the first twelve of the twenty-five paradoxes which Estienne had 
selected from Lando's original thirty.llo 
Significantly, of the five paradoxes which Estienne removed from Lando's 
thirty, two attack the authority and wisdom of Aristotle, and another, Cicero's views 
on both philosophy and rhetoric. lll Though Lando does not explicitly recommend 
the Platonic epistemology advocated by Erasmus and Agrippa, the conspicuous lack 
of ambiguity in his defense of conventionally unpopular conditions such as poverty, 
blindness, exile, ugliness, drunkenness and even death indicates that his arguments 
will not proceed with attention to possible variations in the denotations oftheir 
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critical terms as did the syllogisms of Donne's, Synesius' and Sandford's paradoxes. 
When Lando defends poverty, as he does in various ways in his first, sixth, twelfth, 
fourteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth, twenty-first, twenty-second and twenty-third 
paradoxes, he is not exploring the natures of these qualities in the manner prescribed 
for the thesis by Cicero in De Inventione and De Partitione Oratoria. As a 
consequence, contradictory senses of the critical terms such as poverty, ignorance 
and the like are not explicitly conflated (as in Donne's Paradoxes) or clarified (as in 
Biathanatos). Poverty signifies the lack of material wealth univocally, and, 
according to Lando, conduces to the equally unambiguous virtues of modesty, 
humility and chastity. He asks in his first paradox, 'Qu'il soit vray, combien de 
personnes a l'on veu, par Ie moyen d'honneste indigence, avoir este reduits a toute 
modestie, humilite, chastete, providence?'112 To such a question, Lando provides the 
examples of popularly celebrated good men who have also advocated the virtues of 
poverty or who have themselves embodied such virtues by means of 'honneste 
indigence', and in so doing confirms the common favorable opinion of attributes 
such as modesty and humility. Lando is not interested in investigating the natures of 
those qualities which render poverty preferable by asking whether modesty, honesty 
and humility are to be preferred as goods. Orthodox Christian morality provides 
sufficient proof that these virtues are indeed goods; and therefore, no further proof is 
required. Because the goodness of these conventional Christian virtues is accepted 
on the authority of tradition and scripture, syllogistic proofs which demonstrate the 
identification of terms such as honesty and humility with poverty produce no 
surprises. In the form of a syllogism seeking to prove the preferability of poverty, 
Lando's minor premise has no more to recommend it than his examples of famous 
poor but virtuous people. Ifhe were to reason, therefore, from the conjunction of the 
assumed major premise (honesty is good) with the minor premise (poverty produces 
honesty) to the conclusion (poverty is good), he would have created an argument, 
which, while valid, fails to reach the startling conclusions of the unelaborated Stoic 
paradoxa or Donne's Paradoxes. 
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Not surprisingly, Lando, does not defend any of his paradoxes syllogistically. 
As Aristotle had noted in the Topics, uncontroversial positions such as he is 
advocating require no more than a catalogue of pious examples to prevail with the 
common opinion. Aristotle had explained, 'Induction is more convincing and clear: 
it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the 
mass of men: but deduction is more forcible and more effective against 
contradictious people. ,113 In his tenth paradox, 'That it is possible to find some 
vertue in some women' , Donne assumes the role ofthe sophist against whom 
Aristotle recommends the use of deduction and seeks to prove his purportedly absurd 
assertion deductively by arguing that since 'Suum cuique dare [to give each his own] 
be the fulfilling of all civil justice' and women 'deny that which is thers to no man', 
women 'are mostjust'.114 Though, as expected, it commits the fallacy of four terms, 
the syllogism reaches its startling conclusion by manipulating the definition of the 
term, justice. Only such manipulation within a deductive argument could produce 
such a paradoxical and 'contradictious' conclusion; as Donne says, 'these [fallacious 
syllogisms] or none must serve as reasons: and it is my great happiness that 
Examples prove not rules, for to confirme this opinion the World yields not one 
Example.'115 In Lando's arguments for the virtues of poverty, however, the 
identification of critical terms is not proven by deductions drawn from precisely 
stated definitions of their natures; they are merely predicated of each other on the 
strength of his inductive proofs. His defense of 'chaste et humble pauvrete' and 
'honneste indigence' is nothing more than a defense of chastity, humility and 
honesty, a defense so orthodox that Aristotle would surely have found its inductive 
proof perfectly' applicable generally to the mass of men' . 
If Lando was interested in defending a paradoxical position he would have 
had to show that these conventionally approved qualities were actually not to be 
preferred. Such a demonstration would require, in tum, an analysis of terms similar 
to that found in Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum and Donne's Paradoxes and 
Biathanatos. And while Donne's Paradoxes achieve their surprises by means of 
equivocally deployed middle terms, the startling conclusions of both the Paradoxa 
250 
and Biathanatos are intentionally mitigated by the clarification and restriction of the 
denotation of their middle terms. Cicero refers to the mitigation of the 
paradoxicality of his thesis when he says in his third paradox, 'If you posit...cases 
without qualification, their real nature cannot easily be judged' as does Donne when 
he maintains, in his letter to Herbert, that he believes he has sufficiently defended his 
position in Biathanatos both 'by argument and example' .116 His stated intention to 
bring 'our judgement ... nearer to a straightness' by presenting arguments 'founded 
upon a rigorous suspicion' which expose the 'the nakedness and deformity' of the 
orthodox reasons against suicide is his declaration that he intends to discover the 
fundamental natures of the laws which appear categorically to forbid suicide. 117 
Throughout the Paradossi, Lando provides an abundance of examples to prove his 
points, but omits the syllogistic demonstrations which correspond to the 'argument' 
opposed to the 'example' in Donne's letter to Herbert. Lando's reluctance to 
undertake an analysis of terms 'upon a rigorous suspicion' of their common 
connotations is characteristic of his desire to eradicate the contention and doubt 
which the schoolmen had propagated in their wordy theological disputes. llB In this 
respect, Lando's reforming spirit falls neatly in the tradition of Erasmus and 
Agrippa. 119 When Lando does scrutinize a potentially ambiguous term, he quickly 
resolves any confusion by restricting its meaning to that reflected in the examples of 
commonly admired figures or sanctioned by orthodox authorities. Of course, the 
standard from which these figures and authorities derive their orthodoxy is the 
degree to which their views conform with the undoubted word of scripture. In his 
twenty-first paradox, 'Qu'il vault se servir qu'estre servy', Lando asks: 
Mais pense tu que ce mot de serviteur soit quelque nom abj ect ou 
injuri eux? ... Combien pense tu qu'il se trouve de grans personnages, et 
d'honorables en memoire avoir este serviteurs, qui toutefois jamais ne se 
lamenterent de leur condition ou fortune?12o 
Lando answers his own question citing the example of 'Ie divin Platon' and Terence, 
and thus dismisses the potential confusion of verbal analysis. In his twenty-fifth 
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paradox, 'Qu'il vault mieux vivre en craincte qu'en asseurance', Lando defends fear 
as he had poverty in his first paradox, by uncritically associating it with the 
undisputed virtues of modesty and prudence, and by citing the authority of 
examples, such as Paul, in support of these associations. There is only one sense in 
which fear may be understood in this paradox, therefore, and that is as the moderator 
of rashness. Lando concludes on the strength of his inductive proofs that: 
Ie hornrne craintif est sage et discret, et que la crainte ne vient grande 
discretion et bon jugement. Aussi nous voyons les hardiz et temeraires estre 
prodigues de leur vie et honneur, et n'avoir aucun discours de l'advenir, mais 
sans conseil s'exposer a tous dangers et fortunes ... 121 
We need only recall his conflation of Aristotle's doctrines of the golden mean and 
final causes in his first paradox, to confirm that Donne's analysis of terms 
(sophistical or genuine) reflects an acknowledgement of ambiguity which is totally 
lacking in Lando's analysis. 
6 
Lando's Paradossi, Estienne and the Dismissal of Syllogistic 
It is possible to explain Lando's failure to question the nature ofthe virtues 
he defends by reading the Paradossi not as paradoxical theses, but as the forensic 
declamations which both Estienne and Munday had called them in their French and 
English translations. 122 This explanation would appear to relieve them of the burden 
of philosophical investigation prescribed for the thesis by Cicero in De Partitione 
Oratoria. Hence, Lando's argument that ignorance is better than wisdom is not a 
declamation of the third type of the cogitatio described by Cicero in De Partitione 
Oratoria or of the thesis comtempliuae described by Aphthonius in the 
Progymnasmata, but is actually a declamation of a forensic hypothesis, which seeks 
not to exalt the universal nature of ignorance above that of wisdom, but rather to 
defend a certain type of ignorance (of worldly knowledge) of a certain type of man 
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(a Christian) against the claims of a certain type of wisdom (worldly knowledge) of a 
certain type of man (learned in worldly knowledge). According to this explanation, 
Lando's Paradossi, therefore, are only loosely called paradoxes because, though 
they superficially argue against common opinion, they neither investigate the 
relative natures of their subjects in the abstract (as Cicero, Aphthonius and Aristotle 
had prescribed for the thesis) nor utilize deductive argument, the characteristic 
dialectical tool of the philosopher (as Cicero and Quintilian had observed). This 
explanation also clarifies Lando's statement that 'the truth of any matter whatsoever, 
appeareth most cleerly, when the different reasons against the same, is equalled or 
neighboured therewith.' 123 As we have seen, Lando's paradoxes did not intend to 
'vex' or raise 'an alarum to truth' as Donne's Paradoxes and Biathanatos had, 
because he intended simply to confirm the common opinion of an accepted truth by 
employing those reasons, which could be used as refutations of that truth, to defend 
it. Hence, if a defense of ignorance normally constitutes a reason against the truth of 
the superiority of wisdom, it becomes a confirmation of that truth when a specific 
type of ignorance is defended as an exalted form of wisdom. It was this type of 
defense which Wilson, the model for student lawyers in late sixteenth-century 
England, recommended when he explained in the Arte of Rhetorique, 'Contraria 
inter se opposita magis elucescunt'. In his translation of the preface to the reader, 
Estienne retains Lando's emphasis on the forensic nature of the Paradossi. 
A ceste cause [to improve the skills oflawyers] je t'ay offert en ce livret Ie 
debat d'aucuns propos que les anciens ont voulu nommer Paradoxes, c'est a 
dire contraires a l'opinion de la plusparts des hommes, a fin que par discours 
d'iceulx la verite opposite t'en soit a l'advenir plus clere et apparante, et 
aussi pour t'exercer au debat des choses qui te contraignent a chercher 
diligemment et laboriuesement raisons, preuves, authoritez, histoires, et 
memoires fort diverses et cachees. 124 
As Lando suggests, the Paradossi resemble Cicero's Paradoxa in their defense of 
uncommon opinions by appeals to common sense; such appeals, as Quintilian had 
noted, dispense with dialectical demonstrations in favor of examples. Despite 
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Lando's claim that the Paradossi are exhortations to the lawyer to search diligently 
for reasons and proofs as well as examples, there are no instances of deductive proof 
in them. Though Cicero suggests a more precise rhetorical objective when he says 
that he will transpose 'things expressed in the schools of philosophy in the form of 
logical demonstration into this oratorical style of discourse that is my own', he does 
not omit analyses of ambiguous terms in the form of deductive argument. 125 To 
questions typical ofthe general inquiries ofthe philosophical thesis, such as 'Can a 
thing that is a good for anybody be an evil?" Cicero consistently adds examples 
from 'the life and actions of men of eminence', never forgetting that his arguments 
are designed to appeal to the common opinion.126 Nonetheless, the analysis of theses 
in the form of deductive argument remains central to the procedure of his arguments. 
In his third paradox, 'That transgressions are equal and right actions equal', he 
examines the nature of transgression both in abstract terms and in the structure of 
deductive argument. 'If this fact of not being allowed cannot ever become greater or 
smaller, since the action's not being a transgression consists in its not having been 
allowed, the transgressions springing from the fact of non-allowance must 
necessarily be equal. ,127 Cicero's combination of example and syllogistic analysis in 
his defense of the Stoic paradoxa reflects his concern with the reconciliation of 
rhetoric and dialectic. When, in Brutus, Cicero had praised Servius' combination of 
knowledge of aequitas (which is obtained through the examination of the third class 
of the cogitatio) derived from the consideration of theses and of the particular 
circumstances (hypotheses) addressed by the civil law, he designated dialectic ars 
omnium artium maxima, and a prerequisite for the ideal forensic orator. The 
Paradossi's neglect of dialectical analysis, while pleasing the anti-Aristotelian, 
would certainly have displeased Cicero. 
In his1554 edition ofthe Paradossi, Estienne added a paradox of his own, 
'Que Ie plaider est chose tresutile et necessaire a la vie des hommes' to which a 
rebuttal was added in the Deux Plaidoyez, which was included in the 1570 Poitiers 
edition of the Estienne translation of the Paradossi. 128 Estienne's defense of the 
lawyer's art is predominantly satirical and displays none of the respect for the 
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dialectical analysis evident in Cicero's Paradoxa or Donne's Biathanatos. Indeed, 
the target of his satire is precisely that lawyer who exploits ambiguous questions to 
obscure the plain truth. Agrippa's opinion oflawyers reflects the suspicion of 
Aristotelian dialectic evident in both the Vanity and in Lando's Erasmian paradoxes 
of ignorance and foolishness. Agrippa had described lawyers as Nashe had 
described Ramists, as Harvey had described Nashe, as Cicero had described the 
Stoics, as Isocrates had described the sophists, as Erasmus had described the 
schoolmen, and as Donne had described the equivocal Jesuits in Ignatius His 
Conclave. Among lawyers, Agrippa complained: 
is so much deceipte, wrangling, and discorde, that he which disagreeth not 
from others: he that knoweth not how to gainsaie other mens woordes with 
newe opinions, and bringe all apparante thinges in doubte, and with doubtfull 
expositions to applie well inuented Laws to theire deuises, is accompted little 
or nothing learned. 129 
Agrippa himself had claimed that he was not entirely serious in his invective in the 
Vanity, but there is little doubt that his attack on the contentiousness of lawyers, 
orthodox as it is, was entirely in earnest. 130 Estienne's paradox oflawyers, like all of 
Lando's, lacks dialectical ingenuity, perhaps because his objective is to show that 
there are some lawyers who are not like those condemned as vain paradoxists by 
Agrippa. To succeed in this proof, therefore, he must avoid precisely that dialectical 
analysis of the meanings of ambiguous terms that Cicero claimed distinguished the 
forensic oratory of Servius. 131 After observing that the common opinion (in the 
voice of Bon Acord) finds the arguments of prosecutors to be the product of 
'differents' and 'questions' full of 'inventions et subtilitez des debats', which are 
only interpretable by other subtle lawyers, Estienne proceeds in the inductive manner 
of Lando to provide examples oflawyers who are not sophistical. 132 Where would 
be, he asks, without the lawyer who helps 'procure Ie bien et utilite des hommes' and 
the counselor 'qui donne son advis pour l'equite'?133 If Estienne held dialectical 
analysis in as low regard as Lando, as it appears he did, his counselor would have no 
recourse to the type of investigations (cogitatio) which Cicero had insisted were 
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specifically concerned with equity. In his response to the paradox of the lawyer, the 
second 'plaidoyer', exactly the same sophistical qualities in lawyers are attacked, 
except in this case, examples need not be provided of good lawyers; all that is 
required is a rehearsal of the common opinion's low estimate of them. The 
indubitable authority of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians is then invoked for the 
same purpose as Lando had invoked it in his third paradox, 'Qu'il vault mieux estre 
ignorant que s9avant', to illustrate the vanity of human knowledge, and particularly 
that of the subtle dialecticians. 134 
In his paradox of ignorance, Lando had advised a humility in matters of 
religion which was characteristic of those who asserted the priority of scripture in 
the direction of moral life, such as Erasmus and Agrippa. And though this humility 
was informed only by contrast to the intellectual pride of the scholastic theologians 
so reviled by humanists throughout Europe in the early sixteenth century, to 
recommend the abandonment of the Aristotelian logic which underpinned scholastic 
theology was also to recommend the abandonment of the faculty of practical reason, 
which employed that same logic to deliver probable conclusions upon which the will 
could confidently take action. Such confidence, therefore, is possible only within an 
epistemological scheme which permits the mind some access to knowledge through 
the exercise of reason alone. As Cicero had observed, Stoic dialectic, while it 
permitted such access, failed to recognize the disparity between the theoretical 
necessity of its syllogistic conclusions and the mere probability of those conclusions 
obtaining in the circumstantially complex ethical1ives of real men. Both Aristotle 
and Aquinas, recognize this disparity between knowledge (episteme) and opinion 
(doxa) and provide for it in their explanation oflogical operations of the practical 
reason, operations which, while sometimes mistaken, may yet achieve a degree of 
likelihood sufficient to produce a rectified conscience and a confident will. Lando's 
Pauline exhortations to ignorance and folly, leave the conscience stripped of its 
access to the fallible Aristotelian dialectic so corrupted by the schoolmen and 
lawyers, and refer it to alternative methods of verification. Lando could not approve 
the attempts of scholastic reformers, such as Lull or Ramus, to eliminate the 
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uncertainty from Aristotle's logic, and advised instead, the pious confession of the 
vanity of human knowledge, the fearful submission to the inscrutable authority of 
God and obedience to the expression of his will in scripture. 135 
7 
Montaigne's Pyrrhonist View of Paradox 
As we have seen, Donne's decision not to use Augustine's definition of sin in 
Biathanatos reflects an underlying dissatisfaction with epistemological positions, 
such as Lando's, which respond to the doubt exposed both by the sceptical critique 
and by scholastic controversy with a declaration that the truth of God's law is 
knowable only to those who faithfully submit to it. Such a view makes faith the sole 
criterion for the establishment of the first ethical principles from which the moral 
agent may deduce the right course of action given a certain set of circumstances. 
While Donne maintained that faith was necessary to lead the mind to assent to the 
truth of divine mysteries which appear to defy rational explanation such as 
Marbeck's paradox of Psalm 24 (23), he also maintained that reason should be 
utilized to resolve our doubts about matters upon which God has not revealed the 
truth, and to deduce courses of action in our ethical life which seem likely to be free 
of sin. The identification of the laws of nature, reason and God in Biathanatos 
represents Donne's effort not only to create a paradoxical argument which refutes 
the common opinion against suicide, but also to delineate the constructive role of 
reason in ethics according to the Aristotelian ethics of Aquinas. 136 And while Donne 
never forgets the tentativeness of the positions he advances in Biathanatos, positions 
which fall under the category of theses or paradoxes, his repeated emphasis on the 
universality and immutability of the laws of nature, reason and God reveal that his 
thesis will do more than simply refute the universality of laws forbidding suicide. 137 
His intention, he says, is to free suicide 'not only from those enormous degrees of 
sin, but from all'. 138 
257 
As we will see, Donne does not choose the sceptical and relativist tactic of 
the libertine who asserts that the law of nature prohibits nothing, that the law of 
reason is subjective and variable, and that the law of God is inscrutable. Against 
such assertions, Donne claims that 'that part of God's law which binds always bound 
before it was written, and so it is but dictamen rectae rationis, and that is the law of 
nature' and that 'though our substance of nature, which is best understood of the 
foundations and principles and first grounds of natural law, may not be changed, yet 
functio naturae, which is the exercise and application thereof, and deduction from 
thence, may and must. ,139 These claims constitute a response not only to libertines, 
but also to fideists such as Montaigne, who deny rational access to divine law on 
Pyrronist grounds. 140 Donne, following Aristotle and Aquinas on the operation of 
practical reason, acknowledges that deductions of particular actions from these first 
principles oflaw may change according to circumstances, but maintains that such a 
rational process, though imperfect, is both necessary and reliable. In his' Apology of 
Raymond Sebond' (1580), Montaigne had called this rational process 'lumpish and 
barren matter' and attributed any claim of its worth to the' grace of God. ,141 And 
despite the fact that Sebond sought to devise a cognitive system whereby the 
intellect could attain an understanding of everything it observed, Montaigne defends 
him only in so far as he exalted the necessity of faith. 142 Thus, instead of defending 
the allegorical method ofSebond as the most reliable rational means to knowledge, 
Montaigne will use reason as Sextus had, 'to make them [those who place reason 
before faith] feele the emptinesse, vacuitie, and no worth of man: and violently to 
pull out of their hands, the silly weapons of their reason' . 143 As we have seen, 
Donne's rejection of Sebond was a consequence of his Aristotelian mistrust ofthe 
allegorical method of confirming the primacy of first principles and of 
demonstrating their analogues. Montaigne, like Aristotle before him, suspected 
'meerely poetical' explanations of human superiority in the order of creatures, but, 
unlike Donne and Aquinas, would not permit human reason any access to a law of 
nature which could be identified with the law of God. 144 
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Donne's aim to identify the laws of nature, reason and God, required him to 
invest the two former laws, so disparaged by Montaigne, with a universality and 
certainty which could distinguish them from the mutable, particular and unreliable 
law of man, ius gentium. As we will see, after arguing in the first part of 
Biathanatos that the principal law of nature for man is the law of reason, Donne need 
only claim that the first indemonstrable principles of these laws are known self-
evidently to all men. Donne's argument for the identification of the laws of reason 
and nature in man is derived from an inversion of Aquinas' hierarchical organization 
of the three principles of nature operative in man, and will be examined below. Such 
an identification for Montaigne, however, is impossible because the mutable ius 
gentium cannot be distinguished from the umeliable law of reason. And as the 
various and contradictory customs of cultures around the world, which he is so fond 
of observing, all claim their source in nature, neither nature, reason nor custom can 
be said to command universally or absolutely. Moreover, any attempt to locate the 
source of the principles of Christianity in nature also reveals their true source in the 
mutable ius gentium. Montaigne says, 'Another country, other Testimonies, equall 
promises: alike menaces, might semblably imprint a cleane contrary religion in us: 
we are Christians by the same title, as we are either Perigordins or Germans. ,145 And 
as of all laws of all nations, 'there is not one alone, that is not impugned or 
disallowed, not by one nation, but by many, ... the generalitie of approbation ... [is] 
the one1y likely ensigne, by which they may argue some lawes to natural' .146 Donne 
complained that the law of nature 'is with most authors confounded and made the 
same with ius gentium' and rejected the view of the Catholic casuists, Azorius and 
Sylvius (which Montaigne shared), 'that the law of nature, as it concerns only 
reason, is ius gentium' on the grounds that such an identification has been asserted 
merely to distinguish the natural law of self-preservation in all animate beings from 
the higher law of nature which rational beings follow. 147 To assert from this 
negatively derived definition of natural law in humans, from what such a law cannot 
be, that what is most reasonable in ethics is what 'is ... practiced and accepted in most, 
especially civilest, nations' is simply not, as Donne illustrates in the following 
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paragraph, supported by historical precedent. 'How,' he asks, 'shall we accuse 
idolatry or immolation of men to be sins against nature,' if these once customary 
practices must be considered to accord with reason, which is the law of nature in 
humans?148 The list of examples of immolation which Donne then offers, whether 
true or not, are certainly inappropriate as support for an identification of ius gentium 
and recta ratio. 149 However, as illustrations ofthe kind of patently forbidden 
behavior (idolatry and immolation) which could be defended as natural and rational 
because customarily practiced, these examples serve Donne's objective perfectly. ISO 
Donne is fully aware that no one would attempt to defend such behavior as 
universally natural, that is, in accordance with 'that part of God's law which binds 
always [and] bound before it was written, ... [that] dictamen rectae rationis, ... the law 
of nature. , 
Montaigne's rejection ofthe universality of natural law resulted only partly 
from his observation of the variability of human laws and customs. In the 
'Apology', he summarizes both Cicero's and Sextus' principles of scepticism as 
expounded in the Academica, the Outlines, and Against the Mathematicians, and 
declares his allegiance to scepticism generally, not only because it denies the 
presence of immutable natural laws underlying human law, but also because it 
denies the mind the capacity to discern the true from the false. Montaigne's denial 
ofthis capacity is simply a restatement of Cicero's and Sextus' rejection of the Stoic 
lekton. He says that 'we are those that aver some falsehood entermixt with every 
truth, and that with such likenesse, as there is no set note in those things for any 
assuredly to give judgement or assent.' 151 We have seen that Cicero was content to 
assert the probable correspondence of our perceptions with the external world 
(verisimile), but that Sextus, recognizing that such an assertion assumes a true 
perception of the external world, took the stronger sceptical line and proclaimed that 
no proposition was more likely to be true than false. Montaigne follows Sextus, 
stating, 'Apparances are every where alike. The law of speaking pro and contra is 
all one. Nothing seemeth true, that may not seeme false. ,152 Still following Sextus, 
Montaigne recommends the suspension of judgement and the obedient acceptance 
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of the particular civil and ecclesiastical laws under whose jurisdiction one finds 
oneself, for, he says, 'The first law that ever God gave unto man, was a Law of pure 
obedience.'153 And the prerequisite for such obedience is, as Erasmus, Agrippa and 
Lando had said, ignorance ofthe vain contentious debates of those who argue the 
preferability of their opinions. 'We must be besotted,' Montaigne says, 'ere we can 
become wise' .154 He continues later, 'It is more by the meanes of our ignorance, 
than of our skill, that we are wise in heavenly knowledge. It is no marvell if our 
natural and terrestial meanes cannot conceive the supernaturall, or apprehend the 
celestial knowledge. Let us add nothing of our own unto it, but obedience and 
subjection' .155 Montaigne has eliminated the role of the conscience led by practical 
reason, which Donne's identification of the laws of nature, reason and God was 
intended to facilitate. 
While Montaigne's Pyrrhonism required him to recommend that the 
individual conscience submit to external authority, he also recognized that only the 
individual can detennine ifhe has acted in good conscience.156 This detennination, 
however, is impossible because the Pyrrhonist maintains that no position is more 
likely to be true than any other.157 As we have seen, Donne found those who 
doubted even the testimony of their consciences as a consequence of sceptical 
epistemologies, such as Montaigne's, guilty of moral laziness. After describing the 
deductive procedure of the practical reason from 'those true propositions, which 
are ... the issue oflight of nature and of our discourse' to 'those conclusions' which 
then assume 'the nature of propositions and beget more', Donne explains that 
provided these conclusions are not 'corrupted and bastarded by fallacy, ... every 
man's resolution is detennined and arrested by [them], and submitted to [them]' .158 
To those whose consciences' are led according to this syllogistic method of 
reasoning, he opposes the obedient Pyrrhonists praised by Montaigne, those 'men of 
weak disposition, or lazy, or flattering, [who] look no farther into any of these 
propositions than from whose mouth it proceeds, or what authority it hath now, not 
from whence it was produced' .159 What Donne is recommending when he suggests 
that the conscience is bound to analyze the universal premises from which particular 
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choices are deduced is the type of investigation of which Biathanatos is an example, 
the investigation ofa thesis or paradox. Montaigne's Pyrrhonism denied reason any 
knowledge of these premises, and therefore, rejected the utility of speaking pro and 
contra which Harvey had praised in the declamation of paradoxes of genuinely 
controversial issues. Montaigne asks, 'Is it not better for a man to suspend his owne 
perswasion, than to meddle with these seditious and quarellous divisions?' 160 The 
ancient paradoxists, whose theses are mentioned by Aristotle in the Topics, argued in 
'a manner of writing doubtfull both in substance and intent, rather enquiring than 
instructing' , and therefore, intended not to convince others oftheir opinions, but 
rather 'to shew the wavering of mans minde above all matters, or ignorantly forced 
by the volubilitie and incomprehensibleness of all matters' .161 As Isocrates, Aristotle 
and Diogenes Laertius had noted, Montaigne claims that the paradoxes of Mel iss us, 
Protagoras, Parmenides and Zeno were all devised to demonstrate the absurd theses 
which one could defend syllogistically. In his refutations of their theses, Aristotle 
had warned against abandoning the principles of logic because sophists constructed 
arguments which appeared to demonstrate the futility of dialectic to distinguish the 
true from the false. 162 Montaigne, however, following Sextus' opinion of the 
consequences of Gorgias' paradox 'that nothing is', disregards Aristotle's warning 
and concludes that even the wisest men 'humane reason hath perswaded, that she 
had neither ground or footing, no not so much as to warrant the snow to be white' .163 
The final proof that the logic so prized by Aristotle and his followers is unable to 
lead reason to know ledge is Epimenides' paradox of the liar, which of course, still 
troubles logicians today.164 
8 
Syllogistic Analysis and the Operation of Conscience 
For Montaigne, the paradoxes of the philosophers hold no surprises because 
our methods of demonstration are too uncertain to eliminate any possibility, much 
less to identify likelihoods. In 'Ofthe Art of Conferring', he had said, 'No 
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propositions amaze me, no conceit woundeth me, what contrariety soever they have 
to mine' because, as he observes in 'Of the Institution and Education of Children', to 
declare anything to be impossible 'is by rash presumption to presume and know how 
farre possibilitie reacheth. ,165 Of course, to determine the probabilities of 
possibilities was the original purpose of Aristotle's dialectic; to deny logic the power 
to distinguish the true from the false was, for Montaigne, to liberate the conscience 
from the contentious, yet dogmatic, precepts of Aristotelian divines and 
philosophers. In the midst of his praise oflearning by example and experience, he 
recounts the story of his encounter with an Aristotelian from Pisa in terms 
reminiscent of the Oxford dons attacked by Bruno in The Ash-Wednesday Supper 
and recorded by Anthony a Wood in The History and Antiquities of the University of 
Oxford. This man, Montaigne explains, was 'such an Aristotelian, as he held this 
infallible position; that a conformitie to Aristotles doctrine was the true touchstone 
and squire of all solide imaginations, and perfect veritie; for, whatsoever had no 
coherencie with it, was but fond Chimeraes, and idle humours' .166 Aristotle, Ramus 
and all those who have followed them in believing in the se1f-evidency of first 
principles are promptly dismissed with Montaigne's dismissal of this Aristotelian. 
'Aristotles principles shall be no more axiomes unto him [the sceptical scholar], than 
the Stoikes or Epicurians. Let this diversitie of judgements be proposed unto him, if 
he can, he shall be able to distinguish the truth from falsehood, if not, he will 
remaine doubtfull.'167 
Montaigne's sceptical scholar, will, of course, disbelieve the demonstrations 
of the dialecticians and remain doubtful. His Pyrrhonist doubt will not make him 
contentious or seek to discover the natures ofthings through dialectical analysis of 
theses, as did the probabilist scepticism represented in Cicero's Paradoxa 
Stoicorum. Such analysis results only in the discovery of the uncertainty of our 
definitions. After describing the controversies created by Luther's theses and other 
such unorthodox writings, Montaigne says: 
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Our contestation is verball. I demaund what Nature voluptuousnesse, circle 
and substitution is? The question is of words, and with words it is answered. 
A stone is a body: but he that should insist and urge: And what is a body? A 
substance: And what a substance? And so goe-on: Should at last bring the 
respondent to his Calepine or wits end. )68 
Harvey had also bemoaned the convoluted verbal conflicts between the religious 
factions of his and Montaigne's time, but had maintained that it was the method of 
Aristotle and Ramus which was the means by which the confusion arising from these 
disagreements could be dispelled. If these schismatics would 'define thinges simply, 
without any colours, or embellishments, according to the precepts of Aristotle, and 
the examples of Ramus ... the most-endlesse altercations; being generally verb all, 
then reall, and more circumstantiall, then substantiall; will soon grow to an ende.')69 
Montaigne was obviously not convinced by the view of Ramus and his followers 
that a syllogistic demonstration may preempt the sceptic's infinitely regressive 
analysis of terms when it reaches the self-evident axiom from which the 
demonstration proceeds. Had Harvey been as confident in the demonstrative power 
of syllogism, he would not have acknowledged genuinely controversial issues to 
which the precepts of Aristotle did not definitively speak; hence his praise of the 
profitable paradox. However, regarding the uncertainty of the conscience, with 
which Donne is principally concerned in Biathanatos, Harvey's concerns about the 
libertine threat to public order force him to endorse the Ramist method as a means to 
eliminate the doubts of the moral agent. The principles which ground our 
knowledge ('Science') may not be applied to serve the individual, and sophistical, 
ends against which Wilson had warned in his discussion of the 'libertines reason'. 
Though he alludes to Aquinas' emphasis ofthe knowledge (scientia) constitutive of 
conscience which will inform Donne's Thomist treatment ofthe conscience in 
Biathanatos, Harvey does not accommodate the error which both Aquinas and 
Donne allow a rectified conscience. 
Indeed Conscience, grounded upon Science, is a double Ancher; that neither 
deceiueth, nor is deceiued: and no better rule than, then a regular, or publique 
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Conscience; in diuinity ruled by Diuinitie, in law, by Law, in art, by Art, in 
reason, by Reason, in experience, by Experience. Other irregular, or priuate 
Conscience, in Publique functions, will fall-out to be but a lawlesse 
Church ... !70 
Harvey's Ramistic confidence in the certainty of knowledge comprising the scientia 
of conscientia, allows him to collapse the distinction between judgements made in 
foro interiori and exteriori with which Donne was so concerned in Biathanatos and 
the Essays in Divinity.!7! Judgements made in foro interiori are determined by what 
Harvey would call the 'priuate Conscience' while those made inforo exteriori are 
those made against the legal standards imposed by the civil and canon laws, which 
for Harvey represent the 'publique Conscience'. 
Donne recognizes the validity ofthe claims of the individual conscience 
against the mandates of human law, and, following Aquinas and the casuists, insists 
that even the commands of an erring conscience must be obeyed over against any 
external authority. 'And this obligation which our conscience casts upon us is of 
stronger hold and of straiter band than the precept of any superior, whether law or 
person, and is so much iuris naturalis as it cannot be infringed nor altered beneficio 
divinae indulgentiae'.172 Donne is careful to distinguish, as had Aquinas, between a 
conscience which errs 'mala fide' because it has neglected to exercise 'all moral 
industry and diligence', and one 'which errs justly, probably, and bona fide', but 
nevertheless maintains that 'as long as that error remains and resides in it, a man is 
bound not to do against his conscience. ,173 As we will see, Donne's allowance of 
probability as sufficient for a rectified conscience betrays his adoption of Aquinas' 
Aristotelian doctrine of the potentially fallible faculty of practical reason, which 
makes use of primary universal principles known intuitively in its consideration of 
the particular circumstances under which an ethical choice must be taken. For 
Aristotle, the complexity of ethical circumstances often reflects the same complexity 
inherent in the diversity ofthe objects of sense; and therefore, universal conclusions 
drawn from the observation of partiCUlar sets of circumstances were no more certain 
than those derived from the examination of sets of physical objects. Though 
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Montaigne's Pyrrhonism takes this resemblance as grounds for rejecting claims of 
probability in ethics, Aristotle's confidence in both the accuracy of universal 
conclusions drawn inductively and their application as major premises in deductive 
arguments leads him to recommend a syllogistic method in the exercise of practical 
reason. Donne's advocacy of the conscience's use ofthe syllogistic method of 
analysis is evident in his description of the deductive procedure by which our 
discourse produces conclusions which produce propositions from which further 
conclusions may be drawn, but remembers that the further the deductive procedure 
descends from the first principles, the more likely that its conclusions will be 
'corrupted and bastarded by fallacy'. 174 Donne's observation of the variability of 
human laws leads him to reject the universality of the ius gentium, and with it, its 
use in the deductive procedure of the practical reason. Only the law of reason, in so 
far as it is common to all men, deserves the title of human law. Montaigne, 
observing this same variability, had also rejected the possibility of a universal and 
absolute human law. However, unlike Donne, who accepted some ethical first 
principles which are known to all through natural reason, his sceptical mistrust of the 
reliability of both the senses and syllogistic demonstrations would not pennit him to 
posit the law of reason as the ground upon which human law could claim 
universality.175 After Montaigne explains that 'the generalitie of approbation ... [is] 
the onely likely ensigne, by which they [those who seek to identify the human law 
and the natural law] may argue some lawes to be naturall', he proceeds to illustrate 
that such a generality does not exist. 176 If reason were capable of delivering 
conclusions to which all men could assent, this general approval might be attained, 
but since the 'senses are the beginning and end of humane knowledge', human law 
and science generally 'cannot be maintained but by unreasonable, fond and mad 
reason'.177 Beginning with the criterion for universality, which Montaigne claims 
reason cannot fulfill, Donne says that 'that law hath most force and value which is 
most general, and there is no law so general that it deserves the name of ius gentium 
(or if there be, it will be the same ... as recta ratio ... )'.178 Later, he gives an example 
from the De privilegiis iuris civiles (1606) written by the Austrian legal and political 
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commentator, Georgius Acacius Enenkelius; this example of the deductive 
procedure of conscience describes the function of practical reason as neither 
unreasonable, fond nor mad. 'It is natural and binds all always, to know there is a 
God; from this is deduced by necessary consequence that God, if He be, must be 
worshipped, and after this, by likely consequence, that he must be worshipped in this 
or this manner' . 179 
Donne's awareness that the more particular our deductions are, the less able 
they are to claim more than likelihood, reveals the Aristotelian and Thomistic 
grounds on which he bases his exposition of the operations of the conscience. As we 
have seen, the use of syllogistic argument requires the acceptance of some first 
principles which themselves are indemonstrable. Aquinas had stated that the human 
law could not be derived from the natural law discernible to reason for the same 
reason as had Montaigne and Donne (i.e. the variability of human laws); but like 
Donne, he attributed the discrepancy between the 'general precepts of the natural 
law' and the discordant laws of various societies not to a lack of universality and 
necessity in the precepts, but to the 'great variety of human affairs' which obscure 
the application ofthe first principles ofthe natural law to specific and complex 
circumstances. 180 Montaigne's Pyrrhonism led him to dismiss the view that 'there 
be some firme, perpetuall and immoveable [laws], which they call naturall, and by 
the condition of their proper essence, are imprinted in mankind' .181 Because this 
dismissal implicitly denies differences in degrees of likelihood, it results in the 
elimination of the distinction separating the orthodox and the paradoxical; all 
assertions, therefore, are opinions (doxa) which are no more likely than any other. 
On the other hand, Ramus' insistence on the presence of true, but indemonstrable, 
axioms and definitions governing the whole of human knowledge, renders all 
assertions either true or false, and therefore, the proper objects of knowledge, not of 
opinion. For both Aristotle and Aquinas, the practical reason, in so far as it 
determines our ethical choices, is concerned specifically with contingencies. By 
their nature, these contingencies represent matters which may be otherwise, and thus, 
are contrasted with those first necessary principles of which we may claim to have 
knowledge (episteme).182 Of contingent matters, however, we may only have 
opinions. In the Posterior Anaiytics, Aristotle explains the difference between 
objects of knowledge and of opinion. 
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No one thinks that he opines when he thinks that it is impossible for it to be 
otherwise, but that he understands; but when he thinks that it is so but that 
nothing prevents it being otherwise, then he thinks he opines, supposing 
opinion to be about that sort of thing and understanding about what is 
necessary. 183 
Donne explicitly observes this relation in the title of Biathanatos, stating that he will 
argue that the law prohibiting suicide is merely an opinion, and therefore, is 
susceptible to paradoxical arguments against it. As a thesis, it will investigate the 
nature of the reasons traditionally used to defend the universality of the law in 
accordance with the Ciceronian prescriptions for the philosophical procedure of 
theses; and as a paradox, it will argue that the issue lacks a precept which presides 
over it absolutely and with necessity, and is thus, bound irrevocably within the 
domain of opinion. He says that Biathanatos is a 'declaration ofthat Paradox or 
Thesis, that Self-Homicide is not so naturally Sin that it may never be otherwise; 
wherein the Nature and the Extent of all those Laws which seem to be violated by 
this Act are diligently surveyed' . 184 
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and M. Pabst Battin note Donne's use of Aquinas' defmition of sin, but consider it to be merely a 
'refmement of the unitary account of sin in Augustine'. See Donne, 1982, pp. xlvii-xlix. 
57 More, 1965, p. 99 
57 Ibid., p. 99 
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58 Ibid., p. 101. A. E. Malloch has overlooked More's irony in this passage of Utopia, and concludes 
that he was sceptical about man's apprehension of the universality of Christian truths, and therefore, 
genuinely recommended a relativist ethics which could accommodate changing, and potentially 
contradictory, political circumstances. His decision to remain silent on the issue of Henry's divorce, 
a decision which, while initially politic, resulted in his knowingly effecting his own execution, should 
be sufficient evidence that More did not genuinely advocate the subordination of Christian ethics to 
the inconsistent demands of secular authority. As a result of his misreading, Malloch makes More, 
Erasmus, Agrippa, Montaigne and Donne all part of a tradition of paradox which subscribes to the 
relativist principle 'that knowledge is dramatic ... [and] proportional to each historical scene' (p. 202). 
See Malloch, 1956, pp. 191-203; and Malloch, 1958, pp. 32-34. M. T. Jones-Davies has followed 
Malloch into the same error by accepting his reading of the Utopia. See Jones-Davies, 1982, pp. 
105-123, esp. 116. For useful comment on this passage in Utopia, see the introduction of Edward 
Surtz, S. J. in More, 1965, p. cxlvii. 
59 It is worth noting that the Anglican casuist, Jeremy Taylor accused Catholic casuists of the same 
attempt to relieve the conscience of its burden to assent to what it perceives to be the best course of 
action through 'ingenious' interpretations. 'They [the Catholic casuists] have made their cases of 
conscience and the actions of their lives unstable as the face of the waters, and irnmeasureable as the 
dimensions of the moon; by which means their confessors shall be enabled to answer according to 
every man's humour, and no man shall depart sad from their penitential chairs'. See Taylor, 1660, 
XI, p. 345 (quoted in Camille Welles Slights, 1981, p. 6). Not surprsingly, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth-century controversies between Protestant and Catholic casuists, both sides were equally 
convinced that the other was inventing ways to justify sinful actions. For more on this controversy, 
see Camille Welles Slights, 1981, pp. 3-34. 
60 In a letter to Henry Goodyer in 1609, Donne said, 'To do things by example, and upon confidence 
of anothers judgement may be some kinde of second wisdome; but it is but writing by a copy: or 
indeed it is the hardest of all, and the issue of the first wisdome, for I cannot know that this example 
should be followed, except I knew that it is good, and so I must judge my Judge. Our assent 
therefore, and arrest, must be upon things, not persons.' See Donne, 1977, p. 28. On More's 
orthodox Catholic view on suicide, see Green, 1972, pp. 135-155. On the relation of More and 
Erasmus to Donne's Catholic upbringing, see Flynn, 1983, pp. 1-9. For Flynn's criticism of Bald's 
and Walton's accounts of Donne's conversion from Catholicism, see Flynn, 1975-1976a, pp. 1-17; 
and Flynn, 1975-1976b, 178-195. 
61 On More's and Eramsus' common humanist claims against the scholastic theologians on points of 
scriptural interpretation, see Nauert, 1998, pp. 427-438, esp. 435. 
62 Erasmus, 1988, p. 9 
63 Ibid., p. 9 
64 Ibid., p. 13. See also Matthew 6:22. 
65 For Augustine's description of the attainment of illumination through figurative reading, see 
Augustine, On Christian Docrtine III, 5-17. 
66 Erasmus, 1988, p. 34. For a discussion of Augustine's use of allegorical interpretation as a means 
to avoid the errors which arise from excessive attention to the literal signification of words, see 
Mazzeo, 1964, pp. 1-28, esp 7-16. For a discussion ofOrigen's neoplatonic influence on Erasmus' 
theory of exegesis, see Screech, 1980, pp. 113-117, 223-240. For a discussion of Origen's preference 
for allegorical interpretation, see Copleston, 1972, pp. 21-22. 
67 Erasmus, 1988, p. 33 
68 Ibid., p. 65 
69 Ibid., p. 69. For a discussion of Erasmus' aversion to the Aristotelian methods of exposition of the 
scholastic theolgians, see Screech, 1980, pp. 107-110. 
70 For discussion of the mixture of Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines in the late sixteenth century, 
see Schmitt, 1983a, pp. 139-190; and Schmitt, 1983b, pp. 89-109. Martin Camargo has shown that 
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Augustine himself may have criticized Erasmus for overestimating the power of Platonic philosophy 
to discover the truth. See Camargo, 1998, pp. 393-408. 
71 Donne, 1967a, p. 27. Donne, no doubt, was also thinking of the moral permissiveness of the Jesuit 
doctrines of equivocation and probabilism. Probabilism, as opposed to the Protestant casuistical 
doctrine of probabiliorism, permitted an action to be justified by reasons which achieved even a 
lesser degree of probability. In John Webster's Duchess of Malji (1623), Bosola observed the danger 
of such forms of justification. ' ... Why, 'tis well: / Security some men call the suburbs of hell, / Only 
a dead wall between ... ' (V, iii, 11. 333-335). 
72 Donne, 1967a, p. 39. In Biathanatos, Donne would confirm that only a decision taken without the 
perturbations of the passions is rationally justified. There he says that 'he whose conscience, well-
tempered and dispassioned, assures him that the reason of self-preservation ceases in him, may also 
presume that the law ceases too'. See Donne, 1982,11. 1741-1743. 
73 Mary Paton Ramsay has failed to observe these critical distinctions in Donne's interpretive 
practice, and permits him to approve both the allegorical readings of Augustine and the syllogistic 
expositions of Aquinas. Though Donne could utilize allegorical methods to express ideas which he 
considered to be beyond the limits of human knowledge, Ramsay fails to describe Donne's 
epistemological views with respect to the divergent traditions of neoplatonic Augustinianism and 
Aristotelian Thornism. As a result, her account of Donne's scepticism is confused, at times affIrming 
his rejection of knowledge of universals through the senses on traditional neoplatonic grounds, and at 
others, his acceptance of Aristotelian deductive procedures (which assume some knowledge of 
universals through the senses). See Ramsay, 1924, pp. 153-173,200-223. For a useful discussion of 
Erasmus' debt to Augustine's allegorical method of interpretation, which draws the distinctions 
between Augustinian and scholastic epistemology which Ramsay neglects, see Cave, 1979, pp. 78-
110. 
74 Donne, 1967a, p. 40. See Donne, 1953, VI, pp. 62-63 for Donne's warning against the dangers of 
both allegorical and literal interpretations of scripture. Quoted in Stanwood and Asals, 1986, pp. 
266-267. Veronica Kahn has shown that Luther objected to the figurative reading of Erasmus for the 
same reasons that Donne objected to excessively allegorical interpretation. See Kahn, 1985, pp. 100-
101. 
75 Donne, 1967a, p. 40. See Donne, 1953, IX, pp. 328-329 in which Donne observes a discrepancy 
between the figurative interpretations of Jerome and Augustine. Quoted in Stanwood and Asals, 
1986, pp. 254-255. For a discussion of Protestant typology and its relation to literal readings of 
scripture, which explicates the typological exegesis displayed in some of Donne's sermons, see 
Lewalski, 1979, pp. 111-144. Lewalski notes that despite Donne's 'creative uses of typology' in his 
divine poems and interpretations of scripture, he 'made very limited use of natural types' , and 
therefore, should not be understood to have employed the 'pervasive Platonic symbolism of 
Augustine' (pp. 138-140). Though he argues for Donne's reliance on Augustine in his exegetical 
practice, Dennis Quinn observes that Donne derived 'spiritual'meanings 'especially in connection 
with the Psalms and other poetical and prophetic books'. See Quinn, 1962, pp. 323-324. Jeanne M. 
Shami has argued that Lewalski has over-emphasized Donne's reliance on typological interpretations 
of examples in his sermons. See Sharni, 1983, pp. 53-66. Donne regularly expresses his suspicion of 
logical inferences drawn from allegorical readings of scripture in Biathanatos (e.g. 11. 4225-4228). 
His suspicion of such metaphorical interpretations is further reflected in his condemnation of this 
practice in the formation of Catholic doctrine, a practice, he said, which rendered such doctrine 
merely 'a piece of poetry'. See Donne, 1839, III, p. 318; quoted in Sprott, 1949-1950, p. 344. Joan 
Webber has also observed Donne's criticisms of excessively allegorical methods of interpreting 
scripture, but has failed to distinguish the Thornist basis of analogical methods of interpretation and 
the neoplatonic basis of allegorical and metaphorical methods. She does, however, notice the Puritan 
preference for allegorical reading and the Anglican insistence on the preservation of literal meanings 
in interpretation. See Webber, 1963, pp. 122-182, esp. 139-142, 164-174. 
James S. Baumlin would have benefitted from more attentive reading of Lewalski's and 
Quinn's studies of Donne's interpretive practices. In his attempt to attribute to Donne the 
'incarnationist rhetoric' (which Baumlin's fails to notice is taught in Book IV of Augustine's On 
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Christian Doctrine), he misrepresents Donne's negative opinion (expressed in The Essays in Divinity) 
of the mystical interpretations of the cabalists, and mistakenly associates Donne's poetic use of 
Platonic imagery with Calvinist and Augustinian semiotics. See Baumlin, 1988, pp. 151-182. In a 
later book on Donne's rhetoric, Baumlin continues to insist that Donne responds to sceptical doubts 
about the power of words accurately to represent external reality through the assertion of an 
'incarnation' of the truth in the text. This incarnation, like Baumlin's sister rhetorical response to 
scepticism, 'transcendentalism', is a mystical (and pseudo-neoplatonic) affIrmation of the 
accessibility of truth which relies fundamentally on an initial declaration of faith. Transendentalism 
is essentially the mirror image of incarnationism for Baumlin; instead of the truth mystically 
becoming incarnate in the word, the word equally mystically transcends the subjectivity of its own 
ambiguous verbal parameters to accurately reflect the Platonic concept lying static beyond the 
sensible realm. Baumlin says that Augustine's rhetoric is the origin of Donne's supposed 
transcendentalism, and argues that Donne recommended that the reader of Christian paradoxes 'yield 
to the umeason of its paradoxy' by asserting with Augustine, 'credo ut intelligam' (p. 226). Two 
errors are evident in Baumlin's account. First, and most drastic, is his assertion that incarnationism is 
a feature of Aquinas' and Aristotle's rhetorical theory because for them 'truth is knowable and 
language capable of expressing it' (p. 263). Baumlin defends this claim on the basis of Aquinas' and 
Aristotle's rejection of scepticism, but does not investigate the details of that rejection, and 
consequently, ignores both their realism and empiricism, both of which are incompatible with 
Baumlin's notion of incarnation ism (pp. 48-49). Second, Baumlin's representation of Donne's view 
of the literal, figurative and allegorical assumes Donne's incarnationism and transcendentalism, and 
therefore, creates the impression that, for Donne, the literal was just a more restricted form of the 
figurative or allegorical, which, of course, it was not. At one point, Baumlin tries to distinguish the 
figurative from the performative in an effort to distance his notion of incarnationism from the 
sceptical problems of verbal representation, but ultimately his distinction disintegrates into a jumble 
of un-significant hyphenated and half-italicized neologisms, a sure sign that his explanation is 
incoherent. Finally, as if to suggest that hyphenating the word 'represent' removed its symbolic 
connotation, Baumlin says of one of Donne's verse letters to Thomas Woodward, 'the poem admits 
its failure to re-present, and thus preserve, the poet through language' (p. 165). See Baumlin, 1991, 
pp. 47-52,162-176,191-229,263-269. 
On Augustine'S 'incarnational rhetoric', see Camargo, 1998, pp. 393-408. Thomas F. 
Merrill has argued that as a minister, Donne insisted, with the Puritans, on the sacramental power of 
the preached word of God, an insistence, Merrill claims, which would have placed him at odds with 
the Anglican view represented by Hooker, that both the reading and hearing of scripture conduce 
equally well to the salvation of the congregation. See Merrill, 1968-1969, pp. 597-616. In his 
discussion of Donne's view of the value of mystical interpretations of Christian mysteries, James 
Biester overemphasizes the influence of Augustine as well as Donne's intention to simulate the 
divine mysteries in his sermons and religious poems by attempting to evoke the wonder associated 
with their contemplation. See Biester, 1997, pp. 128-154. 
76 In his brief discussion of Donne's ethical interpretations of scripture, Dennis Quinn continues to 
recognize only Augustine's influence and fails to mention Aquinas at all. See Quinn, 1962, pp. 326-
329. For a discussion of Augustine's interpretive theory and its potential for divergent applications 
to ambiguous texts, see Mazzeo, 1964, pp. 1-28, esp. 16-23. 
77 Donne, 1982,11. 1430-1432; see Summa II ii, q. 91, a. 2 
78 See Summa II i, q. 21, a. 1; q. 19, a. 4; q. 71, a. 6. 
79 Summa II i, q. 71, a. 6 
80 Summa II i, q. 19, a. 4 
81 Aquinas had said that 'a wrong act is simply one which deviates from the rightness that a given 
action ought to have'. See Summa I, q. 63, a. 1. 
82 The laws of nature, reason and God are delineated by Aquinas in his treatise on law in Summa II i, 
qq.90-105. 
83 Donne, 1982,11. 1446 
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84 Ibid., 11. 1447-1449. Though he claims that Aquinas distinguished between the eternal and divine 
law on the grounds that the fonner consisted of a set of divine archetypes similar to Platonic fonns 
and the latter, of divine commands such as the Ten Commandments, Anthony J. Lisska, maintains 
that both confonn to rational necessity. It is this conformity, we will see, which Donne seeks to 
emphasize in his utilization of Aquinas' tripartite analysis oflaw. See Lisska, 1996, pp. 89-115, 126-
128. 
85 Donne, 1982,11.4104-4111 
86 Ibid., 11. 1457-1460 
87 Aquinas relies heavily on Isidore's fonnulations of the laws of God, reason, nature and custom in 
the Etymologiae throughout his discussion in Summa II i, q. 90-105. See for example Summa II i, q. 
95,a.4;q.96,a.2;q. 100,a. 7. 
88 For a survey of humanist objections to scholastic logic, including those ofPetrarch, Valla, Vives 
and Colet, see Perreiah, 1982, pp. 3-22. For a general discussion of the elements contributing to the 
rise of humanism against scholasticism, see Nauert, 1998, pp. 427-438; and Ashworth, 1982, pp. 
787-796. 
89 Erasmus presented his edition of Aristotle to John More (1510-1547), the son of his friend Thomas, 
in the dedicatory letter of 1531. There he acknowledges the confusion into which the scholastic 
tradition has cast his work, but assures John that with patience, he will be led to an understanding of 
Aristotle's greatest of minds. See Erasmus, 1539, sig. A2. Obviously, Erasmus recognized the value 
of Aristotle's thought, particularly of his natural philosophy. His objection to Aristotle rested 
principally on the use of his logic in divinity. On Erasmus' edition of Aristotle, see Schmitt, 1983b, 
p.19. 
90 See Paradoxa 2-3. 
91 Erasmus, 1522, pp. 265, 271 
92 Agrippa, 1569, sig. Uuiii. Agrippa's Latin for 'brief questions' is quaestiunculas. See Agrippa, 
1537, sig. Xiiii. Petrarch had opposed Ciceronian eloquence to the syllogistic method of the 
schoolmen, calling the dialecticians 'monsters ... anned with double-edged enthymemes' who should 
be avoided when they 'spit out syllogisms'. Quoted in Cassirer, Kristeller and Randall Jr, 1948, pp. 
135, 139. For more on Petrarch's critique of Aristotelianism, see Trinkaus, 1980, pp. 249-274; and 
Perreiah, 1982, pp. 3-22. For a summary ofPetrarch's Augustinianism and his rejection of the 
logical abuses ofscholasticsm, see Murphy, 1980, pp. 223-247. 
93 Agrippa, 1569, sig. Xxi 
94 Ibid., sig. Xxii. Agrippa's Latin emphasizes the point more forcefully. He has 'demonstrare' for 
Sandford's 'to declare'. See Agrippa, 1537, sig. Yi. 
95 Agrippa, 1569, sig. Zziii 
96 Ibid., sig. Yy 
97 See ibid., sig. Ssiii-Ttiii. Agrippa later claimed that Aristotle 'thorowe the immoderate desire of 
knowledge fallinge madde slewe him selfe, beinge made a woorthy sacrifice for the deuils which 
taught him knowledge'(sig. Tiii-U). 
98 Ibid., sig. C 
99 Ibid., sig. Biii 
100 Ibid., sig. Xxiii 
101 Ibid., sig. Bbbi 
102 See Satire III, 1. 80. For an interesting discussion of the possible sources for Donne's 'hill of 
truth' image, and its relation to the 'rectilinear movement' (i.e. 'about must, and about must goe', 1. 
81) which represents the rational exertions of the searching Christian, see Hester, 1976-1977, pp. 
100-105. 
103 Donne, 1982,11. 1284-1285, 1333 
104 Ibid., 11. 1340-1343 
105 Augustine, Ad Simplicianum I, q. 2, 13. See also Romans 9: 16-17. 
106 Augustine, Retractionum I, 23. For a discussion of the problem of grace and free will in 
Augustine, see Gilson, 1961, pp. 154-164. 
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107 For Donne's anxiety, see for instance, 'Divine Meditation 1',11.7-14. Donne expressed the same 
epistemological reservations with respect to predestination in a 1626 sermon. There he warned, 
'Consider how dangerously an abuse of the great doctrine of Predestination may bring thee to think, 
that God is bound to thee, and thou not bound to him, that thou mayest renounce him, and he must 
embrace thee, and so to make thee too familiar with God, and too homely with Religion, upon 
presumption of a Decree.' See Donne, 1953, VII, p. 317. See also John F. H. New's discussion of 
this passage in the context of the AnglicanlPuritan controversy over grace and predestination. His 
comments on the commitment of Donne, Hooker and Anglican's in general to the application of 
reason in matters which scripture does not explicitly address are illuminating on this point. See New, 
1964, pp. 7-29, esp. 20-21. Jeffrey Johnson has shown that Donne also thought that the issue of the 
resistability of God's grace (which, like predestination, grew out of the objections raised by Calvin) 
was theoretically insoluable and should not, therefore, be admitted as a matter for disputation. See 
Johnson's discussion of Sermons I (p. 255) in relation to Donne's view on grace and predestination in 
Johnson, 1999, pp. 123-131, esp. 125. For a reading of 'Holy Sonnet I' as a declaration of the 
necessity offaith and grace in the Christian response to doubt, see Bond, 1981, pp. 25-35. 
108 Charles B. Schmitt observes that even Aquinas incorporates Platonic elements into his thought to 
provide a metaphysical framework in which the mind may apprehend universal principles of 
Christian ethics and theology. He goes on to argue that Aquinas' 'eclectic Aristotelianism' 
influenced the thought of the late sixteenth-century Aristotelian, John Case. See Schmitt, 1983b, pp. 
93-95; and Schmitt, 1983a, pp. 149-150. For an account of the conventional and contradictory 
position, that Aquinas' rejected Plato's doctrine ofIdeas, see Henle, 1956, pp. 324-400. F. C. 
Copleston has observed the Platonic elements in Aquinas' thought to which Schmitt may be 
referring, but is also careful to emphasize the critical differences between Aquinas' theory of analogy 
and the Platonic Idealism adopted by Augustine. See Copleston, 1955, pp. 121-142. 
109 Donne, 1930, p. 40 
110 For more on the publishing history of the Paradossi, see Trevor Peach's introduction to his critical 
edition of Estienne's Paradoxes, which contains his translation of Lando's Paradossi and some 
supplementary material added by Estienne. See Lando, 1998, pp. 7-50. 
III The twenty-eighth through thirtieth of Lando's Paradossi are entitled: 'Che l'opre quali al 
presente habbiamo sotto nome di Aritotele Stagirita non sieno di Aristotele', 'Che Aristotele fusse 
non solo ignorante, rna il piu malvagio huomo di quella eta', 'Che M. Tullio fusse non solo ignorante 
di Filosofia, della quale tanto temerariamente si vanta, rna anche di Retorica'. Michel Simonin 
suggests that Estienne omitted these paradoxes because they would offend both the humanists and 
scholastics who so valued the works of Cicero and Aristotle. He goes on to argue that the 
conventional Christian piety of Lando's Paradossi (especially the frrst paradox, 'Che miglior sia la 
poverta, che la richezza ') influenced the development of Christian paradoxes, such as Poissenot's 
Traicte Paradoxique (1583), which placed faith and humility above reason and power. See Simonin, 
1982, pp. 23-39. 
112 Lando, 1998, pp. 64 
113 Topics (Aristotle) 105a15-18 
114 Donne, 1980, pp. 21-22,11. 10-12 
115 Ibid., p. 22, 11. 29-31. See also Donne, 1953, VI, pp. 208-209. 
116 Paradoxa 24; Donne, 1977, p. 20 
117 Donne, 1982,11. 1274-1275, 1205-1206 
118 Sister Mary Geraldine has argued that Lando's' concern is with wordishly ingenious dialectic', 
and attempts to establish his influence on Donne's Paradoxes. She does not, however, notice that 
Lando avoids syllogistic argumentation. The syllogism, as Cicero had made clear in his attack on 
Stoic logic, is the trademark vehicle for 'wordishly ingenious dialectic'. If Lando was concerned 
with such dialectic, he criticized it not by parodying it, as did Donne in the Paradoxes (and as 
Geraldine suggests), but by avoiding it altogether. In her attempt to argue Lando's influence on 
Donne, Helen Peters cites Geraldine in support, but observes that 'Donne's Paradoxes with their 
outrageous wit outstrip Lando's earlier efforts'. Peters' observation is accurate, but she fails to 
recognize why. The structure of Lando's conventional inductive argumentation simply cannot serve 
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as a vehicle for the wit which arises from the fallacy offour terms in syllogism. See Geraldine, 1964, 
pp. 46-49; and Donne, 1980, p. xxii. See also MacMillan, 1971, p. 67. 
119 Myron P. Gilmore has argued that Lando disagreed with Erasmus on a number of issues, most 
prominent of which was Erasmus' criticism of the Ciceronian rhetoricians in his Ciceronianus 
(1528). In Lando's Cicero relegatus et Cicero revocatus (1534), Ciceronian rhetoric is criticized in 
the form of the imaginary trial and exile of Cicero in the fIrst dialogue, but in the second, is 
vindicated by a defense of Cicero's rhetorical virtues. Lando subjects Erasmus to similar scrutiny in 
his In Des. Erasmi Roterodamifunus dialogus lepidissimus (1540). Though his true opinion of 
Ciceronianism and Erasmus is not clear from these works, Lando's epistemological affmity with 
Erasmus and Agrippa is evident in his dialogue Sacra Srittura (1552), which adamantly emphasized 
the superiority of scripture as a guide to moral knowledge. See Gilmore, 1974, pp. 1-14. On Cicero 
relegatus et Cicero revocatus, see Fahy, 1975, pp. 30-41. On Sacra Srittura, see Grendler, 1981, pp. 
25-38. 
120 Lando, 1998, p. 204 
121 Ibid., pp. 234-235 
122 In his introduction, Trevor Peach discusses the similarity of Lando's Paradossi to mock-forensic 
declamations ('causes grasses'). See Lando, 1998, pp. 18-19. We recall also that Thomas Newton, 
in his commentary on his translation of the Paradoxa, considered Cicero's rhetorical objective to be 
forensic. See Cicero, 1569, sig. Aii. Rosalie Colie profoundly misreperesented both the rhetorical 
prescription according to which Lando was composing his Paradossi as well as the Augustinian and 
Pauline epistemology which they advocate when she confusingly claimed that the 'forensic 
paradoxes of Lando's epideixis' are opposed to the 'paradoxes of religious transcendence exploited in 
Paradise Lost and Donne's Anniversary Poems'. See Colie, 1966, p. 481. J. C. Margolin mistakenly 
combines the paradoxical encomia and mock defenses explicitly distinguished by Isocrates in his 
critique of Gorgias' praise of Helen, and then places writers of philosophical theses, paradoxical 
encomia and mock defenses under one category which he calls 'l'eloge-plaidoyer'. Because he fails 
to distinguish these gemes, he, like Geraldine, Peters and Carey before him, continues mistakenly to 
make Donne a disciple of Lando. See Margolin, 1982, pp. 59-84, esp. pp. 62, 72. Anne R. Larsen 
has usefully stressed both Lando's and Estienne's desire to confIrm orthodox opinions in their 
paradoxes, and has also drawn some attention to their function as forensic declamations. However, 
she does not observe the difference between the uncontroversial nature of the specifIc forensic 
declamation and the speculative nature of the defense of a general thesis. As a consequence, she does 
not distinguish the respective objectives of Cicero's Paradoxa, Agrippa's Vanity and Lando's and 
Estienne's paradoxes. See Larsen, 1997, pp. 759-774. 
123 Lando, 1593, sig. A4 
124 Lando, 1998, p. 59 
125 Paradoxa 5. We recall that Thomas Newton, in his commentary on this passage in his translation 
of the Paradoxa, considered this more precise rhetorical objective to be forensic. See Cicero, 1569, 
sig. Aii. 
126 Paradoxa 7 
127 Ibid., 20 
128 See Peach, 1995, pp. 101-110, esp. 102, n. 5. 
129 Agrippa, 1569, sig. Uui 
130 In his defense of the Vanity against the condemnation of the work by the University of Lou vain 
and the Sorbonne, Agrippa had said, 'declamatio nonjudicat, non dogmatizat sed ... aliajoco, alia 
serio, alia false, alia saevere dicit ... quaedam vera, quaedamfalsa, quaedam dubia 
pronunciat... multa invalida argumenta adducit'. See Agrippa, 1533, c. xii. See the discussions of 
this passage and Agrippa's seriousness in Lando, 1998, p. 19; Bowen, 1972b, pp. 11-12; and Bowen, 
1972a, pp. 249-256. 
131 Peach notices the irony of a legal defense which must not employ its characteristic rhetorical 
devices in its arguments against the common low opinion of these devices. 'Quelle ironie d'ailleurs 
a faire soutenir cette "cause diffIcile", et qui va contre Ie bon sens, par un "jeune avocat" qui n'est 
autre que "Proces" lui-meme!' (p. 109). See Peach, 1995, pp. 101-110. 
132 Estienne, 1998, p. 260 
133 Ibid., p. 260 
134 Ibid., p. 266. See also 1 Corinthians 6: 1-11. 
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l3S Lando reminds us that Paul warned that we should avoid the 'abysme de doctrines humaines' and 
'demourer en crainte, sans passer la borne d'obeissance'. In his twenty-fifth paradox, 'Qu'il vault 
mieux vivre en craincte qu' en asseurance', he again cites Paul's letters to the Corinthians in defense 
of fear and against the vain pride of human wisdom. See Lando, 1998, pp. 86,234. 
136 Though he is correct in his rejection of Louis I. Bredvold' s claim that Donne followed Montaigne 
in his denial of objective moral standards, Robert Ornstein underemphasizes Donne's insistence, in 
Biathanatos, on the necessity and self-evidency of first moral principles derived both from nature and 
from revelation. Ornstein's attempt to show that Donne 'insists that objective moral standards can 
only be deduced in each particular instance by reason itself, not by the unthinking application of 
immutable rules' fails to recognize that a deduction requires the use of a universal principle, which 
by defmition, is a 'standard' and a 'rule' (p. 224). Furthermore, if these standards and rules are not 
accepted as 'objective' and 'immutable', they continue to be susceptible to the sceptical critique of 
first principles which Donne sought to delimit, and against which Ornstein sought to align Donne's 
epistemology. See Ornstein, 1956, pp. 213-229; and Bredvold, 1923, pp. 471- 502. In her often 
confused account of the relation between Stoic and sceptical epistemology, Rosalie Colie failed to see 
that Bredvold's claim that Donne followed Montaigne was irreconcilable with Ornstein's view that 
Donne (like the Stoics) insisted on man's ability to apprehend first principles. As a result, Colie 
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Chapter VI 
The Augustinianism and Thomism of Donne's Biathanatos 
1 
Practical Reason, Probability and Opinion 
It is important that we remember that Donne consistently maintains that 
opinions, though derived from our estimations ofthe significance of complex and 
variable circumstances, are able to achieve degrees of probability proportional to 
their proximity to the first principles relevant to their formation. As both he and 
Aquinas had emphasized, the further we descend from the universal principles in the 
deductive deliberations of our practical reason, the more likely we are to form false 
opinions. But though our opinions become less certain the more particular they 
become, they may still accord with the universal principle which determines the true 
position which we should take on a particular matter. Our inability to demonstrate 
the truth and necessity of our opinions is what makes them opinions and not 
knowledge, but as, Aristotle explains, this inability does not entail the indeterminacy 
of opinion. When he says that 'everything that is an object of opinion is already 
determined' and that 'opinion is not inquiry but...assertion', he assumes the 
precedence of criteria of truth, which though unknown to us, bear the distinguishing 
epistemic trait of objects of knowledge, necessity.1 To this claim he then adds his 
advocacy of the inductive method of the practical reason as a means to discovering 
universal, necessary and primary definitions from which deductions may be drawn. 
He makes this claim with respect to the application of the faculty of comprehension 
to both universal and particular propositions within deductive arguments; the 
speculative reason comprehends the universal premises and the practical reason 
comprehends the particular premises. He says that 'in demonstrations 
comprehension grasps the unchangeable and primary definitions, while in practical 
282 
reasonings it grasps the last and contingent fact, i.e. the second proposition. For 
these are the starting-points of that for the sake of which, since universals are 
reached from the particulars'.2 Obviously, the more complicated the set of 
particulars under the consideration of the practical reason, the more difficult it is to 
identify which universal principle should serve as the major premise in our 
deduction about our prospective action. Aquinas confirms Aristotle's description of 
this relation between speculative and practical reason when he says that 'the business 
of the practical reason is with contingent matters which are the domain of human 
acts, and although there is some necessity in general principles the more we get 
down to particular cases the more we can be mistaken. ,3 As a result, Aquinas 
concludes, that 'The first principles of natural law are altogether unalterable. But its 
secondary precepts, which we have described as being particular conclusions close 
to first principles, though not alterable in the majority of cases where they are right 
as they stand, can nevertheless be changed in some particular and rare occasions'. 4 
When Donne had described the relation between those 'true propositions, which 
are ... the issue of our light of nature and of our discourse' and the more particular, 
but potentially fallible, conclusions deduced from them, he adopts a doctrine of 
probabilism derived directly from Aristotle's and Aquinas' doctrine ofthe practical 
reason and opinion. 5 
Though Aristotle had established contingencies as the proper object ofthe 
practical reason, he did not develop a theory of ethical first principles which 
provided the moral agent with an infallible set of universal and necessary precepts 
against which the partiCUlar deductions of practical reason might be judged. 
Considering the nature of the deliberation of practical reason, he says that: 
in general the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. Now 
no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise nor about things that 
it is impossible for him to do. Therefore, since knowledge involves 
demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose first principles 
can be otherwise (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since 
it impossible to deliberate about things which are of necessity, practical 
wisdom cannot be knowledge ... 6 
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A statement or principle which can be otherwise is, for Aristotle, an opinion. He 
concludes, therefore, that 'opinion is about what can be otherwise, and so is practical 
wisdom' and that 'practical wisdom deal[s] with things that can be otherwise.,7 
Donne's catalogue of counterexamples to the various civil and canon laws 
prohibiting suicide in his examination ofthe human law in the second section of 
Biathanatos is a result of his agreement with Aristotle on the involvement of 
practical reason in matters of opinion. Through the citation of particular examples, 
which contradict the universality of the laws against suicide, he asserts, in the 
relativist manner ofMontaigne, that the issue of suicide is a matter of opinion.s 
Aristotle, however, did not provide a detailed account of first practical principles, 
which like the first principles of natural science and mathematics, could serve as 
reliable universal premises from which to deduce conclusions about particulars. He 
explains this omission when he describes the difference between the inductive 
process by which universal ethical principles are learned and the intuitive process of 
abstraction by which the first principles of nature and mathematics are known. 
Practical wisdom, he says, 'is concerned not only with universals but with 
particulars, which become familiar from experience' while 'the objects of 
mathematics exist by abstraction,.9 This difference explains why it is possible to 
find young mathematicians and geometricians, but not young men of practical 
wisdom. Montaigne might have cited this passage for support against those who 
claim the existence of moral laws which are known immediately by all according to 
natural reason. Though the inductive basis of his first ethical principles exposed 
them to the sceptical critique and accusations of relativism, Aristotle thought that 
these principles constituted a reliable standard by which the man of practical wisdom 
should form his opinions upon particular matters of action. Such a man exhibits the 
'correctness in thinking' which allows him to form opinions which correspond to the 
inductively grounded first principles of ethics; these opinions, however, can never 
attain the status of knowledge because they lack necessity by virtue of their 
limitation to the realm of choice. 10 
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In Biathanatos, Donne seeks to demonstrate that assertions for or against 
suicide may never attain the status of knowledge, but that opinions on the matter, 
even paradoxical ones such as his own, may follow from a deductive process derived 
ultimately from first ethical principles which are apprehended intuitively by natural 
reason. To argue thus, Donne must reject Aristotle's claim that the first principles of 
ethics are inductively based, and maintain that they are known in the manner of the 
principles of mathematics and the natural sciences, that they have the nature of 
'those true propositions, which are ... the issue of our light of nature and of our 
discourse' . II The authority on which he will base his assertion of the se1f-evidency 
of first practical principles is Aquinas, although as we will see, he grants reason a 
priority in the analysis of both first speculative principles (e.g. law of non-
contradiction) and the first principles of ethics which Aquinas denies. 12 Donne's 
objective is to reserve for the individual conscience not just the authority to 
countermand the mandates of external law, but also those of non-rational natural 
laws which govern the behavior of all animate and non-animate substances. This 
constructive element in the argument of Biathanatos seeks not to restrict the issue of 
suicide within the domain of opinion as did his observations of the variability and 
incompatibility of the diversity of human laws treating the subject, but to delegate to 
the individual conscience the power to judge the application of both the first 
speCUlative and practical principles to particular circumstances. This judgement, 
though it bears the mark of a conclusion deduced from self-evident principles, may 
be mistaken, and therefore, may be otherwise; it remains an opinion despite its 
derivation from first principles because ofthe involvement of our fallible reason. 
Aquinas had stated that because human reason 'is imperfect and mutable, so as well, 
therefore, is the law it makes, and therefore its law is the same;' the natural law on 
the other hand 'comprises universal commands which are everlasting, whereas 
human positive law comprises particular commands to meet various situations that 
arise.'13 The natural law, therefore, would seem to command more universally than 
laws established by the reason of man. However, in so far as man is incapable of 
apprehending the natural law without the involvement of reason, the law of nature, if 
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it is to be understood by man, must be rational. Aquinas accommodates this 
inevitable rationalization of the natural law, by insisting that the natural law, though 
not restricted to the governance of rational beings, is nevertheless rational and 
comprehensible. Of course, this rationality does not insure that every particular 
intellect will comprehend it; only that those equipped with sufficient knowledge can 
comprehend it. Comprehension is made easier for human reason if the procedure of 
demonstration follows a syllogistic arrangement, from the general to the particular. 
This is the manner which is most natural to reason and which is associated properly 
with the logical procedure of the speculative reason. Because the practical reason is 
concerned with contingent matters, however, it has more difficulty identifying which 
of the first practical principles should occupy the major premise presiding over the 
particular circumstances occupying the minor premise. But while Aquinas admits 
that 'the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter 
deviations', he will insist that 'there is necessity' in the first practical principles just 
as there is necessity in the first principles of speculative reason. 14 It is this insistence 
that protects his ethics from accusations of relativism. And in so far as Donne agrees 
with Aquinas on this point, he is protected from those same accusations of relativism 
which readers of Biathanatos have frequently brought against him. 
To begin his argument for the individual conscience's intuitive knowledge of 
first practical principles, Donne cites the passage from Romans which he wi11later 
cite in the Essays in Divinity to argue against the claims of natural theologians, such 
as Sebond, that reason can discern all knowledge, universal and particular, through 
the allegorical observation of created world. 15 In this case, however, he is interested 
in establishing that some invisible things (invisibilia), such as God's existence and 
the sinfulness of lust, are known to all without instruction, Christian and pagan alike. 
He explains that the turning of women against nature described by Paul 'is so much 
abhorred, not because the being against nature makes it so abominable, but because 
the knowledge thereof is so domestic, so near, so inward to us, that our conscience 
cannot slumber in it, nor dissemble it' .16 Donne may also have had Romans in mind 
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when he made this critical statement about the conscience's fundamental role in the 
determination of sin. There Paul says: 
Cum enim gentes quae legem non hebent, naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt; 
eiusmodi legem non habentes ipsi sibi sunt lex qui ostendunt opus legis 
scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia ipsorum ... 17 
Even pagans who are ignorant of the law of God may have it written upon their 
hearts by nature (naturaliter); with this imprinted knowledge, all they must do to 
live in accordance with the God's law is to consult the testimony of their 
consciences. The first practical principles, therefore, are known intuitively 
according to the nature of all rational beings. 18 As Donne repeatedly emphasizes, 
this fundamental knowledge renders all those with reason 'inexcusable' for not 
pursuing the study of virtue which would eventually result both in an acceptance of 
the Christian faith and in a conscience informed by a broader knowledge of ethical 
principles. 19 If the conscience is to obey the commands of its nature, therefore, it 
must cultivate its rational abilities, for it is only by reason that it acquires the more 
detailed knowledge of ethics necessary to reveal the applicability ofthe first 
practical principles to particular situations. It is for this reason that of the three laws 
of nature which Aquinas says govern human conduct, the law of self-preservation, 
the law of generation and corruption, and the law of reason, Donne gives precedence 
to the law of reason. 20 
But that natural law is so general that it extends to beasts more than to us, 
because they cannot compare degrees of obligation and distinctions of duties 
and offices, as we can. For we know that some things are natural to the 
species, and other things to the particular person, and that the latter may 
correct the first. 21 
Donne's suggestion that the ability to 'compare degrees of obligation' most 
accurately represents the natural law of humans makes the probabilistic analysis of 
conflicting opinions the most natural of all rational pursuits; and, as we have seen, 
such an analysis often results in the assertion of a paradox. 
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2 
Donne and Aquinas on the Primacy of the Particular 
It is not surprising, in light of his involvement in the religious controversies 
of his day, that Donne believed that the disputation of opposing opinions was an 
obligation placed upon all rational creatures by natural law. When Donne seeks the 
support of Aquinas in the defense ofthis obligation, however, he delegates more 
authority to the individual conscience than even Aquinas' liberal views on 
contention and discord would allow. Donne's claim that 'some things are natural to 
the species, and other things to the particular person, and that the latter may correct 
the first' is a reference to Aquinas' discussion of special (i.e. of the species) and 
individual natures in the Summa, in which he asks, 'are any dispositions innate?,22 
Since he is considering the disposition of humans primarily, Donne correctly orients 
Aquinas' inquiry toward the issue under consideration: the relation between the 
general subject, the human species, to the individual subject, the particular human, 
with respect to the their common form, reason.23 Donne's objective is to show that 
the law of nature which addresses itself specifically to rational agents (i.e. 'fly evil, 
seek good') binds more forcefully upon humans than that law of nature which 
applies to all beings (i.e. self-preservation), so that he may assert that the individual 
conscience's 'appetition of good whether true or seeming' transforms the law of self-
preservation into a rational principle which the practical reason recognizes to be the 
ultimate criterion for moral j udgement. 24 His success in authorizing this objective on 
the basis of Aquinas' views on the relation of the special and individual utilization of 
reason is vital to the general success of his argument for the justifiability of suicide 
inforo interiori and exteriori. For if he can establish the individual's right to judge 
the rationality of taking his own life inforo interiori by supplanting the 'tribunal' of 
those casuists who have 'made all our actions perplexed and litigious' there, then 
both the civil and canon law may judge only secondarily (in foro exteriori) the 
validity of the individual's reason for suicide. Further, if the individual's reasons are 
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fonned in deference to the universal laws of nature and reason, which Donne has 
argued are identical for rational beings ('fly evil, seek good'), then the secular and 
ecclesiastical authorities, though they may disagree with the individual's appraisal of 
the circumstances in which his decision was taken, will have to acknowledge the 
rectitude both of that decision and of the process of contention from which his 
opinion emerged. 
With regard to the difference between special and individual natures Aquinas 
describes two types of relations: 
There are two ways in which one thing may be natural to another. It 
may be natural to it according to the nature of the species: as it is natural to 
man to be capable oflaughing ... Or it may natural according to the nature of 
the individual: as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be sickly or healthy, 
each according to his constitution. 
Again, in each ofthese ways there are two further different ways in 
which one thing can be natural to another. A thing may be natural because 
wholly the work of nature, or it may be partly the work of nature and partly 
the work of an external agent (ab exteriori principio). Thus if someone 
recovers from an illness by his own power, his restored health comes wholly 
from nature; if he is cured with the help of medicine, then his recovery is due 
partly to nature and partly to an external agent.25 
When, on the authority of the Summa, Donne says that things which are natural to 
'the particular person ... may correct. .. things [which] are natural to the species,' he 
conflates the two relations described in the above passage and then applies this 
conflation analogously as a principle to further the cause of his argument. 26 Those 
things which are natural to the species are conflated with things which are entirely 
from nature and those which are natural to the individual are conflated with things 
which are partly from nature. These conflations established, Donne makes the 
example of the sick individual returned to health by an extrinsic principle (the 
medical arts) analogous to a situation in which that which is natural to the individual 
'corrects' that which is natural to the species. In light of the fact that he believed 
that rational principles become less certain the further they descend into particulars, 
it is unlikely that Aquinas would have agreed with Donne's interpretation of Summa 
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II i, q. 51, a. 1 that, with respect to reason, particular natures were superior to special 
(general) natures. 
However, it is clear that Aquinas believed that these two senses of nature 
were connected in some way when he says further in the same article, 'There are also 
cognitive dispositions, at least of a rudimentary kind, which are natural to 
individuals. Two men may differ in intelligence because of a difference in the 
condition of their sensory organs, since in the activity of the intellect we make use of 
our sense faculties.'27 Ifwe oppose this statement to that concerning the natural 
disposition of the specific nature with respect to intellectual activity, the nature of 
the relation between the specific and individual intellect is exposed. He says: 
The dispositions which are natural to the species belong to the soul itself: the 
understanding of principles, for instance, is called a natural disposition. It is 
because of the very nature of his spiritual soul that a human being, once he 
knows what a whole is and what a part is, knows that every whole is greater 
than any of its parts; and similarly in other cases.28 
The specific nature, 'the spiritual soul,' understands principles through intelligible 
species which Aquinas, citing Aristotle, tells us it 'receives from phantasms.' For 
Aquinas, phantasms are the verified sense images received from those images which 
are organized but unverified by the common sense (sensus communis). These 
verified sense images are then stored in the inner sense commonly called 
phantasia.29 The intelligible species through which first principles are known, 
therefore, are dependent for their development on the abilities ofthe individual's 
own senses, or as Aquinas says the' condition of [his] sensory organs.'30 It is crucial 
to note that though Aquinas derived his theory of ph ant asia from Aristotle's 
discussion of perception in De Anima, he is bound by theological necessity to 
acknowledge the certainty ofthe first principles of both nature and ethics and to 
mitigate the uncertainty which Aristotle had claimed necessarily attended assertions 
ultimately informed by phantasms. Aquinas' confidence in the correspondence 
between the intelligible species arising from verified sense images and the first 
practical principles known intuitively, allowed him to disregard the Stoic 
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explanation for this correspondence.3l As we have seen, the Stoic theory eliminated 
the uncertainty of the intelligible species by employing the notion of the lekton as 
the cognitive intermediary which insured the accurate correspondence between sense 
images (phantasms) and the verified and co-ordinated sensible species stored in 
phantasia. 
rnDe Anima Aristotle says of perception that 'a sense is what has the power 
of receiving into itself the sensible forms ofthings without the matter, in the way in 
which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or 
gold'.32 Unlike the Stoics, however, Aristotle is careful not to overestimate the 
power ofthe images retained in the soul to reflect reality accurately. Though he 
makes phantasia necessary for the mental process which produces such accurate 
reflections (thought), he maintains that the images of phantasia, unlike sensations, 
which 'are always true', are 'for the most part false' .33 Aristotle is not saying that 
sensations always reflect external objects as they are in themselves, however, for he 
says that 'while the perception that there is white before us cannot be false, the 
perception that what is white is this or that may be false' .34 The decision on the 
goodness or badness, and truth or falsity of both perceptions and the images to which 
they give rise is left to the faculty of thinking. 
The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images ... by means of the 
images and thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it 
calculates and deliberates what is to corne by reference to what is present; 
and when it makes a pronouncement, as in the case of sensation it 
pronounces the object to be pleasant or painful, in this case it avoids or 
pursues ... That too which involves no action, i.e. that which is true or false, is 
in the same province with what is good or bad ... 35 
Aristotle goes on to distinguish two types of imagination (phantasia), the sensitive 
and the deliberative. The deliberative imagination is found only in animals that 
calculate, such as humans, and, as in the faculty ofthinking, is always involved in 
the formation of an opinion. Because the imagination can either be right or wrong, 
its necessary involvement in the processes of thought threatens to undermine the 
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certainty of knowledge derived from syllogistic demonstrations.36 Aristotle suggests 
this threat when he describes the syllogistic organization of the faculty of knowing in 
terms of the opinions which comprise the premises. He says that the 'faculty of 
knowing is never moved but remains at rest. Since the one premise or judgement is 
universal and the other deals with the particular (for the first tells us that such and 
such a kind of man should do such and such a kind of act and the second that this is 
an act of the kind meant, and I am person of the type intended), it is the latter 
opinion that really originates the movement, not the universal' .37 Though both the 
major (universal) premise and the minor (particular) premise are both said to be 
opinions, Aristotle is concerned to show that the minor premise, being more 
proximately derived from the images of co-ordinated sensations, is the opinion in 
which the movement of assent originates. 
In his commentary on the third book of the De Anima, Aquinas 
acknowledges Aristotle's description of the deliberative imagination in terms of 
syllogistic, and explains its role in the exercise of practical reason. 
This deliberation [of deliberative imagination] requires some sort of rule by 
which to reckon what most needs to be done. Clearly, a man will "follow", 
i.e. seek for, the better and more suitable alternative: which is always 
measured by some standard. We need therefore a measure for our actions, a 
criterion for discerning what is most worth doing. And this will be the 
middle term of the syllogism ofthe practical reason issuing in a choice.38 
The discovery of this ethical criterion ultimately requires the involvement of the 
senses because, Aquinas has said, the intelligible species from which we come to 
recognize the universality and self-evidency of the first practical principles arise 
from sensible species. Of course, God's establishment of the first practical 
principles is sufficient to insure their universality and self-evidency, but our 
discovery of them as such requires the use of our senses, as Aristotle had explained 
in De Anima.39 Aristotle had described the major premise of the deliberative 
imagination's syllogistic determination of ethical choice as a universal assertion 
stating 'that such and such a kind of man should do such and such a kind of act', but 
292 
admits that though this premise appears to be a universal and necessary principle in 
comparison to the particular assertion of the minor premise (i.e. 'this is an act of the 
kind meant, and I am person of the type intended'), its ultimate derivation from the 
senses restricts its status to that of opinion. Such a universal opinion may appear 
probable, or even be true, but its theoretical confirmation requires the imposition of a 
definition which artificially stabilizes its truth, in the manner which Ramus and 
Fraunce insisted axioms must be stabilized. Such a stabilization, Aristotle insists, is 
necessary to defend syllogistic demonstrations against the sceptical critique, and the 
abuse ofparadoxists.40 For Aquinas, however, the truth of the first practical 
principles is stabilized not by artificially imposed definition, but by the intelligible 
order imposed by God.41 
The challenge for the human intellect is to discover these principles through 
the use of their senses. Aquinas' observation that 'one man, from the disposition of 
his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well' suggests that some 
intellects, which have less acute powers of sensory perceptions, will be less able to 
discover the ethical criteria necessary to regulate the determinations ofthe 
deliberative imagination and the choices of practical reason. There is no suggestion, 
however, that the individual with the most powerful organs of sense understands the 
first principles in a qualitatively more thorough way; he simply is able to receive 
intelligible species more effectively because the disposition of his senses is most 
properly directed toward an accurate perception of external objects. If an individual, 
whose senses are not disposed in this way, is assisted by an 'extrinsic principle' (e.g. 
spectacles, hearing aid) to receive intelligible species, he can be said to be in 
possession of these principles only partly from nature as a result of some deficiency 
in his sensory disposition. The relation between the specific and individual intellects 
consists, therefore, in the former's general and constant disposition toward 
knowledge of the intelligible species and the latter's particular and variable sensory 
dispositions.42 When, in Biathanatos, Donne claims that 'some things are natural to 
the species, and other things to the particular person, and that the latter may correct 
the first' he is suggesting that there are two classes of knowledge (intelligible 
293 
species), one known to human reason generally and another known only to 
individual intellects, and that the former is less precise than the latter.43 As we will 
see, this conclusion will serve his intention to reduce the justifiability of suicide to 
the individual conscience (in foro interiori) quite neatly, but as we have already 
suggested, it will also expose him to charges of relativism and libertinism. 
3 
Donne's Inversion of Aquinas' Three Precepts ofthe Natural Law 
It is difficult to say whether Donne innocently misunderstood or intentionally 
misrepresented Aquinas on the relation of specific and individual intellects in the 
context of natural reason, but whatever his motivation, the statements which moved 
his critics to advance anti-relativist arguments in response to Biathanatos are 
dependent upon his reading of Summa II i, q. 51, a. 1. Donne makes two of these 
statements as the conclusion of his section on natural law. 
No law is so primary and simple, but that it foreimagines a reason upon 
which it was founded; and scarce any reason is so constant, but that 
circumstances alter it, in which case a private man is emperor of 
himsel£..And he whose conscience, well-tempered and dispassioned, assures 
him that the reason of self-preservation ceases in him, may also presume that 
the law ceases toO ... 44 
Self-preservation, which we confess to be the foundation of general natural 
law, is no other than a natural affection and appetition of good, whether true 
or seeming ... Now since this law of self-preservation is accomplished in 
attaining that which conduces to our ends and is good to us ... yet, iffor 
reasons seeming good to me, I may do it without violating the law of nature. 
If I propose to myself in this self-homicide a greater good, though I mistake 
it, I perceive not wherein I transgress the general law of nature, which is an 
affection of good, true or seeming; and if that which I affect by death be truly 
a greater good, wherein is the other stricter law of nature, which is rectified 
reason, violated?45 
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It should be evident in light of what we have said about Donne's understanding of 
specific (general) and individual reason that the primary place is given to that law of 
nature which corresponds to individual reason. He makes this arrangement explicit, 
however, in the paragraphs immediately preceding the above two statements. It is 
there that Donne most definitively identifies the first law of nature with the mandates 
of reason when he says that 'all the precepts of natural law result in these: fly evil, 
seek good, that is, do according to reason.' 'For these,' he continues, 'as they are 
indispensable by any authority, so they cannot be abolished nor obscured, but that 
our hearts shall ever not only retain, but acknowledge this law. ,46 This definition, as 
Donne indicates, is also accepted by Aquinas. In the Summa, Aquinas had said that 
'this is the first command of law, "that good is to be sought and done, evil is to be 
avoided"; all other commands of natural law are based on this. Accordingly, then, 
the natural-law commands extend to all doing and avoiding of things recognized by 
the practical reason of itself as being human goods. ,47 The practical reason for 
Aquinas considers good and evil courses of actions against the standard imposed by 
our natural inclinations, and hence, proceeds not by judging the truth or falsity of 
these inclinations but by orienting the will toward what the speculative reason has 
determined to be a necessary logical consequence of the first practical principles. 
Following Aristotle, Aquinas designates speculative reason the task of judging the 
truth or falsity of our proper ends independent of an individual agent's volition, 
while the practical reason insures a correspondence in action between the will and 
speculative reason which results in a good intention.48 The ends toward which our 
natural inclinations direct us are not considered by the practical reason within the 
context of a specific set of circumstances without delivering a jUdgement of their 
preferability; it is only when those ends are apprehended as goods or evils to be 
pursued or avoided within a specific set of circumstances that the practical reason 
can be said to be operative in ethical decisions. Aquinas says, affirming this 
description of practical reason's function, that 'as to be real first enters into human 
apprehending as such, so to be good first enters the practical reason's apprehending 
when it is bent on doing something. ,49 
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Donne makes two claims in the passages quoted above which place him at 
odds with Aquinas on the role of the practical reason with respect to the first laws of 
human nature. First, he states that just as circumstances may alter the putative 
reason for certain human laws, such as those prohibiting loitering in front of public 
buildings for instance, so may circumstances alter the reason for the law of self-
preservation; ifthere were no popular desire to loiter in front of public buildings or if 
such gatherings were perceived by law-makers not to injure the public interest, then 
the reason for the law against loitering would cease to be.so Second, he claims that 
the law of self-preservation is merely' a natural affection and appetition of good, 
whether true or seeming', which is a technical mistake symptomatic of his inversion 
of Aquinas' ordering of the relation between specific and individual reason. The law 
of self-preservation, of itself, does not pertain to reason specifically, but to an 
inclination which Aquinas attributes to all substances. It is not the function of 
reason, speculative or practical, to question the universality of this inclination, 
although, it is within the function of the speculative reason to apprehend what both 
Aristotle and Aquinas claim to be the principle upon which all others are based, the 
law of non-contradiction. In its assertion that "'There is no affirming and denying 
the same thing simultaneously",' this law depends intrinsically upon the 
apprehension of being, which Aquinas, citing Aristotle in Metaphysics 1 005b29, 
claims is the principle upon which 'all other propositions are based.,sl The law of 
self-preservation is an inclination of all things which have being; it does not require 
for its application a judgement of its conformity to truth by speculative reason nor of 
its goodness by practical reason. It is akin to those propositions which Aquinas 
describes as 'self-evident [in themselves], and 'known to all'. Examples given by 
Aquinas of such propositions are 'The whole is greater than the part' and 'Things 
equal to a third thing are equal to one another. ,52 There are other self-evident 
propositions, however, whose terms are not known to all and which are, as a result, 
not acknowledged by those unfamiliar with their terms as self-evident. Aquinas 
suggests that these less commonly known propositions may be grasped if their terms 
are learned. Therefore, we may liken those self-evident propositions which are 
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known to all to those things which are natural to the species and which are entirely 
from nature; those self-evident propositions which are not known to all, we may 
liken to those things which are natural to the individual and which require the 
assistance of an extrinsic principle. By making the law of self-preservation subject 
to the scrutiny of reason, Donne reverses the order of natural inclinations explicitly 
given by Aquinas in Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2. 
The order in which commands of the law of nature are ranged corresponds to 
that of natural tendencies. Here there are three stages. There is in man, first, 
a tendency towards the good of the nature he shares in common with all 
substances; each has an appetite to preserve its own natural being. Natural 
law here plays a corresponding part, and is engaged at this stage to maintain 
and defend the elementary requirements of human life. 
Only after placing human's generic inclinations, those 'which he has in common 
with other animals,' does Aquinas mention the special inclination of humans to 
follow reason. The· order of priority in any analysis of the justifiability of suicide, 
therefore, is from most universal to most particular, that is, from the law of self-
preservation observed by all things which have being, to the law of generation and 
corruption observed by all animals, and finally, to the law of reason observed by 
humans. 
4 
First Principles, Erring Conscience and Charity 
When he considers whether 'it is legitimate for somebody to kill himself 
Aquinas makes explicit his reasons for unconditionally condemning suicide. 53 It is 
no accident that he omits irrationality from his list of the three principal arguments 
against suicide. The first reason he offers is a combination of the first two laws 
described in Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2, self-preservation, and generation and corruption. 
He says: 
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Suicide is completely wrong for three reasons. First, everything naturally 
loves itself, and it is for this reason that everything naturally seeks to keep 
itself in being and to resist hostile forces [corrumpentibus]. So suicide runs 
counter to one's natural inclination, and also to that charity by which one 
ought to cherish oneself. Suicide is, therefore, always a mortal sin in so far 
as it stultifies the law of nature and charity.54 
We may wonder why Aquinas bothers to add the mandates of charity to those of the 
two most general laws of nature at this stage of his argument against suicide when he 
has taken such pains to maintain that these supra-rational laws of nature obtain 
without conscious assent. In Summa II i, q. 100, a. 10, Aquinas explains that the law 
of charity, which commands that all ethical decisions be 'oriented to God' by an act 
of love directed primarily to Him in accordance with the first commandment, may be 
consciously omitted. Such an omission, as in the case described by Aquinas of the 
man who honors his father but who does so without charity, is worthy of punishment 
because the intention of the man in honoring his father is somehow corrupt. He says 
that: 
the act of charity can be considered as the mode of the acts of the other 
virtues, inasmuch as their acts are done in view of charity, which is the end of 
the commandment; for, as we have already seen, the intention ofthe end is a 
kind formal mode of the act done for that end. 55 
The' end of the commandment' to which Aquinas refers in 1 Timothy is stated by 
Paul. 'Finis autem praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide' .56 
By grounding the intention of an act in the act of charity, Aquinas designates a place 
for the use of conscience in all morally relevant acts. And the use of conscience, as 
its etymology indicates, requires the application of some knowledge to some 
circumstances. 57 Aquinas explains that 'the original meaning of the word 
[conscience]. .. denotes knowledge ordered towards something, since it means 
knowledge-along-with-another [cum alio scientia]. ,58 In Pseudo-Martyr, Donne 
employs this definition of conscience to attack the weakness of the mere opinion on 
which Catholics ground their assertion of papal supremacy in temporal affairs. As 
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he stresses repeatedly throughout the work, for a decision to take one's own life to 
be rectified, the conscience must ground the defense of its choice on a principle 
which it considers to be certain, and therefore, known. After quoting Aquinas' 
definition, Donne explains that: 
the Conscience euer presumes Knowledge: and we may not (especially in so 
great dangers as these) doe anything upon Conscience, if we doe it not upon 
Knowledge. For it is not the Conscience it selfe that bindes us, but that law 
which the Conscience takes knowledge of, and presents to our 
understanding. 59 
Aquinas calls this moral knowledge, synderesis; it is comprised of the first practical 
principles which, like first speculative principles, are 'known naturally prior to 
rational analysis. ,60 
Without any rational assistance, synderesis can 'incite to good and ... murmur 
at evil,' much in the same way as Donne claimed the special mandate of nature in 
humans to follow reason commands us 'to seek good' and 'fly evil'. For Donne, 
such 'murmuring' reflects not a universal and constant delivery of the criteria for 
ethical judgement, but a private and often controversial assurance of one's own 
moral rectitude. In the Essays in Divinity he says that God's judgement of our 
conformity with the divine law is 'never certainly and infallibly produced and 
exemplified in foro exteriori, but onely insinuated and whisper'd to our hearts, Ad 
informandum conscientium Judicis, which is the Conscience it selfe.'61 It is the 
private testimony of the conscience interpreted by the individual's reason which 
must guide his moral life, despite the fact that his decisions may never be infallibly 
confirmed to be just. The vital difference, of course, between Donne's first law of 
nature and Aquinas' synderesis lies in the former's assertion of the priority of the 
individual reason in the assessment of goodness and evil, and the latter's suggestion 
that the individual intellect's denial of principles self-evident to the species, such as 
the law of self-preservation, indicates not a superior understanding, but a mistake of 
practical reason. For Donne, some of the first practical principles are self-evident to 
all rational beings regardless of their perception of circumstances (e.g. God is to be 
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worshipped, unnatural lusts are evil), but others, most notably those governing 
suicide, are subject to the judgement of the private conscience, which utilizes the 
reason natural to the individual to clarify the imprecise reason of the human species 
generally. Aquinas, however, would not claim that self-evident practical principles 
which are understood by individual intellects with the assistance of an extrinsic 
principle are any more precise than those which are self-evident to the entire species 
without such assistance. Nowhere in Biathanatos does Donne mention the habit of 
synderesis, which, for Aquinas, imposes accountability upon the power of practical 
reason through its ability to influence all consciences toward good and away from 
evil. An erring conscience may result when the practical reason encounters a 
particularly complex individual case, but not as a consequence of the agent's 
ignorance of the first practical principles; the agent has the requisite knowledge (or 
can acquire it through learning), but is unable to see how that knowledge should be 
applied to his circumstances. It is for this reason that Aquinas can distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary errors of conscience with respect to a body of 
knowledge which he claims one 'ought to know' and of which ignorance is 
'inexcusable (non excusante),.62 Conscience's dependence uponsynderesis for its 
cognitive content is crucial to Aquinas' theory ofintentionalism for, as he says, 
'though the habits which inform conscience are many, nevertheless they all take 
effect through one chief habit, the grasp of principles called synderesis. ,63 
It would be unjust to accuse Donne of relativism because he omits the habit 
of synderesis from his explanation of the function of the conscience. As we have 
seen, there is no shortage of statements which ascribe to human knowledge a natural 
understanding of first practical principles not unlike that understanding manifest in 
Aquinas' synderesis. 64 We will be on surer ground if we base such an accusation on 
his inversion of Aquinas' three laws of nature governing human affairs; by giving 
precedence to the most particular (and therefore least reliable) law of nature, that of 
reason, over the more general laws of the animal world and beings generally, Donne 
has delegated to the individual conscience a comprehensiveness in the determination 
of ethical action which exceeds that envisioned by Aquinas. However, any 
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ascription of relativism to the ethical system outlined in Biathanatos will have to be 
scrupulously qualified in order to accommodate its insistence on the presence of first 
indemonstrable principles in every human mind which may and must be followed to 
deduce directions for behavior in particular situations to which those principles are 
clearly relevant.65 It is advisable at this point to recall Donne's language in his 
statement summarizing the view of the French Catholic, Antonio Sylvius Clarus, 
regarding the operation of practical reason. 'Though our substance of nature, which 
is best understood of the foundations and principles and first grounds of natural law, 
may not be changed, yet functio naturae, which is the exercise and application 
thereof, and deduction from thence, may and must. ,66 Donne uses this view to 
support his statement concerning the alterability and limitedness of Aquinas' first 
and most general law of nature, self-preservation; it is this statement which contains 
the reason for his failure to answer Aquinas' most fundamental objection to the 
justifiability of suicide, that it violates the law of self-preservation. He says that the 
'like danger [of deriving circumstantially based conclusions from first principles] is 
in deducing consequences from this natural law of self-preservation, which doth not 
so rigorously and urgently and illimitedly bind, but that, by the law of nature itself, 
things may-yea, must-neglect themselves for others, of which the pelican is an 
instance or an emblem. ,67 
As we have seen, Donne's lack of confidence in the certainty of deductions 
from moral first principles relies on his utilization of an Aristotelian ethical scheme 
which places the judgements of practical reason within the realm of opinion (doxa); 
hence, his defense of a particular ethical choice (i.e. suicide) taken under particular 
circumstances makes no claim to exceed the boundaries of opinion, and remains 
either paradoxical or orthodox depending on the equally fallible judgement of his 
fellow disputants. Aquinas' insistence on the presence of first principles which 
preclude the considerations of practical reason upon the matter of suicide (i.e. self-
preservation, generation and corruption), indicate his wish to free the conscience 
from the deductive deliberations which may lead it to make an erroneous choice 
which it is then bound to follow. For Aquinas, the issue of suicide is not a matter of 
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OpInIOn. The knowledge which the conscience must apply to circumstances in 
which suicide is an option does not admit exceptions because it does not pertain to 
human reason primarily; and therefore, the conscience has but one choice available 
to it, and cannot unwittingly err. It is because Aquinas assumes that the conscience 
is necessarily in possession of such indisputable knowledge that he condemns 
suicide on the grounds that it is contrary to charity. The presence of charity reflects 
a love of the proper end toward which an action is directed; and because Aquinas 
agrees with Augustine's view that a thing must be known to be loved, the proper end 
of an action must be known if it is to be taken in charity.68 In the case of suicide, the 
proper end of action, the good, is known never to be served because the agent, as a 
being, cannot but know that its self-preservation is the proximate good toward which 
God, in his ultimate goodness, has ordained it. 
Now when we are discussing what a man is, we are either talking 
about his very substance and nature, in which case we all know what we are, 
namely beings made up of soul and body; and in this way all, good or bad, 
love themselves to the extent that they love their own self-preservation.69 
The self-evidency and universality of this knowledge results in a love for oneself 
which renders the decision to commit suicide categorically uncharitable, irrespective 
of any rational analysis ofthe issue. Further, bearing in mind Aquinas' acceptance 
of Paul's view that a clear conscience is necessary for a decision to be taken in 
charity, it follows that it is impossible for a clear conscience to recommend suicide 
because the relevant principles constituting the scientia of conscience in its 
consideration of suicide are known to all. 
Donne's inversion of Aquinas' three reasons against suicide made the 
universality of the law of self-preservation subj ect to a rational analysis which would 
determine its jurisdiction according to the particular circumstances considered by the 
individual moral agent. The individual conscience, therefore, could be mistaken in 
its rational analysis but still clear in its conviction that the good was ultimately being 
served. Hence, Donne can, and does, maintain on the authority of Aquinas that a 
302 
suicide may be committed in charity because the good end toward which it was 
directed was the honor and love (charitas) of God, an end which Donne counts 
among those things which are 'so domestic, so near, so inward to us, that our 
conscience cannot slumber in it, nor dissemble it,.70 According to Donne's scheme, 
the major premise of the deduction leading to the conclusion that one ought to take 
one's own life is the first commandment itself, and is correspondingly certain.71 The 
minor premise, in which the particular circumstances are examined in light of the 
major premise, may be mistaken, however, as both Donne and Aquinas are aware. 
As a result, the conclusion ofthe syllogism fails to achieve any more than a degree 
of probability, and remains an opinion despite its derivation from a known major 
premise. As we have seen, Aquinas could permit a clear conscience to make such a 
mistake because he appreciated the difficulty with which the deductive procedure of 
human discourse proceeded toward certain conclusions upon matters of great 
circumstantial complexity.72 Such mistakes, we will see, are accommodated by his 
theory of charity, and are the basis for Donne's constant appeals for charity in the 
religious disputations of his day. For Donne, positions argued in charity rarely 
achieve the status of knowledge. However, their derivation from the principle 
commanding the love (charitas) of God, who is known by all to be worthy of such 
love, requires those who would refute them to acknowledge their good intentions 
and to propose counter-theses in the same spirit of charity.73 Such charity recognizes 
the fallibility of human reason and the possibility of clear but erring consciences, and 
is ready to consider all opinions, orthodox and paradoxical alike, as it presides over 
these disputations of opinion (doctrine).74 
5 
Donne on Augustine's Notion of Knowledge and Charity 
When Donne comes to consider the view of Augustine on the matter of 
suicide, his divergence from the neoplatonism of Erasmus, Lando and Agrippa, and 
from the reformed Aristotelianism of Lull and Ramus, becomes clear. For while 
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Donne's conventional acknowledgement ofthe truth of divine mysteries which 
cannot be demonstrated using the tools of Aristotelian dialectic pennits him to 
express his cognition of these truths in the fideistic tenns ofthe mystical 
neoplatonist following in the tradition of Augustine, he is aware that the exigencies 
of ethics may and must be resolved in the context of dialectical disputations which, 
like the recommendations of the conscience, may not produce the undoubting 
conviction demanded by the sacred mysteries.75 In his chapters on suicide in the City 
of God, Augustine, like Aquinas, admits no exception to be granted to an individual 
conscience claiming justification for the act. 76 Augustine grounds his unqualified 
rejection of the potential dissent of conscience in this matter on what he considers to 
be the absolute and universal mandate against killing made in the sixth 
commandment arguing that 'since the text "Thou shall not kill" has no addition 
[which indicates who mayor may not be killed,] .. .it must be taken that there is no 
exception, not even the one to whom the command is addressed'. 77 In an attempt to 
justify the self-inflicted death of Samson, Augustine's offers dispensations to 
suicides from the sixth commandment only upon the expressed authority of God 
stating that 'one who accepts the prohibition against suicide may kill himself when 
commanded by one whose orders must not be slighted [i.e. God]; only let him take 
care that there is no uncertainty about the divine command'.78 Donne considers 
Augustine's defense of Samson in the last part of Biathanatos, but promptly 
dismisses the liberties he believes Augustine to have taken with the text in positing a 
'special inspiration from God' secretly known to Samson alone. He says that 
because 'it appears not in the history, nor lies in proof, [it] may with same easiness 
be refused as it is presented.' 79 The crux of Donne's disagreement with Augustine is 
not merely a dispute over the universality of the sixth commandment, nor over the 
allegorical license with which Samson's defense was constructed, though he objects 
to both. 80 The problem rests ultimately in an epistemology which responds to the 
sceptical critique in a way which Donne could not approve, and which would make 
Aquinas' more flexible Aristotelian epistemology of greater use to his own attempts 
to resolve those inevitable dilemmas of ethics to which no single solution was 
clearly evident. 
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Though Augustine, on the authority of Paul, acknowledges the unknowability 
of any individual's conscience to another when he says that we 'have only a hearsay 
acquaintance with any man's conscience [and] we do not claim to judge the secrets 
of the heart', he declares considerably more confidence in the reliability of a 
rectified conscience than Donne could admit in Biathanatos. 81 When he considers 
whether greatness of soul is ever deservedly attributed to a suicide, Augustine says 
that 'we rightly ascribe greatness to a spirit that has the strength to endure a life of 
misery instead of running away from it, and to despise the judgement of men-and in 
particular the judgement of the mob, which is so often clouded in the darkness of 
error-in comparison with the pure light of a good conscience. ,82 Augustine's 
confidence in the certitude of the moral knowledge apparent to the rectified 
conscience is a result of his view of the correspondence between charity (charitas) 
and knowledge.83 As we have seen, Aquinas also accepted this view, maintaining 
that the end toward which an action is directed must be known for the intention of 
the will to be guided by a rectified conscience; only such an informed intention is 
rightly called charitable. Unlike Augustine however, Aquinas, acknowledged a 
variability in the degree of charity which corresponded to the variability in the 
degree to which the object oflove is known. He explains that charity grows as the 
knowledge of an accidental form (in this case, the image of God in man) 'grows in 
one who now knows what he knew already but with greater certainty than before. ,84 
The increased certitude of this charity allows its possessor more diligently to pursue 
the ultimate good, the love of God through conformity with his will, by making the 
knowledge of that good more certain, and therefore, more intelligible through the 
obscurities of particular ethical circumstances. 
In his Homilies on I John, Augustine asserts that the growth of charity is a 
progression from fear to confidence, and that the register of this progression is the 
testimony of the conscience.85 What he does not explain, however, is by what 
criteria the conscience is required to judge the conformity of the will with the 
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command to love God. He maintains with Cicero that the 'difference in the intention 
makes a difference in the acts', but will reveal no more than that the rectitude of 
intentions are 'discerned only according to their root in charity.,s6 For Donne, the 
conscience, as the instrument of practical reason, requires some knowledge by which 
to judge the conformity ofthe will to the demands of charity; and it is the natural 
reason described by Aquinas, and embraced by Donne in his identification of the 
laws of nature and reason in man, which discerns this knowledge. The object of 
charity, Aquinas explains, 'is the good as a value which is universal, such as only the 
intellect can grasp'; it is the 'divine good, known by intellect alone.' 87 Aquinas is 
careful to attribute the presence of charity in the will to the grace of God, but 
maintains on the authority of Paul's description of the relationship between 
conscience and charity in Timothy 1: 5, that the acts of a good conscience 'awake' 
charity in ourselves and 'prepare us to receive charity from above. ,88 Though charity 
resides in the will ultimately as a result of the derivation of its end from God as the 
source of the divine good, its activation is dependent upon the initiation of 
conscience, which, as we have seen, is an application ofthe universal good 
apprehended by the intellect to particular circumstances.89 As both Donne and 
Aquinas make clear, however, such an application may be mistaken despite the 
recommendation of a good conscience and the presence of charity. Augustine, on 
the other hand, makes no provision for moral error conceived in charity and a good 
conscience because he does not believe that the intellect which contemplates the 
intelligible forms with faith in their certitude can fail to act with the wisdom attained 
through such contemplation. We should recall here that Erasmus' recommendation 
of faith as the key to divine illumination in the Enchiridion, was an exhortation to 
follow Augustine, and that Donne could not sanction such a recommendation. 
In On the Trinity, Augustine discusses the role of charity in the recognition 
of intelligibles and argues that loving God indicates the faith necessary to illuminate 
the reason to the universality and immutability ofthe patterns of 'genus and species' 
by which we may judge particular manifestations of them (i.e. 'righteousness' in the 
individual soul).90 For Augustine, the clarity ofthe 'form or pattern' is obtained 
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through contemplation assisted by charity, and may only be maintained if charity is 
present. 'The only way of cleaving to that pattern is by love. ,91 This charity, 
however, may only be maintained through an exercise of the will in accordance with 
the commandments to love both God and neighbor. 
This striving or search may seem a different thing from the love by which the 
thing known is loved, inasmuch as the knowledge sought is yet to be 
realized. None the less, it is something of the same kind. It can really be 
described as "will": for everyone who seeks is willing to find.92 
It is in this way, Augustine concludes, that we are to understand Paul in I 
Corinthians 8:3 when he says, 'Si quis autem diligit Deum, hie eognitus est ab eo' 
('someone who loves God, is known by God').93 To enter into a clear cognitive 
relationship with God requires a diligent exercise of the will in accordance with the 
mandate of eharitas. Though Aquinas can agree with Augustine that to love a thing, 
one must know it, he attributes the 'awakening' of charity to the right application of 
the moral knowledge possessed by the conscience naturally. Donne adopts this 
ordering of charity and knowledge when he says that it is the testimony of his 
rectified, though possibly mistaken, conscience that assures him of his 'charitable 
purpose' in seeking support in scripture for his defense of suicide.94 Augustine, 
however, in his commitment to locate the source of moral knowledge in the divine 
intellect alone, must reverse the order and make charity the source of knowledge of 
the divine. Employing the terms of dialectic in the service of his trinitarian allegory, 
Augustine describes love as the argument or similitude through and by which certain 
moral knowledge is obtained. He calls this certain moral knowledge 'a kind of 
word, begotten by an inward speech' which 'is born when we approve the product of 
our thought, either for sinning or for doing right. ,95 It is the pronouncement of this 
word 'in the heart' which precipitates the action of the moral agent and secures his 
accountability, since, Augustine says, 'There is nothing we effect through the body 
by act or speech involving judgements of ethical value that is not preceded by the 
utterance of such an inner word. ,96 Thus, with respect to spiritual things whose 
possession, unlike that of temporal things, is secured by the knowledge of them 
alone, 'this word of ours, and the mind of which it is begotten, are united by the 
middle term of love, which binds itself to them as a third member in a spiritual 
embrace without any confusion. ,97 
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If Augustine believed that certain moral knowledge could be attained through 
a union of charity and the mind, he also believed that the possession of such 
knowledge was sufficient to insure the righteousness of its possessor whether he was 
required to act upon it or not.98 For Donne, the exigency of moral decisions which 
arose from particular circumstances in which action was unavoidable was precisely 
the point at which the certainty of our light of nature became obfuscated by its 
commingling with our discourse. Aquinas recognized the error into which 
discursive reasoning could lead human minds especially when encountered with 
circumstantially complex situations, and therefore, made allowances for consciences 
which erred 'after just diligence [was] used', while Augustine, following the 
Socratic and Stoic co-ordination of knowledge and the will, could not admit an 
individual who enjoyed the grace of God to perform a sinful act in charity. 99 In 
other words, Augustine believed that God could in no way be involved in a decision 
to commit a sinful act, and therefore, that such an act could not have been committed 
by one who possessed the knowledge and charity required to act justly. 100 It was the 
inflexibility of Augustine's doctrine of divine illumination with respect to matters of 
practical divinity which concerned Donne, a concern which troubled him all the 
more deeply because, he says, that 'almost all the reasons of others ... are derived 
from ... St. Augustine.' lOl We should recall that Donne's concern for the potential 
abuse of this absolutist epistemology by casuists was expressed with respect both to 
Calvin's Augustinian doctrine of the elect and to Augustine's definition of sin, and 
therefore indicates a philosophical aversion to the doctrine of divine illumination in 
preference to the naturalist epistemology of Aristotle and Aquinas.102 Before he 
criticized Augustine's specific reasons against suicide for masquerading as an 
exhaustive list, Donne clearly states his misgivings about following Augustine in 
matters of ethics: 
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Though St. Augustine, for sharp insight and conclusive judgement in 
exposition of places of Scripture, which he always makes so liquid and 
pervious that he hath scarce been equalled therein by any of all the writers in 
the church of God, except Calvin may have that honor ... , have a high degree 
of reverence due to him, yet in practic learning and moral divinity he was of 
so nice, and refined, and rigorous a conscience-perchance to redeem his 
former licentiousness, as it falls often in such convertites to be extremely 
zealous-that for our directions in actions of this life, St. Jerome and some 
others may be thought sometimes fitter to adhere to than St. Augustine. 103 
In this passage the details of Donne's allegiance to Augustine are delineated; where 
scriptural exegesis is concerned, Augustine, like his disciple, Calvin, may be 
followed because neither the Old nor New Testaments are concerned with resolving 
the particular moral dilemmas which the Christian may encounter in his attempt to 
act in conformity with their sometimes conflicting universal precepts.104 It is for this 
reason that in matters of 'practic learning' or 'moral divinity', which concern 
themselves explicitly with the application of principles to specific, often 
circumstantially complex, situations, Donne will incline to the method of practical 
reason described in Nicomachean Ethics and modified to suit Christian doctrine by 
Aquinas. lOS 
Despite his allegiance to Aquinas' ethics, when he returns to the reasons 
urged against suicide in The City of God I, Donne does not hesitate to offer his 
unqualified assent. It is important that we recognize this agreement in contrast to 
Donne's disagreement with Aquinas' arrangement of the three first laws of nature. 
As we have already seen, Donne inverts the order of priority of Aquinas' laws of 
nature because he seeks to delegate to the individual conscience the authority to 
override the mandates of both the laws of self-preservation and of generation and 
corruption. Having delegated this authority to the conscience, Donne may then 
follow Aquinas' formulation ofthe potentially fallible and particular function of 
charity and conscience over against the infallibility and universality of Augustine's 
formulation. Hence, though Donne can agree with Augustine that 'neither to avoid 
temporal troubles, nor to remove from others occasion of sin, nor to punish our own 
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past sins, nor to prevent future, nor in a desire for the next life ... [can it J ... be lawful 
for any man to kill himself,' he can also accuse him of failing to acknowledge other 
reasons (other than the special commandment of God as in the case of Samson) 
which may justify the act. 106 Augustine's failure to acknowledge these other 
possible reasons is a result of his confidence in the knowledge possessed by one who 
in charity enjoys the 'pure light of a good conscience' and who, therefore, cannot 
will a sinful act. Moreover, because a sinful act cannot be willed by God, any such 
act must be attributed to the free will of the agent. Donne, speaking as a paradoxist 
in the tradition of Aquinas, can claim exceptions to general laws, such as those 
relating to the principle of redde depositum, which the practical reason must 
endeavor to discover and justify, and assert that 'St. Augustine hath condemned 
those causes which we defend not, but hath omitted those wherein it is 
justifiable ... [which are cases that areJ ... hard to be discerned and distinguished from 
others arising from human infirmity' .107 From this assertion, Donne, citing the 
Jesuit Petrus Thyraeus' De daemoniacis liber unus (1594), concludes that 
Augustine's condemnation of suicide, like his view that the devil may only possess a 
person by entering him by sin, 'speaks not of what must of necessity be, but what for 
the most part uses to be. ' 108 
6 
Augustine and the Certainty of Moral Knowledge 
As we have seen, Donne's project as a paradoxist involves the refutation of 
universal claims which 'must of necessity' govern absolutely the truth or falsity of 
their particular members. 109 His consistent criticism ofthe breadth of Augustine's 
practical moral precepts such as his general definition of sin and his putatively 
exhaustive list of reasons against suicide indicate his preference for an examination 
of specific moral problems which begin according to the inductive process implicit 
in the exercise of an Aristotelian practical reason upon matters which do not appear 
unambiguously to be governed by a universal principle. The logical limitations of 
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this necessarily empirical process restrict the epistemological force of its conclusions 
by yielding only a degree of certainty which corresponds to the proportion ofthe 
relevant data collected and inspected. Hence, when Donne claims that Augustine 
'speaks not of what must of necessity be, but what for the most part uses to be,' he is 
accusing Augustine's assertion that 'Christians have no authority to commit suicide 
in any circumstance,' of masquerading as a universal principle from which we may 
deduce with certainty.l1O For Donne, the statement should read: Christians have no 
authority to commit suicide in most cases; stated in this way, a conclusion deduced 
from this major premise could only attain a degree of probability, and would 
therefore require an individual considering suicide to examine as many hypothetical 
particular circumstances as possible to insure the greatest degree of certainty. 111 As 
we have seen in the Aristotelian ethics of Aquinas, the examination of particulars 
against first practical principles is the special province of the practical reason. Such 
an examination implies the lack of a first practical principle which, through 
revelation or self-evidency, speaks directly and unambiguously to the particular 
circumstances being considered; and therefore, the very existence of a work such as 
Biathanatos is an objection to the excessive confidence of Augustine in the practical 
moral knowledge attainable by the human mind through charitas. ll2 Because 
Aquinas thought that the practical reason could deliver errant judgements which the 
conscience was bound to follow, Donne could remain faithful to the considerably 
less confident epistemological principles underlying an ethical doctrine which could 
admit fallible judgement without sin. However, before Donne could restrict his 
consideration of suicide to the fallible realm of practical reason, he had to invert 
Aquinas' three general reasons against suicide given in Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2 in 
order to give precedence to the mandates of reason over those delivered by the more 
general, non-rational testimony both of all beings and of all living beings. 
In On Free Will, Augustine himself advocates this inversion in his dialogue 
with Evodius: 
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Ev.-To exist, to live and to know are three things. A stone exists but does not 
live. An animal lives but has not intelligence. But he who has intelligence 
most certainly both exists and lives. Hence I do not hesitate to judge that that 
is more excellent, which has all these qualities, than that in which one or both 
of them is absent. .. Aug.-And of these three things that is most excellent 
which man has along with the other two, that is intelligence. l13 
When Donne, after comparing the inclination of our sensitive nature to that of our 
rational nature, identifies the law of nature in human beings with the law of reason 
stating that the rational nature 'is that light which God hath afforded us of his eternal 
law, and which is usually called recta ratio,' he admits a decided allegiance to the 
view expressed by Augustine in the passage from On Free Will quoted above against 
Aquinas' ordering of the natural laws observed by the practical reason discussed in 
Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2.114 However, because Donne inverts the order of Aquinas' 
natural laws so that he may claim a circumstantial alterability of the reasons 
prohibiting suicide which can be recognizable by the practical reason alone, he 
cannot permit the possibility that practical reason may always deliver universal, 
necessary and unerring judgements on particular moral dilemmas. In On Free Will, 
Augustine will attribute such judgements to the capacity of right reason in his 
attempt to locate the source of evil in the free will of human beings. He says 
regarding the Platonic virtues and right reason, 'No one makes a bad use of prudence 
or fortitude or temperance. In all these, as in justice which you have chosen to 
mention, right reason prevails, without which there can be no virtues. And no one 
can make a bad use of right reason. ,115 The claim that right reason may only lead to 
right action is not in itself repugnant to Donne's desire to ground the alterability of 
reasons for and against suicide in the shortcomings of reason, for in so far as reason 
exercised in a particular decision is right, it must necessarily have been well used. 
The problem for Donne is whether reason must apprehend a single objectively good 
course of action to be right. Such apprehension, as we have seen, is not guaranteed 
according to Aquinas' practical ethics. 
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Augustine, on the other hand, not only credits human reason with the ability 
to acquire true and immutable knowledge, but also claims that such knowledge is 
required for the orientation ofthe will toward the good through the exercise of right 
reason. He begins by asserting the commonality ofthe truth available to human 
reason. 'Just as the rules of numbers are true and unchangeable, and the science of 
numbers is unchangeably available for all who can learn it, and is common to them 
all, so the rules of wisdom are true and unchangeable.' 116 He goes on to maintain 
that it is according to these rules of wisdom that we make right decisions about 
particular matters. 'Of minds we say this one is not so capable as it ought to be, or it 
is not gentle enough or eager enough, according to our moral standard. All these 
judgements we make according to those inward rules of truth, which we discern in 
common. ,117 Finally, he identifies the possession of wisdom with the ability to judge 
correctly. 'No one judges it, and no one without it judges aright. Hence it is evident 
beyond a doubt that wisdom is better than our minds, for by it alone they are made 
individually wise, and are made judges, not of it, but by it of all other things 
whatever. ,118 Recalling Donne's approval of Aquinas' opinion of the variability of 
human law, and its subsequent lack of certitude and perfection, Augustine's belief in 
the subordination of the 'temporal' (human) law to the eternal law would seem to 
suit Donne's purposes in Biathanatos perfectly. Augustine says that 'from the 
eternal law are derived all just laws even when they are variable according to 
circumstances ... those who with a good will cleave to the eternal law do not need 
the temporal law' . 119 
At first glance, it would seem that because Donne agrees with Augustine that 
any just human law must be so only by virtue of its conformity with the eternal law, 
he would be more likely to follow the tacit advice of Augustine to disregard the 
temporal law when it conflicts with the eternal law. However, Augustine never 
offers such advice in his discussion in On Free Will because he believes that human 
beings, with the assistance of grace, are capable of accessing the eternal law for the 
derivation of the temporal law. He explains to Evodius in On Free Will 'that there is 
nothing just or legitimate in temporal law save what men have derived from the 
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eternal law;' and this eternal law, he maintains a short while later, is 'stamped upon 
our minds' .120 The possibility of human minds deriving their human laws from the 
infallible source of all justice, the eternal law, makes Augustine unsympathetic to 
those who err in spite of their belief that they are pursuing a good and just object. 121 
He argues that because wisdom is the 'truth in which the chief good is beheld and 
possessed' and this chief good 'is one for all men', the happy (morally justified) life 
consists solely in pursuing this chief good through the application of wisdom. He 
concludes, uncharitably by Donne's standards, that whoever 'seeks that which ought 
not to be sought, even though he would not seek it unless it seemed to him to be 
good, is nevertheless in error' . 122 It will be assumed that the difference between this 
statement and Donne's commonly expressed view that suicide does not violate the 
law of nature if it is committed for reasons which 'seem' good to the perpetrator 
need not be further explained. 
As our analysis of his departure from the ethics of Augustine should indicate, 
the principal issue upon which Donne believes the two most important authorities in 
the Christian tradition (Augustine and Aquinas) disagree is epistemological. 
Specifically, it concerns points of ethical knowledge which lie at the heart of late 
sixteenth-century reformation controversy. Donne's claim that the Calvinist doctrine 
of'impenitibleness' stands 'proportionally and analogally to their other doctrine' 
which, upon the authority of Augustine, asserts the determination of the elect and the 
damned by the foreknowledge of God, indicates quite early on in Biathanatos that he 
is going to reject the Platonic epistemology of Augustine. 123 Because of its 
derivation from Plato's theory of recollection, Augustine's doctrine of divine 
illumination could not be reconciled with the Aristotelian empiricism incorporated 
into the natural philosophy of Aquinas; this movement toward Aristotelian 
epistemology, in tum, resulted in the possibility of the re-emergence ofthe sceptical 
critique of the certitude of moral knowledge. Aquinas was able to disregard 
sceptical arguments against his natural theology by arguing that its first principles, 
against which the sceptical critique of Stoic and Peripatetic syllogistic is consistently 
directed, are delivered by divine revelation in scripture. However, with respect to 
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those issues to which scripture does not unambiguously address itself, such as that 
which the third part of Biathanatos claims suicide to be, our intellects, and the 
increasingly fallible knowledge of particular ethical matters which it produces, must 
be utilized.124 
As the testimony of 'Divine Meditation l' attests, Donne was no more 
prepared to dispense with the notion that grace was necessary for salvation than 
Aquinas; nor was he more inclined than Aquinas to repudiate Augustine's entire 
doctrine of grace. What he had to deny was that part of Augustine'S epistemology 
which permitted Calvin to assert (against Augustine himself) that the weakness of 
the human intellect that resulted after the fall was so severe that nothing but the 
unsolicited grace of God could guarantee salvation. 125 Hence, where Calvin thought 
that Augustine'S doctrine of divine illumination overemphasized the part which the 
human being could play in his own salvation by functioning in accordance with a 
shared 'co-operating' grace which gave some degree of power to human beings in 
their own salvation, Donne suspected (with the Pelagians) that this same doctrine 
admitted the possibility that moral perfection could be achieved through the 
independent exercise of the free will. It is in the light of this suspicion that we must 
understand Donne's comments regarding illumination and grace, for these terms 
cannot be employed in a work such as Biathanatos without resonating their 
Augustinian connotations. After providing the mitigating conditions for Augustine's 
categorical condemnation of suicide, a position which needs 'moderation' because it 
'speaks not of what must of necessity be, but for the most part uses to be', Donne 
may employ Augustine's terms in as novel a way as he had employed Aquinas' 
terms earlier in the work (i.e. three precepts of the natural law). To his now familiar 
pseudo-Thomist formulation ofthe freedom of the conscience in decisions 'where 
there is [not] a proper court' , he adds a pseudo-Augustinian formulation which 
results a short while later in the startling claim that suicide may actually be the 
consequence of the grace of God, a claim which would likely have upset any 
Christian irrespective of the extent of their loyality to Augustine. 126 He says, 'So 
that, ifthere be cases wherein one may assuredly, or probably, after just diligence 
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used, conclude upon an illumination of the spirit of God, or upon a ceasing of the 
reason of the law at that time in him, that man is sui iuris.' 127 After what we have 
learned about Augustine's confidence in the knowledge of a mind illumined by God, 
Donne's use ofthe term 'probably' to .describe a conclusion reached 'upon an 
illumination of the spirit of God' must appear problematic. Before we explain how 
Donne solves this problem, however, we must first identify the grounds on which 
Augustine based his rejection ofprobabilism. 
7 
Augustine's Rejection of Probabilism 
Augustine's rejection of scepticism is recorded in Against the Academicians, 
which he wrote as a response to the doubts into which he had fallen while still a 
disciple of Academic philosophy.128 His rejection of scepticism was, in part, a 
consequence of his denial of the doctrine ofprobabilism advocated by Cicero and his 
master, Cameades, a doctrine, which seemed to Augustine to provide an excuse for 
the error that leads to sin. He says: 
I am utterly at a loss to know how he sinned, if whoever does what seems 
probable is not guilty of sin, unless perhaps they [the Academics] say that to 
err is one thing, while to sin is another, and that they intended by those 
precepts [which lead to the suspension of assent] that we should not err, but 
that they thought that committing sin is of no great consequence. 129 
Augustine's main objection to the Academics, as they are defended by Cicero in the 
Academica, is that in maintaining that what is probable is like the truth (veri simile), 
the sceptic committed to withholding assent to propositions which claim to be true 
or false tacitly admits knowledge ofthe very truth he wishes to assert only probably. 
Augustine illustrates this inconsistency in Academic epistemology when he asks his 
young interlocutor, Licentius, how someone who does not know his father can 
appear anything but foolish ifhe claims that his brother is like his father. Licentius, 
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though a bit slow to grasp the intention of Augustine's illustration, eventually 
manages to conclude that the 'analogy proclaims aloud that your Academicians 
ought to be ridiculed, who say that they are striving in this life after what is like the 
truth when they do not know what truth itself is. ,130 After stating confidently that 
while the Academics believe that it is probable that 'truth cannot be found', he 
believes that it is probable that it can be found, Augustine begins to demonstrate how 
he believes some truths can be proven. Integral to his demonstration is the 
combination of his beliefs that it is absurd to claim that the wise man can be ignorant 
of wisdom and that wisdom can be nothing.131 He maintains this belief upon the 
assumption that wisdom is something, and if it is, the wise man, by definition, 
knows it. Despite the fact that Augustine claims only that he believes that it is 
'improbable that the wise knows nothing,' his doubt (if indeed he intends to express 
any) is not about the knowledge of the wise man but about whether wisdom is 
something, which is tantamount to doubting whether there is objective truth. After 
briefly praising Alypius' admission ofthe necessity of divine aid 'to show man what 
is true', he delivers what he believes to be the decisive logical proof against the 
comprehensive doubt of the Academics. 132 
I hold as certain that there is or is not one world; and if there is not one, there 
are either a finite or an infinite number of worlds. Cameades would teach 
that that opinion resembles what is false. I likewise know that this world or 
ours has been so arranged either because ofthe nature of bodies or by some 
providence, and it either always was and will be or that it began to exist and 
will by no means cease existing, or that it does not have its origin in time but 
will have an end, or that it has started to remain in existence and will remain 
but not forever, and I know innumerable physical phenomena of this type. 
For those disjunctions are true nor can anyone confuse them with any 
likeness of what is false. 133 
In this passage Augustine is combating the view propounded by Cameades 
that our perception is unable to distinguish between true and false impressions. He 
appeals to the principle of non-contradiction, as do the Stoics, Aristotle and Aquinas, 
as the evidence that disjunctive propositions such as 'a thing either is or it is not' can 
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be asserted with complete certainty.134 However, this proof is merely a refutation of 
the sceptical claim that the mind cannot be said to be know anything certainly; 
Donne was familiar with Sextus' critique of the Stoic unprovables in the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians, and therefore would have also known 
that a disjunctive proposition does not establish a necessary relation between its two 
terms; nor do universal propositions which predicate one term of another, such as 
Donne would have known from his study of Aristotelian syllogistic, provide any 
information about the actual (metaphysical) nature ofthose two terms. For instance, 
when Augustine claims that the wise man knows wisdom, he says no more than that 
the wise man is wise, which, of course, is simply to predicate wisdom of this man 
twice. The proposition which underlies these claims, and the truth of which the 
sceptic denies can be demonstrated, is 'a man is wise'. As Cicero had urged against 
Zeno in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, the reason for this uncertainty is simply that we are 
unable to prove that wisdom or virtue or pain bear any relation to the subjects of 
which they are predicated that extends beyond the definitions which we have devised 
for them. Augustine rightly accuses the Academics of contradicting themselves 
when they claim that the wise man assents to nothing because they themselves assert 
that such a man exists (i.e. the man who assents to nothing) while maintaining that 
he knows nothing, not even wisdom. 135 
However, Augustine'S solution to the problem ofthe relation of sense 
perception to reality, the most persistent problem raised by scepticism, provides 
nothing that Aristotle and the Stoics had not provided before him. 136 His interior 
sense (interior sensus) as described in On Free Will functions in the same manner as 
Aristotle's 'common sense,' by co-ordinating the images gathered by the five 
external senses and producing a unified perception.137 Unlike the sceptics, Augustine 
does not believe that this unified perception is peculiar to each individual perceiver. 
'In spite of the fact that my sense and yours are two different things, what we 
actually see need not be two different things, one of which I see while you see the 
other. There is one object for both of us, and both of us see it simultaneously.'138 
We are never told, however, by what mechanism the unified perceptions assembled 
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by the individual interior senses of individual perceivers are grasped in common by 
them all. The Stoics, as we have seen, provided such a mechanism in the form of a 
cognitive intermediary called the lekton which carried the notes of a true perception 
from the object perceived to any who could perceive it, but Augustine's use of a 
concept corresponding to the lekton (dicibile) is restricted to his discussion, in De 
Dialectica, of signification in language alone.139 With respect to the signification of 
non-verbal signs, however, he seems to see no problem in leaving his assertion that 
we all perceive the same objects in common unsupported, and indeed he meets no 
resistance from his interlocutor, Evodius. However, he does anticipate sceptical 
objections to the claim that we know abstract truths in common, such as those 
expressed in mathematical principles, because he does not believe that such truths 
are the product of an inductive process dependent upon the bodily senses, interior or 
exterior. He says: 
The double of any number is found to be exactly as far from that number as it 
is from the beginning of the series. How do we find this changeless, firm and 
unbroken rule persisting throughout the numerical series? No bodily sense 
makes contact with all numbers, for they are innumerable. How do we know 
that this rule holds throughout? How can any phantasy or phantasm yield 
such certain truth about numbers which are innumerable? We must know 
this by the inner light, of which bodily sense knows nothing. 140 
Despite the undeniable but circular reasoning which informed his argument for the 
certainty of disjunctive propositions, the success of Augustine's response to the 
Academics, as this passage indicates, ultimately rests on his doctrine of illumination. 
In The Teacher, he closely examines the relation of words understood as signs to 
those objects which they are supposed to signify (significabilia) and concludes after 
considerable dialectical inquiry that words merely remind us of things of which our 
minds are already in possession. 141 Hence, with respect to sense knowledge, words 
remind us of objects which we have perceived through the external senses, co-
ordinated into images by the internal sense and 'imprinted on ... [ our] memory'. 142 
With respect to that abstract, intellectual knowledge (e.g. mathematical principles) 
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which he had denied could be derived from the bodily senses in On Free Will, 
Augustine concludes that the teacher merely leads his pupil so that he may 'look 
upon [it] in the inner light of truth which illumines the inner man and is inwardly 
enjoyed. ,143 This inner light shining inwardly in the inner man must ultimately be 
derived from God who will make universal truths 'manifest' to those who direct 
their wills in accordance with the command of charity. 144 Those who do not direct 
their wills in this way, however, may in no way blame God for allowing them to fall 
into error. Augustine explains that it 'often happens that a man, when asked a 
question, gives a negative answer, but by further questioning can be brought to 
answer in the affirmative.' 'The reason' for this discrepancy, he continues, 'lies in 
his own weakness. He is unable to let the light illumine the whole problem. ,145 
In light of Augustine's association of error and sin, we may now return to 
Donne's innovation of the doctrine of illumination in his statement that 'ifthere be 
cases wherein one may assuredly, or probably, after just diligence used, conclude 
upon an illumination of God, ... that one is sui iuris.' As we have seen, probability is 
achieved through an inductive process which indicates the likelihood of a universal 
principle through the accumulation of particular bits of evidence which indicate its 
universality. As the paradoxist knows, only one exception need be discovered to 
reduce a universal principle masquerading as certain to a mere probability. 
Augustine also knew that principles reliant upon inductive reasoning could not attain 
the degree of certainty which he believed was characteristic of knowledge conceived 
in the bright light of grace. It is for this reason that he denied the knowledge of 
mathematical principles an inductive basis when he dismissed the possibility 'that 
numbers [could] make their impression on our minds not in their own right but 
rather as images of visible things, springing from our contacts by bodily sense with 
corporeal objects' .146 He felt similarly about moral principles.147 Their truth was 
authorized by God himself; and therefore, no exception to them could be claimed 
which would reveal their underlying inductive basis. Just as in mathematics, when a 
theorem is shown theoretically to admit no exceptions, it is called a universal proof 
and need not be verified with respect to particular cases, when a moral principle is 
320 
asserted to be without exception, it can never be said merely to be probably true. In 
Against the Academicians, Augustine considered the threat ofprobabilism and its 
empirical (inductive) treatment of ethics and law extremely serious. He explains that 
'this is of vast importance, this is appalling, this ought to be feared by every good 
man, namely, that he may commit every kind of sin not only without the blame of 
crime but even without the blame of error if this probable line of reasoning will be 
(followed)' .148 Hence, when Donne permits probability to coexist with illumination, 
he does so in order to provide a place for excusable ignorance in error, but he can do 
so only by compromising the foundations of Augustine's theory of moral 
knowledge. 149 
8 
Degrees of Certainty and Degrees of Charity 
We have seen that Donne believed the knowledge of God's existence and the 
obligation to worship him to be common to all rational creatures, Christian and 
pagan alike, and that those who deny this knowledge represent the 'inexcusabiles' 
condemned by Paul in Romans 1 :20-21. Both his inversion of Aquinas' three 
precepts of the natural law and his incorporation of a limited form of probabilism 
into Augustine's doctrine of illumination represent his attempt to establish a class of 
moral dilemmas which are sufficiently ambiguous to allow the individual conscience 
to claim an excusable ignorance of the means to ascertain their solution with 
certainty. When we encounter such a dilemma, Donne explains, we must endeavor 
to identify which of the conflicting principles speaks most authoritatively. In ethical 
matters, this identification is facilitated by the arrangement of the Decalogue into 
those commandments ofthe First Table (1-3) which concern 'the honor of God and 
faith' , and those of the Second Table (4-10) which are' directed upon our neighbor 
by charity.' ISO Of course, the commandments of the First Table must be followed 
before those of the Second Table; and hence, if we must choose to 'do an act of 
idolatry or kill' , Donne explains, that we are 'bound to the latter' .151 Later, Donne 
321 
argues that because the commandments of the First Table impose a 'necessary 
obligation which lies always upon us, of preferring God's glory above all human 
respects', we may deduce 'mediately and secondarily' from them other laws which 
permit the transgression ofthe commandments of the Second Table.152 As both 
Donne and Aquinas acknowledge, these secondary laws may be mistaken because 
they are the 'issue of our light of nature and of our discourse', but so long as they are 
derived from that first principle of which no one may claim an excusable ignorance, 
the glorification of God, they have been deduced from the knowledge necessary to 
insure a rectified conscience, which, in tum (according to Aquinas' arrangement), 
insures a charitable will. As Moses had explained to the Israelites, keeping the ten 
commandments is the means to following the general commandment to love GOd. 153 
When there is no conflict between the interests of God and of our neighbor, we may 
claim with Augustine that we exhibit our love for God when we show love for our 
neighbor, but in cases in which there is such a conflict, it is our knowledge that 
God's glory is to be preferred to the interests of our neighbor that insures that our 
decision is taken out of love for God, and is therefore, charitable. 154 With regard to 
ourselves, Donne concludes that if the sixth commandment (Thou shalt not kill) may 
be countermanded by any of the first three, and is an instance of our love for God 
asserting its priority over our love for our neighbor, then our love for ourself, for 
which there is no explicit commandment in the scriptures, may be assumed also to 
be subordinate to our love for GOd. 155 Aquinas, though he places the love of one's 
own soul before the love of neighbor, orders the objects ofthe commands to love 
placing God first, our own soul second, our neighbor third, and our own body last. 156 
Augustine also recognizes this arrangement, but, as we have seen, does not provide 
the epistemological or logical mechanisms by which these variabilities in the degree 
of charity can result in variablilities in the degree of knowledge or proof. 157 
After stating that the lesson of I John 3: 16 provides us with 'a true 
understanding of charity, ... [and of] a contempt of this life in respect of it' , Donne 
follows Aquinas on the relation of the degrees of charity to those of knowledge when 
he concludes that this 'true understanding' compels us to accept that 'as He did in 
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perfect charity, so we, in such degrees of it as this life and our nature are capable of, 
must die by our own will, rather than His glory be neglected' .158 Our nature, which, 
we have seen, Donne identifies with reason, is capable of the knowledge that God's 
glory is to be exalted above all else. From this 'true understanding', we may deduce 
that under certain circumstances, we must take our own lives in order to follow the 
command to love God. This deduction, as it is the product of our fallible practical 
reason, may be mistaken, but is nonetheless without sin because we have reached it 
employing the highest degree of knowledge of which our nature is capable. It is this 
highest degree of knowledge, this certainty, which results in the highest degree of 
charity of which we are capable. As an illustration of a charitable but erroneous 
conclusion which may be deduced from the certain truth of the command to love 
God, Donne cites Paul's wish 'to be separated from Christ' if such separation results 
in the salvation of his brothers. 159 Donne agrees with Calvin that though this wish 
was contrary to the will of God, and therefore sinful, Paul's intention was deduced 
from his knowledge that God is to be glorified before all else. This knowledge 
secured that highest degree of charity which, Donne claims, excused the sinful wish; 
Paul's deduction that his wish was a means to glorify God was mistaken, but for 
Donne, 'remains as an argument to us that charity will recompense and justify many 
excesses which seem unnatural and irregular and enormous transportations. ,160 
In his declaration that his intention in Biathanatos is to show how suicide 
'may be free, not only from those enormous degrees of sin, but from all', Donne 
reveals that he will attempt this proof according to Aquinas' formulation of the 
relation between charity and knowledge, the same formulation, which, we have seen, 
is operative in his defense of Paul's sinful wish. 161 After the defense of his 
paradoxical thesis has 'delivered ... [us] from the tyranny of ... prejudice', he explains, 
'our judgement may be brought nearer to a straightness, and our charity awakened 
and entendered to apprehend' that, like Paul, those who commit suicide out of a 
perceived conformity with the command to love God have done so with the rectified 
conscience necessary to secure their charitable intention. 162 As Aquinas had said, the 
conscience which possesses the universal practical principle to 'fly evil' and 'seek 
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good' apprehends the knowledge which initiates its identification of God with the 
good. Once such an identification is made, our charity is awakened and our will 
strives to do the will of God despite its uncertainty that particular decisions taken 
under specific circumstances actually conform with the universal good. 163 Donne's 
refutation of the orthodox, and categorical, position against suicide by the 
enumeration of counterexamples in combination with his constructive deductive 
proofs for the identification ofthe laws of nature, reason and God are intended to 
bring our judgment 'nearer to a straightness', to raise its awareness of the universal 
command to love. By this awareness, charity is awakened, not only in our own 
pursuit of the good in our ethical lives, but in our readiness to exonerate those who, 
out of their charitable will to follow the command to love God, have committed acts 
which, according to our own potentially erroneous rational discourse, appear to be 
sinful. What is critical, as Donne insists in Pseudo-Martyr, is that we diligently 
exercise our practical reason in the service of charity, because 'whatsoever appears 
true to the Iudgement, seemes good to our will, and begets a desire to doe it. ,164 This 
desire to do good fulfills the criterion for a charitable intention, and though it must 
be remembered that Donne continues to require only a 'seeming' good to present 
itself to the judgement, a rectified conscience must endeavor to apply its knowledge 
with a view to discovering truth, elusive as it may be. 165 Donne explains to those 
English Catholics who would sacrifice their lives by refusing to swear the Oath of 
Allegiance that 'our Conscience, whose office is to apply our knowledge to 
something, and to present to us some law that bindes us in that case, cannot binde us 
to these heavy incommodities [of a suicide mistaken for martyrdom], for any matter, 
but that, which wee therefore beleeue that wee know' .166 The potential conflict 
between the doubt implicit in belief and the certitude required for knowledge, 
represented in the final clause of this statement of Donne's allegiance to Aquinas' 
theory of the conscience, reflects a compassion for erring human reason which could 
not accord with Augustine's confidence in the conscience rectified by charity. 
Unlike Augustine, Aquinas admitted that charity may be present in the 
intention of the will but fail to succeed in its pursuit of the good. This failure, he 
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says, is the result of 'the changeable condition of the subject', a condition which, he 
had explained earlier, makes a constant perception of the divine good impossible in 
this life. 167 Our practical reason may try to serve the end of the divine good in its 
particular deductions, but it is bound to fail, at least occasionally, to observe the true 
order of goods by preferring, albeit unwittingly, some temporal to a spiritual good. 
Aquinas explains that 'a disordered affection about things subordinate to an end does 
not destroy love for the end itself. Hence charity towards God can remain side by 
side with a mortal sin, which has been committed through a disordered love for some 
temporal good. ,168 Donne's presentation of Biathanatos as a paradox which in all 
earnestness exposes the uncertain basis of the opposing orthodox position, is an 
illustration of the difficulty with which our rational discourse apprehends the correct 
relative order of the conflicting ends among which we must choose in this life. We 
have only a few precepts which we can claim to know with certainty, and our 
deductions from them are bound to descend into the fallible realm of probability. 
First in the order of priority is the command to love God; the more particular the 
circumstances to which we attempt to apply this precept, the more likely we are to 
fall into error. Hence, Donne concludes his thesis defending the conditions under 
which suicide may be deemed preferable, with an acknowledgement of its nature as 
an opinion, a nature which, though changeable and uncertain, reflects the difficulty 
with which we all must contend in our rational efforts to bring our will into 
conformity with the command to love God. Ifwe refuse to involve ourselves in this 
struggle with a consciousness both of our desire to discover the truth and the fallacy 
which may impair that discovery, we diminish the value of the disputation of 
paradoxes which Harvey had praised, and which Donne implicitly approved in both 
his Paradoxes and Biathanatos. Those innovators, who seek to obscure the truth, 
those sceptics, who deny that it can be discovered, those dogmatists, who do not 
recognize their own fallibility, and those wits, who draw on these authors to affect 
the appearance oflearning, all may enlist the service of the paradox as a vehicle to 
convey their misinformation. What they all lack, and what ultimately makes their 
paradoxes contemptible, is the rigor to 'vex' or 'raise an alarum to' truth in the hope 
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that the means to act in accordance with it, and hence with the command to love God 
as the source of truth, will more clearly be discerned by reason. 
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society to 'collapse in chaos' (p. 192). See Carey, 1981, pp. 190-195. Finally, Meg Lota Brown also 
fails to observe the limitation of Donne 's syllogism, and, like Carey, deploys it as evidence of his 
relativism. Though she is careful to mention Donne's own reservations about the exemptions from a 
law which one may justifiably claim, she does not make explicit his insistence on the absolute 
inviolability of certain natural, rational and divine laws. See Lota Brown, 1995, pp. 21-23, 76-83. 
Coffm, Carey and Lota Brown may have reconsidered their opinions had they compared Richard 
Hooker's comments on the relation of particular laws to the reasons (ends) upon which they are 
based. Hooker says that 'the nature of every law must be judged by the end for which it was made, 
and the aptness of things therein prescribed unto the same end.' The involvement of reason in this 
judgement is precisely the process which Donne argues reveals the circumstantial complexity of the 
reason of the law. See Hooker, 1850, III, x, I (quoted in New, 1964, p. 54). 
45 Donne, 1982,11. 1783-1803. Donne derives his view that the pursuit of an apparent good is 
ethically justifiable from Nicomachean Ethics 1113a 15-1115a6. There Aristotle says, 'Those who 
say the apparent good is the object of wish must admit that there is no natural object of wish, but only 
what seems so to each man. Now different things appear so to different people, and, if it so happens, 
even contrary things' . 
46 Donne, 1982, 11. 1700-1704 
47 Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2. This law was also observed by Lactantius and Augustine. See also 
Lactantius, Divine Institutes III, 8; and Augustine, On Free Will II, 26. It continued to be observed 
by the Anglican casuist, Robert Sanderson. See Sanderson, 1660, pp. 131, 132, 133 (cited in Camille 
Welles Slights, 1981, p. 21). 
48 See Nicomachean Ethics 1112a5-17, 1140a24-1145all. Lisska says, 'Practical reason pursues the 
goods which lead to human well-being. To do the opposite would be to act irrationally. Acting 
irrationally is opposed to the rational disposition central to the essence of the human person. 
Furthermore, this is opposed to what we are as human beings. Hence, the ends which make up the 
human essence, determined by the theoretical [speculative] reason and pursued by practical reason, 
establish the obligatory actions for human beings' (p. 109, my brackets). 
49 Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2 (translator's emphasis) 
50 Donne considers these circumstantial alterations in the second and third sections of Biathanatos in 
which he examines various civil, canon and divine laws against suicide. See Donne, 1982,11.2710, 
2770,2795, 3060, 3350, 3362, 3800, 3900, 3935 and 4512. 
51 Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2. Aquinas recognized a hierarchy of being in the phenomenal world which 
could be apprehended by the intellect through its perception of the analogical correspondence 
governing the relations of various substances. This correspondence is perceptable through various 
modes of analogy (e.g. of being, of proportionality, of attribution), which are derived from Aristotle's 
discussion of the relation between substance and accident in the Metaphysics. It is necessary to 
acknowlege Aquinas' debt to Aristotle in this area of his metaphysics in order to avoid mistakenly 
locating his theory of analogy in the tradition of Platonic metaphysics, which both Aquinas and 
Aristotle explicitly rejected. For Aquinas, analogical correspondences between substances co-
ordinated within the hierarchy of being reflected their univocal reference to a common predicate, as 
'healthy' can be predicated univocally (by analogy of attribution) of medicines and of certain types 
of food. Without the univocity secured by analogical correspondence, our deductions from the first 
universal principles of both speculative and practical reason cannot avoid the fallacy of four terms; 
nor would our observations of substance/accident and genus/species relations be reliable, thus 
rendering the common predicates, which serve as the middle terms of our syllogistic analysis of the 
created universe, undistributed. For a discussion of the difference between univocal and equivocal 
reference in various types of analogy, see Anderson, 1967, pp. 30-45. For a discussion of Aquinas' 
theory of analogy and its relation to the problem of univocal reference, see McInerny, 1996, esp. pp. 
32-35; and Wippel, 1993, pp. 85-127. On Aquinas' rejection of Platonic Idealism and its derivation 
from Aristotle's critique of Plato in the Metaphysics, see Henle, 1956, pp. 324-400. F. C. Copleston 
has observed similar Platonic elements in Aquinas' thought, but is also careful to emphasize the 
critical differences between Aquinas' theory of analogy and the Platonic Idealism adopted by 
Augustine. See Copleston, 1955, pp. 121-142. He has also observed it as the basis for Aquinas' 
rejection of Anselm's ontological argument. See Copleston, 1972, p. 196. 
52 Summa II i, q. 94, a. 2. For a discussion of Aquinas' characterization of universal, self-evident 
principles in Summa II i, q. 94 and elsewhere, see Gilson, 1983, pp. 34-39. 
53 Summa II ii, q. 64, a. 5 
54 Summa II ii, q. 64, a. 5 
55 Summa II i, q. 100, a. 10 
56 1 Timothy 1:5 
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57 Veronica Kahn has failed to notice the reliance of charity upon a conscience active in its 
application of knowledge (scientia), and consequently, mistakenly opposes charity to prudence on the 
grounds that charity is a function of contemplation, and prudence of action. The root of her error is 
her incorrect opposition of the speculative and practical reason. See Kahn, 1985, pp.60-62, 84-85. 
58 Summa I, q. 79, a. 13. For a discussion of this passage in relation to the casuistical practice to 
which Biathanatos referred, see Donne, 1982, pp. xxviii, xci, n. 44. 
59 Donne, 1610, sig. Mm. The use of Aquinas' deftnition of conscience was commonplace among 
Protestant moral theologians. See Perkins, 1612-1613, 11,11; and Sanderson, 1660, p. 7 (quoted in 
Camille Welles Slights, 1981, pp. 16-17). For more on Perkins' view of the conscience, see Keenan, 
1995, pp. 105-130. 
60 Summa I, q. 79, a. 12 
61 Donne, 1967a, p. 7 
62 Summa II i, q. 19, a. 6 
63 Summa I, q. 79, a. 13~ On Aquinas' theory of synderesis and its relation to the erring conscience, 
see Sigmund, 1993, pp. 217-231. On the tradition of casuistical treatment of the subject of the erring 
conscience with which Donne would have been familiar, see Donne, 1982, pp. xxx-xxxiv. 
64 Camille Welles Slights has observed that seventeenth-century Protestant casuists utilized synderesis 
in their accounts of practical reason, but she does not locate or discuss its source in Aquinas. See 
Camille Welles Slights, 1972, p. 90; and 1981, pp. 11,20. 
65 We recall, however, that Donne was reluctant to offer instances of such properly casuistical 
exercises in Biathanatos. See Donne, 1982,11.5451-5452. 
66 Ibid., 11. 1716-1720. Donne cites Sylvius, Commentarius ad leges regias, Praefatio, cap. 1. For 
more on Sylvius, see Donne, 1982, p. 212. 
67 Ibid., 11. 1721-1725 
68 See Summa II ii, q. 27, a. 1; and Augustine, On the Trinity X, 1. 
69 Summa II ii, q. 25, a. 7 
70 Donne, 1982,11. 1633-1634 
71 See Donne, 1953, VIII, pp. 222-223 in which Donne says, 'It is impossible to love anything till we 
know it: First our Understanding must present it as Verum, as a Knowne truth, and then our Will 
imbraces it as Bonum, as Good, and worthy to be loved' (quoted in Stanwood and Asals, 1986, pp. 
149-150). 
72 On Aquinas' admission of probable justiftcation in dialectical analysis, see MacDonald, 1993, pp. 
160-195, esp. 179-180. 
73 On Donne's belief that the knowledge and reason natural to all men must be tempered by charity 
because of their fallibility, see Donne, 1953, VIII, pp. 313-314, 316-317 (quoted in Stanwood and 
Asals, 1986, p. 107). 
74 Wesley Trimpi has observed, 'What equity is in Roman testamentary law, charity is in Scriptural 
testamentary law: in each, the letter, the scriptum, must be put aside to reveal the voluntas of the 
writer of the will. It is precisely in this sense that we may say with st. Paul that charity is the 
fulfilling of the law (Rom. 13.10).' Trimpi has argued that equity is determined by the consideration 
of theses; though he does not expand on charity's relation to the thesis, we may assume that it 
functions in the same manner as equity. See Trimpi, 1974, p. 107. Brian Vickers has noted that 
humanist commentators on Cicero's De Officiis (esp. 1,43, 153) advocated his praise of an active 
participation in the ethical life of one's society because it contributed to the fulftllment of one's 
Christian duty of charity. Vickers also observes that this charitable social involvement requires the 
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diligent cultivation of moral knowledge with an eye towards its application in the practical afffairs of 
Christian society. See Vickers, 1988, pp. 273-276. 
75 Donne's Augustinianism has been understood as a consequence of the Pyrrhonist scepticism 
embraced by Montaigne. As we have seen, Donne's moderate scepticism permitted him to recognize 
the indemonstrabilility of some principles of religion, but not all. For a discussion of Donne's 
Augustinianism, Pyrrhonism and fideism, see Bredvold, 1925, pp. 193-232. Terry Sherwood has 
challenged Bredvold's view that Donne's Augustinianism consists in their shared 'anti-
intellectualism' by claiming that both Augustine and Donne advocate the powers of reason against 
the sceptical critique. While he is correct to say that Augustine refuted the sceptical arguments of the 
Academics by a rational appeal to the certitudes which reason discovers in disjunctive propositions, 
and that Donne made use of Augustine's argument in the 'Elegy upon the untimely death of the 
incomparable Prince Henry' (11. 77-80), Sherwood does not distinguish Augustine's view that 
rational certitude is ultimately derived from the illumination of the Spirit through the inner teacher 
from Aquinas' view that this certitude can be attained through a rational examination of natural law 
alone. As a result, Sherwood appears to make Donne a disciple of Augustinian epistemology with 
almost no mention Aquinas' influence. When Aquinas is mentioned, no attempt is made to reconcile 
his Aristotelianism with Augustine's neoplatonism. See Sherwood, 1984, pp. 30-62; and Sherwood, 
1972, pp. 353-374. In Sherwood's doctoral thesis, however, he argues that Donne followed Aquinas' 
epistemology and not Augustine's (p. 41). Though Sherwood sometimes confuses the details of 
these two epistemological systems in his thesis, his study of Donne's use of Aquinas to counter the 
sceptical critique is more convincing than his later view that Donne followed Augustine in his 
response to scepticism .. See Sherwood, 1969, pp. 40-139. 
76 See City of God, I, 17-27. 
77 Ibid., I, 20 
78 Ibid, I, 26 
79 Donne, 1982,11. 5113ff. Earlier in Biathanatos, Donne had called such a defense 'poor and 
improbable'. See Donne, 1982,11.4023-4025. 
80 On the authority of the precedent of! Kings 20:35, Donne claims that had God commanded the 
suicide of Samson, he would have been 'pleased to deliver it plainly and expressly'. For a discussion 
of Donne's account of Samson's suicide and its influence on Milton's view in Samson Agonistes, see 
Butler, 1997, pp. 199-219. 
81 City of God, 1,26. See also I Corinthians 2:11. 
82 City of God, 1, 22. Donne claims that Augustine objects to suicide primarily because it is a 
violation of the virtue offortitude. See Donne, 1982,11.3140-3141. 
83 For discussion of Augustine's intolerance of error and its relation to Pelagianism and charity, see 
Hoopes, 1962, pp. 63-72. 
84 Summa II ii, q. 24, a. 6. See also Summa II ii, q. 24, (p. 50, n. c. of Black friars). 
85 See Homilies on I John 9, 2. In Biathanatos, Donne notices Augustine's assertion that 'the 
perfection of charity ... [is] to be ready to die for your brother' (Homilies 5, 4), and argues that if Paul 
could wish for his death out of perfect charity, then 'there is a degree of charity above that, which is 
to do it.' See Donne, 1982,4718-4719. 
86 Homilies on I John 7, 7-8 
87 Summa II ii, q. 24, a. 1 
88 Summa II ii, q. 24, a. 2 
89 In his discussion of charity in Biathanatos, A.E. Malloch fails to recognize the intellectual rigor 
demanded by the command to love. See Malloch, 1958, pp. 144-146. 
90 See On the Trinity VIII, 10-14. 
91 Ibid., VIII, 9 
92 Ibid., IX, 18 
93 The punctuation is mine. Lindsay A. Mann has criticized Mary P. Ramsay's failure to notice 
Donne's reliance, in his sermon preached at Paul's Cross, 24 March 1616/1617 (Donne, 1953, I, pp. 
184-185), on Aquinas' formulation of the relation between the loved and the lover in the third book 
of his commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences (III Sent., d. 27, q.l, a.l). See Mann, 1971, p. 287. 
94 See Donne, 1982,11.4723-4727. 
95 On the Trinity IX, 12-13 (translator's emphasis) 
96 Ibid., IX, 12 
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97 Ibid., IX, 13. For a discussion of Augustine's adoption of Platonic Idealism in his account of the 
role of love in the comprehension of the similitudes which participate in the divine trinitarian pattern, 
see Gilson, 1961, pp. 210-224. 
98 See On the Trinity IX, 14. 'The man, for example, whose knowledge and love are perfect, is 
thereby righteous, even though there be no occasion for an outward and bodily act displaying it' 
(translator's emphasis). 
99 Donne, 1982,1. 3053 
100 Augustine's inflexibility upon the issue of the certitude of moral knowledge depends largely on his 
response to the sceptical critique of knowledge detailed at length in Against the Academicians and On 
the Free Will. His reliance on Stoic logic and the notion of the sensus communis to ground his 
doctrine of the free will, will allow him to argue an accurate correspondence between external objects 
and their represenation in the mind. Not surprisingly, he will assert by allegorical correspondence the 
doctrine of divine illumination which states that knowledge of moral truths can be gained by the 
examination of disjunctive propositions (which are certain, and therefore, according to Augustine, 
refute the sceptics) in the co-ordinating light of God which is a type of sensus communis enjoyed by 
rational beings alone. For further discussion of Augustine's use of Stoic logic against the sceptical 
critique, see Kneale and Kneale, 1962, pp. 173-174; B. Darrell Jackson, 1969, pp. 9-49; and Baratin, 
1981, pp. 260-268. 
101 Donne, 1982, 11. 2855-2856 
102 See Donne, 1982,11. 1331-l350, 1410-1451. 
103 Ibid., 11. 2862-2874 
104 For the often repeated view that Donne followed Augustine in his principles of biblical exegesis, 
see Quinn, 1962, pp. 313-329; Sherwood, 1972, pp. 353-374, esp. 363-367; Vessey, 1993, pp. 173-
201, esp. 189. 
105 For a discussion of the anti-rationalism of both Luther and Calvin, its debt to Augustine and 
Richard Hooker's AristotelianlThomist reaffIrmation of the constructive role of reason in the 
discernment of the harmony of natural and divine law, see Hoopes, 1962, pp. 96-114, 123-l32; and 
Camille Welles Slights, 1981, pp. 20-21. Unfortunately, Hoopes follows Bredvold in placing Donne 
in the sceptical tradition ofMontaigne, and fails to observe his scholastic affinities with his fellow 
Anglican divine, Hooker. A. E. Malloch makes the same mistake when he concludes on the basis of 
a comparison between a passage from The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity and Donne's Paradoxes, that 
Donne and Hooker were opposed on the issue of scholastic theology. Of course, Malloch's 
conclusion is necessitated by his view that Biathanatos was a parody of scholastic methods of 
reasoning. See Malloch, 1958, pp. 79-80. John F. H. New's comments on the commitment of 
Donne, Hooker and Anglican's in general to the application of reason in matters to which scripture 
does not explicitly address itself are illuminating on this point. See New, 1964, pp. 8-12,20-21,28-
29,54-55. 
106 A few pages after offering his agreement to Augustine on these points, Donne seems to contradict 
himself when he asks, 'May not I accuse and condemn myself to myself, and inflict what penance I 
will, for punishing the past and avoiding like occasion of sin?' (11.3002-3004). Donne, however, 
never answers this question because it is used merely to set up a rhetorical inquiry into the right of 
popes, sovereigns and judges to pronounce both temporal and spiritual judgements upon themselves, 
an inquiry which seeks only to expose a double standard, and not to advocate a positive position (e.g. 
that if popes, sovereigns and judges may inflict punishments upon themselves 'for punishing the past 
and avoiding like occasion of sin', so may anyone.). See Donne, 1982,11.3002-3004. See also the 
comments of Rudick and Battin on this passage, in Donne, 1982, pp. lxvii-Ixviii. 
107 Donne, 1982,11.2901-2905. The issue of red de depositum is examined by Aquinas in Summa II i, 
q. 94, a. 4., and by Donne in Donne, 1982,11. 1705-1710. 
108 Donne, 1982,11.2929-2930 
109 See Prior Analytics 66b16. 
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110 City of God I, 20 
III Richard B. Miller has shown that, in his Ductor Dubitantium, the Anglican casuist, Jeremy Taylor, 
objected to Augustine's claim that lying is evil under all circumstances on the same grounds as 
Donne objected to his absolute condemnation of suicide. Their allegiance with respect to 
Augustine's reluctance to admit exceptions, as well as their similar adoption of Aquinas' principles of 
the practical reason, suggest a solution to the problem of 'the relation between Puritan and Anglican 
casuistry' which Camille Welles Slights has noticed. See Camille Welles Slights, 1981, pp. 28-66, 
esp.41. See Richard B. Miller, 1995, pp. 131-157, esp. 145-152. Coleridge may also offer some 
help in understanding Slights' problem. In his comments on Donne's sermons, he had noted that 
both Donne and Taylor had a 'Taste for the Fathers, and all the Saints and Schoolmen before the 
Reformation [which] amounts to a dislike of the Divines of the Continental protestant Churches, 
Lutheran or Calvinistic.' This taste for the Fathers, Colerdige claimed, caused 'prelatic Divines' such 
as Donne to use (what Coleridge considered to be) 'forced and fantastic analogies ... by which they 
sought to distinguish themselves from the Puritans.' Coleridge did not believe Donne to have always 
used such fantastic analogies in his scriptural interpretations, however. He observed, though 
guardedly, Donne's preservation of the literal meaning of scriptural allegories through the exposition 
of the univocity of its symbolic or typological meaning. See Brinkley, 1955, pp. 163, 171, 177-178. 
112 F. C. Copleston's discussion of Aquinas' Aristotelian empiricism in relation to his theory of first 
principles is useful for understanding his approach to ethical problems. See Copleston, 1955, pp. 32-
33,56-57,72-73,109-110,198-204,223-226. 
113 On Free Will II, 7 
114 Aquinas believed that the sensitive appetite should also direct towards the good. See Summa II i, 
q. 24, a. 3. In his fourth paradox, 'That Nature is our worst Guide', Donne expresses the Augustinian 
and Platonic disdain for the sensitive nature, which we fmd implicit in Biathanatos' exaltation of the 
rational nature and its inversion of Aquinas' ordering of the three laws of nature. There he says, 
'Alas how unable a guide is that which follows the temperature of our slimy bodyes?' See Donne, 
1980, p. 7, 11. 15-16. For an overview of Aquinas' ordering and its relation to the sensitive and 
rational nature, see Copleston, 1955, pp. 177-180, 198-226. 
115 On Free Will II, 50. See also Plato's formulation in Charmides 174c. 
116 On Free Will II, 29 
117 Ibid., 34. Remarking on Augustine's doctrine of illumination, Etienne Gilson says, 'Ethical 
knowledge is a particular case of the divine illumination which itself is an effect of the divine ideas. 
The defmitions of the circle or the sphere are eternal and necessary truths, which judge our thought 
and by which, in its tum, our thought judges particular circles or spheres. But moral truths are just as 
immutable, necessary and eternal as speculative truths. In their case too, each man sees them in his 
own mind, and yet they are common to all.' See Gilson, 1955, p. 77. 
118 On Free Will II, 38 
119 Ibid., I, 31 
120 Ibid., I, 15. For discussion of Augustine's view on the relation between the eternal law and human 
knowledge of it, see Gilson, 1961, pp. 127-136. 
121 This is not to say that Augustine thought that human beings always succeeded in deriving their 
temporal laws for the management of their various earthly cities from the eternal law. In the City of 
God XIX, 17, he considers specifically the problem of 'discord' between the heavenly and earthly 
cities and maintains the authority of temporal laws only in so far as 'it limits the harmonious 
agreement of citizens concerning the giving and obeying of orders to the establishment of a kind of 
compromise between human wills about the things relevant to mortal life '. In cases where the 
religious laws of the Heavenly City were threatened by those of the earthly, he states that 'she was 
bound to dissent from those who thought differently and to prove a burdensome nuisance to them'. 
As Eugene Portalie has indicated, however, Augustine does not detail many particular points of 
dispute between temporal and eternal laws; in the City of God XIX, 17, he is discussing only the 
polytheism of pre-Christian Rome versus the monotheism of contemporary Rome. Portalie says of 
Augustine, 'Mais s'il affmne les droits de l'autorite civile dans sa sphere, il maintient aussi 
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l'independence de la conscience en face du prince qui envahit Ie domaine de foi.' See Portalie, 1924, 
col. 2440. 
122 On Free Will II, 26-27 
123 Donne, 1982,11. 1340-1341 
124 Etienne Gilson has described the manner in which Aquinas' division of the soul and body 
according to the Aristotelian fonnlmatter distinction complicated the Platonic relationship between 
the Augustinian intellect and the intelligible world. 'By becoming the immediate form of the body, 
the human soul loses its Augustinian aptitude to the direct apprehension of the intelligible ... Our 
intellect does not provide us with innate intelligible species; it cannot even directly receive them from 
the separate substances, nor from God; itself a form, it feeds on other sensible forms. Its highest 
function is the cognition of primary principles; these are pre-existent in us, at least virtually, and they 
are the fIrst conceptions of the intellect. It is the perfection of the agent intellect to contain them 
virtually and to be capable of forming them, but it is also its weakness to be able form them only in 
connection with our perception of sensible things. The origin of human knowledge is therefore in the 
senses; it results from the collaboration between material things, senses and intellect.' Commenting 
on the developments of scholastic epistemology after it fully recognized the vulnerability to sceptical 
dissent to which Aquinas had exposed it, Gilson summarized the protection which Augustine's 
doctrine of illumination provided against scepticism. 'So long as the master adhered to the doctrine 
of divine illumination, he could distrust sense knowledge without falling into skepticism; his 
certitude came to him from on high, not from sensations.' See Gilson, 1955, pp. 377-382,447. See 
also Gilson, 1961, pp. 71-76; Copleston, 1955, pp. 25-57; and Copleston, 1972, pp. 33-49. For a 
discussion of Aquinas' Aristotelian metaphysics with respect to Platonic and modem notions of 
Idealism, see Gilson, 1983, pp. 129-215. R. J. Henle has shown that Aquinas tacitly attacked 
Augustine'S Platonic epistemology when he attacked the Platonists generally, but that he sought to 
preserve the authority of Augustine by interpreting Augustine's views in a way amenable to his own 
Aristotelian epistemology. See the discussion of Summa I, q. 84, a. 5 in Henle, 1956, pp. 381-396, 
424. 
125 For a discussion Donne's view of grace in the context of the views of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther 
and Calvin, see Klawitter, 1991, pp. 137-149. 
126 See Donne, 1982,11.3056,3078-3080; and p. lxvi . 
127 Ibid., 11. 3052-3055 
128 For his own account of his conversion from Manichaeism to Academicism, see Augustine, 
Confessions V, 10. For an account of Augustine's affIliation with the Academics after his 
repudiation of Manichaeism, see Gilson, 1961, pp. 38-43, 229-230. 
129 Against the Academicians III, 35 
130 Ibid., II, 19 
131 See ibid., III, 12. 
132 Ibid., III, 13 
133 Ibid., III, 23. Augustine is referring here to Cameades' objection to Zeno's defmition of truth as 
that which 'has no notes in common with what is false' and its communication through the lekton. 
See ibid., III, 18; and Cicero, Academica II, 34, 112. 
134 On Augustine's use of the Stoic unprovables, including arguments of implication such as 'if there 
are four elements in the world, there are not fIve' and of conjunction such as 'The same soul cannot 
both die and be immortal', in his refutation of scepticism in Against the Academicians, see B. Darrell 
Jackson, 1969, pp. 9-49, esp. 34-36. See also Kneale and Kneale, 1962, pp. 173-174. 
135 Against the Academicians III, 17 
136 See De Anima 425b24-25, 428a2-3, 429a4-5, 431aI4-17; Metaphysics 1027b29-30; Diogenes, 
Lives, VII, 110 (cited by Wolfson, 1935, pp. 78-79, esp p. 71, n. 12). 
137 See On Free Will II, 9. See also De Sensu et Sensibili 449a3-10 (cited by Wolfson, 1935, p. 78). 
138 On Free Will II, 16 
139 Brain Stock has suggested dicibile, as it is used in Augustine's early and unfmished work on 
dialectic, De Dialectica, may have been an equivalent for the Stoic lekton. Whether Augustine 
intended such an association or not, he abandons the notion that language can independently convey 
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truth in The Teacher. See Stock, 1996, pp. 138-145. B. Darrell Jackson examines the similarities 
between Augustine's dicibile and the Stoic lekton more closely, and uses them as evidence that 
Augustine inherited his sign theory from the Stoics. See B. Darrell Jackson, 1969, pp. 9-49, esp. 46-
49. Catherine Atheron has also commented briefly on the simlarities between the Stoic lekton and 
Augustine's dicibile. See Atherton, 1993, pp. 289-298, esp. 294, n 68. See also Kneale and Kneale, 
1962, p. 188. Marc Baratin discusses the relation of the Stoic solution to the problem of object-word 
correspondence to Augustine's solution. See Baratin, 1981, pp. 260-268. He says that 'les Stoi'ciens 
se donnent la notion de representation cataleptique, c'est-a-dire de representation exacte du monde, 
principe indemontrable. Mais I 'hypothese sceptique de la non-comcidence ne conduit a rien dans 
cette perspective du langage comme systeme de substitution' (p. 267). He explains that Augustine's 
solution avoids both the Stoic and sceptical positions through the doctrines of recollection and 
illumination. 'Le langage n'a lui que Ie mince pouvoir de rappeler une information dont l'origine est 
ailleurs, revelle par ce Maitre interieur par quoi Augustin conclut Ie De Magistro' (p. 268). 
140 On Free Will II, 23 
141 For an account of Augustine's view of the relation between the senses and the intelligibles, see 
Gilson, 1961, pp. 66-105. 
142 The Teacher, 39. Noralyn Masselink argues that Donne's theory of memory was derived from 
Aquinas, and that the choice of Aquinas reflects a preference for his sense-based Aristotelian 
epistemology over Augustine's neoplatonic epistemology. Though her discussion overestimates the 
value of sense knowledge for both Donne and Aquinas, particularly their ability to reveal information 
about the nature of God through the allegorical interpretation of creation, her attention to Donne's 
awareness of the epistemological incompatibilities of Augustine and Aquinas deserves note. See 
Masselink, 1989, pp. 57-88. 
143 The Teacher, 40 
144 On Augustine's confidence in the power oflove (charity) to lead the reader/listener to an 
understanding of the unequivocal meanings hidden within language, see Louth, 1989, pp. 151-158. 
For more general discussion of Augustine's view of charity with respect to his ethics, see Gilson, 
1955, pp. 79-80; Gilson, 1961, pp. 31-33, 136-142, 165-173,237-239; and Bigham and Mollegen, 
1955, pp. 371-397. 
145 The Teacher, 40. On Augustine's view that errors in belief and understanding originate in the 
weak disposition of the student, see Stock, 1996, pp. 157-173. 
146 On Free Will II, 21. See also On the Trinity IX, 9. 
147 Etienne Gilson observes, 'Whether it is a matter of the theoretical or practical order, of number or 
wisdom, truths are necessary, immutable and common to all minds which contemplate them.' See 
Gilson, 1961, p. 16. 
148 Against the Academicians III, 36 
149 In his discussion ofPoggio's De avaritia (1430) and Valla's De vera falsoque bono (1441), David 
Marsh observes both the influence of Cicero's sceptical dialogic form (in utramque partem) and of 
Augustine's anti-sceptical critique of it in Against the Academicians. He attributes the coexistence of 
these apparently conflicting influences to a transition in the fifteenth century from 'Ciceronian 
eclecticism to humanist syncretism.' In our examination of the neoplatonic and Augustinian 
influences on sixteenth-century humanists such as Erasmus and Agrippa, we have also observed this 
syncretism. Donne's rejection of Augustine's response to probabilism, as well as his critique of the 
neoplatonic basis of anti-scholastic epistemology, represents his rejection of this syncretism. See 
Marsh, 1980, pp. 4-10, 56-62. For more on the unsceptical quality of humanist syncretism, see 
Schmitt, 1972,p.53. 
150 Donne, 1982,11.4347-4349 
151 Ibid., 11. 4350-4351 
152 Ibid., 11. 4368-4373. For Aquinas' ordering of the Decalogue, see Summa II i, q. 72, a. 4; II ii, q. 
39, a. 2. Scotus also recognized this order, and applied a comparative analysis of the degrees of 
obligation imposed on the conscience by the two tables of the Decalogue according to the logical 
principles of necessity (first table) and contingency (second table). Like Donne, he fmds that the 
sixth commandment may be countermanded in compliance with the command to love and glorify 
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God. See Scotus, 1986, pp. 269-287, 481-501. For a discussion of Scotus' casuistical application of 
the Decalogue, see Copleston, 1972, pp. 226-229; and Shannon, 1995, pp. 3-24. William ofOckham 
utilized the superlative in a way similar to Anselm and Lull to establish the perfection of God's 
nature. That established, he could then claim that reason's assent to God's perfection would naturally 
lead to the conclusion that He is to be loved to a correspondingly superlative degree, hence, insuring 
compliance with the command to love. See Ockham, Scriptum in I Sent., d. 1, q. 4. For a discussion 
of this passage in relation to Ockham's ethics, see Marilyn McCord Adams, 1995, pp. 25-52. For a 
brief discussion of the differences between Scotus and Ockham on the command to love, see 
Copleston, 1972, pp. 254-255. 
153 See Deuteronomy 6:5. See also Summa II ii, q. 44, a. 1. 'All Ten Commandments are directed to 
the love of God and our neighbor. Therefore the commands to love are not enumerated among them 
but are implicit in them all. ' 
154 See On Christian Doctrine 1,22,27; Homilies on I John IX, 10. 
155 Donne, 1982,11.5409-5414 
156 See Summa II ii, q. 44, a. 8. 
157 See On Christian Doctrine I, 23. 'Although there are four kinds of things which may be loved-
ftrst, the kind which is above us; second, the kind which constitutes ourselves; third, the kind which 
is equal to us; and fourth, the kind which is below us-no precepts need to be given concerning the 
second and the fourth. However much a man departs from the truth, there remains in him the love of 
himself and of his body.' 
158 Donne, 1982,11.4924-4931. See also 11.4922-4923. 
159 Donne, 1982, l. 4955. See Romans 9:3. A. J. Smith considers Donne's treatment of this passage 
in relation to his discussion of self-homicide in Biathanatos and Pseudo-Martyr, but fails to 
recognize that the comparative analysis of degrees of obligation based on the two tables of the 
Decalogue frees the moral agent seeking to advance the glory of God from a purely relativist 
consideration of apparently equal circumstantial claims. See Smith, 1982, pp. 21-38. 
160 Donne, 1982,11.4963-4965. In his Golden Grove (1608», which contained fifteen chapters on 
suicide, William Vaughn uncharitably rejected the opinion of 'many of our moderne divines, that if a 
man laying before his eyes the glory of God onely do kill himselfe', his suicide is free of sin. See 
Vaughn, The Golden Grove (1608), I, xiv-xxix. 
161 Donne, 1982,11. 1277-1278 
162 Donne, 1982,11. 1274-1276. In a dialogue entitled 'Whether it be Dampnation for a man to kill 
himself', dated 1578, which is included among the British Museum's collection of Sir John 
Harrington's papers, Saul's suicide is defended on the grounds that a justiftable motivation for the act 
can be judged by God alone; and therefore, fallible human judgements upon the rectitude of a 
decision to kill oneself must be drawn in charity. See S. E. Sprott's discussion of this dialogue in 
Sprott, 1961, pp. 15-16: 
163 See Summa II ii, q. 24, a. 2. 
164 Donne, 161O~ sig. D 
165 See Donne, 1982,11.1784-1785. 
166 Donne, 1610, sig. Mrn2. See Klause, 1994, pp. 206-207; and Malloch, 1962, pp. 72-73. 
167 Summa II ii, q. 24, a. 12. See also Summa II ii, q. 24, a. 8. 
168 Summa II ii, q. 24, a. 12 
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Conclusion 
A 'sweete and gentle Interpretation': Charity Excuses the Paradox 
Because Biathanatos was argued with this rigor, Donne claims that he is 
'excusable in this paradox' if, in fact, he is mistaken, just as similarly rigorous 
thinkers, such as Cassianus, Origen, Chrysostom and Jerome, were excused for the 
mistake of 'following Plato's opinion that a lie might have the nature of medicine, 
and be admitted in many cases, because in their time the church had not declared 
herself in that point, nor pronounced that a lie was naturally ill. ,1 Those prejudiced 
opponents of Donne's paradox, who out of 'contempt' for the apparent 'weakness' 
and 'misdevotion' of his arguments 'have not been pleased to taste or digest them' 
have acted contrary to the mandate of charity in their unwillingness to engage as 
rigorously in the disputation of an issue so grave as suicide.2 These 'malicious, 
prejudged' men, as well as the 'lazy affecters of ignorance', will be left 'to their 
drowsiness', to remain unaware of the true value of the disputation of paradoxes as a 
means to the awakening of charity.3 In Pseudo-Martyr, Donne warns of this laziness 
in the investigations of Catholics into the issue of the jurisdiction of the Pope, 
complaining that the 'blind assent, which you [Catholics] were used to heretofore to 
giue to the spirituall supremacy [of the Pope] ... brought you into a drowsie and 
stupid adoration of the Pope'.4 This drowsiness, like that which has prevented 
charitable interpretations of suicide, has prevented those English Catholics who 
dogmatically follow the rule of the Pope from appreciating the gravity and 
complexity of the issues of martyrdom and papal authority. Most importantly, it has 
blinded them to the weakness of the arguments upon which Catholic polemicists 
have grounded their opinions, arguments which proceed 'onely by probabilities, and 
verisimilitudes, and equiualences', and which conclude uncharitably with a severity 
reserved for those indisputable laws of nature, reason and God which constitute the 
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first practical principles.5 The conclusion that a king may cease to be obeyed 
contradicts, Donne argues, the first principle from which it was drawn and which 
states axiomatically that a king must be obeyed. Because of this contradiction, 
Donne maintains that the conclusion 'degenerates and rebels, and we may not adhere 
to it. And if the first [principle] may still consist without it, though this seeme 
orderly and naturally deduced from thence, yet it imposes not so much necessity 
upon us, as the first doth; for that bindes peremptorily; this [ conclusion], as it is 
circumstanced and conditioned. ,6 
In Pseudo-Martyr, a work which Donne was confident in publishing and 
which he dedicated to his fellow Anglican controversialist, King James, Donne urges 
English Catholics to return to first principles over against the circumstantially 
alterable conclusions of their apologists. He says of the claim of one of these 
conclusions to be a law of nature that it 'depends upon such reasons, and 
circumstances, as are alterable, and when they cease, this law of nature ceases toO.,7 
We recall that in Biathanatos, a work which Donne perceived to be sufficiently 
unorthodox to prevent him from publishing it, the same argument was brought 
against human laws prohibiting suicide.8 But as Donne's protestations of its value in 
his letter to Herbert attest, Biathanatos reveals no more than would Pseudo-Martyr 
one year later, that Donne had 'a just and Christianly estimation, and reuerence, of 
that deuout and acceptable sacrifice of our lifes, for the glory of our blessed 
Sauiour. ,9 The difference, of course, is that in Pseudo-Martyr, the obligations to the 
king are advanced as more binding than the reasons for suicide defended by the 
Catholics, while Biathanatos, delineates on what grounds an individual conscience 
may countermand all external authority, even the king's.1O In both works, however, 
the functions of conscience and charity with respect to complex ethical issues are 
represented with a consistency which is still present in Donne's consideration of 
Esther's decision to allow herself to be killed in his sermon on Esther 4:16. 11 No 
position (thesis) which can be advanced on these complex ethical issues achieves 
more than the status of opinion, and therefore, any thesis can be made to appear to be 
a paradox by its antagonist, just as Aristotle had observed in the Sophistical 
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Refutations. Donne recognized this variability in the appearance of opinion, and like 
Cicero in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, attempted to render the potentially paradoxical 
theses of Biathanatos and Pseudo-Martyr amenable to the common opinion. Of the 
common opinion to which the Catholics claim to adhere, however, Donne observes 
that 'though this be understood of the opinion of such men as are intelligent and 
understanding, and conuersant in the matter in question, yet oftentimes, amongst 
them, both sides say, This is the common opinion; and who can iudge it?,'2 As the 
fallacious arguments of the Paradoxes were intended to alert the reader to the 
fallacies which may be encountered in deductive arguments, this warning is intended 
as 'an alarum' to the truth of first principles, which may be fallaciously contradicted 
by opinions deduced from them. Despite the efforts of Wilson and Blundeville to 
disarm these fallacies by teaching Aristotle's methods of refutation, or of Lull and 
Ramus to eliminate them through the development of a supposedly infallible 
dialectic, or of Sebond, Agrippa and Erasmus to combat them by dispensing with 
Aristotelian dialectic altogether, or finally ofMontaigne, to embrace them with the 
equanimity taught by Sextus, the value of disputing theses, extolled by Cicero, 
Quintilian and Aphthonius, remained evident to Donne. 
But the necessity of arguing both sides of an issue (in utramque partem 
dissere) in charity was no less evident to him, as he explains in the preface to 
Biathanatos. 
But in all such intricacies [of suicides and martyrs], where both opinions 
seem equally to conduce to the honor of God, His justice being as much 
advanced in the one as His mercy in the other, it seems reasonable to me that 
this tum the scales: if on either side there appear charity towards the poor 
soul departed. 13 
In this statement, Donne acknowledges that contradictory opinions may both be 
deduced as a perceived consequence ofthe certain first principle commanding honor 
and love to God. In cases such as these, Donne recommends that the charity in 
which these opinions were derived, be acknowledged by both parties. Opinions 
deduced from this common premise deserve the 'sweete and gentle Interpretation' 
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which Donne guarantees 'to all professors of Christian Religion, if they shake not 
the Foundation'. 14 However, in the interest of securing the rectified conscience 
necessary to achieve a charitable will, all diligence must be used in the investigation 
of the thesis under dispute; and this diligence is exercised, as Pseudo-Martyr and 
Biathanatos attest, in the attempt to convince one's antagonists by deductive 
argument of the necessity or likelihood of one's own position and of the contingency 
or unlikelihood of their position. IS Hence, Donne is merely following charity's 
command to exercise the practical reason when, after condemning the 'iniquities' of 
Gratian's Decretum, he explains that 'in Charitie towards them, which are carried 
with an implicite Faith in Canons, in which the name Gratian is enwrapped, we are 
bound to tell you how unworthy he is, to bee relied upon by you. ,16 Here, Donne's 
charity consists in his attempt to unite the divergent opinions of his antagonists with 
those of the Church of England. It is in this attempt that the disputation of paradoxes 
finds its highest expression, for to argue paradoxes which seek to promote division 
and disagreement, as had Gorgias and the innovators condemned by Donne in 
Ignatius His Conclave, is to act in direct opposition to charity. 
In his condemnation of the schismatic Donatists, Augustine observed, 'If 
your love is for a part only, you are sundered: if sundered, you are not in the Body 
[Church]: if not in the Body, you are not under the Head [Christ]. ,17 This 
observation is informed by his identification of the unity of Christ achieved by the 
love shared by the members of the Trinity with the unity of the Catholic Church 
achieved by its members' common love for each other.ls When a member of the 
Church dissents from this unity, Augustine explains, his dissent can only indicate a 
lack of charity and the intent to promote schism. To the Catholic critics who would 
accuse Donne of instigating schism in Pseudo-Martyr, Donne responds with a 
declaration of that charity with which he undertook his argument. 'I haue no other 
shelter against these Imputations but an appeale to our blessed Sauiour, and a 
protestation before his face, that my principall and direct scope and purpose herein, 
is the unity and peace of his Church. ,19 As we have seen, however, Augustine does 
not provide the epistemological or logical flexibility necessary to allow the 
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conscience freedom to dissent from the common opinion of the Church without 
disobeying the command to love.20 This lack of flexibility results in a notion of 
charity which lacks the compassion implicit in Donne's 'sweete and gentle 
Interpretation' of divergent opinions and in his effort to achieve reconciliation 
through debate.21 Augustine describes how the charitable should deal with such 
dissension in terms that reveal clearly the 'rigorous' conscience which Donne 
thought made him unfit as a guide in 'practic learning and moral divinity' .22 
Augustine advises, 'You may rebuke, but that will be the act of love, not of 
harshness: you may use the rod, but it will only be for discipline; for the love of love 
itselfwill not suffer you to pass over the lack of discipline in another. ,23 
Donne's uncertainty upon matters of doctrine and discipline is among the 
most conspicuous aspects of his devotional writing, and so we would be surprised if 
Donne could accept Augustine's advice without reminding him that one man's lack 
of discipline is another man's orthodoxy. Augustine's lack of sympathy for 
divergent opinions regarding religious discipline would have led him to condemn 
both Donne's accommodating notion of charity as well as his defense of the 
profitability of paradox. Commenting on the danger of the Pelagian heresy, 
Augustine dismisses such opinions because oftheir paradoxicality in terms with 
which he would have been familiar from his reading of Cicero's Paradoxa 
Stoicorum. 'Haec sunt sententiarum portenta vestrarum, haec inopinata mysteria 
dogmatum novorum, haec paradoxa Pelagianorum haereticorum, mirabiliora quam 
stoicorum philosophorum. ,24 To comply with the mandate of charity, therefore, 
Donne relied on the flexibility which Aquinas permitted his notion of charity; it was 
this flexibility that accommodated Donne's investigation of the 'perplexity and 
flexibility in the doctrine' of self-homicide in both Biathanatos and Pseudo-
Martyr. 25 In his examination of discord, Aquinas provided the conditions under 
which division could coexist with charity, conditions which Donne makes necessary 
in his representation of the rectified conscience and the charitable will. Aquinas 
explains: 
341 
Take the case then when the intention of several people is to achieve some 
good pertaining to God's honour or their neighbour's benefit. And if one of 
them thinks this particular good will serve and another thinks the contrary, 
the discord against God and neighbour's good here would be indirect. It 
would be neither sinful nor go against charity unless an error about things 
necessary for salvation or too much obstinacy were involved.26 
In Biathanatos, Donne had argued that under certain circumstances suicide may be 
construed in charity as a particular good conducing to the honor of God, and insisted 
that an error in this judgement need not have been about those self-evident and 
fundamental truths which both he and Aquinas could agree 'were necessary to 
salvation'. Nor did Aquinas think that contention, which concerns itself specifically 
with matters of doctrine, was contrary to charity. He claimed that 'ifit means an 
attack on falsity with a judicious amount of acrimony, then it is laudable' and went 
on to defend the contention of disciples on the grounds that 'each was defending 
what he thought was true. ,27 Even Job's contention with God is defended because, 
Aquinas explains, he 'had no intention of attacking the truth-he was looking for it' .28 
Donne's approval of the benefits of contention and discord continued even after his 
ordination. As late as 1629, Donne could proclaim in a sermon that 'it is not 
alwayes unlawfull to sowe discord, and to kindle dissention amongst men; for men 
may agree too well, to ill purposes. ,29 Schism is still detested for being opposed to 
charity, but because not every dispute results in the sundering of the unity of the 
church, opinions, both orthodox and paradoxical, may be disputed without upsetting 
that common foundation which Donne sought to protect in both Biathanatos and 
Pseudo-Martyr.3o The will to protect this foundation consists in following the 
commands of charity, which require the practical reason to endeavor to convince the 
conscience that the particular choice it has deduced from the knowledge of the first 
practical principles is valid and, at least, probable. This rational process, as we have 
shown, is characteristic specifically of the logic of Aristotle, and forms the basis of 
the method of the thesis described by Cicero and Quintilian, and adapted to the 
purposes of rhetoric by Aphthonius. What characterizes it finally, is its struggle with 
uncertainty, a struggle which cannot but result in discord, contention, and, as 
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Donne's ninth paradox, 'That by Discord things increase' testifies, uncommon 
opinions.3 ! If Donne was concerned that the discord by which he increased the 
number of his paradoxes could have been misinterpreted to promote schism and 
division in either the commonwealth or the church, his conviction in the charitable 
use to which he believed the disputation of the paradox could be applied, was his 
consolation. 
1 Donne, 1982,11.5476-5482 
2 Ibid., 11. 5483-5485 
3 Ibid., 11. 1144-1145,5485-5486 
4 Donne, 1610, sig. C3 
Notes to Conclusion 
5 Ibid., sig. Rr3-Xx. We recall that Donne referred to the interpretive practice of Catholic doctrine as 
'a piece of poetry'. See Donne, 1839, III, p. 318 (quoted in Sprott, 1949-1950, p. 344). 
6 Donne, 1610, sig. Kk3 
7 Ibid., sig. V3 
8 See Donne, 1982, 11. 1736-1738. 
9 Donne, 1610 sig. A3. See also sig. E3. 'And Almightie God himselfe ... hath been so indulgent to 
our nature, and the frailty thereof, that he hath affoorded us a meanes, how wee may giue away our 
life, and make him, in a pious interpretation, beholden to us for it; which is by deliuering ourselves to 
Martyrdome, for the testimony of his name, and aduancing his glories'. 
10 It should be noted that in Biathanatos, Donne never claims that an illegal act committed in good 
conscience ought not to receive the prescribed penalty; his aim is merely to show that a conscience 
rectified in foro interiori may be in conflict with a judgement made in foro exteriori. See Donne, 
1982,11. 1745-1757. For a discussion of James' conception of the relationship between the 
individual conscience and external authority, and Donne's intentionally ambiguous estimation of it in 
his Eclogue and Epithalamion (1613), see Goldberg, 1979, pp. 379-398. 
11 See Donne, 1953, V, p. 225. Meg Lota Brown and Jeanne M. Shami acknowledge that Donne is 
emphasizing the necessity for practical reason to determine which of two competing commands has 
greater authority in his sermon on Esther, but neither relate this necessity to the tradition of the 
disputation of paradoxes or theses. See Lota Brown, 1995, pp. 91-97; and Shami, 1983, pp. 62-64. 
12 Donne, 1610, sig. Kk3. In a letter to Sir Henry Goodyere in 1609, Donne had recognized that upon 
the issue of the Oath of Allegiance, there is 'a perplexity (as farre as I see yet) and both sides may be 
in justice, and innocence'. He went on to complain of an unidentified Catholic controversialist's 
deceitful 'miscitings' and 'mis-interpretings' in the interest of his own position. See Donne, 1977, 
pp. 160-161. See also Annabel Patterson's discussion of this letter in Patterson, 1982, pp. 39-53. 
13 Donne, 1982, 11. 1173-1178 
14 Donne, 1610, sig. B2. Charles M. Coffm maintains that 'the scholastic method of disputation was 
[odious] to Donne', and that his choice of the Anglican position was informed by this hatred. He 
argues that Donne's interest in 'the new philosophy' and the 'heathen' learning of Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle, betrayed a dissatisfaction with scholastic methods of analysis, a dissatisfaction which, 
Coffm claims, resulted in Donne's belief that the Anglican position was the least contentious of all 
parties involved in the religious controversies of the day. These mistaken claims lead Coffm to 
create the impression that Pseudo-Martyr was not a controversial work which relied on scholastic 
methods. Donne's 'sweete and gentle interpretation', he concludes, indicates his unwillingness to 
succumb to the pedantry of the schoolmen. Coffin's conclusion, however, is contradicted by his 
accurate observations of Donne's typically Anglican consultation of scholastic sources (pp. 75-76, 
216). See Coffm, 1937, pp. 214-229. 
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15 Donne continued to observe this relation between disputed problems of doctrine (opinion) and 
points 'necessary to salvation'. We recall that in a 1629 sermon preached upon Whitsunday, Donne 
had warned against 'paradoxicall opinions, or schismaticall, or ... problematicall opinions' which 
masquerade as 'certain and constant truths' because they seek to undermine the true foundations 
known commonly by all Christians and which are 'necessary to salvation'. Appropriately, Donne 
cites Augustine against the use of rhetoric and the art of disputation to weaken the true foundations of 
religion. See Donne, 1953, IX, pp. 94-95; X, p. 148 (IX, pp. 94-95 quoted in Stanwood and Asals, 
1986, pp. 271-272). 
16 Donne, 1610, sig. Qq. Gratian's Decretum was observed as an authority by the papal curia and was 
included in the Corpus Iuris Canonici. 
17 Homilies on I John IX, 8 
18 Ibid., 3. For a discussion of Augustine's description of the role of charity in the individual's 
understanding of scripture in Book I of On Christian Doctrine, see Stock, 1996, pp. 194-196. 
19 Donne, 1610, sig. B2. Donne remarked in a letter to Henry Goodyer in 1612, 'I doe (I thank God) 
naturally and heartily abhorre all schism in Religion so much, as, I protest, I am sorry to fmde this 
appearance of schism amongst our adversaries the Sorbonists'. See Donne, 1977, p. 132. For more 
on Donne's condemnation of schism and his Anglicanism, see Grierson, 1948, pp. 305-314. 
20 Thomas O. Sloane recognizes Augustine's lack of tolerance for disputation as a feature of his 
theory of charity, but does not recognize that Aquinas' theory provided for a form of disputation 
which did not contradict the command to love. As a result, in his attempt to illustrate Donne's debt 
to Augustine, he cannot accommodate Donne's 'controversial' mode of thought, which Sloane fmds 
indicative of Donne's scepticism. See Sloane, 1985, pp. 100-111, 145-207, esp. 200. 
21 In his discussion of the relation of Donne's application of Augustine's trinitarianism to his own 
theological views, Jeffrey Johnson fails to observe that Donne could oppose schism as against the 
command to love on other than Augustinian grounds. As a result, he does not notice Donne's 
epistemological divergence from Augustine on the conformity of opinion and the doctrinal unity of 
the church. See Johnson, 1999, pp. 32-36, 85-88. 
22 Donne, 1982,11.2865-2866 
23 Homilies on I John IX, 7 
24 Augustine, Haeresis Pelagianae defensorem, libri sex, III, iii. Later in the same chapter, Augustine 
says of the Pelagian opinions, 'mira sunt quae dicitis, nova sunt quae dicitis,falsa sunt quae dicitis'. 
For more on Augustine's distrust of opinion, see Stock, 1996, pp. 174-181. 
25 Donne, 1982, 11. 1096 
26 Summa II ii, q. 37, a. 1 
27 Summa II ii, q. 38, a. 1 
28 Summa II ii, q. 38, a. 1 
29 Donne, 1953, IX, vi, p. 167 (quoted in Shami, 1983, p. 65) 
30 For Aquinas' condemnation of schism, see Summa II ii, q. 39. 
31 See Donne, 1953, VI, pp. 318-319 for Donne's mature view of the relation between syllogistic 
reasoning and arguments 'contraria opinantem' (quoted in Stanwood and Asals, 1986, pp. 114-116). 
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